← Back to Distinction 25

Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus
p. 597

Distinctio XXV. Pars I. Articulus unicus. Quaestio III.

Utrum liberum arbitrium complectatur simul rationem et voluntatem.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium complectatur simul rationem et voluntatem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus de Quinque Responsionibus12: « Cum de libero arbitrio loquimur, non de parte animae loquimur, sed de tota4 »: ergo non tantummodo comprehendit cognitivam, immo etiam affectivam.

2. Item, Damascenus5: « Anima libero arbitrio appetit, libere iudicat3, libere impetum facit, libere disponit, libere vult, libere eligit »; sed hic concernuntur actus rationis et voluntatis: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum per obiectum6; hoc nihil est, quia ipse idem dicit, quod « in eo coniugatae sunt virtutes cognitivae et vitales »: complectitur ergo liberum arbitrium et vim motivam et vim cognitivam.

p. 598

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per definitionem liberi arbitrii, quam ponit Bernardus in libro de Libero Arbitrio7, quod definiens dicit, quod « liberum arbitrium est consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem et rationis indeclinabile iudicium »: ergo simul complectitur rationem et voluntatem.

4. Item, per aliam definitionem Augustini8, quam Magister posuit distinctione praecedenti9, quae talis est: « Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis »; sed facultas voluntatis surgit ex ipsa voluntate, facultas rationis ex ipsa ratione: ergo facultas voluntatis et rationis comprehendit utramque potentiam. Sed liberum arbitrium est talis facultas: ergo etc.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia peccatum et culpa est in solo libero arbitrio10; sed aliquod peccatum est in ratione, ut peccatum infidelitatis, aliquod in voluntate: ergo liberum arbitrium comprehendit in se rationem et voluntatem.

6. Item, gratia et virtus est in solo libero arbitrio; sed tres virtutes theologicae dicuntur esse in rationali, concupiscibili et irascibili11: ergo liberum arbitrium omnes illas potentias habet circumplecti.

Sed contra: 1. Liberum arbitrium non potest cogi, ratio autem potest cogi: ergo liberum arbitrium rationem ipsam non comprehendit. Quod autem ratio aliquando cogatur, planum est; quod liberum arbitrium non possit cogi, hoc indicat ipsum nomen; si enim posset cogi, non esset liberum12.

2. Item, ratio est eorum quae sunt a nobis, et quae non sunt a nobis; sed liberum arbitrium solum est respectu eorum quae sunt a nobis: ergo in plus est ratio quam liberum arbitrium; ergo liberum arbitrium non comprehendit in se rationem.

3. Item, quod non comprehendat voluntatem, videtur. — Voluntas nostra respectu aliquorum est impermutabilis; sed quidquid liberum arbitrium nostrum appetit, permutabiliter appetit13: ergo etc.

4. Item, voluntas est possibilium et impossibilium; sed liberum arbitrium est possibilium tantum14: ergo ad plura se extendit voluntas quam liberum arbitrium: ergo liberum arbitrium non comprehendit in se rationem et voluntatem.

5. Item, ratio et voluntas sunt diversae potentiae15; sed liberum arbitrium est una potentia, cum habeat actum unum, videlicet eligere sive consentire: ergo impossibile est, liberum arbitrium comprehendere in se rationem et voluntatem.

6. Item, si liberum arbitrium comprehendit in se rationem et voluntatem: aut ergo sicut partes subiectivas, aut sicut partes integrantes16. Si sicut partes subiectivas: ergo tota ratio liberi arbitrii salvatur in ratione, et tota ratio in voluntate. Cum igitur alia potentia sit ratio, et alia voluntas; et numerato inferiori, numeratur superius: videtur ergo, quod in quolibet homine sint duo libera arbitria; quod manifeste falsum est. Si autem sicut partes integrantes; sed contra: ex duabus potentiis nunquam fit una tertia potentia, maxime cum illae potentiae manent distinctae, et actus earum sunt ad invicem ordinati, ita quod unus est ante alterum16. Si ergo ratio et voluntas sunt potentiae distinctae, et actus earum sunt ordinati ad invicem secundum prius et posterius; videtur, quod liberum arbitrium ex his integrari non possit tanquam ex principiis constitutivis; et ita videtur, quod liberum arbitrium voluntatem et rationem non possit comprehendere.

