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Proemium, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Proemium

Textus Latinus
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The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

QUAESTIO I.

Quae sit materia quodve subiectum huius libri vel theologiae.

Et3 quod Deus sit subiectum, videtur.

1. Illud enim subiectum est in scientia, de quo et de cuius proprietatibus est scientia tota4; sed de Deo et eius operibus, utpote creatione et reparatione, est totus iste liber: ergo etc.

2. Item, videtur quod subiectum istius libri sint res et signa. Illud enim est subiectum in scientia, secundum cuius divisionem dividitur illa scientia, quia «scientiae secantur in res5», hoc est, dividuntur secundum divisionem subiectorum; sed hoc est res et signum, sicut manifestum est: ergo etc.

3. Item, videtur quod credibile sit subiectum huius libri. Illud enim est subiectum in libro, circa quod versatur auctoris intentio et tractatus; sed credibile est huiusmodi. Unde Magister dicit in Prologo, quod propositum suum est, «fidem nostram clypeis Davidicae turris munire», hoc est, ad probandum fidem rationes adducere, non, inquam, fidem-habitum, sed creditum6: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Subiectum in scientia debet complecti omne, quod determinatur in illa; sed in hoc libro non tantum determinatur de Deo, sed etiam de creaturis: ergo Deus non est subiectum totius istius7 libri generaliter, sed solum primi libri.

2. Item, aliter ostenditur illud idem sic. Licet tres causae coincidant in unam, tamen materia non coincidit simul cum fine8; quia materia dicit quid incompletum, finis autem dicit totius operis complementum; sed Deus est finis totius istius operis, quia finis totius theologiae: ergo non est subiectum vel materia.

3. Item, quod res et signa non sint subiectum9, videtur. Omnis enim scientia est de rebus vel de signis: ergo si res et signa sunt subiectum huius libri, liber iste est generalis ad omnes. Quodsi10 specialis scientia et doctrina traditur in hoc libro, patet quod res et signa non debent assignari in eo pro subiecto.

4. Item, constat quod alia est scientia de rebus et alia de signis, ut patet; differt enim sermocinalis scientia a naturali; ergo scientia tradita in hoc libro aut11 non est unius generis, aut non est simul de rebus et de signis; sed est unius generis: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod credibile non sit subiectum, videtur, quia scientia et virtus12 sunt diversi habitus: ergo habent diversa obiecta; ergo cum credibile, in quantum huiusmodi, sit obiectum virtutis, non erit obiectum scientiae in quantum huiusmodi: ergo etc.

6. Item, sicut consideratio huius libri versatur

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circa fidem, ita etiam1 circa spem et caritatem: ergo si sperandum vel diligendum sive diligibile non est subiectum huius libri, pari ratione nec credibile est subiectum in eo.

Conclusio

Deus est subiectum theologiae radicale, Christus est subiectum integrale, res et signa sunt subiectum universale sive etiam credibile, prout transit in rationem intelligibilis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod subiectum in aliqua scientia vel doctrina tripliciter potest accipi. Uno modo dicitur subiectum in scientia2, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad principium radicale; alio modo, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum integrale; tertio modo, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum universale.

Exemplum huius manifeste patet in grammatica. Nam subiectum primo modo, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad principium elementare3 vel radicale, est littera, quam ideo vocat Priscianus4 elementum, quia est minimum, in quo stat resolutio grammatici. Subiectum, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum integrale, est oratio congrua et perfecta. Subiectum vero, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum universale, est vox litterata, articulata5 ordinabilis ad significandum aliquid in se vel in alio.

Per hunc modum est distinguere in quadrivialibus. Nam subiectum in geometria, ad quod omnia resolvuntur6 ut ad principium, est punctus. Subiectum, ad quod omnia reducuntur ut ad totum integrum, est corpus, quod continet in se omne genus dimensionis. Subiectum, ad quod omnia reducuntur ut ad totum universale, est quantitas continua, immobilis.

Per hunc modum et in hoc libro est assignare subiectum secundum triplicem differentiam.

Nam subiectum, ad quod omnia7 reducuntur ut ad principium, est ipse Deus.

Subiectum quoque, ad quod omnia reducuntur, quae determinantur in hoc libro, ut ad totum integrum, est Christus, prout comprehendit naturam divinam et humanam sive creatum et increatum8, de quibus sunt duo primi libri; et caput et membra, de quibus sunt duo sequentes. Et accipio large9 totum integrum, quod multa complectitur non solum per compositionem, sed per unionem et per ordinem.

Subiectum quoque, ad quod omnia reducuntur sicut ad totum universale, possumus nominare per circumlocutionem10 sive sub disiunctione; et sic est res vel signum; et vocatur hic signum Sacramentum. Possumus et unico vocabulo nominare; et sic est credibile, prout tamen credibile transit in rationem intelligibilis, et hoc per additionem rationis; et hoc modo, proprie loquendo, est11 subiectum in hoc libro.

Concedendae ergo sunt rationes probantes, et Deum esse subiectum et res et signa, et credibile, diversimode, sicut dictum est.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, quod non tantum de Deo12 agitur in hoc libro; dicendum,

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quod, quamvis non agatur de Deo quantum ad substantiam tantum, agitur tamen de Deo quantum ad substantiam, vel quantum ad opera eius; et ideo non est subiectum ut totum, sed ut principium.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod materia non coincidit in unum cum fine; dicendum, quod materia tripliciter dicitur: scilicet materia ex qua, materia in qua et materia circa quam; et haec ultima materia magis1 dicitur obiectum quam materia. Quando ergo dicitur, quod materia non coincidit cum fine, verum est de materia ex qua, quae proprie est materia2, sed non de materia circa quam, quae proprie est obiectum; nam idem potest esse obiectum habitus et finis; et tali modo accipitur materia in scientia pro obiecto virtutis3 cognoscentis.

