Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

QUAESTIO II.

Quae causa formalis quive modus procedendi sit in his libris Sententiarum.

Secundo quaeritur¹ de causa formali sive modo agendi. Et dictum est, quod est perscrutatorius et inquisitivus secretorum.

Sed contra: 1. Isaiae quadragesimo²: Deus dat secretorum scrutatores quasi non sint.

2. Item, Proverbiorum vigesimo quinto³: Perscrutator maiestatis opprimetur a gloria.

3. Item, Ecclesiastici tertio⁴: Altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris. Ergo, si ea quae Magister perscrutatur, sunt secreta,

sunt magna, sunt alta et fortia, male Magister procedit.

4. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: modus procedendi in parte scientiae debet esse uniformis modo totalis scientiae¹; sed modus procedendi in sacra Scriptura est typicus et per modum narrationis, non inquisitionis: cum ergo liber iste pertineat ad sacram Scripturam, non debet procedere inquirendo.

5. Item, modus agendi debet esse conveniens materiae, de qua est; unde in principio veteris Ethicae² dicitur: «Sermones inquirendi sunt secundum materiam»; sed materia huius doctrinae est credibile; sed credibile est supra rationem: ergo modus procedendi per rationes non convenit huic doctrinae.

6. Item, modus agendi debet esse conveniens fini, ad quem ordinatur scientia; sed haec scientia, ut dicit Magister in littera³, ordinatur ad fidei promotionem; sed rationes fidem non promovent, sed evacuant; unde Gregorius⁴: «Fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum»: ergo talis modus contrariatur fini, ergo non est conveniens. Unde et Ambrosius⁵: «Tolle, inquit, argumenta, cum de fide agitur. Piscatoribus creditur, non dialecticis». Vanus ergo et inutilis videtur hic modus.

Sed contra: 1. Primae Petri tertio⁶: Parati omni poscenti reddere rationem de ea quae in vobis est fide et spe. Cum ergo multi sint, qui fidem nostram impugnant, non tantum rationem de ea poscunt; utile et congruum videtur per rationes eam astruere et modo inquisitivo et ratiocinando procedere: ergo etc.

2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore in libro de Trinitate⁷: «Credo sine dubio, ad quorumlibet explanationem, quae necesse est esse, non modo probabilia, sed etiam necessaria argumenta non deesse, licet contingat nostram industriam latere». Ergo cum fides nostra credat necessaria, et illa habeant rationes latentes, et talia indigeant perscrutatione, ut enodentur⁸; patet quod modus perscrutatorius maxime convenit huic scientiae.

3. Item, non est peioris conditionis veritas fidei nostrae quam aliae veritates; sed in aliis veritatibus ita est, quod omnis, quae potest per rationem impugnari, potest et debet per rationem defendi: ergo pari ratione et veritas fidei nostrae.

4. Item, non est modo fides nostra peioris conditionis quam in principio; sed in principio, quando impugnabatur per falsa miracula magorum, defendebatur per vera Sanctorum: ergo cum modo impugnetur per falsa argumenta haereticorum, debet defendi per vera argumenta doctorum.

Conclusio

Modus procedendi perscrutatorius sive ratiocinativus convenit huic doctrinae, cum valeat ad confundendum adversarios fidei, ad fovendum infirmos in fide, ad delectandum perfectos.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod modus perscrutatorius convenit huic doctrinae sive libro. Cum enim finis imponat necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem; quia, sicut dicit Philosophus⁹: «Serra est dentata, quia est ad secandum»; sic iste liber, quia est ad promotionem fidei, habet modum inquisitivum. Modus enim ratiocinativus sive inquisitivus valet ad fidei promotionem, et hoc tripliciter secun-

dum tria genera hominum. Quidam enim sunt fidei adversarii, quidam sunt in fide infirmi, quidam vero perfecti.

Modus inquisitivus valet primo ad confundendum adversarios. Unde Augustinus primo de Trinitate¹: Adversus garrulos ratiocinatores elatiores quam capaciores rationibus catholicis et similitudinibus congruis ad defensionem et assertionem fidei est utendum. Secundo valet ad fovendum infirmos. Sicut enim Deus caritatem infirmorum fovet per beneficia temporalia, sic fidem infirmorum fovet² per argumenta probabilia. Si enim infirmi viderent, rationes ad fidei probabilitatem deficere et ad oppositum abundare, nullus persisteret. Tertio valet ad delectandum perfectos. Miro enim modo anima delectatur in intelligendo quod perfecta fide credit. Unde Bernardus³: «Nihil libentius intelligimus, quam quod iam fide credimus».