Conclusio

Liberum arbitrium comprehendit simul rationem atque voluntatem.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod liberum arbitrium simul comprehendit et rationem et voluntatem; et hoc manifestat ipsa nominatio17, ipsa etiam notificatio, manifestat etiam suae proprietatis inquisitio. — Nominatio manifestat. Dicitur enim liberum, et dicitur arbitrium; et arbitrium est ipsius rationis, libertas vero ipsius voluntatis, ad cuius nutum et imperium moveri habent cetera, quae sunt in nobis. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus de Quinque Responsionibus18: « Liberum arbitrium dicitur ab arbitrando, quia a rationali parte, quid eligat quidve recuset, nomen accepit ».

p. 599

Hoc etiam patet per eius notificationem. Dicitur enim esse facultas voluntatis et rationis, sive consensus rationis et voluntatis.

Postremo illud amplius manifestatur per suae proprietatis inquisitionem. Liberum enim arbitrium, sive nominet potentiam sive habitum, nominat ipsam potentiam ut dominam, vel dominium illius potentiae; et hoc planum est ex ipso nomine libertatis. — Attendendum autem, quod dominium alicuius potentiae19 potest esse dupliciter; aut respectu obiecti, aut respectu actus. Dominium potentiae respectu obiecti attenditur in hoc, quod possit in illud et in amplius, sicut equus, qui potest ferre decem modios, dominium habet super tres modios ad portandum, quia praevalet et cum facilitate portat. Dominium autem potentiae respectu actus attenditur in hoc, quod potentia potest esse in actu et cessare ab actu secundum suum imperium et secundum proprium motum. Ad hoc autem, quod aliqua potentia hoc dominium habeat, necesse est, quod ipsa possit movere se ipsam, et quod possit se super actum suum reflectere. Nisi enim posset se super actum suum reflectere, nunquam posset illum refrenare; nisi posset se ipsam movere, nec posset in illum exire, quando vellet. Reflectere autem se super se, hoc est virtutis cognitivae, sublimatae a materia, quae quidem est ratio. Movere autem se, hoc est virtutis appetitivae, rationem consequentis.

Ad hoc igitur, ut illud dominium sit in anima, necesse est, quod habeat et rationem et voluntatem. Nam si rationem tantum haberet et non voluntatem, per quam moveret; posset se super actum suum reflectere, sed non posset movere20 vel imperare. Si vero appetitum solum haberet et non rationem, posset utique movere et in actum exire; sed quia non posset se super actum suum reflectere, non posset utique refrenare, et ita dominium non haberet. — Sicut igitur ex concursu virtutis duorum hominum resultat quaedam21 facultas ad portandum unum lapidem, quem non posset ferre alter eorum; et sicut ex concursu patris familias et matris familias ad disponendum regimen domus resultat una potestas, ita quod altera non sufficeret; et sicut ex concursu virtutis manus et oculi resultat potestas scribendi, ad quod altera earum non sufficeret: sic ex concursu rationis et voluntatis resultat quaedam libertas sive quoddam dominium ad aliquid faciendum et disponendum.

Et sic patet, quod liberum arbitrium rationem complectitur et voluntatem. Patet etiam, quod cum liberum arbitrium sit quaedam potestas sive quoddam dominium resultans ex coniunctione istarum duarum potentiarum, scilicet rationis et voluntatis, quod optime nominatur per hoc, quod dicitur liberum arbitrium, non uno nomine, sed composito, ut unum nomen respondeat rationi, et alterum voluntati. — Optime etiam22 definitur, cum dicitur esse facultas rationis et voluntatis. Facultas enim non tantum nominat potentiam, immo facilitatem potentiae, ex qua non tantum potens est, sed etiam praepotens est ad exeundum in actum; et ideo facultas dicit potestatem sive dominium, quod quidem dicitur esse rationis simul et voluntatis, quia non est unius, nisi concomitante altera. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes probantes, quod liberum arbitrium rationem comprehendit et voluntatem.

