Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II. Utrum intentio in rationalibus se teneat ex parte intellectus, vel ex parte affectus.

Secundo quaeritur de intentione, secundum quod reperitur in rationalibus: utrum se teneat ex parte intellectus, vel ex parte affectus. Et quod ex parte affectus, videtur.

1. Bernardus ad Eugenium¹: « Ut oculus sit simplex, duo sunt necessaria, videlicet caritas in intentione et veritas in electione »; sed caritas non est nisi in voluntate: ergo si caritas est in intentione, intentio se tenet ex parte voluntatis.

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2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera²: « Intentio est, qua sic ad finem pervenire volo »; sed nemo vult pervenire ad finem nisi per voluntatem: ergo intentio est ex parte voluntatis.

3. Item, intentio iungit cum ipso fine; sed « voluntas non tantummodo dicit appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem, immo etiam ipsius finis », sicut vult Philosophus³. Si ergo illud quod principaliter iungit cum fine, est intentio, et hoc ipsum est voluntas; videtur, quod intentio sit voluntas.

4. Item, meritum principaliter residet penes intentionem; sed illud, penes quod principaliter residet meritum et demeritum, est ipsa voluntas⁴: ergo videtur, quod intentio se teneat ex parte voluntatis sive affectionis.

Sed contra: 5. S. Matthaei sexto⁵: Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex etc.; ibi Glossa exponit, ut per oculum intelligatur intentio: si ergo oculus animae non est affectus, sed intellectus; videtur, quod intentio non se teneat ex parte affectus, sed magis ex parte intellectus.

6. Item, super illud Lucae undecimo⁶: Vide, ne lumen, quod in te est etc.; Glossa: « Intentio, qua bonum quodcumque facimus, lumen est »; sed lumen se tenet ex parte cognitivae: ergo etc.

7. Item, intentionis est referre opus sive voluntatem in finem⁷; sed eius est referre, cuius est conferre; et conferre est proprie ipsius rationis: ergo et intentio.

8. Item, sicut voluntas nunquam vult aliquod volitum, nisi illud praecognoscatur a ratione⁸, sic nunquam appetit finem, nisi ratio vel affectus rationis eam praecurrat, quae finem illum ostendat: si igitur intentio est illa quae finem monstrat, videtur, quod intentio ex parte rationis se teneat.

Si forte tu dicas, quod se tenet ex parte rationis et voluntatis simul:

Contra: 1. Intendere est actus unus: ergo est unius potentiae: ergo non potest esse voluntatis et rationis simul et semel.

2. Item, si intentio se tenet ex parte rationis et voluntatis, aut ergo sicut potentia, aut sicut passio, aut sicut habitus⁹. Sicut potentia, non videtur, quia, cum voluntas et ratio non sint una potentia, et in uno homine respectu unius finis sit una intentio, nomine intentionis non potest intelligi potentia. Pari ratione nec habitus, quia non est unus habitus in duabus potentiis. Quod nec passio, constat, quia passionibus non meremur nec demeremur¹⁰; circa intentionem autem est meritum et demeritum. Nullo ergo modo videtur, quod intentio simul spectet ad rationem et voluntatem.

3. Item, si simul spectat ad rationem et voluntatem; quaero: ad quam principaliter? Et principalius videtur se tenere ex parte rationis, per hoc quod Glossae dicunt, quod intentio est lumen et oculus, quod quidem est solius rationis proprie. Quod autem principalius se teneat ex parte voluntatis, videtur per hoc, quod intentio principaliter respicit finem; et potentia in nobis, quae principaliter respicit finem, voluntas est, cum « bonum et finis sint idem¹¹ ». Ergo si non potest principaliter esse ex parte utriusque, videtur, quod non consistat in utraque potentia, scilicet in ratione et voluntate.

4. Item, inferius non se extendit ad plus quam suum superius; sed intelligentia est universalior quam intentio; unde Damascenus¹²: « Intelligentia est primus motus; quae vero circa aliquid est intelligentia, intentio dicitur ». Si ergo intelligentia non se extendit ad rationem simul et voluntatem, sed tantum consistit in ratione, pari ratione videtur, quod similiter nec intentio.

Conclusio.

