← Boethius
Contra Eutychen et Nestorium (De duabus naturis)
Loci are given as Quaracchi prints them, in the order of the work cited. Each entry opens the passage of Bonaventure at the footnote.
Cap. 1 Whether it is to be conceded that the human nature was assumed by God
c. 1-3. Whether unity of nature can stand together with a trinity of persons
Cap. 1. et 3. Whether unity of nature can stand together with a trinity of persons
c. 3 Whether substance or essence is begotten
Cap. 3 Whether several substances can be said in the divine
Cap. 3. Doubts on the Master's text
Cap. 3. Whether the name 'person' in the divine is said according to substance or according to relation
c. 3. Whether the fittingness for union is greater in a rational creature than in the whole universe
c. 3. Distinction V — text of the Master of the Sentences
c. 3. Whether an intention of personality is to be posited in the separated soul, every union being set aside
Cap. 6. Whether the Angels are composed of matter and form
Cap. 6 Whether the matter of which the Angels are composed is the same as the matter of corporeal things
c. 6. seq. Whether the union of the two natures is terminated at the unity of the person
c. 8. Whether Christ's flesh in Abraham and the other Fathers was distinct in quality from the flesh of other men
c. 8. Whether that man, namely Christ, could sin
Cap. 8. Whether Christ assumed the necessity of suffering
— Whether the name 'person' is conveniently transferred to the divine
— Whether the name essence is fittingly used in divine matters; and on the difference of the names essence, subsistence, substance, and person
— Whether several substances can be said in the divine
— Whether 'one' in divine matters is said according to substance or according to relation
— Whether the name 'person' in the divine is said according to substance or according to relation
— Whether person is rightly defined by Boethius as 'an individual substance of rational nature,' and whether this account fits the divine persons
— Whether person is rightly defined by Boethius as 'an individual substance of rational nature,' and whether this account fits the divine persons
— Whether the personal property in the angels is substantial, or accidental
— Whether the personal property in the angels is substantial, or accidental
— Whether to assume befits the divine person
— Distinction XVI — text of the Master of the Sentences
— Whether unity of nature can stand together with a trinity of persons