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Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 33

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum virtutes cardinales sint in parte animae rationali, an in ea parte, quae solum obtemperat rationi.

Tertio quaeritur de virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad subiectum, et est quaestio, utrum sint in parte animae rationali1, an in ea parte, quae solum obtemperat rationi. Et quod sint in parte animae rationali, videtur:

1. Primo per auctoritatem Augustini in Soliloquiis6: « Virtus est ratio recta perducens in finem »; sed constat, quod hic est praedicatio causalis sive materialis: ergo videtur, quod subiectum virtutis sit ipsa ratio sive potentia rationalis.

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2. Item, virtus est principium merendi et operis meritorii et laudabilis: ergo circa illam potentiam habet esse, circa cuius actum consistit laus et meritum; sed talis est potentia rationalis, scilicet liberum arbitrium: ergo videtur idem quod prius2.

3. Item, in eo subiecto est virtus, in quo anima habet imaginem Dei, cum virtutes ceterae habeant ortum a gratia, cuius anima est capax, per hoc quod est imago; sed non est imago nisi per potentiam rationalem3: ergo etc.

4. Item, omnis virtus consistit circa electionem boni et fugam mali4; sed habitus electivus est solius potentiae rationalis proprie dictae: ergo videtur, quod omnis virtus proprie sit in rationali parte ipsius animae.

5. Item, virtus est in genere honesti, secundum quod vult Tullius5; sed bonum, quod est honestum, et eius oppositum est obiectum solius rationalis virtutis, quia potentiae sensitivae solummodo feruntur ad ea bona, quae sunt de genere commodi: ergo videtur, quod virtus sit solum in parte animae rationali.

Sed contra: 1. Fortitudo est in irascibili, et temperantia in concupiscibili; sed istae non sunt rationales, nisi quia obtemperantes rationi, secundum quod dicit Philosophus in fine Novae Ethicae6b: ergo videtur, quod cardinales virtutes non habeant esse in parte rationali, sed potius in parte sensibili.

2. Item, in ea parte est habitus virtutis expediens et rectificans, circa quam habet esse pronitas et obliquitas; sed haec duo sunt maxime circa motivam sensibilem, quae quidem sunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis7: ergo videtur, quod in illis habeat collocari virtus cardinalis.

3. Item, in ea parte est habitus virtutis tanquam in subiecto proprio, quae immediatius et proximius elicit actum ipsius virtutis; sed temperantiae et fortitudinis actus eliciuntur immediate a concupiscibili et irascibili, quae sunt obedientes rationi8: ergo videtur, quod in eis virtutes cardinales habeant poni.

4. Item, virtutes cardinales distinguuntur a theologicis, sicut consuetudinales ab intellectualibus; sed intellectuales, ut sapientia et intelligentia et phronesis, ponuntur in ratione proprie dicta, consuetudinales vero in ea parte, quae obtemperat rationi9: ergo videtur similiter, quod theologicae debent reponi in parte rationali, et cardinales in parte sensibili, secundum quod rationi obedit.

5. Item, in ea parte maxime habet reponi habitus virtutis, quae magis indiget rectificari; sed pars, quae magis indiget rectificari, est pars sensitiva, quoniam, secundum quod dicit Philosophus10, « intellectus semper est rectus, phantasia recta et non recta »: cum ergo phantasia nominet potentiam sensitivam, videtur, quod circa ipsam habeant esse virtutes cardinales.

Conclusio.

Secundum theologos virtutes cardinales omnes ponendae sunt in parte animae rationali, quatenus rationale dicitur quod participat rationem.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum rationale dicatur dupliciter, secundum quod vult Philosophus11, videlicet quod rationem participat, et quod rationi obedit. Si large accipiatur pars rationalis, sic non est dubium, quin omnes virtutes in parte rationali sint, sive theologicae sive cardinales, sive intellectuales, sive consuetudinales. — Si vero rationale dicatur proprie, secundum quod participat rationem, sic voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod quaedam virtutes cardinales sunt in parte rationali, utpote prudentia et iustitia; quaedam vero non, sed in potentia inferiori, quae est rationalis largo modo dicta, quia obtemperat rationi, ut fortitudo et temperantia, quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili.

Licet autem hic modus dicendi aliquo modo probabilis videatur secundum morales philosophos; tamen secundum theologum non videtur rationabiliter dici, quasdam virtutes cardinales reponi in parte superiori et quasdam in inferiori; cum omnes virtutes cardinales aequales sint quantum ad meriti dignitatem12; omnes etiam sunt principium merendi. Et propterea, cum meritum consistat radicaliter circa liberum arbitrium, in solis illis potentiis habent esse virtutes, sive cardinales sive theologicae, in quibus reperitur libertas arbitrii. — Propter quod, cum libertas arbitrii non sit nisi in parte animae rationali, secundum quod rationale dicitur quod participat rationem13; necesse est, ceteras virtutes cardinales in parte illa reponi. Et hoc necessario exigit earum dignitas; cum ipsae habeant ortum a gratia, et sint perfectiones animae multo nobiliores quam ipsa scientia, quae ponitur tanquam in subiecto in parte animae rationali et intellectiva14. — Et propterea concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.

