Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 39
Articulus II. De synderesi.
Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, videlicet de synderesi, quae est conscientiae scintilla1. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
Primo quaeritur de ipsa synderesi quantum ad essentiam, utrum scilicet sit in genere cognitivi, vel affectivi.
Secundo quaeritur de ipsa quantum ad usum, utrum videlicet per peccatum possit exstingui.
Tertio quaeritur de ipsa quantum ad abusum, utrum scilicet per peccatum possit depravari.
Quaestio I. Utrum synderesis sit in genere cognitionis, vel affectionis.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum synderesis sit in genere cognitionis, vel affectionis.
Et quod sit in genere affectionis, videtur:
1. Per illud quod dicitur in Glossa super primum Ezechielis2, in qua post plura verba dicitur de synderesi: « Hic est spiritus, qui postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus »; sed gemere est actus affectionis: si ergo synderesis est gemere, synderesis spectat ad potentiam affectivam.
2. Item, Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in littera3, quod « homo subiectus peccato naturaliter vult bonum »; sed illud quod naturaliter inclinat nos ad bonum, vel est synderesis vel conscientia; ergo illa voluntas inclinans nos ad bonum vel est synderesis, vel conscientia; sed non est conscientia: ergo est synderesis.
3. Item, contra malum est bonum sibi oppositum4; sed nos habemus in parte motiva sensibili aliquid impellens ad malum: ergo et in parte motiva rationali debet in nobis aliquid esse instigans ad bonum; hoc autem non est nisi synderesis: ergo synderesis est in parte affectiva.
4. Item, sicut intellectus indiget lumine ad iudicandum, ita affectus indiget calore quodam et pondere spirituali ad recte amandum5: ergo sicut in parte animae cognitivae est quoddam naturale iudicatorium, quod quidem est conscientia, ita in parte animae affectiva erit pondus ad bonum dirigens et inclinans; hoc autem non est nisi synderesis: ergo etc.
Sed contra: 1. Super illud Malachiae secundo6: Custodite spiritum vestrum, et uxorem adolescentiae tuae noli despicere; Glossa Hieronymi: « Per uxorem adolescentiae intellige legem naturalem scriptam in corde, spiritus vero dicitur non animalis pars, quae non percipit ea quae Dei sunt, sed rationalis »; hanc autem vocat synderesim: ergo videtur, quod synderesis se teneat ex parte rationis sive cognitivae. Si tu dicas, quod spiritus accipitur ibi communiter ad intellectum et affectum; obiicitur per hoc quod in eadem Glossa subiungitur: « Hic est spiritus, qui postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus »; sed postulare est actus rationis: ergo etc.
2. Item, super illud Lucae decimo7: Abierunt, semivivo relicto; Glossa: « Immortalitatem exuere
sed rationis sensum abolere non possunt, quin homo sapere et Deum possit cognoscere ». Si ergo sensus rationis se tenet ex parte rationis, et huiusmodi sensus, qui in nobis remanet, non est aliud quam synderesis; videtur etc.
3. Item, scintilla conscientiae et conscientia sunt in eadem parte; sed conscientia, ut superius8 probatum est, spectat ad cognitivam, et synderesis est scintilla conscientiae, secundum quod dicitur super Ezechielis primum: ergo videtur, quod synderesis se teneat ex parte cognitivae.
4. Item, si synderesis se tenet ex parte motivae, aut ergo est potentia, aut passio, aut habitus9? Passio non; hoc constat. Habitus non, ut videtur, quia aut esset bonus, aut malus. Non bonus, quia si bonus, esset virtus; si malus, esset vitium; ipsorum neutrum conceditur de synderesi. Potentia non, ut videtur, quia potentia voluntatis10 indifferenter se habet ad quodcumque appetibile; synderesis autem non dicitur respectu cibi et potus et huiusmodi appetibilium. Ergo non videtur, quod aliquo modo se teneat ex parte affectivae.
Est igitur quaestio, quid sit ipsa synderesis, et de comparatione ipsius ad legem naturalem et ad conscientiam, quomodo se habent, utrum sint eadem, vel diversa.
