Dist. 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 1
Contents
Articulus II. Quid sit frui.
Habito de uti et utibili, consequenter quaeritur de frui et fruibili, et primo, quid sit frui per essentiam, utrum scilicet sit actus voluntatis, an aliarum virium.
Quaestio Unica. Utrum frui sit actus voluntatis, an aliarum virium.
1. Quod sit actus voluntatis, videtur per primam definitionem, quae est: Frui est amore inhaerere etc.1; sed amor est voluntatis: ergo et frui similiter. Si dicas, quod amor sumitur ibi communiter, secundum quod est in qualibet vi respectu sui actus; contra: in omnibus aliis definitionibus idem dicitur. Unde dicitur in sequenti2: «Fruimur cognitis, in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit». Quietatio autem voluntatis est.
p. 36Et in alia9 similiter: «Frui est uti cum gaudio». Gaudium autem ad voluntatem proprie pertinet.
2. Item, ostenditur ratione, quia fruitione delectamur10, secundum quod delectabile est differentia boni, cum sit bonum honestum, conferens et delectabile; bonum autem obiectum est voluntatis: ergo frui est solius voluntatis.
3. Item, eo fruimur, quo quietamur; sed quietatio respicit rationem finis, «et finis rationem boni11», et «bonum est obiectum voluntatis»: ergo fruitio, quae ordinat ad illud, similiter.
Sed contra:
1. Omnis virtus appetit uniri suo obiecto, quo habito delectatur, si cognoscit, et quiescit: ergo motus cum quietatione et delectatione est omnium virium: ergo cum talis sit fruitio, fruitio erit in omnibus, non tantum in voluntate;
2. Item, absentia rei amatae potius contristat amantem, quam delectat12; quod enim delectat ipsum, hoc est, quia videt ipsam et habet. Si ergo motus fruitionis est cum delectatione vel est ipsa delectatio: ergo hoc13 est, quia videt illud in quo est ipsa delectatio; sed visio respicit cognitivam: ergo etc.
3. Item, Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana14: «Haec est summa merces, ut ipso perfruamur». Sed super illud Psalmi: Ostendam illi salutare etc., dicit Glossa15, quod «visio est tota merces»: ergo si fruitio est merces, fruitio est visio per essentiam; sed visio est in cognitiva sive in ratione: ergo etc.
4. Item, fide et spe tendimus in Deum: aut ergo fruendo, aut utendo; sed non utendo, cum Deo non sit utendum: ergo fruendo: ergo fide et spe fruimur; sed fides est habitus rationis cognitivae; sed cuius est habitus, eius est actus: ergo actus fruitionis est actus16 rationis; similiter videtur de irascibili: ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Frui sumtum essentialiter est actus voluntatis, sumtum dispositive est actus etiam aliarum potentiarum.
Respondeo: Secundum aliquos17 frui pertinet ad omnes vires; et hoc dicunt, quia omnes vires remunerabuntur; qui dicunt etiam, quod18 in gloria erit magis proprie rationis, quia immediatius se habet ad delectationem.
Sed aliter videtur dicendum secundum Augustinum, scilicet quod sit actus ipsius voluntatis. Cum enim tres dentur definitiones de frui, omnes dantur penes actum voluntatis, quem tripliciter est considerare. Primo modo communiter, prout dicit motum cum delectatione; et sic definit Augustinus19: «Frui est uti cum gaudio». Secundo modo, prout dicit motum cum quietatione; et hoc modo definitur ab Augustino de Doctrina christiana: «Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam»; et hoc modo accipitur proprie. Tertio modo accipitur, prout complectitur utrumque, scilicet quietationem et delectationem; et hoc modo definitur ab Augustino decimo de Trinitate: «Frui est quiescere in cognitis, voluntate propter se delectata», et sic accipitur propriissime.