Ad evidentiam vero obiectorum, quae in contrarium opponuntur, notandus est alius modus distinguendi rationale secundum theologum. Uno enim modo distinguitur rationale contra partem sensitivam; alio modo distinguitur contra potentiam affectivam. Secundum quod distinguitur contra potentiam sensitivam, sic sunt in parte ista rationali omnes virtutes. Secundum vero quod distinguitur contra potentiam affectivam, sic non sunt in ea omnes virtutes, sed illae solum, quae dirigunt in discernendo, sicut fides et prudentia; aliae vero reponuntur in potentia affectiva, quae quidem pars est liberi arbitrii et dicitur voluntas, secundum quod est coniuncta rationi; dicitur etiam concupiscibilis et irascibilis, secundum quod diversimode habet affici et moveri. Nihil enim aliud est voluntas quam affectus sive appetitus ratiocinatus15. Omnis autem affectus sive appetitus vel est vis irascibilis, vel concupiscibilis, quae duae vires, secundum quod sunt liberi arbitrii partes, rationales sunt; et in ipsis possunt esse virtutes theologicae et cardinales: theologicae, in quantum immediate elevantur in Deum, ipsum diligendo et ipsi innitendo; cardinales vero, in quantum versantur circa bonum creatum. Et per hoc pro magna parte patet responsio ad obiecta.

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Ad argumenta pro parte negativa [Ad opposita]:

Ad 1. Ad illud16 quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod fortitudo et temperantia sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, et istae solum sunt rationales, quia obtemperant rationi; dicendum, quod absque dubio istae duae virtutes cardinales quantum ad habitus substratos in illis duabus viribus reponuntur, licet quantum ad rationem primariam merendi et ordinandi omnis virtus in libero arbitrio ponenda sit. Et ista duo sunt compossibilia, pro eo quod liberum arbitrium non est potentia distincta a rationali, concupiscibili et irascibili secundum rem17. Et propterea illa assumtio est falsa, quod concupiscibilis et irascibilis solummodo sunt rationales, quia obtemperant rationi. — In nobis enim est duplex irascibilis et concupiscibilis, videlicet rationalis et sensibilis: rationalis, secundum quam immediate nati sumus in Deum ferri, et in qua communicamus cum Angelis, et in qua secundum diversas comparationes habet reponi theologica virtus et cardinalis. Alia vero est irascibilis et concupiscibilis sensibilis18, quae solummodo dicitur rationalis, quia obtemperat rationi. Et in his non consistit libertas arbitrii, nec in his sicut in subiecto ponitur virtus cardinalis, licet per frequentem assuefactionem aliquo modo illae potentiae non incongrue dicantur habilitari; illa tamen habilitatio non est de virtutis essentia, sed potius sibi annexa.

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Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pronitas et obliquitas habent esse circa partem sensibilem, quia nata est rationi subiacere; dicendum, quod obliquitas habet esse circa aliquam potentiam dupliciter: aut quia in ea inchoatur, aut quia consummatur. Primo modo est obliquitas in parte sensibili, scilicet quantum ad inchoationem, et hoc propter fomitis inclinationem. Secundo vero modo est in parte rationali propter consensum et deliberatam electionem, et in hac principaliter residet obliquitas vitii, et per oppositum rectitudo virtutis, et ideo non19 in parte sensibili, sed magis in rationali.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus virtutis fortitudinis et temperantiae immediate eliciuntur a concupiscibili et irascibili; dicendum, quod illud verum est, loquendo de concupiscibili et irascibili humana; sed si loquamur de concupiscibili et irascibili brutali et sensibili, sic per illas potentias non immediate elicitur actus istarum virtutum, immo quasi consequenter: quia, rectificata concupiscibili et irascibili rationali per habitum virtutis, per consequens rectificatur ipsa concupiscibilis et irascibilis brutalis, quae illis habent subiici et famulari. — Unde sicut rectificata voluntate in dispensando, per consequens rectificatur manus ad tribuendum beneficium, tamen largitas non est in manu sicut in subiecto, sed in ipsa voluntate; sic intelligendum est in proposito.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consuetudinales virtutes reponuntur in ea parte, quae obtemperat rationi; dicendum, quod hoc non est, quia habitus consuetudinalis virtutis, secundum quod virtus est, habeat esse in illa parte sensibili, quae rationali obtemperat; sed quia ex quadam consuetudine bene faciendi in parte illa relinquitur quaedam habilitas. Et ideo potest dupliciter ad rationem illam responderi: primum quidem, quia non est simile de virtute cardinali et consuetudinali, secundum quod consuetudinalis est: quia cardinalis virtus nominat habitum dirigentem in operibus electivae, consuetudinalis vero praeter hoc nominat habitum acquisitum ex frequenti bene agere20. — Aliter etiam responderi potest per interemptionem minoris: quia consuetudinalis virtus, etsi aliquo modo sit in parte sensibili quasi in exsequente et subiacente; in rationali vero est principaliter tanquam in imperante actum virtutis et potentiae sensibili praesidente.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia sensibilis magis indiget rectificari quam intellectualis; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia rectitudo et obliquatio, quae homini imputatur, haec est, quae habet ortum a parte rationis. — Et quod obiicit, quod intellectus semper est rectus; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de intellectu, secundum quod respicit leges aeternas et ab ipsis recipit et in eis speculatur, non autem qualitercumque ex se movetur, immo frequenter est obliquus et erroneus21. — Vel potest dici, quod hoc intelligitur de intellectu, secundum quod est acceptio principiorum notissimorum in qualibet scientia, utpote dignitatum, circa quae non contingit errare22, non autem prout habet applicari ad opera specialia; et ideo ad ipsarum directionem virtutes sunt sibi necessariae. Et propter hoc ratio illa non concludit, quia procedebat ex falsa assumtione.