Ad argumenta ad oppositum:

Ad 1, 2, 3, 4. Ad rationes vero ad oppositum facile est respondere. Quod enim obiicitur, quod non comprehendit totam rationem, nec totam voluntatem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed comprehendit solum ipsam potentiam cognitivam, in quantum iuncta est affectivae, et affectivam, in quantum iuncta est cognitivae; unde dicit affectum deliberativum, vel deliberationem voluntariam. Et propterea, quia ratio nominat ipsam potentiam cognitivam ut ordinatam ad affectivam, et voluntas ipsam affectivam ut regulatam et ratiocinatam a cognitiva; hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium potius dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis quam intellectus et affectus. Non enim comprehendit totam cognitivam, sicut duae primae rationes ostendunt, nec totam affectivam, sicut ostendunt duae sequentes, sed aliquid huius et aliquid illius, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem inductae.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium est potentia una, cum habeat actum unum; dicendum, quod quamvis actus liberi arbitrii, utpote eligere et consentire, unus esse videatur; nihilominus tamen implicat in se actus diversos. Consensus enim dicit concordiam aliquorum duorum, et ita concursum actuum rationis et voluntatis in unum. Eligere etiam includit in se rationis iudicium et voluntatis appetitum23; et ita, quemadmodum consentire et eligere, etsi unus actus esse videatur, tamen diversos actus in se includit: sic liberum arbitrium, etsi videatur una potentia, tamen diversas in se potentias complectitur, ita quod ex concursu illarum se invicem adiuvantium resultat in nobis regimen potestatis perfectae.

p. 600

Ad 6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, utrum complectatur eas sicut partes integrales aut subiectivas; dicendum, quod non complectitur eas omnino sicut totum integrale, nec omnino sicut totum universale, sed sicut totum potentiale24, quod partim habet naturam totius integri, partim naturam totius universalis: naturam totius integri in hoc, quod in una potentiarum non potest salvari absque altera; naturam vero totius universalis habet, quia ex earum concursu ad invicem quamlibet earum denominat. Unde, sicut duo homines facultatem habent ferendi lapidem, quam neuter per se habet, et illa25 facultate potentia cuiuslibet eorum dicitur esse facilis, nec tamen est una sine altera; sic intelligendum est in proposito. Et rursus, sicut similitudo est in duobus similibus, ita quod non est in uno sine altero, et tamen quilibet eorum denominatur similis nec dicuntur esse duae similitudines, sed una; sic libertas dicitur esse in ratione et voluntate, ita quod utraque illarum potentiarum est libera ex coniunctione sui cum alia; nec tamen sunt in eis duae libertates, sed una. Et sic patent obiecta26.

---

English Translation

Distinction XXV. Part I. Sole Article. Question III.

Whether free choice embraces reason and will together.

Third, it is asked whether free choice embraces reason and will together. And that it does, is shown.

1. Augustine, On the Five Responses12: « When we speak of free choice, we do not speak of a part of the soul, but of the whole4 »: therefore it does not comprehend only the cognitive [power], but indeed also the affective.

2. Likewise, Damascene5: « By free choice the soul desires, freely judges3, freely makes its impulse, freely disposes, freely wills, freely chooses »; but here the acts of reason and of will are concerned: therefore etc. If you should say that this is said by reason of the object6; this is nothing, because the same author himself says that « in it the cognitive and the vital powers are conjoined »: therefore free choice embraces both the motive power and the cognitive power.

3. Likewise, this same thing is seen from the definition of free choice which Bernard sets down in his book On Free Choice7, who in defining it says that « free choice is consent on account of the will's inamissible liberty and reason's undeviating judgment »: therefore it embraces reason and will together.

4. Likewise, from another definition of Augustine8, which the Master set down in the preceding distinction9, which is this: « Free choice is a faculty of will and of reason »; but the faculty of will arises from the will itself, the faculty of reason from reason itself: therefore the faculty of will and of reason comprehends both powers. But free choice is such a faculty: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason, because sin and fault is in free choice alone10; but some sin is in the reason, as the sin of unbelief, some in the will: therefore free choice comprehends in itself reason and will.