3. 4. Quod obiicitur de rebus et signis, quod sunt subiecta omnium scientiarum; dicendum, quod res et signum4 possunt accipi in sua generalitate; et sic non pertinent ad scientiam specialem nec ad librum nec ad eandem scientiam. Possunt iterum accipi secundum quod induunt rationem credibilis, et sic, quemadmodum una est virtus5 et unus est habitus de omnibus credibilibus, sive sint res sive sint signa, ut fides, sic una est scientia specialis de omnibus, in quantum induunt hanc rationem6, sive sint res sive signa.

Aliter potest dici, quod dupliciter est loqui de rebus et signis, aut absolute, aut in relatione ad fruitionem sive ad illud, quo fruendum est. Primo quidem modo spectant ad speciales scientias et diversas; secundo modo ad unam scientiam sive doctrinam. Unde quemadmodum de omnibus entibus, in quantum reducuntur ad unum primum ens, est una scientia et7 unus liber, sic de omnibus rebus et signis, in quantum reducuntur ad unum, quod est alpha et omega, est una scientia.

5. 6. Quod obiicitur, quod credibile est obiectum virtutis8 etc.; dicendum, quod alio modo est credibile obiectum virtutis, alio modo scientiae. Credibile enim, secundum quod habet in se rationem primae veritatis, cui fides assentit propter se et super omnia, pertinet ad habitum fidei; secundum quod super rationem veritatis addit rationem auctoritatis, pertinet ad doctrinam sacrae Scripturae, de qua dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram9, quod «maior est eius auctoritas quam humani ingenii perspicacitas»; sed secundum quod supra rationem veritatis et auctoritatis addit rationem probabilitatis, pertinet ad considerationem praesentis libri, in quo ponuntur rationes probantes fidem nostram. Et sic patet, quomodo differenter est fides de credibili, et libri de canone sacrae Scripturae, et praesens scriptura. Et ideo non valet illa10 obiectio, quoniam iste liber non est sic ad defensionem spei et caritatis, sicut fidei; et ideo non est simile.

Scholion

I. Supponit Doctor Seraphicus in his quaestionibus prooemialibus et alibi passim, quod theologia sit vera scientia; immo in Breviloq. p. I. c. 1. dicit: Ipsa sola est scientia perfecta. Quo sensu hoc dicatur, explicatur III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, et ibid. q. 4. — Scotus (Prolog. q. 4.) cum Nominalibus negat, theologiam in viatoribus esse proprie scientiam; S. Thomas (S. I. q. 1. a. 2.) vero hoc affirmat.

II. Non quaeritur hic de subiecto, in quo est scientia, quod est intellectus, sed de subiecto, de quo est scientia et circa quod immediate versatur. Dicitur subiectum, quia de illo ea praedicantur, de quibus agitur in illa scientia. Licet ab auctoribus non raro hi termini: subiectum, obiectum et materia circa quam, confundantur, tamen in sensu stricto obiectum scientiae est id quod scitur, subiectum vero eius est id de quo conclusiones praedicantur. S. Doctor accipit hic subiectum in sensu stricto.

III. Circa distinctionem, quam habet in solutione ad 2, hoc notandum. Materia in qua vocatur subiectum sive corporale sive spirituale, in quo recipitur aliquod accidens: sic intellectus dici potest materia, in qua recipitur scientia. Materia ex qua dicitur ea pars compositi, quae cum forma facit compositum. Materia circa quam dicitur in scientia ipsum subiectum, circa

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quod versatur scientia. Haec ultima sub diverso respectu potest esse tum obiectum habitus tum finis, ut patet in virtutibus theologicis: v. g. fidei obiectum et finis est prima Veritas; creditur enim summum verum propter summum verum. Cfr. Alexander Hal. Sum. p. I. q. 1. m. 3.

IV. In solutione ad 3. tangitur quaestio de unitate scientiae theologicae. Hanc Nominales ex suis falsis principiis impugnant; sed eam adstruunt S. Bonaventura, Breviloq. p. 1. c. 1. Alexander Halensis, p. I. q. 1. m. 3. ad 4. et 5. — Scotus, I. Report. Prolog. quaestiunc. 2. — S. Thomas, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 2; Sum. I. q. 1. a. 3. — B. Albertus M., Sum. p. I. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 2; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I. Sent. Prolog. a. 2. — Richardus a Mediavilla, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, I. Sent. Prolog. part. 1. principalis 2. q. 3. — Henricus Gandaviensis, Sum. a. 6. q. 3. — Durandus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4.