Item, qualiter se habeat ad tres animae potentias, videlicet concupiscibilem, irascibilem et rationalem. Videtur enim, quod sit aliquid praeter haec tria, secundum quod habetur in Glossa super primum Ezechielis: Facies hominis etc; Glossa: « Plerique iuxta Platonem rationabilitatem animae et irascentiam et concupiscentiam ad hominem et leonem et vitulum referunt, quartam vero supra haec et extra haec ponunt, quam Graeci vocant synderesim, quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque non exstinguitur, qua victi voluptatibus vel furore, et ipsa interdum rationis similitudine decepti, nos peccare sentimus; quam proprie aquilae deputant non se miscentem tribus, sed ipsa errantia corrigentem ». Ex hac Glossa videtur, quod differat ab illis tribus. — Sed contra hoc est, quod in libro de Spiritu et anima11 dicitur, quod sufficienter dividuntur vires animae per has tres, videlicet per concupiscibilem, irascibilem et rationalem. Ergo si synderesis est aliquid animae, videtur, quod ipsa se teneat necessario penes aliquam istarum trium virium, vel penes omnes.
Conclusio
Synderesis, cum stimulet ad bonum, se tenet ex parte affectus.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa distinctionem synderesis ab aliis viribus multiplex est opinio, sicut et circa distinctiones aliarum virium animae12.
Voluerunt enim aliqui dicere et ex Glossa praecedenti, prius posita super primum Ezechielis, colligere, quod synderesis dicitur supremum ipsius animae. Supremum autem ipsius animae est superior portio rationis, qua anima ad Deum convertitur; et illa superior portio regit inferiorem portionem rationis, et irascibilem, et concupiscibilem. Haec autem superior portio, secundum quod ad Deum convertitur13, semper est recta; obliquatur tamen, secundum quod descendit ad haec inferiora. Et isti dixerunt, quod inter synderesim et conscientiam et legem naturalem talis est differentia, scilicet quod synderesis nominat ipsam potentiam, scilicet superiorem portionem; conscientia vero nominat ipsius habitum, secundum quem regit inferiorem portionem; lex vero naturalis nominat illud, ad quod conscientia dirigit. — Hic autem modus dicendi satis videtur esse probabilis, nisi repugnaret illi Glossae prius habitae, quae dicit14, quod synderesis aliis peccantibus non se immiscet. Cum enim mortale peccatum non possit esse absque actu superioris portionis, quia in manducatione viri consistit consummatio peccati15; si synderesis esset superior portio rationis, utique aliis peccantibus se immisceret. Praeterea, superior portio rationis dicit ordinationem ad Deum; actus autem synderesis non tantum respicit Deum, sed etiam proximum, secundum quod lex naturalis respicit utrumque.
Et ideo est alius modus dicendi, quod cum potentiae rationales dupliciter habeant moveri, scilicet intellectus et affectus, et per modum naturae et per modum deliberationis16; quemadmodum libertas arbitrii consistit
in ratione et voluntate, secundum quod movetur deliberative; sic conscientia et synderesis respiciunt rationem et voluntatem, in quantum moventur per modum naturae — tam synderesis, quam conscientia, quam etiam lex naturae semper ad bonum inclinant; sed liberum arbitrium aliquando ad bonum, aliquando ad malum — et ideo sicut liberum arbitrium simul complectitur rationem et voluntatem, sic synderesis rationem simul et voluntatem complectitur, et lex naturae similiter, et conscientia similiter, et pro eodem accipi possunt.
Appropriate tamen synderesis dicit potentiam, et conscientia habitum, et lex naturalis obiectum. Sive alio modo appropriando, ut synderesis dicat habitum respectu boni vel mali in universali; conscientia vero habitum respectu boni vel mali in particulari; lex vero naturalis indifferenter se habeat ad utrumque. — Sed quia, ut habitum fuit prius1b, conscientia dicit habitum se tenentem ex parte intellectus; aut necesse erit praeter conscientiam et synderesim ponere in nobis aliquod directivum, aut necesse est ponere, quod synderesis se teneat ex parte affectus.
Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi, quod quemadmodum ab ipsa creatione animae intellectus habet lumen, quod est sibi naturale iudicatorium, dirigens ipsum intellectum in cognoscendis; sic affectus habet naturale quoddam pondus, dirigens ipsum2b in appetendis. Appetenda autem sunt in duplici genere: quaedam enim sunt in genere honesti, quaedam in genere commodi; sicut et cognoscibilia sunt in duplici genere: quaedam in genere speculabilium, et quaedam ex parte moralium. Et quemadmodum conscientia non nominat illud iudicatorium, nisi in quantum dirigit ad opera moralia; sic synderesis non nominat illud pondus voluntatis sive voluntatem cum illo pondere3b, nisi in quantum illam habet inclinare ad bonum honestum. Et quemadmodum nomen conscientiae potest accipi pro potentia cum tali habitu, vel pro habitu talis potentiae; sic etiam synderesis. Usitatiori tamen modo loquendi, synderesis potius nominat potentiam habitualem, quam nominet habitum4b, sicut patet in auctoritatibus, quae supra inductae sunt. Et quia illa potentia nunquam separatur ab illo habitu, hinc est, quod habitus et potentia uno nomine comprehenduntur, et potentia illa, ut sic habilitata, nomen sui habitus sortitur.