Quia ergo frui secundum omnem acceptionem dicit delectationem vel quietem vel utrumque, et omne tale habet rationem boni, et hoc est obiectum voluntatis: ideo loquendo essentialiter, frui est actus voluntatis. Sed quia voluntas nec delectatur nec quietatur nisi in eo, quod cognoscit vel per fidem vel per speciem20, et in eo, quod habet per spem vel in re, ideo actus aliarum virium ad hunc disponunt, non tamen sunt ipsum frui, essentialiter loquendo.
Ex hoc patet solutio21 ad illud quod communiter solet quaeri, quare frui non definitur per actum cognitionis, sicut delectationis. Tamen22 haec quae-p. 37stio fundata est super falsum. Augustinus enim ponit in notificatione una, quod est cognitionis, cum dicit: «Frui est quiescere in cognitis»; cadit tamen ibi sicut dispositio.
Ex hoc etiam patet, quare non definitur per fidem et23 spem, sicut per caritatem, quia caritas inducitur in concupiscibilem, cuius est frui. Tamen ista quaestio similiter fundata est super falsum, quia amor, quo definitur frui, est communis ad amorem castum et libidinosum24, quo avarus fruitur auro, non proprius ipsius caritatis.
Ad opposita:
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus habet delectari et quietari25, cum unitur suo obiecto; dicendum, quod ipsa voluntas, ut vult Augustinus26, amat sibi et aliis. Et sicut etiam dicit Anselmus27: «Voluntas inclinat alias vires et aliis meretur», ideo eius quietatio et delectatio redundat in alias vires. Unde sicut voluntas non sibi cognoscit, sed ratio cognoscit sibi et voluntati, ita voluntas sibi et rationi delectatur et ipsam quiescere facit.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amans non fruitur, nisi videat vel habeat; dicendum, quod videre et habere requiruntur ad frui, similiter et amare. Nam si quis videt aliquid et habet, nunquam delectatur, nisi amet; aliter tamen requiritur visio quam amor. Nam visio disponit, similiter et tentio, sed amor delicias suggerit. Unde est quasi acumen penetrans28, et ideo ei maxime convenit unire et per consequens delectare et quietare: ideo essentialiter, non dispositive, est fruitio. Propter quod est intelligendum, quod actus voluntatis potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet per modum appetitus et29 complacentiae. Primo modo antecedere potest ipsam visionem; secundo vero consequitur, et in hoc est perfecta ratio ipsius fruitionis, scilicet in complacentia rei visae et habitae.
3. Ad illud: Visio est tota merces; dicendum, quod illud non dicitur proprie, sed per concomitantiam30, quia visio et complacentia, in qua est perfecta ratio fruitionis, inseparabiliter se habent.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fide et spe fruimur; dicendum, quod illud non est verum per se, quia quaelibet harum accipit rationem tendentiae31 a caritate; unde fruitio non est ex istis nisi per caritatem. Sola enim caritas considerat finem in ratione finis et obiecti. Unde non dicitur aliquis sperare Deum, sicut amare.
Article II. What enjoyment is.
Having treated of use and the useable, the inquiry next concerns enjoyment and the enjoyable, and first, what enjoyment is essentially — namely, whether it is an act of the will, or of the other powers.
Sole Question. Whether enjoyment is an act of the will, or of the other powers.
1. That it is an act of the will is shown by the first definition, which is: To enjoy is to cleave by love, etc.1; but love is of the will: therefore enjoyment likewise. If you say that love is taken there commonly, according as it is in any power whatever with respect to its own act; against this: in all the other definitions the same is said. Hence it is said in what follows2: «We enjoy things known, in which the will, delighted, comes to rest.» But rest is of the will.
p. 36And in another9 likewise: «To enjoy is to use with joy.» But joy belongs properly to the will.
2. Likewise, it is shown by reason: because by fruition we are delighted10, according as the delightful is a difference of the good, since the good is the honorable, the useful, and the delightful; but the good is the object of the will: therefore to enjoy is of the will alone.
3. Likewise, we enjoy that by which we come to rest; but rest regards the formal character of an end, «and an end the formal character of the good11», and «the good is the object of the will»: therefore fruition, which orders to that, likewise.