V. In solutione principalis quaestionis antiqui scholastici valde saltem verbis dissentiunt. Nonnulli affirmant, Deum esse quidem subiectum theologiae, non autem sub ratione Deitatis, sed sub aliqua limitatione, v. g. quatenus est restaurator et glorificator (ita Aegidius R.) vel quatenus est perfectissimus (Dionys. Carth.). Haec vero limitatio ex parte subiecti non videtur probabilis. — Alexander Hal. ponit tria subiecta secundum tria, quae sunt in quolibet ente completo, scil. secundum substantiam, virtutem (potentiam) et operationem: primo modo subiectum est Deus, secundo modo est Christus, qui est virtus Patris, tertio modo sunt opera restaurationis facta per Christum. — Scoto attribuitur sententia, Deum sub ratione entis infiniti esse subiectum theologiae; attamen cum ipse (I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. n. 9.) dicat: Deum sub ratione entis infiniti aut necessarii non legitime poni obiectum theologiae, sententia eius a Frassenio (Scotus academicus, tom. I. disp. prooem. a. 2. q. 5.) et a Lycheto (ad loc. cit.) ita explicatur, ut in substantia cum S. Thoma conveniat, qui (S. I. q. 1. a. 7.) unum assignat subiectum, scil. Deum sub ratione Deitatis. Differentia tamen inter utrumque consistit in hoc, quod Scotus putat, hoc subiectum Deus intelligi materialiter, uti res est et causa omnium veritatum, quas virtualiter in se continet; S. Thomas vero intelligit Deum in ratione formali, id est, ut scibilis vel revelabilis, non autem in se et subiective. De hac differentia cfr. Caietanus in Comment. et Macedo (Collationes doctrinae S. Thomae et Scoti, Coll. 2. diff. 4. sect. 4.).

Sententia nunc communior accuratius distinguit in qualibet scientia tria obiecta: obiectum materiale (quod in theologia est omne a Deo revelatum) et duplex obiectum formale. Horum alterum se tenet ex parte subiecti, de quo est scientia, et est res ipsa, quae primo cognoscitur; hoc vocatur obiectum formale quod; alterum se tenet ex parte potentiae ut ratio, sub qua intelligimus, et vocatur obiectum formale quo. Hac ultima ratione illae scientiae, quae idem obiectum materiale habent, proprie distinguntur et specificantur.

Uti ex textu patet, S. Bonaventura aliter et tripliciter distinguit subiectum theologiae et secundum hanc distinctionem convenienter triplex subiectum theologiae assignat; sic diversas thelogorum sententias nititur conciliare. Et notandum, quod totum integrale est compositum ex partibus, quae cum aliis constituunt totum, unde vocantur partes integrales. Totum universale vero est quodlibet superius substantiale sumtum ad suum inferius in linea praedicamentali, ut animal ad hominem et homo ad Socratem. Ita Petrus Hispanus, Bonaventurae coaevus, in sua Summula super librum Topicorum, de locis concomitantibus. Nec sententia Seraphici contradicit S. Thomae, qui unum tantum assignat subiectum, cum hic subiectum praecise sumat ut subiectum formale quod. Non tamen negat S. Thomas, quod sub diversis respectibus etiam alia subiecta theologiae rationabiliter assignari possint; immo hoc in utroque loco infra citato sufficienter innuit. Ipse autem S. Bonaventura dicit in corpore quaestionis, et Deum esse subiectum, et Christum, et res et signa et credibile, tamen diversimode. Unde sibi constans in 1. conclusione ipse cum S. Thoma dicit, Deum esse subiectum theologiae; sed hoc aliter explicat, scil. ut subiectum radicale, ad quod omnia reducuntur ut ad principium. Hoc Trigosus intelligit de subiecto formali adaequato et sic Seraphicum omnino ad sententiam S. Thomae trahit. Ex contextu tamen patet, intelligendum esse potius de subiecto materiali, quatenus Deus est principium, a quo omnia derivantur sive, ut dicit in Breviloquio p. I. c. 1: Subiectum, ut a quo omnia, est Deus. In 2. conclus. sub alio respectu ponit Christum ut subiectum materiale adaequatum, per quod et de quo propinque omnia sciantur. In 3. conclus. ponit duplex subiectum, nempe res et signa, sed sub ratione credibilis, et ipsum credibile, quatenus veritates revelatae per rationes fiunt intelligibiles et probabiles. In hac ultima conclusione vocabula totum universale significant subiectum formale et attributionis. Trigosus, Sum. S. Bonav. q. 1. a. 2. dub. 2; Hauzeur, Collatio totius theologiae, tom. I. q. 1.

VI. Auctores antiqui de hac quaestione tractantes: Breviloq. p. I. c. 1. — Alexander Hal., S. p. I. q. 1. m. 3. — Scotus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3; I. Report. Prolog. q. 1. — S. Thomas, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 1. a. 4; Sum. I. q. 1. a. 7. — B. Albertus M., Sum. p. I. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 1; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I. Sent. Prolog. a. 3. — Richardus a Mediavilla, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 6. — Aegidius Romanus, I. Sent. Prolog. p. 1, princip. q. 1. — Henricus Gandaviensis, Sum. a. 19. q. 1. — Durandus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 5. — Gabriel Biel, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 9.

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English Translation
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QUESTION I.

What is the matter or subject of this book or of theology.

And3 that God is the subject, it seems.

1. For that is the subject in a science, concerning which and concerning whose properties the whole science is4; but this whole book is concerning God and his works, namely creation and restoration: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems that the subject of this book is things and signs. For that is the subject in a science according to whose division that science is divided, since «the sciences are cut into things5», that is, they are divided according to the division of their subjects; but this is thing and sign, as is manifest: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems that the credible is the subject of this book. For that is the subject in a book about which the author's intention and treatment turn; but the credible is of this sort. Hence the Master says in the Prologue that his purpose is «to fortify our faith with the shields of the tower of David», that is, to bring forward reasons for proving the faith — not, I say, faith-as-habit, but the thing believed6: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. The subject in a science ought to embrace everything that is determined in it; but in this book not only is there a determination concerning God, but also concerning creatures: therefore God is not the subject of this whole7 book generally, but only of the first book.

2. Likewise, the same thing is shown otherwise thus. Although three causes coincide in one, the matter nevertheless does not coincide together with the end8; because the matter states something incomplete, whereas the end states the completion of the whole work; but God is the end of this whole work, since he is the end of all theology: therefore he is not the subject or the matter.