Ad argumenta: Et ex hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem primo propositam, qua quaerebatur, utrum synderesis dicat quid affectivum, vel cognitivum. Dico enim, quod synderesis dicit illud quod stimulat ad bonum; et ideo ex parte affectionis se tenet, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt.
Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod synderesis est spiritus rationalis, qui postulat et interpellat; dicendum, quod sicut dicit Gregorius super Iob primum5b, non tantum loquimur ad Deum cogitationibus et exterioribus verbis, sed etiam affectibus et desideriis; et propterea, dum synderesis continue stimulando nos facit bonum desiderare, dicitur gemitibus inenarrabilibus ad Deum interpellare.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sensu rationis, dicendum, quod per sensum rationalem6b magis intelligitur ibi iudicatorium naturale, quam intelligatur synderesis. Si quis autem contendat, quod per sensum illum accipitur synderesis; distinguendum est, quod ratio aliquando accipitur proprie pro parte cognitiva, aliquando accipitur communiter, prout comprehendit totum spiritum rationalem; et sic sensus rationis non tantum sumitur ex parte cognitivae, sed etiam ex parte affectivae; sicut patet de spirituali gustu et tactu; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod synderesis se teneat ex parte cognitionis.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod synderesis est scintilla conscientiae; dicendum, quod ideo dicitur scintilla, pro eo quod conscientia, quantum est de se, non potest movere nec pungere sive stimulare nisi mediante synderesi, quae est quasi eius stimulus et igniculus. Unde sicut ratio non potest movere nisi mediante voluntate, sic nec conscientia nisi mediante synderesi; et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod sit ex parte cognitivae, immo potius, quod sit ex parte affectivae.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit potentia, vel passio, vel habitus; dicendum, quod est potentia proprie, attamen non nominat potentiam voluntatis generaliter, sed solum voluntatem, in quantum movetur naturaliter; nec adhuc7b universaliter, sed solummodo respectu boni honesti, vel eius oppositi. Nihilominus potest etiam dicere habitum; sed ille non debet dici nec virtus nec vitium, pro eo quod virtus et vitium proprie respiciunt liberum arbitrium et voluntatem, in quantum est deliberativa, non in quantum est naturalis.
Ex praedictis patet responsio ad illas quaestiones, quae ultimo quaerebantur. — Ad illud enim quod quaeritur, quomodo se habeat synderesis ad conscientiam et legem naturalem; dicendum, quod sic se habet synderesis ad conscientiam, sicut se habet caritas ad fidem, vel habitus ipsius affectus ad habitus intellectus practici, secundum quod est habitus. Lex autem naturalis communiter se habet ad utrumque, videlicet ad synderesim et ad conscientiam. Nam lex naturalis dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo, prout dicit habitum in anima1c; et sic quia per legem naturalem instruimur et per legem naturalem recte ordinamur, dicit habitum, qui comprehendit intellectum et affectum, et ita comprehendit synderesim et conscientiam. Alio modo lex naturalis vocatur collectio praeceptorum iuris naturalis; et sic nominat obiectum synderesis et conscientiae, unius sicut dictantis, et alterius sicut inclinantis2c. Nam conscientia dictat, et synderesis appetit vel refugit. Et utroque istorum modorum invenitur lex naturalis in diversis locis; hoc tamen ultimo modo accipitur magis proprie. Et sic, ut proprie loquamur, synderesis dicit potentiam affectivam, in quantum naturaliter habilis est ad bonum et ad bonum tendit; conscientia vero dicit habitum intellectus practici; lex vero naturalis dicit obiectum utriusque.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem ultimam, qualiter synderesis se habeat ad concupiscibilem, rationalem et irascibilem. Illae enim tres potentiae indifferenter nominant potentias animae, sive secundum quod moventur naturaliter, sive secundum quod moventur deliberative. Synderesis autem nominat potentiam affectivam, secundum quod movetur naturaliter et recte; et ideo non distinguitur ab illis potentiis secundum essentiam potentiae, sed secundum modum movendi; et quia secundum illum modum movendi semper movet recte: hinc est, quod dicitur super alias volare et aliis errantibus non se immiscere, sed eas3c corrigere.