On the contrary:
1. Every power seeks to be united to its object, and, this being had, is delighted (if it knows) and comes to rest: therefore motion together with rest and delight belongs to all the powers: therefore, since fruition is such, fruition will be in all, not only in the will;
2. Likewise, the absence of the loved thing rather grieves the lover than delights him12; for what delights him is the fact that he sees it and has it. If therefore the motion of fruition is with delight, or is delight itself: therefore this13 is so because he sees that in which is the delight itself; but vision regards the cognitive [power]: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Christian Doctrine14: «This is the highest reward, that we may enjoy himself.» But upon that of the Psalm: I will show him my salvation, etc., the Gloss says15 that «vision is the whole reward»: therefore if fruition is the reward, fruition is vision essentially; but vision is in the cognitive [power] or in reason: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, by faith and hope we tend toward God: therefore either by enjoying or by using; but not by using, since God is not to be used: therefore by enjoying: therefore by faith and hope we enjoy; but faith is a habit of cognitive reason; but whose is the habit, his is the act: therefore the act of fruition is an act16 of reason; the same seems to be the case for the irascible [power]: therefore, etc.
Conclusion.
To enjoy, taken essentially, is an act of the will; taken dispositively, it is an act also of the other powers.
I respond: According to some17 enjoyment pertains to all the powers; and this they say, because all the powers will be rewarded; who say also that18 in glory it will be more properly of reason, because reason has a more immediate relation to delight.
But it seems must be said otherwise according to Augustine, namely that it is an act of the will itself. For since three definitions of to enjoy are given, all are given in terms of an act of the will, which can be considered in three ways. First, commonly, inasmuch as it signifies motion with delight; and thus Augustine defines it19: «To enjoy is to use with joy.» Secondly, inasmuch as it signifies motion with rest; and in this way it is defined by Augustine in On Christian Doctrine: «To enjoy is to cleave by love to some thing for its own sake»; and in this way it is taken properly. Thirdly, it is taken inasmuch as it embraces both, namely rest and delight; and in this way it is defined by Augustine in book ten On the Trinity: «To enjoy is to come to rest in things known, the will being delighted for their own sake»; and so it is taken most properly.
Since, therefore, to enjoy according to every acceptation signifies delight or rest or both, and every such thing has the formal character of the good, and this is the object of the will: therefore, speaking essentially, to enjoy is an act of the will. But since the will is not delighted and does not come to rest except in that which it knows either by faith or by sight20, and in that which it has by hope or in reality, therefore the acts of the other powers dispose toward this, but are not enjoyment itself, speaking essentially.
From this is clear the solution21 to that which is commonly wont to be asked: why enjoyment is not defined by an act of cognition, as it is by [an act of] delight. Yet this22 ques-p. 37tion is founded upon a falsehood. For Augustine in one notification puts what is of cognition, when he says: «To enjoy is to come to rest in things known»; yet it falls in there as a disposition.
From this also is clear why it is not defined by faith and23 hope, as it is by charity, because charity is brought into the concupiscible [power], to which enjoyment belongs. Yet this question likewise is founded upon a falsehood, since the love by which enjoyment is defined is common to chaste love and to lustful love24, by which the miser enjoys gold — not proper to charity itself.
To the opposites:
1. To that, then, which is objected, that every power has [the capacity] to be delighted and to come to rest25 when it is united to its object; it must be said that the will itself, as Augustine26 holds, loves for itself and for the others. And as Anselm27 also says: «The will inclines the other powers and merits for the others»; therefore its rest and delight redound to the other powers. Hence, just as the will does not know for itself, but reason knows for itself and for the will, so the will is delighted for itself and for reason, and makes reason come to rest.