3. Likewise, it seems that things and signs are not the subject9. For every science is concerning things or concerning signs: therefore if things and signs are the subject of this book, this book is general to them all. But if10 a special science and doctrine is handed on in this book, it is plain that things and signs ought not to be assigned in it as the subject.

4. Likewise, it is agreed that the science of things is one and that of signs another, as is plain; for the science of discourse differs from the natural science: therefore the science handed on in this book either11 is not of one genus, or is not at once concerning things and concerning signs; but it is of one genus: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it seems that the credible is not the subject, because science and virtue12 are diverse habits: therefore they have diverse objects; therefore since the credible, insofar as it is such, is the object of a virtue, it will not be the object of a science insofar as it is such: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, just as the consideration of this book turns

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about faith, so also1 about hope and charity: therefore if what is to be hoped for, or what is to be loved, or the lovable, is not the subject of this book, by parity of reasoning neither is the credible the subject in it.

Conclusion

God is the radical subject of theology, Christ is the integral subject, things and signs are the universal subject — or also the credible, insofar as it passes over into the character of the intelligible.

I respond: It must be said that the subject in any science or doctrine can be taken in three ways. In one way that is called the subject in a science2 to which all things are reduced as to a radical principle; in another way, that to which all things are reduced as to an integral whole; in a third way, that to which all things are reduced as to a universal whole.

An example of this appears manifestly in grammar. For the subject in the first way, to which all things are reduced as to an elementary3 or radical principle, is the letter, which for that reason Priscian calls4 the element, because it is the least thing at which the grammarian's resolution comes to a stand. The subject to which all things are reduced as to an integral whole is congruous and complete speech. But the subject to which all things are reduced as to a universal whole is the lettered, articulate5 utterance capable of being ordered to signify something either in itself or in another.

In this same way a distinction is to be made in the quadrivial arts. For the subject in geometry, to which all things are resolved6 as to a principle, is the point. The subject to which all things are reduced as to an integral whole is body, which contains in itself every genus of dimension. The subject to which all things are reduced as to a universal whole is continuous, immobile quantity.

In this same way the subject is to be assigned in this book too, according to a threefold difference.

For the subject to which all things7 are reduced as to a principle is God himself.

The subject also to which all the things determined in this book are reduced as to an integral whole is Christ, inasmuch as he comprehends the divine and the human nature, that is, the created and the uncreated8, of which the first two books treat; and the head and the members, of which the two following treat. And I take integral whole broadly9, as embracing many things not only by composition, but by union and by order.

The subject also to which all things are reduced as to a universal whole we can name by a circumlocution10 or under a disjunction; and thus it is thing or sign — and the sign is here called a Sacrament. We can also name it by a single word; and thus it is the credible, provided, however, that the credible passes over into the character of the intelligible, and this by the addition of a rational ground; and in this way, properly speaking, it is11 the subject in this book.

The reasons proving it are therefore to be granted, namely that God is the subject, and things and signs, and the credible, in diverse ways, as has been said.

1. As to what is objected on the contrary, that it is not only concerning God12 that this book treats; it must be said

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that, although it is not concerning God as to his substance only that it treats, it nevertheless treats of God as to his substance, or as to his works; and therefore he is not the subject as a whole, but as a principle.

2. As to what is objected, that the matter does not coincide into one with the end; it must be said that matter is spoken of in three ways: namely the matter out of which, the matter in which, and the matter about which; and this last matter is called an object rather1 than a matter. When therefore it is said that the matter does not coincide with the end, this is true of the matter out of which, which is properly matter2, but not of the matter about which, which is properly the object; for the same thing can be the object of a habit and its end; and it is in this manner that matter is taken in a science for the object of the knowing power3.

3. 4. As to what is objected concerning things and signs, that they are the subjects of all the sciences; it must be said that thing and sign4 can be taken in their generality; and thus they do not pertain to a special science, nor to a book, nor to one and the same science. They can also be taken according as they put on the character of the credible, and thus, just as there is one virtue5 and one habit concerning all credible things, whether they be things or signs — namely faith — so there is one special science concerning them all, insofar as they put on this character6, whether they be things or signs.

It can also be said otherwise, that there are two ways of speaking of things and signs: either absolutely, or in relation to fruition, that is, to that which is to be enjoyed. In the first way indeed they belong to the special and diverse sciences; in the second way to one science or doctrine. Hence, just as concerning all beings, insofar as they are reduced to one first being, there is one science and7 one book, so concerning all things and signs, insofar as they are reduced to one, who is alpha and omega, there is one science.

5. 6. As to what is objected, that the credible is the object of a virtue8 etc.; it must be said that the credible is the object of a virtue in one way, and of a science in another. For the credible, according as it has in itself the character of the first truth, to which faith assents for its own sake and above all things, pertains to the habit of faith; according as, over and above the character of truth, it adds the character of authority, it pertains to the doctrine of sacred Scripture, of which Augustine says, on Genesis according to the letter9, that «its authority is greater than the perspicacity of human wit»; but according as, over and above the character of truth and of authority, it adds the character of probability, it pertains to the consideration of the present book, in which are set down the reasons proving our faith. And thus it is plain in what different ways faith is concerned with the credible, and the books of the canon of sacred Scripture, and the present writing. And therefore that10 objection is of no force, since this book is not for the defence of hope and charity in the way that it is for the defence of faith; and therefore the case is not alike.