Scholion

I. In hac quaestione solvenda est duplex modus dicendi. S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. II. q. 56. a. 4.) docet, ipsam irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quae sunt in appetitu sensibili, esse subiectum virtutis, scilicet temperantiae et fortitudinis, quatenus participant rationem per hoc, quod natae sunt rationi obedire; unde vult, quod ista virtus « nihil aliud est quam quaedam habitualis conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem » (S. loc. cit.). Idem docet Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.). Cum multis aliis S. Bonav. putat, quod in concupiscibili et irascibili sensibili non ponatur virtus cardinalis sicut in subiecto; subiungit autem: « Licet per frequentem assuefactionem aliquo modo illae potentiae non incongrue dicantur habilitari; illa tamen habilitatio non est de virtutis essentia, sed potius sibi annexa » (hic ad 1; cfr. ad 4.). Huic modo dicendi favent etiam B. Albert. et Uldaricus (apud Dionys. Carth.), Richard. a Med., Henric. Gandav., Scot. et Dionys. Carth., qui (hic q. 2.) dicit: « Fateor, me amplius inclinari ad positionem dicentium, quod subiective sint in parte animae superiori, et in parte inferiori per impressionem et relucentiam quandam ». — Controversia autem fere reducitur ad quaestionem, utrum dispositiones illae vel impressiones in parte sensitiva mereantur proprie nomen virtutis, an non; de quo plura dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.). Eadem autem differentia in modo loquendi occurrit etiam in quaestione de subiecto peccati et vitii; de quo vide II. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 2, et scholion, nec non S. Thomam, S. I. II. q. 74. a. 2. seqq. — De duplici irascibili et concupiscibili (hic ad 1.) cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 5, in scholio. — Nota in principio corp. etiam specialem modum loquendi de rationali, et cfr. supra pag. 716, nota 11.

II. Praeter laudatos: Scot., hic q. unica n. 4. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. ad 6. 7. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 22. — Durand., hic q. 1.

III. In numero quaternario virtutum cardinalium omnes conveniunt; sed in assignandis rationibus pro aptitudine et sufficientia huius numeri magistri diversas ineunt vias. S. Thom. in Sum. (I. II. q. 61. a. 2.) duplicem viam assignat, scilicet alteram secundum principia formalia, alteram secundum subiecta; et secunda convenit cum septima, quam auctor noster iudicat esse magis probabilem (cfr. hic dubia circa lit.).

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English Translation

Question III. Whether the cardinal virtues are in the rational part of the soul, or in that part which only obeys reason.

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the cardinal virtues as regards their subject, and the question is whether they are in the rational part of the soul1, or in that part which only obeys reason. And that they are in the rational part of the soul seems to be the case:

1. First, by the authority of Augustine in the Soliloquies6: « Virtue is right reason leading to the end »; but it is established that this is a causal or material predication: therefore it seems that the subject of virtue is reason itself, that is, the rational power.

2. Likewise, virtue is the principle of meriting and of meritorious and praiseworthy work: therefore it has its being about that power about whose act praise and merit consist; but such is the rational power, namely free choice: therefore the same seems to follow as before2.

3. Likewise, virtue is in that subject in which the soul has the image of God, since the other virtues have their origin from grace, of which the soul is capable through this, that it is an image; but there is no image except through the rational power3: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, every virtue consists about the choice of the good and the flight from evil4; but the elective habit belongs to the rational power properly so called alone: therefore it seems that every virtue is properly in the rational part of the soul itself.

5. Likewise, virtue is in the genus of the honorable, according to what Tully holds5; but the good which is honorable, and its opposite, is the object of the rational virtue alone, since the sensitive powers are borne only toward those goods which are of the genus of the advantageous: therefore it seems that virtue is only in the rational part of the soul.

On the contrary: 1. Fortitude is in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible; but these are not rational, except because they obey reason, according to what the Philosopher says at the end of the New Ethics6b: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues do not have their being in the rational part, but rather in the sensible part.

2. Likewise, the habit of virtue, expediting and rectifying, is in that part about which proneness and obliquity have their being; but these two are most of all about the sensible motive [power], which indeed are the irascible and concupiscible7: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtue is to be placed in them.