2. To that which is objected, that the lover does not enjoy unless he sees or has [the beloved]; it must be said that to see and to have are required for enjoyment, likewise also to love. For if anyone sees something and has it, he is never delighted unless he loves; but vision is required otherwise than love. For vision disposes, likewise too holding, but love offers the delights. Hence it is, as it were, a piercing sharpness28, and therefore it most befits it to unite and consequently to delight and to bring to rest: therefore essentially, not dispositively, it is fruition. On account of which it must be understood that the act of the will can be considered in two ways, namely by way of appetite and29 of complacency. In the first way it can precede the vision itself; in the second it follows, and in this is the perfect formal character of fruition itself, namely in the complacency of the thing seen and had.
3. To that: Vision is the whole reward; it must be said that this is not said properly, but by concomitance30, because vision and complacency, in which is the perfect formal character of fruition, are inseparably connected.
4. To that which is objected, that by faith and hope we enjoy; it must be said that this is not true per se, because each of these receives its character of tending31 from charity; whence fruition does not arise from these except through charity. For charity alone considers the end under the formal character of end and of object. Hence no one is said to hope for God, as [he is said to] love [Him].
I. In solutione principali huius quaestionis, scilicet quod fruitio sit actus voluntatis, omnes antiqui doctores cum Seraphico conveniunt; attamen iam istis temporibus circa quasdam subtiles de hac re quaestiones erant controversiae.
Primo quoad ipsum conceptum fruitionis S. Bonaventura docet, fruitionem praesupponere quidem cognitionem sive visionem tanquam dispositionem, tamen, essentialiter loquendo, ipsam esse actum voluntatis, qui importet tum dilectionem tum delectationem, sive esse formaliter actionem voluntatis, nempe amorosam eius inhaesionem, ad quam sequitur inseparabiliter passio delectationis; cfr. hic ad 2. et dub. 1. 2; III. Sent. d. 29. a. 1. q. 2, et ibid. d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. Hexaem. Serm. 12. in fine. Idem docet Scotus cum suis, Richard. a Med., B. Albert. M., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand. — Alii vero doctores volunt, fruitionem esse formaliter ipsam delectationem, non quidem qualemcumque, sed ultimatam, seu quae coniuncta est cum quietatione; ipsam vero non esse amorem nisi connotative et causaliter; ita discipuli S. Thomae, teste Caietano (ad S. I. II. q. 1. a. 1.), Dionys. Carth. aliique.
Secundo, quoad actum, in quo fruitio formaliter consistit, docet S. Bonav., hic ad 1. et 2; II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4: omnem delectationem spiritualem ortum habere ex amore voluntatis, praesupposita perceptione convenientis. Consentiunt Alex. Hal., Henr. Gand., Richard. a Med. qui inter alia dicit: «Actum cognitivae non sequitur delectatio nisi mediante actu appetitivae.» Hoc negatur ab auctoribus secundae sententiae.
Tertio, hinc orta est celebris controversia, praecipue inter asseclas S. Thomae et Scoti agitata, utrum scilicet beatitudo in patria formaliter consistat in actu intellectus sive in visione, qui tum amorem tum delectationem inseparabiliter habet annexa, immo «virtualiter continet et causaliter exerit» (Caietanus), an potius, ut vult Scotus cum aliis multis, in actu voluntatis, qui visionem supponit et delectatione completur. Hanc quaestionem tangit S. Bonav., hic ad 3.; plura vide IV. Sent. d. 49. p. 1. q. 5. Haec controversia cohaeret cum doctrinis psychologicis praecipue de relatione inter intellectum et voluntatem.
II. De quaestione hic proposita: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 4. — Scot., hic q. 3. in Oxon. et Report. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 11. a. 1. et 2. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 12. et 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 49. q. 6. n. 26.; de delectatione etiam agit S. a. 50. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 2.
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I. On the principal solution of this question, namely that fruition is an act of the will, all the ancient doctors agree with the Seraphic; nevertheless already in these times concerning certain subtle questions about this matter there were controversies.