Scholion

I. The Seraphic Doctor supposes, in these proemial questions and elsewhere throughout, that theology is a true science; indeed in the Breviloquium, p. I, c. 1, he says: It alone is a perfect science. In what sense this is said is explained in III Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, and in the same place, q. 4. — Scotus (Prolog. q. 4) with the Nominalists denies that theology in wayfarers is properly a science; St. Thomas (S. I, q. 1, a. 2), on the other hand, affirms it.

II. The question here is not concerning the subject in which the science is, which is the intellect, but concerning the subject concerning which the science is and about which it immediately turns. It is called the subject because those things are predicated of it which are treated in that science. Although these terms — subject, object and matter about which — are not seldom confounded by authors, nevertheless in the strict sense the object of a science is that which is known, whereas its subject is that concerning which the conclusions are predicated. The holy Doctor here takes the subject in the strict sense.

III. Concerning the distinction which he has in the solution to the second objection, this is to be noted. The matter in which is the name for a subject, whether corporeal or spiritual, in which some accident is received: thus the intellect can be called the matter in which science is received. The matter out of which is the name for that part of a composite which together with the form makes the composite. The matter about which is the name, in a science, for the subject itself, about

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which the science turns. This last, under a different respect, can be both the object of a habit and its end, as appears in the theological virtues: for example, the object and the end of faith is the first Truth; for the highest true is believed on account of the highest true. Compare Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 1, m. 3.

IV. In the solution to the third objection there is touched the question of the unity of theological science. The Nominalists impugn it out of their own false principles; but it is maintained by St. Bonaventure, Breviloq. p. 1, c. 1; Alexander of Hales, p. I, q. 1, m. 3, ad 4 and 5. — Scotus, I Report., Prolog., quaestiuncula 2. — St. Thomas, I Sent., Prolog., q. 1, a. 2; Summa I, q. 1, a. 3. — Blessed Albert the Great, Summa, p. I, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 2; I Sent., d. 1, a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, I Sent., Prolog., a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, I Sent., Prolog., q. 3. — Giles of Rome, I Sent., Prolog., part 1, principal 2, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 6, q. 3. — Durandus, I Sent., Prolog., q. 4.

V. In the solution of the principal question the old scholastics disagree greatly, at least in words. Some affirm that God is indeed the subject of theology, yet not under the character of Deity, but under some limitation — for example, insofar as he is restorer and glorifier (so Giles of Rome), or insofar as he is most perfect (Denis the Carthusian). But this limitation on the side of the subject does not seem probable. — Alexander of Hales posits three subjects according to the three things which are in any complete being, namely according to substance, power (potency) and operation: in the first way the subject is God; in the second way it is Christ, who is the power of the Father; in the third way it is the works of restoration wrought through Christ. — To Scotus is attributed the opinion that God under the character of infinite being is the subject of theology; yet since he himself (I Sent., Prolog., q. 3, n. 9) says: that God under the character of infinite or necessary being is not legitimately set down as the object of theology, his opinion is explained by Frassen (Scotus academicus, tom. I, disp. prooem., a. 2, q. 5) and by Lychetus (on the passage cited) in such a way that in substance it agrees with St. Thomas, who (S. I, q. 1, a. 7) assigns one subject, namely God under the character of Deity. The difference between the two nevertheless consists in this, that Scotus thinks this subject God is understood materially, as he is a thing and the cause of all the truths which he contains virtually in himself; whereas St. Thomas understands God under a formal character, that is, as knowable or revealable, and not in himself and subjectively. On this difference compare Cajetan in his Commentary, and Macedo (Collationes doctrinae S. Thomae et Scoti, Coll. 2, diff. 4, sect. 4).

The opinion now more common distinguishes more accurately three objects in every science: the material object (which in theology is everything revealed by God) and a twofold formal object. Of these the one is held on the side of the subject concerning which the science is, and is the thing itself which is first known; this is called the formal object which; the other is held on the side of the power as the ground under which we understand, and is called the formal object by which. It is by this last ground that those sciences which have the same material object are properly distinguished and specified.

As appears from the text, St. Bonaventure distinguishes the subject of theology otherwise and in a threefold manner, and according to this distinction he suitably assigns a threefold subject of theology; thus he strives to reconcile the diverse opinions of the theologians. And it is to be noted that an integral whole is something composed of parts which together with others constitute the whole, whence they are called integral parts. But a universal whole is any substantial superior taken in relation to its inferior in the predicamental line, as animal in relation to man and man in relation to Socrates. So Peter of Spain, Bonaventure's contemporary, in his Summula on the book of the Topics, on concomitant places. Nor does the Seraphic Doctor's opinion contradict St. Thomas, who assigns only one subject, since he takes the subject precisely as the formal subject which. St. Thomas nevertheless does not deny that under diverse respects other subjects of theology can also reasonably be assigned; indeed he sufficiently intimates this in both the places cited below. But St. Bonaventure himself says in the body of the question that God is the subject, and Christ, and things and signs and the credible, yet in diverse ways. Hence, consistent with himself, in the first conclusion he says with St. Thomas that God is the subject of theology; but he explains this otherwise, namely as the radical subject, to which all things are reduced as to a principle. This Trigosus understands of the adequate formal subject, and so draws the Seraphic Doctor entirely over to St. Thomas's opinion. From the context, however, it is plain that it is rather to be understood of the material subject, inasmuch as God is the principle from which all things are derived — or, as he says in the Breviloquium, p. I, c. 1: The subject, as that from which all things are, is God. In the second conclusion, under another respect, he sets down Christ as the adequate material subject, through whom and concerning whom all things are proximately known. In the third conclusion he sets down a twofold subject, namely things and signs, but under the character of the credible, and the credible itself, inasmuch as revealed truths are made intelligible and probable through reasons. In this last conclusion the words universal whole signify the formal subject and the subject of attribution. Trigosus, Sum. S. Bonav., q. 1, a. 2, dub. 2; Hauzeur, Collatio totius theologiae, tom. I, q. 1.