3. Likewise, the habit of virtue is as in its proper subject in that part which more immediately and more proximately elicits the act of the virtue itself; but the acts of temperance and fortitude are elicited immediately from the concupiscible and irascible, which are obedient to reason8: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues are to be placed in them.

4. Likewise, the cardinal virtues are distinguished from the theological, as the customary [virtues] from the intellectual; but the intellectual, as wisdom and understanding and phronesis, are placed in reason properly so called, while the customary are in that part which obeys reason9: therefore it likewise seems that the theological ought to be set in the rational part, and the cardinal in the sensible part, according as it obeys reason.

5. Likewise, the habit of virtue is most of all to be placed in that part which more needs to be rectified; but the part which more needs to be rectified is the sensitive part, since, according to what the Philosopher says10, « the intellect is always right, the imagination right and not right »: since therefore the imagination names the sensitive power, it seems that the cardinal virtues have their being about it.

Conclusion.

According to the theologians all the cardinal virtues are to be placed in the rational part of the soul, insofar as that is called rational which participates in reason.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, since "rational" is said in two ways, according to what the Philosopher holds11, namely that which participates in reason, and that which obeys reason. If the rational part is taken broadly, then there is no doubt that all the virtues are in the rational part, whether theological or cardinal, whether intellectual or customary. — But if "rational" is said properly, according as it participates in reason, then some have wished to say that certain cardinal virtues are in the rational part, such as prudence and justice; but certain others are not, but rather in a lower power, which is rational in the broad sense, because it obeys reason, as fortitude and temperance, which are in the irascible and concupiscible.

But although this manner of speaking seems in some way probable according to the moral philosophers; nevertheless according to the theologian it does not seem to be said reasonably, that some cardinal virtues are set in a higher part and some in a lower; since all the cardinal virtues are equal as to the dignity of merit12; they are also all a principle of meriting. And therefore, since merit consists radically about free choice, the virtues have their being only in those powers, whether cardinal or theological, in which the freedom of choice is found. — On account of which, since the freedom of choice is only in the rational part of the soul, according as that is called rational which participates in reason13; it is necessary that the remaining cardinal virtues be placed in that part. And this their dignity necessarily requires; since they themselves have their origin from grace, and are perfections of the soul far nobler than knowledge itself, which is placed as in its subject in the rational and intellective part of the soul14. — And therefore the reasons which are for this position are to be granted.

But for the elucidation of the objections which are urged to the contrary, another manner of distinguishing "rational" according to the theologian must be noted. For in one way "rational" is distinguished against the sensitive part; in another way it is distinguished against the affective power. According as it is distinguished against the sensitive power, so all the virtues are in this rational part. But according as it is distinguished against the affective power, so not all the virtues are in it, but only those which direct in discerning, as faith and prudence; while the others are placed in the affective power, which indeed is a part of free choice and is called the will, according as it is joined to reason; it is also called concupiscible and irascible, according as it is variously affected and moved. For the will is nothing other than an affection or a ratiocinated appetite15. But every affection or appetite is either the irascible power or the concupiscible, which two powers, according as they are parts of free choice, are rational; and in them can be theological and cardinal virtues: theological, inasmuch as they are immediately raised up into God, loving Him and leaning upon Him; but cardinal, inasmuch as they are occupied about the created good. And by this the response to the objections is for the most part clear.

To the arguments for the negative part [To the opposed]:

To 1. To that16 which is first objected to the contrary, that fortitude and temperance are in the irascible and concupiscible, and these alone are rational, because they obey reason; it must be said that without doubt these two cardinal virtues, as regards the habits underlying them, are placed in those two powers, although as regards the primary ground of meriting and ordering every virtue is to be placed in free choice. And these two are compossible, for the reason that free choice is not a power distinct in reality from the rational, concupiscible, and irascible17. And therefore that assumption is false, that the concupiscible and irascible are rational only because they obey reason. — For in us there is a twofold irascible and concupiscible, namely rational and sensible: the rational, according to which we are immediately born to be borne into God, and in which we have communion with the Angels, and in which according to diverse comparisons the theological and cardinal virtue is to be placed. But the other is the sensible irascible and concupiscible18, which is called rational only because it obeys reason. And in these the freedom of choice does not consist, nor is the cardinal virtue placed in these as in a subject, although through frequent habituation those powers may in some way not incongruously be said to be made apt; that aptitude, however, is not of the essence of the virtue, but rather annexed to it.