First, as to the very concept of fruition, St. Bonaventure teaches that fruition does presuppose cognition or vision as a disposition; yet, speaking essentially, it is itself an act of the will, which imports both love and delight, that is, it is formally an act of the will — namely its loving adhesion, upon which inseparably follows the passion of delight; cf. here ad 2 and dub. 1, 2; III Sent. d. 29 a. 1 q. 2, and ibid. d. 35 a. 1 q. 1 in corp.; II Sent. d. 38 a. 1 q. 2 ad 4; Hexaem. Sermon 12 at the end. The same is taught by Scotus with his followers, Richard of Mediavilla, Blessed Albert the Great, Peter of Tarantasia, Henry of Ghent. — But other doctors hold that fruition is formally delight itself — not, indeed, any sort, but the ultimate, that is, that which is conjoined with rest; and that fruition is not love except connotatively and causally; so the disciples of St. Thomas, on the testimony of Cajetan (on S. I-II q. 1 a. 1), Denis the Carthusian, and others.
Secondly, as to the act in which fruition formally consists, St. Bonav. teaches here, ad 1 and 2; II Sent. d. 24 p. I a. 2 q. 4: that every spiritual delight has its origin from the love of the will, supposing the perception of what is suitable. Alexander of Hales, Henry of Ghent, [and] Richard of Mediavilla agree, who among other things says: «An act of the cognitive [power] is not followed by delight except mediated by an act of the appetitive [power].» This is denied by the authors of the second opinion.
Thirdly, hence arose the famous controversy, agitated especially between the followers of St. Thomas and of Scotus, namely whether beatitude in the fatherland formally consists in the act of the intellect or in vision, which has both love and delight inseparably annexed — nay, «virtually contains and causally exerts [them]» (Cajetan); or rather, as Scotus with many others holds, in an act of the will, which presupposes vision and is completed by delight. This question is touched by St. Bonav. here, ad 3; see more in IV Sent. d. 49 p. 1 q. 5. This controversy coheres with psychological doctrines, especially concerning the relation between intellect and will.
II. On the question here proposed: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV q. 26 m. 4. — Scot., here q. 3 in Oxon. and Report. — St. Thom., here q. 1 a. 1; S. I-II q. 11 a. 1 and 2. — B. Albert M., here a. 12 and 17. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2 a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2 q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here I princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 49 q. 6 n. 26.; on delight he also treats in S. a. 50 q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, here q. 2.
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- 1Vers. 1. — Paulo ante exhibemus lectionem codd. RVWXYZ aa bb; alii codd. autem, omisso Deus, ponunt Dominus post Abrahae, a quibus non multum dissidet Vat. legendo: est ipse, sicut Dominus dixit ad Abraam. Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 post utitur expunximus Deo.Verse 1. — A little earlier we exhibit the reading of codd. R V W X Y Z aa bb; other codd., omitting Deus, place Dominus after Abrahae, from which the Vatican edition does not greatly differ, reading: est ipse, sicut Dominus dixit ad Abraam. Next, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have expunged Deo after utitur.
- 2Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit et sic utitur.The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, here adds et sic utitur.
- 9In Vat. hic additur definitione probatur idipsum, quod tamen abest a mss. et ed. 1. — De hac definitione vide lit. Magistri, c. 3.In the Vatican edition there is here added definitione probatur idipsum, which however is absent from the manuscripts and ed. 1. — On this definition see the letter of the Master, c. 3.
- 10Concinnius mss. cum sex primis edd., omittendo hic a Vat. additum sed delectabile.The manuscripts together with the first six editions [read] more elegantly, omitting sed delectabile added here by the Vatican edition.
- 11Aristot., I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2: Absolutus namque finis bonum est nec non finis bonum. — Et de sequenti propositione ait I. Rhetor. c. 10. (in ed. Stoer, c. 28.): Est autem voluntas quidem appetitio boni cum ratione coniuncta; nemo enim vult, nisi quando aliquid bonum esse putaverit. Vide etiam I. Ethic. c. 1. — Mox cod. 1 ordinatur pro ordinat.Aristotle, Magna Moralia I, c. 2: For an absolute end is a good, and not less an end is a good. — And on the following proposition he says, Rhetoric I, c. 10 (in ed. Stoer, c. 28): But the will is indeed an appetite for the good joined with reason; for no one wills [something] except when he has judged it to be a good. See also Ethics I, c. 1. — Next, cod. 1 [reads] ordinatur for ordinat.