VI. Ancient authors treating of this question: Breviloq. p. I, c. 1. — Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 1, m. 3. — Scotus, I Sent., Prolog., q. 3; I Report., Prolog., q. 1. — St. Thomas, I Sent., Prolog., q. 1, a. 4; Summa I, q. 1, a. 7. — Blessed Albert the Great, Summa, p. I, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 1; I Sent., d. 1, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, I Sent., Prolog., a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, I Sent., Prolog., q. 6. — Giles of Rome, I Sent., Prolog., p. 1, princip. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 19, q. 1. — Durandus, I Sent., Prolog., q. 5. — Gabriel Biel, I Sent., Prolog., q. 9.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 3
    Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 particulam Et. Mox post verbum videtur cod. M adiungit Probo.
    We have restored from the manuscripts and from edition 1 the particle Et. Presently, after the word videtur, codex M adds Probo.
  2. 4
    Vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 7. et 8. — Mox sequimur codd. et ed. 1 ponendo et pro de ac dein utpote loco ut puta. Codd. F et S operationibus pro operibus.
    See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, cc. 7 and 8. — Presently we follow the codices and edition 1 in putting et for de, and then utpote in place of ut puta. Codices F and S read operationibus for operibus.
  3. 5
    Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. (in ed. Paris. Firmin-Didot c. 8.), ubi sic habetur: Secatur igitur scientia et sensus in res. Cum quibus verbis concordant antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 contra Vat. ac recentiorem cod. cc, qui habent ut res pro in res. Paulo ante Vat. post scientia addit ab aliis; sed mendose (agitur siquidem de divisione scientiae in se, uti ex subnexis colligitur) et praeter fidem mss. ac ed. 1. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, refragantibus tamen antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, ante dividuntur repetit particulam quia, sed male, eo quod proxime subnexa non sint nisi explicatio verborum secantur in res. Paulo post sub demonstrativo hoc intellige tale subiectum, secundum cuius divisionem dividitur theologia. Substituimus ex codd. A G H I M Y etc. et ed. 1 hoc pro haec, licet multi codd. cum Vat. habeant haec, quia in eorum lectione syllogismus perturbaretur.
    Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 38 (in the Paris Firmin-Didot edition, c. 8), where it stands thus: Science therefore, and sense, are cut into things. With which words the more ancient codices and edition 1 agree, against the Vatican edition and the more recent codex cc, which have ut res for in res. A little before, the Vatican edition adds after scientia the words ab aliis; but erroneously (for what is at issue is the division of science in itself, as is gathered from what is subjoined) and against the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1. Presently the Vatican edition with codex cc — the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 opposing it — repeats the particle quia before dividuntur, but badly, since what is subjoined immediately after is nothing but an explanation of the words secantur in res. A little later, under the demonstrative hoc, understand such a subject according to whose division theology is divided. We have substituted, from codices A G H I M Y etc. and from edition 1, hoc for haec, although many codices with the Vatican edition have haec, because on their reading the syllogism would be thrown into confusion.
  4. 6
    Sensus est: non, inquam, fidem in quantum est habitus a Deo in animam infusus, sed in quantum est ipsum creditum, scil. veritates revelatae; sive aliis verbis, si recte tamen intelligantur: non fidem subiective, sed obiective sumtam. — Vat. sed fide creditum; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 legunt: fidem creditum secundum habitum, sed secundum creditum; omnes vero codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent textum nostrum.
    The sense is: not, I say, faith insofar as it is a habit infused by God into the soul, but insofar as it is the very thing believed, namely the revealed truths; or, in other words, provided they be rightly understood: faith taken not subjectively but objectively. — The Vatican edition reads sed fide creditum; editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 read fidem creditum secundum habitum, sed secundum creditum; but all the codices with edition 1 present our text.
  5. 7
    Vat. cum cod. recentiori cc huius contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition with the more recent codex cc reads huius, against the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1.
  6. 8
    Aristot., II. Phys. text. 70. (ed. Paris. Firmin-Didot c. 7.), ubi sic legitur: Veniunt autem tres (causae) in unam plerumque.
    Aristotle, Physics II, text 70 (Paris Firmin-Didot edition, c. 7), where it reads thus: But three (causes) for the most part come together into one.
  7. 9
    Cod. V materia seu subiectum. Mox post vel restituimus ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 omissam particulam de.
    Codex V reads materia seu subiectum. Presently, after vel, we have restored from nearly all the manuscripts and from edition 1 the omitted particle de.
  8. 10
    Lectio Vat., quae est et multorum codd., explicatur per sequentem cod. L: Sed constat quod specialis; codd. A C F R aa Sed specialis; cod. G Sed si specialis. Mox codd. S U ff post patet adiiciunt igitur. Dein fide mss. et ed. 1 posuimus debent pro habent.
    The Vatican reading, which is also that of many codices, is explained by the following reading of codex L: Sed constat quod specialis; codices A C F R aa read Sed specialis; codex G Sed si specialis. Presently codices S U ff add igitur after patet. Then, on the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1, we have put debent for habent.
  9. 11
    Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc vitiose et contra antiquiores mss. ac ed. 1 particulam aut transponit post ergo. Mox cod. V verbo generis adiungit determinati.
    The Vatican edition with the more recent codex cc, faultily and against the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, transposes the particle aut after ergo. Presently codex V adds determinati to the word generis.