I. S. Bonav. docet, synderesim proprie esse potentiam voluntatis cum tali habitu, qui movet motu naturali, et quidem ad bonum honestum. Iam observavimus (schol. ad a. 1. q. 1.), S. Thomam hic (sicut in determinatione liberi arbitrii) a nostro Doctore aliquatenus dissentire, dum synderesim ponat in intellectu practico. Dicit enim (de Verit. q. 16. a. 1.): » Restat igitur, ut hoc nomen synderesis vel nominet absolute habitum naturalem [scil. rationis], similem habitui principiorum, vel nominet ipsam potentiam rationis cum tali habitu. Ut quodcumque hoc fuerit, non multum differt, quia hoc non facit dubitationem nisi circa nominis significationem » (cfr. hic q. 3. a. 1; S. I. q. 79. a. 12; I. II. q. 94. a. 1. ad 2.). — Hinc idem de relatione, quam synderesis habet ad conscientiam et legem naturalem, iudicat aliter ac S. Bonav. (hic ad 3; cfr. S. Thom., loc. ultimo cit.). S. Bonaventurae praeter Alexandrum Hal. consentit Petr. a Tar., qui (hic q. 1. a. 1.) doctrinam S. Bonaventurae concise et dilucide pro more suo sic contrahit: « Sicut intellectus speculativus indiget duplici habitu ad cognoscendum, nempe generali innato, scilicet quodam lumine principiorum, quamvis species eorum non sint innatae, et speciali acquisito, scilicet scientia; et practicus indiget lege naturali tanquam habitu generali innato, et conscientia tanquam habitu speciali acquisito: sic affectus duplici indiget habitu regulante ad operandum, scilicet habitu innato generali, qui est synderesis, et habitu speciali acquisito, qui est virtus aliqua. Primus quidem subiectum habet voluntatem naturalem, secundus voluntatem deliberativam ». Notandum tamen, quod S. Bonav. (hic in fine) aliter ac Petr. determinat relationem legis naturalis ad conscientiam. — Scotus (hic q. 2. n. 4.) favet opinioni S. Thomae, similiter B. Albert. et Aegid. R. At Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 1.) media quadam via incedit, distinguens duplicem sensum huius vocabuli et dicens: « Si dicatur synderesis inclinativum ad bonum absolute per modum persuadentis, non necessitantis, sic est in intellectu; si autem dicatur inclinativum ad bonum absolute vel in generali per modum necessitantis, sic est in affectu ». Aliqui Scotistae etiam Scotum sic interpretantur. — Licet autem synderesis a S. Thoma ponatur in intellectu practico, tamen in hoc ipso est relatio et extensio ad voluntatem, ut monent B. Albert. et Aegid. R. — Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 73. m. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 99. m. 2. a. 1. q. incid. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
II. Duae sequentes quaestiones, suppositis praedictis, non habent difficultatem nec controversiam inter posteriores Scholasticos. — De utraque (2. 3.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 3. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1; de Verit. q. 16. a. 2. 3. — B. Albert., loc. cit. a. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
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Article II. On synderesis.
Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal matter, namely concerning synderesis, which is the spark of conscience1. And concerning this three things are asked.
First, there is inquiry concerning synderesis itself as to its essence, namely whether it belongs to the genus of the cognitive or of the affective.
Second, there is inquiry concerning it as to its use, namely whether it can be extinguished through sin.
Third, there is inquiry concerning it as to its abuse, namely whether it can be depraved through sin.
Question I. Whether synderesis belongs to the genus of cognition or of affection.
Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether synderesis belongs to the genus of cognition or of affection.
And that it belongs to the genus of affection seems [to be the case]:
1. From that which is said in the Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel2, in which, after many words, it is said concerning synderesis: "This is the spirit which intercedes for us with unutterable groanings"; but to groan is an act of affection: if therefore synderesis is to groan, synderesis pertains to the affective power.
2. Likewise, Ambrose says, and it is found in the text [of the Master]3, that "a man subject to sin naturally wills the good"; but that which naturally inclines us to the good is either synderesis or conscience; therefore that will inclining us to the good is either synderesis or conscience; but it is not conscience: therefore it is synderesis.