6. Likewise, grace and virtue is in free choice alone; but the three theological virtues are said to be in the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible11: therefore free choice has the power to embrace all those faculties.

On the contrary: 1. Free choice cannot be compelled, but reason can be compelled: therefore free choice does not comprehend reason itself. That reason is sometimes compelled is plain; that free choice cannot be compelled, the very name indicates this; for if it could be compelled, it would not be free12.

2. Likewise, reason is of those things which are in our power, and of those which are not in our power; but free choice is only with respect to those things which are in our power: therefore reason is more extensive than free choice; therefore free choice does not comprehend reason in itself.

3. Likewise, that it does not comprehend will is seen. — Our will with respect to certain things is unchangeable; but whatever our free choice desires, it desires changeably13: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, will is of the possible and the impossible; but free choice is of the possible only14: therefore will extends to more things than free choice: therefore free choice does not comprehend in itself reason and will.

5. Likewise, reason and will are diverse powers15; but free choice is one power, since it has one act, namely to choose or to consent: therefore it is impossible that free choice comprehend in itself reason and will.

6. Likewise, if free choice comprehends in itself reason and will: then either as subjective parts, or as integral parts16. If as subjective parts: then the whole account of free choice is preserved in reason, and the whole account in will. Since therefore reason is one power, and will another; and when the inferior is numbered, the superior is numbered: it seems therefore that in any man there are two free choices; which is manifestly false. But if as integral parts; then on the contrary: from two powers there is never made a third power, especially when those powers remain distinct, and their acts are ordered to one another, so that one is before the other16. If therefore reason and will are distinct powers, and their acts are ordered to one another according to prior and posterior; it seems that free choice cannot be made integral out of these as out of constitutive principles; and so it seems that free choice cannot comprehend will and reason.

Conclusion

Free choice embraces reason and will together.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that free choice comprehends together both reason and will; and this the very naming17 makes manifest, the very notification also, and the inquiry into its property also makes it manifest. — The naming makes it manifest. For it is called free, and it is called choice; and choice belongs to reason, but liberty to will, at whose beck and command the other things that are in us are moved. And this is what Augustine says On the Five Responses18: « Free choice is so called from judging [arbitrando], because from the rational part it has received its name, [namely] what it should choose and what it should refuse ».

This is also plain from its notification. For it is said to be a faculty of will and of reason, or a consent of reason and will.

Lastly that is more fully made manifest through the inquiry into its property. For free choice, whether it name a power or a habit, names that power as mistress, or the dominion of that power; and this is plain from the very name of liberty. — But it must be attended to that the dominion of any power19 can be of two kinds; either with respect to the object, or with respect to the act. The dominion of a power with respect to the object is regarded in this, that it can [extend] to that object and to more, as a horse which can carry ten measures has dominion over three measures to carry, because it prevails and carries them with ease. But the dominion of a power with respect to the act is regarded in this, that the power can be in act and cease from act according to its own command and according to its own motion. Now, for any power to have this dominion, it is necessary that it be able to move itself, and that it be able to reflect upon its own act. For unless it could reflect upon its own act, it could never restrain it; unless it could move itself, it could not go forth into [the act] when it willed. But to reflect upon oneself, this belongs to the cognitive power, sublimated above matter, which indeed is reason. To move oneself, this belongs to the appetitive power, which follows upon reason.

To the end, therefore, that this dominion be in the soul, it is necessary that it have both reason and will. For if it had reason only and not will, by which it might move; it could reflect upon its own act, but could not move20 or command. But if it had appetite alone and not reason, it could indeed move and go forth into act; but because it could not reflect upon its own act, it could not indeed restrain, and so would not have dominion. — As therefore from the concurrence of the strength of two men there results a certain21 capacity for carrying a stone which neither of them could carry; and as from the concurrence of the father of the family and the mother of the family for arranging the governance of the house there results one authority, such that the one alone would not suffice; and as from the concurrence of the strength of the hand and of the eye there results the power of writing, for which neither of them alone would suffice: so from the concurrence of reason and will there results a certain liberty or a certain dominion for doing and disposing something.