  10. 12
    Mendum Vat. veritas loco virtus et paulo infra veritatis pro virtutis castigavimus auctoritate mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition's error veritas in place of virtus, and a little below veritatis for virtutis, we have corrected on the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1.
  11. 1
    In Vat. et recentiori cod. cc non bene deest etiam, quod tamen in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Mox cod. F sicut pro si. Dein fide omnium codd. et ed. 1 expunximus sperabile vel, quod Vat. praemittit verbo diligibile.
    In the Vatican edition and in the more recent codex cc etiam is wanting, not rightly, since it is nevertheless found in the more ancient manuscripts and in edition 1. Presently codex F reads sicut for si. Then, on the witness of all the codices and of edition 1, we have struck out sperabile vel, which the Vatican edition prefixes to the word diligibile.
  12. 2
    Cod. U hic satis bene addit illud. Mox, postulantibus fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus alio pro secundo.
    Codex U here adds, well enough, illud. Presently, at the demand of nearly all the manuscripts and of edition 1, we have substituted alio for secundo.
  13. 3
    Vat. primum elementale. Auctoritate codd. ee ff et ed. 1 in textum recepimus principium, utpote quod praecedentibus et subsequentibus magis correspondere videtur; multi codd. propter abbreviationem ambigui sunt; omnes tamen cum ed. 1 legunt elementare.
    The Vatican edition reads primum elementale. On the authority of codices ee ff and of edition 1 we have received into the text principium, as being that which seems to correspond better with what precedes and with what follows; many codices are ambiguous on account of the abbreviation; all of them, however, with edition 1 read elementare.
  14. 4
    Libr. I. Grammat. c. 2 (de Littera). — Non multo post cod. X grammaticae pro grammatici.
    Grammar, book I, c. 2 (On the Letter). — Not much later codex X reads grammaticae for grammatici.
  15. 5
    Explicationem horum verborum accipe a Prisciano, I. Grammat. c. 1: Articulata est, quae coarctata, hoc est, copulata cum aliquo sensu mentis eius, qui loquitur, profertur... Litterata est, quae scribi potest. — Unus alterve cod. ut aa haec duo adiectiva coniungit per particulam et.
    Take the explanation of these words from Priscian, Grammar I, c. 1: Articulate is that which is uttered constrained, that is, coupled with some meaning of the mind of him who is speaking... Lettered is that which can be written. — One or another codex, as aa, joins these two adjectives by the particle et.
  16. 6
    Codd. H I K reducuntur. Mox post principium codd. P Q X ff addunt, ut et supra in textu additum est, radicale. Paulo post codd. H Q integrale pro integrum.
    Codices H I K read reducuntur. Presently, after principium, codices P Q X ff add — as was added above in the text also — radicale. A little later codices H Q read integrale for integrum.
  17. 7
    Cod. D hic addit, sicuti et paulo post in textu reperitur, quae determinantur in hoc libro; codd. vero D K post principium adiiciunt radicale vel initiale et cod. ff tantum radicale, quae adiectiva cum praecedentibus correspondent textumque distinctiorem reddunt. Paulo post codd. K Q integrale loco integrum.
    Codex D here adds, just as is found a little later in the text as well, quae determinantur in hoc libro; codices D K, however, add after principium the words radicale vel initiale, and codex ff only radicale — adjectives which correspond with what precedes and render the text more distinct. A little later codices K Q read integrale in place of integrum.
  18. 8
    Lectio Vat. sive creatam et increatam, quae nimis arcta videtur, castigatur auctoritate mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican reading sive creatam et increatam, which seems too narrow, is corrected on the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1.
  19. 9
    Consulto dicit large, quia totum integrum in sensu stricto dicit compositum ex partibus; sed duae naturae in Christo faciunt totum integrum secundum Scholasticos per unionem hypostaticam, non per strictam compositionem. — Vat. praemittit particulam hic et mox post sed addit etiam, quod hic et alibi saepius omnes mss. omittunt, licet minus congrue.
    He says broadly advisedly, because an integral whole in the strict sense means something composed of parts; but the two natures in Christ make an integral whole, according to the Scholastics, by the hypostatic union, not by strict composition. — The Vatican edition prefixes the particle hic, and presently after sed adds etiam, which here and elsewhere all the manuscripts more often omit, though less fittingly.
  20. 10
    Contra auctoritatem codd. et ed. 1 loco per circumlocutionem Vat. ponit dupla nominatione, fortasse propter maiorem oppositionem cum verbis paulo post sequentibus unico vocabulo.
    Against the authority of the codices and of edition 1, in place of per circumlocutionem the Vatican edition puts dupla nominatione, perhaps for the sake of a greater opposition with the words that follow a little after, unico vocabulo.
  21. 11
    Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit hic Vat. credibile, quod certe in textu subintelligendum est. Mox codd. P Q cum edd. 4 et 5 post diversimode satis bene addunt tamen.
    Against the witness of the manuscripts and of edition 1 the Vatican edition here repeats credibile, which is certainly to be understood in the text. Presently codices P Q, with editions 4 and 5, add after diversimode, well enough, tamen.
  22. 12