In nomine intentionis clauditur simul actus rationis et voluntatis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod frequenter ad cognitionem rei perducimur per considerationem vocabulorum. Qui enim prima vocabula imposuerunt proprietates rerum potissime consideraverunt et iuxta illas vocabula imposuerunt¹³. Si igitur velimus attendere, hoc verbum intendere compositum est ab in et tendere. Haec autem praepositio in duplicem potest importare habitudinem, cum componitur huic verbo tendere: aut sicut ad obiectum aut sicut ad terminum ultimum.

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Et primo modo hoc quod est intendere significat solam conversionem potentiae respectu obiecti; secundo vero modo non tantummodo significat conversionem, immo significat cum hoc quandam collationem et coniunctam quietationem. Et secundum istam duplicem acceptionem hoc verbum intendere diversam¹⁴ habet constructionem. Differt enim dicere intendo in hoc, et intendo hoc. Cum enim dico intendo in hoc, intendere dicit conversionem potentiae ad aliquid tanquam ad obiectum. Cum vero dico intendo hoc, intendere dicit conversionem potentiae ad aliquid tanquam ad finem ultimum, quem intendit assequi et cui vult copulari. Et ideo in prima acceptione huius verbi intendere inter ipsum et suum casuale cadit praepositio media, ut per hoc significetur directio et conversio potentiae ad illud tanquam ad obiectum supra quod. In altera vero significatione non cadit praepositio media, pro eo quod hoc verbum tendere de se dicebat inclinationem et ordinationem ad aliquid; et haec praepositio in sibi iuncta super hoc addit quietationem; unde sensus est: intendo beatitudinem, id est, tendo in beatitudinem; et propterea non oportet exterius addi praepositionem. — Et secundum istum ultimum modum accipiendi est hic sermo de intentione. Et quoniam istud vocabulum duo importat, videlicet quandam collationem, et praeter hoc quandam conversionem cum collatione et quandam tendentiam cum quietatione; et unum istorum est rationis et alterum voluntatis: hinc est, quod in nomine intentionis clauditur simul actus rationis et voluntatis. Quamvis enim sit unum vocabulum, tamen secundum quod compositum est, sic implicat duarum potentiarum actus coniunctos ad unum perficiendum, quod non posset facere actus unius sine actu alterius. — Et est simile de verbo consentiendi, quod quamvis videatur importare unicum actum, tamen necessario duos includit. Nam consensus non est aliud quam concordia voluntatis simul et rationis ad unum aliquid faciendum, unius ut arbitrantis et iudicantis, alterius autem ut praeoptantis. Et propterea sic recte nominatur et respicit ipsum liberum arbitrium, quod quidem simul consistit circa voluntatem et rationem, sicut supra¹⁵ fuit ostensum.

Unde sicut tota dispositio familiae pendet ex consensu patrisfamilias et matrisfamilias, sic tota dispositio agendorum in domo animae pendet ex consensu voluntatis et rationis. Et sicut pendet dispositio et regimen ex consensu, sic pendet directio et obliquatio ex intentione¹⁶. Sicut enim ad rectum motum progressivum concurrit simul operatio visus ostendentis viam et operatio pedis incedentis; sic in actu intendendi clauditur simul actus rationis et voluntatis, unius ut aspicientis, alterius ut tendentis. Et quia isti actus coniuncti sunt, ideo per unum vocabulum compositum importantur.

Ad argumenta prima et secunda: Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et ad rationes ad utramque partem. Concedendum est enim, quod intentio nominat aliquid ex parte voluntatis, sicut rationes ad primam partem concludunt. Verum est etiam, quod intentio nominat aliquid ex parte rationis, ratione cuius dicitur et oculus et lumen, sicut ostendunt aliae rationes; et quantum ad haec duo intentio dirigi habet fide et caritate: fide clarificante oculum intellectus, et caritate rectificante pedem affectus¹⁷.

Solutio oppositorum: 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur contra hoc, quod non possit esse simul in ratione et voluntate, quia intendere dicit unicum actum; dicendum, quod falsum est; immo importat plures actus, sicut et consentire, ut ostensum est.