1. 2. 3. Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod omnes illae auctoritates intelliguntur de perscrutatione curiosa, non de perscrutatione studiosa. Nam ipse Dominus dixit Iudaeis, Ioannis quinto⁴: Scrutamini scripturas etc.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod iste⁵ modus non competit sacrae Scripturae; dicendum ad hoc, quod liber iste ad sacram Scripturam reducitur per modum cuiusdam subalternationis, non partis principalis; similiter et libri doctorum, qui sunt ad fidei defensionem. Quod patet sic: quia non quaelibet determinatio trahens in partem facit subalternationem scientiae, sed determinatio quodam modo distrahens⁶. Nam scientia de linea recta non dicitur subalternari geometriae, sed scientia de linea visuali, quoniam haec determinatio quodam modo trahit ad alia principia. Quoniam igitur sacra Scriptura est de credibili ut credibili⁷, hic est de credibili ut facto intelligibili, et haec determinatio distrahit — «nam quod credimus debemus auctoritati, et quod intelligimus, rationi⁸» — hinc est, quod sicut alius modus certitudinis est in scientia superiori et inferiori, ita alius modus certitudinis est in sacra Scriptura et alius in hoc libro, et ideo alius modus procedendi. Et sicut scientia subalternata, ubi deficit, redit ad certitudinem scientiae subalternantis, quae maior est; sic etiam, cum Magistro deficit certitudo rationis, recurrit ad auctoritatis certitudinem⁹ sacrae Scripturae, quae excedit omnem certitudinem rationis.

5. Quod tu obiicis, quod¹⁰ debet convenire materiae; dicendum, quod convenit. Et quod obiicitur, quod credibile est supra rationem; verum est, supra rationem quantum ad scientiam acquisitam¹¹, sed non supra rationem elevatam per fidem et per donum scientiae et intellectus. Fides enim elevat ad assentiendum; scientia et intellectus elevant ad ea quae credita sunt intelligendum.

6. Quod obiicitur, quod¹² non convenit fini, quia evacuat meritum; dicendum, quod, quando assentitur propter se rationi, tunc aufertur locus fidei, quia in anima hominis dominatur violentia rationis. Sed quando fides non assentit propter rationem, sed propter amorem eius cui assentit, desiderat habere rationes; tunc non evacuat ratio humana meritum, sed auget solatium. Et primo modo intelligit¹³ Hieronymus, quod non sunt inducenda argumenta dialectica, quibus homo principaliter innitatur, quia innitendum est auctoritati principalius quam rationi.

QUESTION II.

What is the formal cause, or the manner of proceeding, in these books of the Sentences.

Secondly it is asked¹ about the formal cause, or the manner of acting. And it has been said that it is searching-out and inquisitive of things hidden.

On the contrary: 1. Isaiah, chapter forty²: God giveth the searchers of secrets as though they were not.

2. Likewise, Proverbs, chapter twenty-five³: He that is a searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory.

3. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus, chapter three⁴: Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy strength. Therefore, if the things which the Master searches out are hidden,

are great, are high and beyond one's strength, the Master proceeds badly.

4. Likewise, it is shown by reason thus: the manner of proceeding in a part of a science ought to be uniform with the manner of the whole science¹; but the manner of proceeding in sacred Scripture is typical and by way of narration, not of inquiry: since therefore this book pertains to sacred Scripture, it ought not to proceed by inquiring.

5. Likewise, the manner of acting ought to be suited to the matter with which it deals; whence at the beginning of the old Ethics² it is said: «Discourses are to be inquired into according to the matter»; but the matter of this doctrine is the credible; but the credible is above reason: therefore a manner of proceeding by reasons does not suit this doctrine.

6. Likewise, the manner of acting ought to be suited to the end to which the science is ordered; but this science, as the Master says in the text³, is ordered to the promotion of faith; but reasons do not promote faith, they empty it out; whence Gregory⁴: «Faith has no merit, where human reason supplies the proof»: therefore such a manner is contrary to the end, therefore it is not suitable. Whence also Ambrose⁵: «Away, he says, with arguments, when the question is of faith. Credence is given to fishermen, not to dialecticians». Vain, therefore, and useless does this manner seem.