To 2. To that which is objected, that proneness and obliquity have their being about the sensible part, because it is born to be subject to reason; it must be said that obliquity has its being about some power in two ways: either because it is begun in it, or because it is consummated. In the first way obliquity is in the sensible part, namely as regards its beginning, and this on account of the inclination of the tinder [fomes]. But in the second way it is in the rational part on account of consent and deliberate choice, and in this principally resides the obliquity of vice, and by the opposite the rectitude of virtue, and therefore not19 in the sensible part, but more in the rational.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the act of the virtue of fortitude and temperance is elicited immediately from the concupiscible and irascible; it must be said that this is true, speaking of the human concupiscible and irascible; but if we speak of the brute and sensible concupiscible and irascible, then through those powers the act of these virtues is not elicited immediately, but rather as it were consequently: because, the rational concupiscible and irascible having been rectified by the habit of virtue, consequently the brute concupiscible and irascible itself is rectified, which have to be subjected to and to serve them. — Hence just as, the will having been rectified in dispensing, consequently the hand is rectified for bestowing the benefit, yet liberality is not in the hand as in a subject, but in the will itself; so it is to be understood in the matter proposed.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the customary virtues are placed in that part which obeys reason; it must be said that this is not because the habit of the customary virtue, according as it is a virtue, has its being in that sensible part which obeys reason; but because from a certain custom of doing well a certain aptitude is left in that part. And therefore that argument can be answered in two ways: first indeed, because the case of the cardinal virtue and of the customary is not alike, according as it is customary: for the cardinal virtue names a habit directing in the works of the elective [power], while the customary, beyond this, names a habit acquired from frequently acting well20. — It can also be answered otherwise, by the destruction of the minor: because the customary virtue, although in some way it is in the sensible part as in something executing and subjacent; yet in the rational part it is principally as in something commanding the act of the virtue and presiding over the sensible power.

To 5. To that which is objected, that the sensible power more needs to be rectified than the intellectual; it must be said that it is false, because the rectitude and the obliquation which is imputed to man, this is what has its origin from the part of reason. — And as to what it objects, that the intellect is always right; it must be said that this is understood of the intellect according as it regards the eternal laws and from them receives and in them contemplates, but not however according as it is moved in any way whatever from itself, nay rather it is frequently oblique and erroneous21. — Or it can be said that this is understood of the intellect according as it is the reception of the most evident principles in any science, such as the axioms, about which it does not happen to err22, but not as it has to be applied to special works; and therefore for the directing of these the virtues are necessary to it. And on account of this that argument does not conclude, because it proceeded from a false assumption.

Scholion

I. In solving this question a twofold manner of speaking must be distinguished. St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2; Summa I-II q. 56 a. 4) teaches that the irascible and concupiscible themselves, which are in the sensible appetite, are the subject of virtue, namely of temperance and fortitude, insofar as they participate in reason through this, that they are born to obey reason; whence he holds that this virtue « is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason » (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). The same is taught by Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2). With many others St. Bonaventure holds that in the sensible concupiscible and irascible the cardinal virtue is not placed as in a subject; but he adds: « Although through frequent habituation those powers may in some way not incongruously be said to be made apt; that aptitude, however, is not of the essence of the virtue, but rather annexed to it » (here ad 1; cfr. ad 4). To this manner of speaking are favorable also Blessed Albert and Ulric (in Dionysius the Carthusian), Richard of Mediavilla, Henry of Ghent, Scotus, and Dionysius the Carthusian, who (here q. 2) says: « I confess that I am more inclined to the position of those saying that they are subjectively in the higher part of the soul, and in the lower part by a certain impression and reflection ». — But the controversy is reduced almost to the question whether those dispositions or impressions in the sensitive part properly merit the name of virtue, or not; on which Richard of Mediavilla says more (here a. 1, q. 1). But the same difference in manner of speaking occurs also in the question concerning the subject of sin and vice; on which see II Sent. d. 41 a. 2 q. 2, and the scholion, as well as St. Thomas, Summa I-II q. 74 a. 2 ff. — On the twofold irascible and concupiscible (here ad 1) cfr. above, d. 26 a. 2 q. 5, in the scholion. — Note also at the beginning of the corpus the special manner of speaking concerning the rational, and cfr. above, p. 716, note 11.

II. Besides those cited: Scotus, here q. unica n. 4 ff. — Blessed Albert, here a. 2 ad 6, 7. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 4 q. 22. — Durandus, here q. 1.

III. In the number four of the cardinal virtues all agree; but in assigning the reasons for the aptness and sufficiency of this number the masters enter upon diverse ways. St. Thomas in the Summa (I-II q. 61 a. 2) assigns a twofold way, namely one according to the formal principles, the other according to the subjects; and the second agrees with the seventh, which our author judges to be more probable (cfr. here, the dubia on the letter).