2. Ad illud vero quod quaeritur, utrum sit sicut potentia, vel sicut passio, vel sicut habitus; dicendum, quod etsi intentio aliquando dicatur ipsa potentia intendens, aliquando dicatur ipse habitus, secundum quem intendit, aliquando dicatur actus intendendi, aliquando ipsum intentum; principalius tamen nomen intentionis impositum est ipsi actui; nihilominus tamen in aliis acceptionibus contingit aliquando reperiri. Nam cum dicitur, quod intentio est oculus, accipitur intentio pro potentia. Cum dicitur, intentio est lumen, accipitur intentio pro habitu dirigente. Cum vero dicitur, quod intentio est ipse finis, sicut dicit Magister in littera¹⁸, accipitur intentio pro intento. Cum vero dicitur, quod intentio quaedam est recta, quaedam est obliqua, accipitur intentio pro actu. — Cum ergo dicit Philosophus¹⁹, quod « omne quod est in anima est potentia, vel passio, vel habitus »; dicendum, quod Philosophus sub habitibus comprehendit actus, vel loquitur de his quae sunt in anima per modum quietis, non per modum fieri. Talia enim potius dicuntur esse

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ab anima quam in anima. — Et sic patet, quod intentio potest esse actus, potest etiam esse habitus et potentia; et sicut non nominat unum actum simplicem, sed plures, sic non nominat unicum habitum nec unam potentiam tantum. Nec valet ratio illa: est una intentio: ergo una potentia, vel unus habitus; quia hoc est unum nomen impositum pluribus, sicut supra²⁰ dictum fuit de libertate arbitrii; et sic est in hoc nomine concordia et consensus.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur, in quo sit principalius; dicendum, quod secundum diversa et principalius est in cognitiva et principalius in motiva²¹. Nam quantum ad directionem principalius se tenet ex parte cognitivae, quantum vero ad tendentiam principalius se tenet ex parte affectivae; et hoc non est inconveniens.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intentio est inferius ad intelligentiam; dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur de intentione secundum aliam acceptionem, scilicet secundum quod dicit conversionem ipsius virtutis intellectivae ad aliquod obiectum determinatum, per quem modum dicitur in alterum intendere qui illum aspicit vel considerat; et talis modus accipiendi frequenter habetur in Scriptura. Unde Actuum tertio²² dicitur, quod claudus, qui stabat ad portam templi, intendebat in eos, id est in Petrum et Ioannem; et in Psalmo: Deus in adiutorium meum intende²³.

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English Translation

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Question II. Whether in rational beings intention belongs to the side of the intellect, or to the side of the affection.

Secondly it is asked concerning intention, according as it is found in rational beings: whether it belongs to the side of the intellect, or to the side of the affection. And that it belongs to the side of the affection seems [to be the case].

1. Bernard to Eugene¹: "That the eye may be simple, two things are necessary, namely charity in intention and truth in election"; but charity exists only in the will: therefore if charity is in intention, intention belongs to the side of the will.

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2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is contained in the text [of the Master]²: "Intention is that by which I will thus to attain the end"; but no one wills to attain the end except through the will: therefore intention is on the side of the will.

3. Likewise, intention joins with the end itself; but "the will does not only name the appetite for those things that are toward the end, but also of the end itself," as the Philosopher holds³. If therefore that which principally joins with the end is intention, and this same thing is the will; it seems that intention is the will.

4. Likewise, merit principally resides with intention; but that with which merit and demerit principally reside is the will itself⁴: therefore it seems that intention belongs to the side of the will or of the affection.

On the contrary: 5. St. Matthew the sixth⁵: If thy eye be simple etc.; there the Gloss explains that by the eye is understood intention: if therefore the eye of the soul is not affection, but intellect; it seems that intention does not belong to the side of the affection, but rather to the side of the intellect.

6. Likewise, on that passage of Luke the eleventh⁶: See that the light which is in thee etc.; the Gloss: "Intention, by which we do whatever good, is light"; but light belongs to the side of the cognitive power: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, it belongs to intention to refer the work or the will to the end⁷; but it belongs to that one to refer whose it is to confer; and to confer is properly of reason itself: therefore intention also [is of reason].

8. Likewise, just as the will never wills anything willed unless it be foreknown by reason⁸, so it never seeks the end unless reason or the affection of reason run before it, to show it that end: if therefore intention is that which points out the end, it seems that intention belongs to the side of reason.

If perhaps you should say that it belongs to the side of reason and will together:

On the contrary: 1. To intend is one act: therefore it is of one power: therefore it cannot be of will and reason at once and together.

2. Likewise, if intention belongs to the side of reason and will, then either as a power, or as a passion, or as a habit⁹. As a power, it does not seem [so], because, since will and reason are not one power, and in one man with respect to one end there is one intention, by the name intention a power cannot be understood. By like reasoning neither a habit, because there is not one habit in two powers. That neither is it a passion is established, because by passions we neither merit nor demerit¹⁰; but concerning intention there is merit and demerit. In no way therefore does it seem that intention regards reason and will at once.