And so it is plain that free choice embraces reason and will. It is also plain that, since free choice is a certain authority or a certain dominion resulting from the conjunction of these two powers, namely reason and will, it is best named by this, that it is called free choice, not by one name, but by a composite one, so that one name corresponds to reason, and the other to will. — It is also best22 defined when it is said to be a faculty of reason and of will. For faculty names not only the power, but rather the facility of the power, from which it is not only able, but is even pre-eminently able to go forth into act; and therefore faculty expresses an authority or dominion, which indeed is said to be of reason and of will together, because it is not of the one without the other accompanying. — The arguments proving that free choice comprehends reason and will are therefore to be granted.

To the arguments to the opposite:

To 1, 2, 3, 4. It is easy to respond to the arguments to the opposite. For as to what is objected, that it does not comprehend the whole of reason, nor the whole of will; it must be said that this is true; but it comprehends only the cognitive power itself, insofar as it is joined to the affective, and the affective, insofar as it is joined to the cognitive; whence it expresses a deliberative affect, or a voluntary deliberation. And on that account, because reason names the cognitive power itself as ordered to the affective, and will [names] the affective itself as regulated and reasoned by the cognitive; hence it is that free choice is rather called a faculty of will and of reason than of intellect and of affect. For it does not comprehend the whole of the cognitive [power], as the two first arguments show, nor the whole of the affective, as the two following ones show, but something of this and something of that, as the arguments adduced for the first part show.

To 5. As to what is objected, that free choice is one power since it has one act; it must be said that, although the act of free choice, namely to choose and to consent, is seen to be one; nevertheless it implies in itself diverse acts. For consent expresses the concord of two certain things, and so the concurrence of the acts of reason and will into one. To choose also includes in itself the judgment of reason and the appetite of will23; and so, just as to consent and to choose, although they are seen to be one act, nevertheless include in themselves diverse acts: so free choice, although it is seen to be one power, nevertheless embraces in itself diverse powers, so that from the concurrence of those helping one another there results in us the governance of a perfect authority.