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Sive pro omnibus potentiis animae rationalis. Vide quaest. seq. Cfr. etiam tom. II. pag. 600, nota 1, ubi describitur totum potentiale. — Pro potentialibus, quam lectionem restituimus ex codd. ATOYZbb, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 rationabilibus, alii codd. et Vat. rationalibus, cod. K rationalis, et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. possibilibus.
    Or, "for all the powers of the rational soul." See the following question. Cfr. also tom. II, p. 600, note 1, where the whole potential is described. — For potentialibus, the reading we have restored from codices ATOYZbb, other codices and editions 1, 2 read rationabilibus, other codices and the Vatican rationalibus, codex K rationalis, and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales possibilibus.
  2. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 3. q. 1. ad 8. — Paulo inferius pro partialiter edd. particulariter.
    Cfr. II Sent. d. 24 p. 1 a. 3 q. 1 ad 8. — A little below, for partialiter the editions read particulariter.
  3. Cfr. supra pag. 171, nota 1; pag. 226, nota 1; pag. 528, nota 5.
    Cfr. above, p. 171, note 1; p. 226, note 1; p. 528, note 5.
  4. Vide supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. opinionem primam eiusque improbationem. — Paulo ante pro de omnibus actibus, quibus verbis Vat. addit vel accidentibus, cod. V substituit de aliis actibus.
    See above, d. 27 a. 1 q. 1 in the corpus, the first opinion and its rejection. — A little before, for de omnibus actibus, to which words the Vatican adds vel accidentibus, codex V substitutes de aliis actibus.
  5. Aristot., V. Ethic. c. 1. inter alia dicit: « Adde quod in proverbium dicimus: Iustitia in se virtutes complectitur omnes... Itaque neque haec iustitia pars virtutis, sed integra virtus est, neque huic opposita iniustitia pars vitii, sed integra est vitiositas ». De iustitia speciali (quae est ad alterum) agitur ibid. c. 2. seqq. — Paulo post pro et hoc Vat. et haec.
    Aristotle, Ethics V c. 1, among other things says: « Add that we say in a proverb: Justice embraces in itself all the virtues... And so neither is this justice a part of virtue, but the whole virtue, nor is the injustice opposed to it a part of vice, but the whole viciousness ». Of special justice (which is toward another) it is treated ibid. c. 2 ff. — A little after, for et hoc the Vatican has et haec. [Tully's honestum here equated with Aristotle's general justice.]
  6. Cod. Z subdit cardinales. [Marker on Soliloquiis, fundam. 1.] — Cfr. Bernard., I. de Considerat. c. 8. n. 9. seqq.
    Codex Z adds cardinales. [Marker on Soliloquia, fundamentum 1.] — Cfr. Bernard, On Consideration I c. 8 n. 9 ff.
  7. Codd. a n i et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. discretae (secundum Du Cange, Glossarium etc., discretus idem dicit ac discernens, prudens), pro quo fortasse melius esset discretivae, alii plurimi codd. directae, Vat. directivae. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 3. [Marker on Novae Ethicae, sed contra 1.]
    Codices a, n, i and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales read discretae (according to Du Cange's Glossarium etc., discretus means the same as discerning, prudent), for which perhaps it would be better to read discretivae; very many other codices read directae, the Vatican directivae. Cfr. II Sent. d. 24 p. 1 a. 3. [Marker on New Ethics, sed contra 1.]
  8. Edd. omittunt quin habet prudentiam. Superius pro potentiam rationalem cod. F ipsam vim rationalem.
    The editions omit quin habet prudentiam. Above, for potentiam rationalem codex F reads ipsam vim rationalem.
  9. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. [Marker on obedientes rationi, sed contra 3.]
    See the scholion on the preceding question. [Marker on obedient to reason, sed contra 3.]
  10. [In hac parte, sed contra 4: textual continuity with the p.716 band.] Cfr. supra fundam. 4.
    [In this part, sed contra 4: continues into the p.716 footer band.] Cfr. above, fundamentum 4.
  11. Sed contra 5: marker on Philosophus (Aristot., III. de Anima); vide infra notam ad textum.
    Sed contra 5: marker on the Philosopher (Aristotle, On the Soul III); see the note below on the text. <!-- p.716 (Respondeo band, nn.1–11) -->
  12. Libr. I. c. 6. n. 13. Cfr. supra pag. 448, nota 9. — Quoad hanc definitionem virtutis in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 16. a. 2. q. 6. dicitur: Non est formalis praedicatio, quia virtus non est ipsa ratio, sed est habitus in ratione existens, quantum est ex parte cognitionis etc. Cfr. supra pag. 616, nota 8. et pag. 528, nota 5.
    Book I c. 6 n. 13. Cfr. above, p. 448, note 9. — Concerning this definition of virtue, in the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collatio 16 a. 2 q. 6, it is said: It is not a formal predication, because virtue is not reason itself, but is a habit existing in reason, as far as it is on the side of cognition, etc. Cfr. above, p. 616, note 8, and p. 528, note 5.
  13. Cfr. Aristot., 1. Ethic. c. 12; II. c. 5; III. c. 1. seqq.
    Cfr. Aristotle, Ethics I c. 12; II c. 5; III c. 1 ff.
  14. Vide August., XIV. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6. et c. 8. n. 11. — Quod virtutes aliquo modo ortum habeant a gratia, vide infra q. 5. et in scholio. — In maiori pro in eo [cod. G eodem] subiecto codd. AFTVbb in eo solo. Vocabulum ceterae hic idem valet ac cunctae; cfr. supra pag. 880, nota 1.