3. Likewise, if it regards reason and will at once; I ask: which principally? And it seems principally to belong to the side of reason, through this, that the Glosses say that intention is light and eye, which indeed is properly of reason alone. But that it principally belongs to the side of the will seems [so] through this, that intention principally regards the end; and the power in us which principally regards the end is the will, since "the good and the end are the same¹¹." Therefore if it cannot principally be on the side of both, it seems that it does not consist in both powers, namely in reason and will.

4. Likewise, the inferior does not extend to more than its superior; but intelligence is more universal than intention; whence Damascene¹²: "Intelligence is the first motion; but that which is intelligence concerning something is called intention." If therefore intelligence does not extend to reason and will at once, but only consists in reason, by like reasoning it seems that neither does intention.

Conclusion.

In the name of intention there is enclosed at once the act of reason and of will.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that frequently we are led to the knowledge of a thing through the consideration of words. For those who imposed the first words considered most of all the properties of things and imposed words according to them¹³. If therefore we wish to attend [to it], this word to intend (intendere) is composed of in and tendere (to tend). Now this preposition in, when it is joined to this verb tendere, can import a twofold relation: either as to an object or as to an ultimate terminus.

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And in the first way this which is to intend signifies only the turning of the power with respect to the object; but in the second way it not only signifies the turning, but signifies along with this a certain collation and a conjoined rest. And according to this twofold acceptation this word to intend has a diverse¹⁴ construction. For it differs to say I intend toward this and I intend this. For when I say I intend toward this, "to intend" signifies the turning of the power to something as to an object. But when I say I intend this, "to intend" signifies the turning of the power to something as to an ultimate end, which it intends to attain and to which it wills to be united. And therefore in the first acceptation of this verb to intend, between it and its case-word there falls a middle preposition, so that thereby may be signified the direction and turning of the power to that as to an object upon which. But in the other signification a middle preposition does not fall, for the reason that this verb tendere of itself was signifying an inclination and ordination to something; and this preposition in, joined to it, adds upon this rest; whence the sense is: I intend beatitude, that is, I tend toward beatitude; and therefore it is not necessary to add the preposition externally. — And according to this last mode of taking it is this discourse concerning intention. And since this word imports two things, namely a certain collation, and besides this a certain turning with collation and a certain tending with rest; and one of these is of reason and the other of will: hence it is that in the name intention there is enclosed at once the act of reason and of will. For although it is one word, yet according as it is composite, it thus implies the conjoined acts of two powers toward accomplishing one [thing], which the act of one could not do without the act of the other. — And it is similar concerning the verb to consent, which, although it may seem to import a single act, yet necessarily includes two. For consent is nothing other than the concord of will together with reason toward doing some one thing, the one as judging and discerning, the other as preferring. And therefore it is rightly so named and regards free choice itself, which indeed at once stands about will and reason, as was shown above¹⁵.

Whence just as the whole disposition of a household depends on the consent of the father and mother of the family, so the whole disposition of things to be done in the house of the soul depends on the consent of will and reason. And just as disposition and governance depend on consent, so direction and deflection depend on intention¹⁶. For just as toward a right progressive motion there concur at once the operation of sight showing the way and the operation of the foot walking; so in the act of intending there is enclosed at once the act of reason and of will, of the one as looking, of the other as tending. And because these acts are conjoined, therefore they are imported by one composite word.

To the arguments, the first and the second: From these things the response to the question proposed and to the reasons on either part is clear. For it must be granted that intention names something on the side of the will, as the reasons for the first part conclude. It is also true that intention names something on the side of reason, by reason of which it is called both eye and light, as the other reasons show; and with respect to these two intention has to be directed by faith and charity: by faith clarifying the eye of the intellect, and by charity rectifying the foot of the affection¹⁷.

Solution of the opposing [arguments]: 1. To that, therefore, which is objected against this, that it cannot be at once in reason and will, because to intend signifies a single act; it must be said that this is false; rather it imports several acts, like to consent also, as has been shown.