To 6. As to what is objected lastly, whether it embraces them as integral or as subjective parts; it must be said that it does not embrace them altogether as an integral whole, nor altogether as a universal whole, but as a potential whole24, which partly has the nature of an integral whole, partly the nature of a universal whole: the nature of an integral whole in this, that in one of the powers it cannot be preserved without the other; but it has the nature of a universal whole because from their concurrence with one another it denominates each of them. Whence, as two men have the capacity of carrying a stone which neither has of himself, and by that25 capacity the power of each of them is said to be facile, yet it is not one without the other; so it must be understood in the case at hand. And again, as a likeness is in two like things, so that it is not in the one without the other, and yet each of them is denominated like, nor are they said to be two likenesses, but one; so liberty is said to be in reason and will, so that each of those powers is free by the conjunction of itself with the other; nor yet are there in them two liberties, but one. And so the objections are clear26.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic q. 5. — Paulo inferius pro quod faciat Vat. cum edd. 1, 4 quae faciat, et dein pro ipsum Vat. cum ed. 4 perperam ipsam.
    Here, in question 5. — A little below, for quod faciat [that it may do] the Vatican edition with editions 1 and 4 [reads] quae faciat [which it may do], and then for ipsum the Vatican edition with edition 4 wrongly [reads] ipsam.
  2. Cfr. supra pag. 560, nota 12.
    Compare above, page 560, note 12.
  3. Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt et quae iudicat. Paulo inferius post officium cod. A adiicit et nomen; dein pro iudicati cod. T ponit iudicandi.
    The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 omit and which judges. A little below, after office codex A adds and name; then for of the judged codex T puts of the one to be judged.
  4. Sive Hypognosticon, libr. III. c. 5: Cum de libero arbitrio agimus, non de parte hominis agimus, sed de toto.
    Or the Hypognosticon, book III, c. 5: When we treat of free choice, we do not treat of a part of man, but of the whole.
  5. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22, ubi et seq. textus; originale in primo textu plures alios actus libero arbitrio subiectos affert. — Pro Anima libero arbitrio sola Vat. Anima libere arbitratur, quae et dein pro impetum facit cum edd. 2, 3, 4 substituit imperat et facit. Deinde eadem cum edd. 3, 4 sed haec concernunt pro sed hic concernuntur.
    Book II of On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22, where also the following text [is found]; the original in the first text brings forward several other acts subject to free choice. — For Anima libero arbitrio [the soul by free choice] the Vatican edition alone [reads] Anima libere arbitratur [the soul freely deliberates], which [edition], then, for impetum facit [makes its impulse], together with editions 2, 3, 4, substitutes imperat et facit [commands and does]. Then the same [edition], with editions 3, 4, [reads] sed haec concernunt [but these concern] for sed hic concernuntur [but here are concerned].
  6. Vat. cum codd. FLbbee et edd. 3, 4 per causam, cod. aa per obiecta.
    The Vatican edition with codices F L bb ee and editions 3, 4 [reads] per causam [by cause], codex aa per obiecta [by objects].
  7. Cap. 2. n. 4: Is ergo talis consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem et rationis quod secum semper et ubique portat indeclinabile iudicium, non incongrue dicetur, ut arbitror, liberum arbitrium. Cfr. infra dub. 2.
    Chapter 2, n. 4: Such a consent, then, on account of the will's inamissible liberty and the undeviating judgment of reason which it always and everywhere carries with it, will not unfittingly be called, as I think, free choice. Compare below, doubt 2.
  8. Cap. 3. Vide supra pag. 592, nota 6.
    Chapter 3. See above, page 592, note 6.
  9. Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.
    Compare below, distinction 41, article 2, question 2.
  10. Vide III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. d. 26. a. 2. q. 2. et d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — De maiori cfr. ibid. d. 33. a. 1. q. 3.
    See III Sentences, distinction 23, article 1, question 2; distinction 26, article 2, question 2; and distinction 27, article 1, question 1. — On the major compare ibid., distinction 33, article 1, question 3.
  11. Ut fusius ostenditur infra p. II. huius dist. q. 1. seq. — Cod. aa non posset dici nec esse liberum.
    As is shown more fully below, in part II of this distinction, question 1 and following. — Codex aa [reads] it could not be called nor be free.
  12. Cfr. de hoc arg. supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.
    Compare on this argument above, distinction 24, part I, article 2, question 3.
  13. Idem docet Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 2, de voluntate et electione. Vide etiam supra pag. 563, nota 1.
    Aristotle teaches the same, Ethics III, c. 2, concerning will and choice. See also above, page 563, note 1.
  14. Ut ostensum est supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. De minori cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 6. a. 4, ubi ostendit, quod eligere sit ex parte voluntatis principalis actus eorum, quos Damasc., supra pag. 565, nota 1, enumerat.
    As was shown above, distinction 24, part I, article 2, question 1. On the minor compare Alexander of Hales, Summa, part II, question 72, member 6, article 4, where he shows that to choose is, on the side of the will, the principal act of those which Damascene, above page 565, note 1, enumerates.