- 12Sequimur maiorem partem codd. utACFGIKLORSUVWXYZ etc. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 substituendo delectat loco delectet, ac mox (exceptis edd. 2, 3 et 6) quia loco quod.We follow the greater part of the codices — namely A C F G I K L O R S U V W X Y Z, etc. — and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, substituting delectat for delectet, and next (except for edd. 2, 3, and 6) quia for quod.
- 13Perturbatam lectionem Vat., quae hic addit delectare, castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.We have corrected, from the manuscripts and ed. 1, the disturbed reading of the Vatican edition, which here adds delectare.
- 14Libr. I. c. 32. n. 35.Book I, c. 32, n. 35.
- 15August., in Expos. Psalmi 90, 16.Augustine, Exposition of Psalm 90, [verse] 16.
- 16Plures codd. ut A G H I K M V W Y Z etc. cum ed. 1 omittunt actus.Several codices — such as A G H I K M V W Y Z, etc. — together with ed. 1 omit actus.
- 17Huius opinionis fertur fuisse Antisiodorensis, sive melius Autisiodorensis, teste Dionysio Carthusiano, hic. q. 3.Of this opinion is said to have been [William] of Auxerre (Antisiodorensis, or better Autisiodorensis), on the testimony of Denis the Carthusian, here q. 3.
- 18Cod. X satis bene hic addit frui. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc non ita bene immediate pro immediatius.Cod. X aptly enough here adds frui. Next, the Vatican edition with cod. cc, not so aptly, [reads] immediate for immediatius.
- 19De tribus sequentibus definitionibus fruitionis ex Augustino sumtis vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. 3. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc post Secundo omittit modo.On the three following definitions of fruition taken from Augustine, see here the letter of the Master, c. 2 and 3. — Next, the Vatican edition with cod. cc, after Secundo, omits modo.
- 20Mendosam lectionem Vat. ponentis spem loco speciem correximus ope codd. F H I ee gg hh ii et ed. 1; error multorum codd., qui cum Vat. habent spem, provenit ex modo consimili ista duo verba abbreviandi. Sumta est haec locutio ex verbis Apostoli II. Cor. 5, 7: Per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5. — Mox Cod. R post tamen addit ipsi.We have corrected the faulty reading of the Vatican edition, which puts spem for speciem, by the help of codd. F H I ee gg hh ii and ed. 1; the error of the many codd. which with the Vatican have spem arises from the similar manner of abbreviating these two words. This expression is taken from the words of the Apostle, II Cor. 5:7: For we walk by faith, and not by sight. Cf. also III Sent. d. 31 a. 2 q. 1 ad 5. — Next, cod. R after tamen adds ipsi.
- 21Contra mss. et sex primas edd. habet Vat. resolutio, et paulo post contra maiorem partem mss. utACFGHKLRSTUV etc. et ed. 1 consuevit pro solet. Dein multi codd. cum ed. 1 dilectionis loco delectationis, sed non bene, sicuti ex corp. quaestionis patet.Against the manuscripts and the first six editions, the Vatican has resolutio; and a little later, against the greater part of the manuscripts — namely A C F G H K L R S T U V, etc. — and ed. 1, [it reads] consuevit for solet. Then many codd. with ed. 1 [read] dilectionis in place of delectationis, but not rightly, as is clear from the body of the question.