2. To that, however, which is asked, whether it is as a power, or as a passion, or as a habit; it must be said that, although intention is sometimes called the power intending, sometimes called the habit according to which it intends, sometimes called the act of intending, sometimes the thing intended itself; yet principally the name intention is imposed on the act itself; nonetheless it happens sometimes to be found in the other acceptations. For when it is said that intention is the eye, intention is taken for the power. When it is said, intention is light, intention is taken for the directing habit. But when it is said that intention is the end itself, as the Master says in the text¹⁸, intention is taken for the thing intended. But when it is said that one intention is right, another is crooked, intention is taken for the act. — When therefore the Philosopher says¹⁹ that "everything that is in the soul is power, or passion, or habit"; it must be said that the Philosopher comprehends acts under habits, or speaks of those things which are in the soul by way of rest, not by way of becoming. For such things are rather said to be

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from the soul than in the soul. — And so it is clear that intention can be an act, can also be a habit and a power; and just as it does not name one simple act, but several, so it does not name a single habit nor one power only. Nor does that reasoning avail: there is one intention: therefore one power, or one habit; because this is one name imposed on many, as was said above²⁰ concerning freedom of choice; and so there is in this name concord and consent.

3. To that which is asked, in which it is principally; it must be said that according to diverse [respects] it is both principally in the cognitive and principally in the motive power²¹. For as regards direction it principally belongs to the side of the cognitive power, but as regards tending it principally belongs to the side of the affective power; and this is not unfitting.

4. To that which is objected, that intention is inferior to intelligence; it must be said that Damascene speaks of intention according to another acceptation, namely according as it signifies the turning of the intellective power itself to some determinate object, in which mode he is said to intend toward another who looks upon or considers him; and such a mode of taking is frequently had in Scripture. Whence in Acts the third²² it is said that the lame man, who stood at the gate of the temple, intended upon them, that is, upon Peter and John; and in the Psalm: O God, attend (intende) unto my help²³.