    Vat. quod de Deo non agitur per totum in hoc libro; mss. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. in eo conveniunt, quod omittant per totum; codd. vero R T ee ff et ed. 1, transpositis verbis et addendo tantum, suppeditant lectionem, quam in textum recepimus, quae et in se clarior est et ad amussim correspondet propositioni minori supra in obiectione positae. Mox post tamen ex codd. T et ee supplevimus de Deo, quae verba certe subaudienda sunt. Dein cod. F post substantiam addit et operationem. Plures codd. ex repetitione vocis substantiam decepti propositionem mutile exhibent. Cod. K vero totam responsionem magis succincte ita proponit: Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus non complectitur omnia, quae hic considerantur, dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod Deus non sit subiectum in hac scientia, sed tantum (sic primitus, postea correctum in tamen) sequitur, quod non est subiectum ut totum, sed ut principium. Mentem suam S. Doctor hac de re in Breviloq. p. I. c. 1. ita aperit: Cum s. Scriptura sive theologia sit scientia dans sufficientem notitiam de primo principio secundum statum viae... et Deus non tantum sit rerum primum principium et exemplar effectivum in creatione, sed etiam refectivum in redemptione et perfectivum in retributione; ideo non tantum agit de Deo creatore, sed etiam de creatione (ita codd. contra edd., quae habent creatore) et creatura.
    The Vatican edition reads quod de Deo non agitur per totum in hoc libro; the manuscripts with edition 1, against the Vatican edition, agree in this, that they omit per totum; but codices R T ee ff and edition 1, by transposing the words and adding tantum, supply the reading which we have received into the text — a reading which is both clearer in itself and corresponds exactly to the minor proposition set down above in the objection. Presently, after tamen, we have supplied from codices T and ee the words de Deo, which are certainly to be understood. Then codex F adds et operationem after substantiam. Several codices, deceived by the repetition of the word substantiam, present the proposition mutilated. Codex K, however, sets out the whole response more succinctly thus: As to what is objected on the contrary, that God does not embrace all the things which are here considered, it must be said that from this it does not follow that God is not the subject in this science, but only (so at first, afterwards corrected to nevertheless) it follows that he is not the subject as a whole, but as a principle. The holy Doctor lays open his mind on this matter in the Breviloquium, p. I, c. 1, thus: Since sacred Scripture, or theology, is a science giving sufficient knowledge concerning the first principle according to the state of the wayfarer... and God is not only the first principle of things and their effective exemplar in creation, but also their restorative exemplar in redemption and their perfective exemplar in retribution; therefore it treats not only of God the creator, but also of creation (so the codices, against the editions, which have creatore) and of the creature.
  23. 1
    Cod. N addit proprie.
    Codex N adds proprie.
  24. 2
    Codd. aa adiungit et similiter de materia in qua, quae lectio in textum recipienda videretur, si sufficienti numero codicum fulciretur; certe tamen ipsa subintelligenda est.
    Codex aa adds et similiter de materia in qua, a reading which would seem to deserve reception into the text if it were supported by a sufficient number of codices; certainly, however, it is to be understood.
  25. 3
    Falsa lectio Vat. veritatis loco virtutis emendatur ex mss. et sex primis edd.
    The Vatican edition's false reading veritatis in place of virtutis is emended from the manuscripts and from the first six editions.
  26. 4
    Cod. aa satis bene signa. Mox codd. A T Y etc. ante librum non repetunt particulam ad, cod. I ponit vel librum, cod. X nec ad librum unum.
    Codex aa, well enough, reads signa. Presently codices A T Y etc. do not repeat the particle ad before librum; codex I puts vel librum, codex X nec ad librum unum.
  27. 5
    Vat., quae falso ponit veritas, corrigitur ex mss. et sex primis edd.
    The Vatican edition, which falsely puts veritas, is corrected from the manuscripts and from the first six editions.
  28. 6
    Vat. cum recentiori cod. cc superflue hic addit scilicet credibilis, quod deest in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition with the more recent codex cc here superfluously adds scilicet credibilis, which is wanting in the more ancient manuscripts and in edition 1.
  29. 7
    Ex codd. A F G H I K P R S T V Y etc. cum ed. 1 posuimus et loco aut. Deinde codd. I et T post liber bene addunt scilicet metaphysica. Mox, fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, Vat. habet ordinantur pro reducuntur; cod. vero bb reducuntur vel ordinantur.
    From codices A F G H I K P R S T V Y etc. with edition 1 we have put et in place of aut. Then codices I and T add, rightly, after liber the words scilicet metaphysica. Presently, nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 opposing it, the Vatican edition has ordinantur for reducuntur; codex bb, however, reducuntur vel ordinantur.
  30. 8
    Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 in hac propositione bis habet mendose veritatis loco virtutis.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, has in this proposition twice, erroneously, veritatis in place of virtutis.
  31. 9
    Libr. II. c. 5: Maior est quippe Scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas. — Dein Vat. praeter fidem codd. voci secundum praemittit sed; ed. 1 addit vero.
    Book II, c. 5: For the authority of this Scripture is greater than all the capacity of human wit. — Then the Vatican edition, against the witness of the codices, prefixes sed to the word secundum; edition 1 adds vero.
  32. 10
    Magis placeret, si pro illa haberetur alia. Vat. autem absque ulla mss. auctoritate post obiectio adiungit de sperabili vel diligibili. Circa finem propositionis codd. inter se non conveniunt; Vat. cum cod. cc pro et ideo habet unde; multi codd. ut A C F G S V W X bb etc. nullam coniunctivam particulam ponunt; cod. D nec pro et ideo non; codd. autem B D K Q R exhibent lectionem nostram et ideo; codd. I T ideo.
    It would please better if alia stood in place of illa. The Vatican edition, however, without any authority of the manuscripts, adds after obiectio the words de sperabili vel diligibili. Towards the end of the proposition the codices do not agree among themselves; the Vatican edition with codex cc has unde for et ideo; many codices, as A C F G S V W X bb etc., put no connective particle at all; codex D reads nec for et ideo non; but codices B D K Q R present our reading et ideo; codices I T read ideo. ---
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