- 22Vat. cum cod. cc, mutata interpunctione et posito cum pro Tamen, legit delectationis, cum haec quaestio fundata sit super falsum; sed minus apte, quia responsio cum ipsa quaestione incongrue coniungitur contra morem Seraphici; insuper est contra omnes antiquiores mss. et ed. 1.The Vatican edition with cod. cc, having changed the punctuation and putting cum for Tamen, reads delectationis, [making it run] haec quaestio fundata sit super falsum; but less aptly, since the response is incongruously joined to the question itself, against the Seraphic's custom; moreover it is against all the older manuscripts and ed. 1.
- 23Cod. W vel.Cod. W [reads] vel.
- 24Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 removimus particulam vel, quae hic a Vat. male additur, quia verbum libidinosum large acceptum etiam concupiscentiam oculorum complectitur. Codd. P et Q post caritatis addunt est; cod. X autem legit: ideo non est proprius ipsius caritatis.On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have removed the particle vel, which is here wrongly added by the Vatican edition, because the word libidinosum, broadly taken, also embraces the concupiscence of the eyes. Codd. P and Q after caritatis add est; but cod. X reads: ideo non est proprius ipsius caritatis.
- 25Licet multi mss. utACGKLOSTUVWXYZ omittant et quietari, retinendum tamen duximus, tum quia in aliquibus antiquioribus mss. ut F H I etc. invenitur, tum quia superius in ipsa obiectione exhibetur.Although many manuscripts — A C G K L O S T U V W X Y Z — omit et quietari, we have nevertheless judged it should be retained, both because it is found in some older manuscripts such as F H I, etc., and because it is exhibited above in the objection itself.
- 26Colligitur ex XV. de Trin. c. 22, ubi ostendit, quod memoria, intellectus et amor seu voluntas non sint sua nec sibi, sed supposito agant, quidquid agunt. Et in praecedentibus capitulis trinitatem in anima repertam cum Trinitate divina comparando, c. 17 de Spiritu S. ait: ipse autem et sibi et illis non nisi diligit. — Plurimi codd. ut vult pro ut dicit.Gathered from On the Trinity XV, c. 22, where he shows that memory, intellect, and love (i.e. will) are not their own nor for themselves, but act for the supposit whatever they do. And in the preceding chapters, comparing the trinity found in the soul with the divine Trinity, in c. 17 he says of the Holy Spirit: He himself does not love except both for himself and for them. — Very many codd. [read] ut vult for ut dicit.
- 27Libr. de Concordia praescientiae Dei cum libero arbitrio c. 11. et 12, ubi dicit, quod voluntas movet omnia instrumenta, quae in nobis sunt, ut manus etc.; et quod ex ipsa «descendit omne meritum hominis». — De doctrina hic posita vide II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.Book On the Harmony of God's Foreknowledge with Free Will, cc. 11 and 12, where he says that the will moves all the instruments which are in us, such as the hands, etc.; and that from it «descends every merit of man». — On the doctrine here set forth, see II Sent. d. 24 p. 1 a. 2 q. 1.
- 28Hic loquendi modus sumtus est ex Hugonis de S. Victore Expos. in Dionysii libr. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 7.This manner of speaking is taken from Hugh of St. Victor's Exposition on Dionysius' Book on the Celestial Hierarchy, c. 7.
- 29Cod. X hic repetit per modum.Cod. X here repeats per modum.
- 30Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 magis usitatum verbum concomitantiam loco concomitationem.We have restored, from the manuscripts and ed. 1, the more usual word concomitantiam in place of concomitationem.
- 31Cod. X tendentis. In fine responsionis cod. R addit et propter hoc non valet.Cod. X [reads] tendentis. At the end of the response cod. R adds et propter hoc non valet.
St. Bonaventure, Commentarius in I librum Sententiarum, Dist. 1, Art. 2, Q. 1, in Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1882), tom. I, pp. 35–37.
English translation: Wroot Press, Bonaventure Opera Omnia Translation Project, bonaventure.wrootpress.com/sentences/1/d1/a2-q1. Licensed CC BY-NC 4.0.
Anselm of Canterbury, De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio · Aristotle, Magna moralia · Augustine of Hippo, De doctrina christiana, Enarrationes in Psalmos