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Apparatus Criticus

Haec sunt Bernardi verba integra, quae habentur in eius libro de Praecepto et dispens. c. 14. n. 36: Ego vero, ut interior oculus vere simplex sit, duo illi esse arbitror necessaria, caritatem in intentione, et in electione veritatem.
These are Bernard's words in full, which are found in his book On Precept and Dispensation, c. 14, n. 36: "But I judge that, for the interior eye to be truly simple, those two things are necessary, charity in intention, and truth in election."
Hic c. 4, ubi Magister hanc Augustini propositionem affert, commutato tamen ad finem in ad vitam.
Here, c. 4, where the Master adduces this proposition of Augustine, with to the end changed, however, to to life.
Libr. III. Ethic. c. 2 et 4. seq.; I. Magnor. Moral. c. 16. (c. 17.); II. Moral. Eudem. c. 10, ubi docet, voluntatem magis esse ipsius finis, quam eorum quae sunt ad finem.
Book III of the Ethics, c. 2 and 4 and following; Magna Moralia I, c. 16 (c. 17); Eudemian Ethics II, c. 10, where he teaches that the will is more of the end itself than of those things which are toward the end.
Alanus ab Insulis, Theolog. regul. regul. 72. ait: « Penes voluntatem est omne meritum ». In qua regula exponenda dictus auctor affert illud Ambrosii: Affectus tuus operi tuo nomen imponit. Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XL. c. 1.
Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 72, says: "With the will is all merit." In expounding which rule the said author adduces that saying of Ambrose: "Your affection imposes the name on your work." Compare below, the text of the Master, d. XL, c. 1.
Vers. 22. — De Glossa vide supra pag. 881, nota 1.
Verse 22. — Concerning the Gloss see above, p. 881, note 1.
Vers. 35. — De Glossa supra pag. 889, nota 5. — Codd. et edd. falso signant Matthaei 6.
Verse 35. — Concerning the Gloss, above, p. 889, note 5. — The codices and editions falsely mark it Matthew 6.
Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.
Compare here the text of the Master, c. 4.
Vide August., X. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1. seqq.
See Augustine, On the Trinity X, c. 1, n. 1 and following.
Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5. docet, tria esse in anima: affectus (πάθη), facultates, habitus. — Paulo inferius verbis in uno homine codd. C F I K L O R S T Y ee et alii praefigunt ita.
Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 5, teaches that there are three things in the soul: affections (πάθη), faculties, habits. — A little below, to the words in one man the codices C F I K L O R S T Y ee and others prefix thus.
Sive, ut Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5, ait: Neque ex illis boni vel mali dicimur.
Or, as Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 5, says: Nor are we called good or bad on account of them.
Sicut vult Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 808, nota 5. — Pro sint codd. F H K T ee etc. sit.
As Aristotle holds, concerning whom see above, p. 808, note 5. — For sint (are) the codices F H K T ee etc. [read] sit (is).
Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. In hoc testimonio verba intelligentia et intentio reddunt Graecas voces νόησις et ἔννοια. Aristoteles quoque utitur vocabulo νόησις (intelligentia) III. de Anima, text. 21. (c. 6.) eique obiectum attribuit indivisibilia. Intelligentiam, quae significat primam mentis operationem, sequitur secunda mentis operatio, scil. iudicium, quae in compositione et divisione perficitur. Intelligentia ergo secundum Aristot. ad rationem tantum pertinet, quod et S. Bonav. in seq. propos. insinuat.
Book II of On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22. In this testimony the words intelligence and intention render the Greek words νόησις and ἔννοια. Aristotle too uses the word νόησις (intelligence) in On the Soul III, text 21 (c. 6), and attributes to it as object the indivisibles. Intelligence, which signifies the first operation of the mind, is followed by the second operation of the mind, namely judgment, which is accomplished in composition and division. Intelligence therefore, according to Aristotle, pertains to reason only, which St. Bonaventure also intimates in the following proposition.
Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 3, et pag. 537, nota 2.
See above, the text of the Master, d. XXIII, c. 3, and p. 537, note 2.
Codd. D E duplicem.
The codices D E [read] twofold.
Dist. 25. p. 1. q. 2. seqq. — Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. consensum, quem γνώμη vocat, significat id quo homo « disponit et amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est »; electionem autem esse docet « duobus praeiacentibus praeoptare alterum ». Bernard., de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 2. n. 3. ait: Consensus nutus est voluntatis spontaneus vel certe... habitus animi, liber sui. Cfr. supra d. 25. p. 1. q. 3. ad 5.
Dist. 25, p. 1, q. 2 and following. — Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 22: consent, which he calls γνώμη, signifies that by which a man "disposes and loves what has been judged by counsel"; but election he teaches to be "to prefer the one of two things set before [him]." Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice, c. 2, n. 3, says: Consent is a spontaneous nod of the will, or rather... a habit of mind, free in its own right. Compare above, d. 25, p. 1, q. 3, ad 5.
Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 13: Sic autem Deus ordinavit has duas voluntates sive affectiones [beatitudinis et iustitiae], ut voluntas, quae est instrumentum [potentia], uteretur ea, quae est iustitia, ad imperium et regimen, docente spiritu, qui et mens et ratio dicitur; et altera uteretur ad obediendum sine omni incommoditate. — Paulo inferius pro ut tendentis codd. F H X bb et alii ut intendentis.
Anselm, On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice, q. 3, c. 13: "But God so ordered these two wills or affections [of beatitude and of justice], that the will, which is the instrument [the power], might use that which is justice, for command and governance, the spirit teaching, which is called both mind and reason; and the other might be used for obeying without any inconvenience." — A little below, for as tending the codices F H X bb and others [read] as intending.
Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 affectiva.
The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [read] affective.
Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, infra d. XLI. c. 1. 2, et supra pag. 685, nota 5.
See here the text of the Master, c. 4, below d. XLI, c. 1, 2, and above p. 685, note 5.
Libr. II. Ethic. c. 5. — S. Thom. in hunc locum (lect. 5.) ait: Patet, quod sub hac divisione non comprehenduntur absolute omnia quae sunt in anima; quia essentia animae nihil horum est, nec etiam operatio intelligibilis; sed solum hic tanguntur illa quae sunt principia alicuius actionis. — Pro Cum ergo edd., excepta 1, Cum vero. Paulo inferius pro vel loquitur codd. F bb et ed. 1 et loquitur, codd. K T Y ut loquitur.
Book II of the Ethics, c. 5. — St. Thomas, on this passage (lect. 5), says: It is clear that under this division are not comprehended absolutely all things that are in the soul; because the essence of the soul is none of these, nor even the intelligible operation; but only those things are here touched upon which are the principles of some action. — For When therefore the editions, except 1, [read] But when. A little below, for or speaks the codices F bb and ed. 1 [read] and speaks, the codices K T Y as speaks.
Dist. 25. p. 1. q. 3. seqq.
Dist. 25, p. 1, q. 3 and following.
Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 affectiva.
The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [read] affective.
Vers. 5. — Seq. textus est Ps. 69, 1.
Verse 5. — The following text is Ps. 69, 1.
Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
See the scholion on the preceding question. ---

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