← Aristotle
Magna moralia
Loci are given as Quaracchi prints them, in the order of the work cited. Each entry opens the passage of Bonaventure at the footnote.
I, c. de Spontaneo et seqq. Whether there are only three divine persons
I, c. 2 Whether enjoyment is an act of the will, or of the other powers
I, c. 2 Whether God alone, or only the uncreated good, is to be enjoyed
I, c. 2. seq. Whether the first principle produced all things by itself, or by means of another
I, c. 2. seq. (c. 1.) Whether the divine essence is infinite
I, c. 2. (c. 1.) Whether the will of God is the cause of things in general
I, c. 2. seq. (c. 1. seq.). Whether evil is from the good according to intention, or beside intention
I, c. 2. (c. 1.) Whether anything is so evil that it has nothing of good
I, c. 3. Whether only a created good is to be used
I, c. 3. (c. 2.) Which is the more principal end of created things, whether the divine glory or our utility.
I, c. 3. (c. 2.). Whether spiritual nature surpasses in dignity of nature [that which is] composed of spiritual and corporeal.
I, c. 3. (c. 2.) Whether the will is good and praiseworthy by reason of a good end
I, c. 4 Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXXI)
I, c. 8. (c. 7. et 8.). Whether a person proceeding by way of love or charity is to be posited in God
I, c. 10. Whether the power of begetting signifies something absolute or relative
I, c. 11-16 (c. 12-17). Whether the generation of the Son is according to the account of necessity
I, c. 13. seq. (c. 14. seq.). Whether obstinacy takes from demons the use of freedom
I, c. 13. seqq. (c. 14. seqq.) Whether free choice can be compelled by God
I, c. 14. seq. Whether free choice concerns acts that are contingent and necessary, or only contingent ones
I, c. 16. (17.) Whether charity has a term in its augmentation
I, c. 16. (c. 17.) Whether election is in God from eternity or from time
I, c. 16. (c. 17.) Whether intention is only in those things which share in reason
I, c. 16. (c. 17.) Whether in rational beings intention belongs to the side of the intellect, or to the side of the affection
I, c. 17. (c. 18.) Whether the human soul is by nature immortal.
I, c. 20. (c. 22.) Whether free choice is in those alone that have reason and will
I, c. 22. (c. 23.) Whether sanctifying grace must be divided through essentially diverse differences
I, c. 22. (c. 25.) The curiosity of philosophy is described, first as to the consideration of natural things
I, c. 31. (34.) Doubts on the text of the Master
I, c. 31. (c. 34.) On the four motives that lead to the keeping of the divine precepts, and on the decalogue in general
I, c. 32. seq. (c. 33.) Whether all the cardinal virtues are one virtue, or diverse
I, c. 33. (c. 35.) Whether the motion of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of the other virtues
II, c. 7 Whether God is to be enjoyed
II, c. 7. (c. 6.) In what manner that light made day and night
II, c. 7 (c. 6.). Whether original sin is concupiscence
II, c. 7. (c. 6.). Whether evil is from the good according to intention, or beside intention
II, c. 7. (c. 6.). On the qualities required in the hearers of the divine word, and on Christ the medium of all the sciences
II, c. 7. (c. 6.) First, on the threefold justice of man with respect to God
II, c. 8. (c. 7.). Whether anything is so evil that it has nothing of good
II, c. 8. (c. 7.). Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. XIV, Part II)
II, c. 8. (c. 7.) Thirdly is treated the commendation of the true God
II, c. 8. et 9. (c. 7. et 8.). Whether a procession by way of liberality is to be posited in God
II, c. 9. (c. 8.) Whether grace that makes pleasing and gratuitous virtue differ by essence
II, c. 12. (c. 11.) Whether it is possible for the motion of charity to be mercenary
II, c. 17. (c. 13.). Whether a procession by way of liberality is to be posited in God
c. 30. (c. 33.) Whether the precept of confession belongs to the natural law