    See Augustine, On the Trinity XIV c. 3 n. 6 and c. 8 n. 11. — That the virtues in some way have their origin from grace, see below q. 5 and in the scholion. — In the major premise, for in eo [cod. G eodem] subiecto codices AFTVbb read in eo solo. The word ceterae here is equivalent to cunctae ("all"); cfr. above, p. 880, note 1.
  15. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, virtutem declarat habitum electivum in mediocritate quantum ad nos consistentem etc. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 671, nota 9. Ibid. pag. 599, nota 5. vide de minori.
    Aristotle, Ethics II c. 6, declares virtue to be an elective habit consisting in a mean relative to us, etc. Cfr. tom. II p. 671 note 9. Ibid. p. 599 note 5, see concerning the minor.
  16. Libr. II. Rhetor. c. 53. et 54. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 593, nota 1, ubi et explicatio minoris habetur.
    Book II of the Rhetoric c. 53 and 54. Cfr. tom. II p. 593 note 1, where also the explanation of the minor is had.
  17. Sive in fine Ethic. ex Graeco in Latinum translatae (cfr. tom. I. pag. 10, nota 2.). Docetur ibi, quod in anima forsse sit quidpiam praeter rationem, quod ei adversetur ac resistat; « quod tamen etiam ipsum rationis esse particeps videtur... continentis enim rationi obtemperat. Atque etiam magis forsse in temperante ac forti obediens est; omnia enim in his rationi consonant. Esse igitur irrationalis quoque haec duplex videtur; nam vegetalis nullo modo cum ratione communicat; concupiscibilis autem et omnino appetibilis particeps rationis quodam modo est, quatenus ipsi obedit imperioque eius obtemperat ». — De maiori cfr. Aristot., de Virtut. et vitiis, c. 1.
    Or, at the end of the Ethics translated from Greek into Latin (cfr. tom. I p. 10 note 2). It is there taught that in the soul there is perhaps something beside reason, which opposes and resists it; « which yet itself also seems to be a participant of reason... for in the continent man it obeys reason. And still more perhaps in the temperate and the brave man it is obedient; for all things in these are consonant with reason. So the irrational also seems to be twofold; for the vegetative in no way communicates with reason; but the concupiscible and altogether the appetible is in a certain way a participant of reason, insofar as it obeys it and complies with its command ». — On the major, cfr. Aristotle, On Virtues and Vices c. 1.
  18. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 50. (c. 10.): Appetitus autem movet praeter rationem; concupiscentia enim appetitus quidam est. Cfr. ibid. text. 47. (c. 9.). — In initio arg. post in ea [cod. G eadem] parte cod. Z subdit solum.
    Aristotle, On the Soul III text 50 (c. 10): But appetite moves beside reason; for concupiscence is a certain appetite. Cfr. ibid. text 47 (c. 9). — At the beginning of the argument, after in ea [cod. G eadem] parte codex Z adds solum.
  19. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 10: Hae [fortitudo et temperantia] enim irrationalium partium esse virtutes videntur. Cfr. de Virtut. et vitiis, c. 2. — Paulo ante pro actum ipsius virtutis cod. Z actum suum.
    Aristotle, Ethics III c. 10: For these [fortitude and temperance] seem to be virtues of the irrational parts. Cfr. On Virtues and Vices c. 2. — A little before, for actum ipsius virtutis codex Z reads actum suum.
  20. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 13: Virtus quoque secundum hanc differentiam [quatenus scil. rationem proprie in se habet, aut rationi obtemperat] distinguitur; nam alias ex ipsis intellectivas, alias morales dicimus; sapientiam, perspicaciam [σύνεσιν] et prudentiam [φρόνησιν] intellectivas; liberalitatem et temperantiam morales. — Pro in ratione codd. H U in ratione virtute, edd. in rationali parte.
    Aristotle, Ethics I c. 13: Virtue also is distinguished according to this difference [namely insofar as it properly has reason in itself, or obeys reason]; for some of these we call intellective, others moral; wisdom, sagacity [σύνεσις] and prudence [φρόνησις] intellective; liberality and temperance moral. — For in ratione codices H U read in ratione virtute, the editions in rationali parte.
  21. Libr. III. de Anima, text. 51. (c. 10.). In textu origin. ante phantasia recta habetur appetitus autem et.
    Book III of On the Soul, text 51 (c. 10). In the original text, before phantasia recta ("the imagination right") there is appetitus autem et.
  22. Libr. I. Ethic. c. 13. Cfr. supra nota 6. et 9. — Rationale, in quantum rationem participat, ab aliis, ut a S. Thoma, appellatur etiam rationale per essentiam; et in quantum rationi obedit, rationale per participationem.
    Book I of the Ethics c. 13. Cfr. above, notes 6 and 9. — The rational, inasmuch as it participates in reason, is also called by others, as by St. Thomas, rational by essence; and inasmuch as it obeys reason, rational by participation. <!-- p.717 (replies band, nn.1–7) -->
  23. Vide infra d. 36. q. 5. in fine corp. — Quoad rationem seq. cfr. supra pag. 381, nota 1, et verba Alani ab Insulis, tom. II. pag. 892, nota 2. allata. — Subinde pro principium cod. A exhibet principia et paulo inferius cum codd. Zbb verbis liberum arbitrium praemittit ipsum.