  15. Petr. Hispanus, Summul. tract. de Locis argum. ait: Totum universale, ut hic sumitur, est quodlibet superius et substantiale, sumtum ad suum inferius, ut animal ad hominem, et homo ad Socratem. Pars subiectiva dicitur quodlibet inferius, sub toto universali sumtum... Totum integrale est, quod est compositum ex partibus, quantitatem habentibus, et pars eius dicitur pars integralis. Pars integralis est, quae cum aliis partibus reddit quantitatem totius.
    Peter of Spain, Summulae, the treatise on the loci of argument, says: A universal whole, as it is taken here, is anything superior and substantial, taken in relation to its inferior, as animal to man, and man to Socrates. A subjective part is said to be anything inferior, taken under a universal whole... An integral whole is that which is composed of parts having quantity, and a part of it is called an integral part. An integral part is that which together with the other parts renders the quantity of the whole.
  16. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.). Avicenna, de Anima sive Sexti Natural. p. V. c. 7: Impossibile est autem, duas virtutes esse unam.
    Compare Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 49 (VI, c. 13). Avicenna, On the Soul or part VI of the Naturals, part V, c. 7: But it is impossible that two powers be one.
  17. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et codd. OR et aliis sic: et hoc non solum manifestat ipsa nominatio, sed etiam ipsa etc. Mox post Dicitur enim codd. 1 W addunt liberum arbitrium.
    The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 and codices O R and others [reads] thus: and this not only the very naming makes manifest, but also the very etc. Soon after For it is called codices 1 W add free choice.
  18. Sive Hypognosticon, libr. III. c. 4. Vide supra pag. 593, nota 5. — Pro quia a rationali codd. F K T Vaa ccco et plures alii nec non ed. 1 quod a rationali.
    Or the Hypognosticon, book III, c. 4. See above, page 593, note 5. — For because from the rational codices F K T V aa ccco and several others, and also edition 1, [read] that from the rational.
  19. In codd. C F I K L O R S W et pluribus aliis atque in ed. 1 desiderantur potentiae, pro qua voce cod. T substituit rei. Paulo inferius post attenditur in hoc, quod cod. O interserit potentia potest esse in actu et cessare ab actu et quod, quae verba ex sequente divisionis membro perperam anticipata sunt. Dein pro praevalet et cum Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 praevalet ad illud quod cum.
    In codices C F I K L O R S W and several others, and in edition 1, of the power is wanting, for which word codex T substitutes of the thing. A little below, after is regarded in this, that codex O inserts the power can be in act and cease from act and that, which words are wrongly anticipated from the following member of the division. Then for it prevails and with the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [reads] it prevails for that which with.
  20. Cod. cc et ed. 1 movere se. Mox pro solum codd. F K P Q T W bb ec suum.
    Codex cc and edition 1 [read] to move itself. Soon, for only codices F K P Q T W bb ec [read] its own.
  21. Vat. voci quaedam praefigit una.
    The Vatican edition prefixes one to the word a certain.
  22. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 autem.
    The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [reads] however.
  23. Ab Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 2, electio definitur « consultatrix appetitio », et dicit idem ibidem: Idcirco vel appetitivus intellectus vel intellectivus appetitus electio est. Cfr. et ibid. III. c. 2.
    By Aristotle, Ethics VI, c. 2, choice is defined as « a deliberative appetite », and he says the same in the same place: Therefore choice is either appetitive intellect or intellective appetite. Compare also ibid., III, c. 2.
  24. Hoc totum potentiale, quod etiam virtuale nuncupatur, et quod tunc habetur, quando plures potentiae sive virtutes congregantur in uno actu, quoad significationem propinquum et finitimum est illi quod vocatur totum potestativum (a quo saepe, sed perperam, sumitur pro toto universali). Hoc dominium esse illud, cui plures potentiae inter se distinctae insunt, ut v. g. animae insunt potentia vegetativa, sensitiva etc., quo S. Thom., S. p. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 1. ait: Totum potentiale adest singulis partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo quodam modo potest praedicari de qualibet parte, sed non ita proprie, sicut totum universale. — Paulo superius pro totum integrale codd. 1 W aa bb cc ee et nonnulli alii cum ed. 1 ponunt totum integrum, dum econtra cod. Y in seqq. bis integralis substituit pro integri.
    This potential whole, which is also called virtual, and which is had when several powers or faculties are gathered in one act, is in its signification near and akin to that which is called the whole of power [totum potestativum] (from which often, but wrongly, it is taken for the universal whole). This is the dominion to which several mutually distinct powers belong, as for example to the soul belong the vegetative, sensitive [powers] etc., concerning which St. Thomas, Summa, part I, question 77, article 1, reply 1, says: A potential whole is present to its single parts according to its whole essence, but not according to its whole power. And therefore in a certain way it can be predicated of any part, but not so properly as a universal whole. — A little above, for integral whole codices 1 W aa bb cc ee and some others, with edition 1, put integral whole [totum integrum], while on the contrary codex Y in what follows twice substitutes integral for of the integral.
  25. Vat. ex illa.
    The Vatican edition [reads] from that.
  26. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion on the preceding question. ---
← Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4→