On the contrary: 1. First of Peter, chapter three⁶: Ready to render a reason to every one that asketh of the faith and hope which is in you. Since therefore there are many who assail our faith, they do not merely ask a reason for it; it seems useful and congruous to build it up by reasons and to proceed in an inquisitive manner and by reasoning: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Richard of Saint Victor, in the book On the Trinity⁷: «I believe without doubt that, for the explanation of whatever things must necessarily be, there is no lack of arguments not merely probable but even necessary, though it may happen that they escape our industry». Therefore, since our faith believes things that are necessary, and those things have reasons lying hidden, and such things need searching out in order that they may be unravelled⁸, it is plain that the searching-out manner suits this science supremely.

3. Likewise, the truth of our faith is not of worse condition than other truths; but in other truths it stands thus, that every truth which can be assailed by reason can and ought to be defended by reason: therefore by parity of reason the truth of our faith also.

4. Likewise, our faith is not now of worse condition than in the beginning; but in the beginning, when it was assailed by the false miracles of the magicians, it was defended by the true ones of the Saints: therefore, since it is now assailed by the false arguments of heretics, it ought to be defended by the true arguments of the doctors.

Conclusion

The searching-out or ratiocinative manner of proceeding suits this doctrine, since it avails for the confounding of the adversaries of faith, for the fostering of the weak in faith, for the delighting of the perfect.

I respond: It must be said that the searching-out manner suits this doctrine or book. For since the end imposes necessity upon the things that are for the end — because, as the Philosopher says⁹: «The saw is toothed, because it is for cutting» — so this book, because it is for the promotion of faith, has an inquisitive manner. For the ratiocinative or inquisitive manner avails for the promotion of faith, and this in three ways accord-

ing to three kinds of men. For some are adversaries of the faith, some are weak in faith, and some are perfect.

The inquisitive manner avails first for confounding the adversaries. Whence Augustine, in the first book On the Trinity¹: Against garrulous reasoners, more puffed up than capacious, one must make use of catholic reasons and congruous likenesses for the defence and assertion of the faith. Secondly it avails for fostering the weak. For just as God fosters the charity of the weak by temporal benefits, so He fosters² the faith of the weak by probable arguments. For if the weak were to see that reasons for the probability of faith were lacking and abounded on the opposite side, no one would persist. Thirdly it avails for delighting the perfect. For in a wondrous manner the soul is delighted in understanding what it believes with a perfect faith. Whence Bernard³: «There is nothing we understand more gladly than what we already believe by faith».

1. 2. 3. As to what is therefore objected on the contrary side, it must be said that all those authorities are to be understood of a curious searching out, not of a studious one. For the Lord Himself said to the Jews, John, chapter five⁴: Search the scriptures etc.

4. As to what is objected, that this⁵ manner does not befit sacred Scripture; to this it must be said that this book is reduced to sacred Scripture by way of a certain subalternation, not as a principal part; and likewise the books of the doctors, which are for the defence of faith. Which is plain thus: because not every determination that draws a thing into a part makes a subalternation of science, but a determination that in some manner draws it aside⁶. For the science of the straight line is not said to be subalternated to geometry, but the science of the visual line, since this determination in some manner draws it to other principles. Since therefore sacred Scripture is of the credible as credible⁷, while this book is of the credible as made intelligible, and this determination draws aside — «for what we believe we owe to authority, and what we understand, to reason⁸» — hence it is that, just as there is one manner of certitude in a higher science and another in a lower, so there is one manner of certitude in sacred Scripture and another in this book, and therefore another manner of proceeding. And just as a subalternated science, where it falls short, returns to the certitude of the subalternating science, which is greater; so also, when certitude of reason fails the Master, he has recourse to the certitude of the authority⁹ of sacred Scripture, which exceeds every certitude of reason.

5. As to what you object, that it¹⁰ ought to suit the matter; it must be said that it does suit it. And as to what is objected, that the credible is above reason; it is true, above reason as regards acquired science¹¹, but not above reason elevated by faith and by the gift of knowledge and of understanding. For faith elevates one to assent; knowledge and understanding elevate one to understand the things that are believed.

6. As to what is objected, that it¹² does not suit the end, because it empties out merit; it must be said that, when assent is given to reason for its own sake, then the place of faith is taken away, because in the soul of man the violence of reason holds mastery. But when faith assents not on account of reason, but on account of love for Him to whom it assents, and desires to have reasons; then human reason does not empty out merit, but increases consolation. And it is in the first way that Jerome understands¹³ that dialectical arguments are not to be brought in, upon which a man should principally lean, because one must lean upon authority more principally than upon reason.