    See below, d. 36 q. 5 at the end of the corpus. — Concerning the following ground cfr. above, p. 381 note 1, and the words of Alan of Lille cited tom. II p. 892 note 2. — Thereafter for principium codex A exhibits principia, and a little below, with codices Zbb, it prefixes ipsum to the words liberum arbitrium.
  24. Cod. V dicitur per participationem.
    Codex V reads is called by participation.
  25. Cfr. August., I. de Morib. Eccles. c. 15. n. 25. — Guliel. Mara, hic q. 1, ex August., IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 5. et XIV. de Trin. c. 9. (cfr. supra pag. 680, nota 6.) nec non ex Beda, super Exod. 25, 31. (II. de Tabernac. et vasis eius, c. 11.) adiungit, quod hae virtutes sint in spiritibus separatis. — Paulo inferius pro notandus est codd. FK notandum est, quod est, et deinde pro contra partem cod. bb contra potentiam; Vat. post contra partem subiungit sive potentiam.
    Cfr. Augustine, On the Morals of the Church I c. 15 n. 25. — William de la Mare, here q. 1, from Augustine, City of God IX c. 5 and On the Trinity XIV c. 9 (cfr. above, p. 680 note 6), as well as from Bede, on Exod. 25, 31 (II On the Tabernacle and its Vessels c. 11), adds that these virtues are in the separated spirits. — A little below, for notandus est codices FK read notandum est, quod est, and then for contra partem codex bb contra potentiam; the Vatican after contra partem adds sive potentiam.
  26. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 42. (c. 9.): « In ratiocinativa enim voluntas fit » (cfr. ibid. text. 46.), et text. 50. (c. 10.): Voluntas enim appetitus est (cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. 1. q. 6. ad 2.). — Cod. a ratiocinationis, cod. V rationalis, Vat. ratiocinativus. Superius pro liberi arbitrii Vat. liberum arbitrium. Circa finem corp. pro innitendo, quae lectio est codd. AEG U T f Z bb, edd. cum pluribus codd. inhaerendo, cod. K adhaerendo, cod. V uniendo.
    Aristotle, On the Soul III text 42 (c. 9): « For in the ratiocinative [part] the will arises » (cfr. ibid. text 46), and text 50 (c. 10): For the will is an appetite (cfr. II Sent. d. 25 p. 1 q. 6 ad 2). — Codex a reads ratiocinationis, codex V rationalis, the Vatican ratiocinativus. Above, for liberi arbitrii the Vatican reads liberum arbitrium. Toward the end of the corpus, for innitendo, which is the reading of codices AEG U T f Z bb, the editions with several codices read inhaerendo, codex K adhaerendo, codex V uniendo.
  27. Codd. T U Z bb addunt enim.
    Codices T U Z bb add enim.
  28. Vide verba Bonaventurae, supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. in scholio allata.
    See the words of Bonaventure cited above, d. 26 a. 2 q. 5 in the scholion.
  29. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 12. (c. 9.): In irrationabili [parte] concupiscentia et ira. — Pro sensibilis edd. hic et infra etiam pluries cum pluribus codd. sensualis. Paulo ante pro comparationes cod. G rationes, codd. AV operationes. Paulo inferius pro libertas arbitrii edd. liberum arbitrium, et dein habilitas pro habilitatio.
    Aristotle, On the Soul III text 12 (c. 9): In the irrational [part] concupiscence and anger. — For sensibilis the editions here and below, also several times with several codices, read sensualis. A little before, for comparationes codex G reads rationes, codices AV operationes. A little below, for libertas arbitrii the editions read liberum arbitrium, and then habilitas for habilitatio. <!-- p.718 (replies + scholion band, nn.1–4) -->
  30. Cod. U supplet est. Paulo superius pro deliberatam cod. A habet deliberativam, et subinde post et in hac edd. repetunt parte. — De hac solut. cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. et d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.
    Codex U supplies est. A little above, for deliberatam codex A has deliberativam, and thereafter after et in hac the editions repeat parte. — On this solution cfr. II Sent. d. 31 a. 1 q. 2 in the corpus and d. 41 a. 2 q. 2.
  31. Cfr. infra q. 5. et dub. 5. — Paulo ante pro habitum dirigentem cod. K substituit habituum dignitatem, et dein pro electivae (cfr. hic fundam. 4.) Vat. electice, codd. EFHTU VZ et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. active, cod. A ratione. — De locutione per interemptionem vide supra pag. 640, nota 2.
    Cfr. below, q. 5 and dub. 5. — A little before, for habitum dirigentem codex K substitutes habituum dignitatem, and then for electivae (cfr. here, fundamentum 4) the Vatican reads electice, codices EFHTU VZ and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales active, codex A ratione. — On the expression per interemptionem ("by destruction") see above, p. 640 note 2.
  32. Vide II. Sent. d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. ad 2. et d. 24. p. 2. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. — Paulo superius post non autem Vat. inserit secundum quod, et versus initium solut. pro rectitudo substituit rectificatio.
    See II Sent. d. 5 a. 3 q. 1 ad 2 and d. 24 p. 2 a. 1 q. 1 ad 2. — A little above, after non autem the Vatican inserts secundum quod, and toward the beginning of the solution it substitutes rectificatio for rectitudo.
  33. Cfr. supra pag. 481, nota 1. et pag. 482, nota 2.
    Cfr. above, p. 481 note 1 and p. 482 note 2.
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