3. Likewise, opposed to evil is the good opposite to it4; but we have in the sensitive motive part something impelling toward evil: therefore also in the rational motive part there ought to be in us something instigating toward good; but this is nothing other than synderesis: therefore synderesis is in the affective part.
4. Likewise, just as the intellect needs light in order to judge, so the affection needs a certain warmth and spiritual weight in order to love rightly5: therefore just as in the cognitive part of the soul there is a certain natural faculty of judgment, which indeed is conscience, so in the affective part of the soul there will be a weight directing and inclining toward the good; but this is nothing other than synderesis: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. On that text of Malachi, chapter two6: Keep your spirit, and despise not the wife of your youth; the Gloss of Jerome: "By the wife of your youth understand the natural law written in the heart; but the spirit is called not the animal part, which does not perceive the things that are of God, but the rational part"; and this he calls synderesis: therefore it seems that synderesis is held on the side of reason, that is, of the cognitive. If you should say that "spirit" is taken there commonly for intellect and affection; the objection is made through this, that in the same Gloss it is added: "This is the spirit which intercedes for us with unutterable groanings"; but to intercede is an act of reason: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, on that text of Luke, chapter ten7: They departed, leaving him half-dead; the Gloss: "They could strip away immortality,
but they could not abolish the sense of reason, so that man might not be able to be wise and to know God." If therefore the sense of reason is held on the side of reason, and a sense of this kind, which remains in us, is nothing other than synderesis; it seems etc.
3. Likewise, the spark of conscience and conscience are in the same part; but conscience, as was proved above8, pertains to the cognitive, and synderesis is the spark of conscience, according to what is said on the first chapter of Ezekiel: therefore it seems that synderesis is held on the side of the cognitive.
4. Likewise, if synderesis is held on the side of the motive [part], then it is either a power, or a passion, or a habit9? It is not a passion; this is evident. It is not a habit, as it seems, because it would be either good or bad. It is not good, because if good, it would be a virtue; if bad, it would be a vice; neither of these is conceded of synderesis. It is not a power, as it seems, because the power of the will10 is indifferently disposed toward any appetible object whatsoever; but synderesis is not spoken of with respect to food and drink and appetible objects of this kind. Therefore it does not seem that it is held in any way on the side of the affective.
It is therefore a question what synderesis itself is, and concerning its comparison to the natural law and to conscience, how they are related, whether they are the same or diverse.
Likewise, how it is related to the three powers of the soul, namely the concupiscible, the irascible, and the rational. For it seems that it is something beyond these three, according to what is found in the Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel: The face of a man etc; the Gloss: "Most, following Plato, refer the rationability of the soul and irascibility and concupiscence to the man and the lion and the calf, but they place a fourth above these and outside these, which the Greeks call synderesis, which spark of conscience is not extinguished even in Cain, by which, overcome by pleasures or by fury, and ourselves sometimes deceived by a likeness of reason, we perceive that we sin; which they properly assign to the eagle, as not mingling itself with the three, but correcting those that go astray." From this Gloss it seems that it differs from those three. — But against this is the fact that in the book On the Spirit and the Soul11 it is said that the powers of the soul are sufficiently divided by these three, namely by the concupiscible, the irascible, and the rational. Therefore if synderesis is something of the soul, it seems that it is necessarily held alongside some one of these three powers, or alongside all of them.
Conclusion
Synderesis, since it goads toward the good, is held on the side of affection.
I respond: It must be said that concerning the distinction of synderesis from the other powers there is a manifold opinion, just as also concerning the distinctions of the other powers of the soul12.
For some wished to say, and to gather from the preceding Gloss, set down earlier on the first chapter of Ezekiel, that synderesis is called the supreme [part] of the soul itself. But the supreme [part] of the soul itself is the superior portion of reason, by which the soul is turned to God; and that superior portion governs the inferior portion of reason, and the irascible, and the concupiscible. But this superior portion, insofar as it is turned to God13, is always right; it is bent, however, insofar as it descends to these lower things. And these men said that between synderesis and conscience and the natural law there is this difference, namely that synderesis names the power itself, namely the superior portion; but conscience names its habit, according to which it governs the inferior portion; and the natural law names that to which conscience directs. — But this manner of speaking seems probable enough, were it not repugnant to that Gloss had earlier, which says14 that synderesis does not mingle itself with the others when they sin. For since mortal sin cannot exist without an act of the superior portion, because in the eating of the man consists the consummation of sin15; if synderesis were the superior portion of reason, it would assuredly mingle itself with the others when they sin. Furthermore, the superior portion of reason bespeaks an ordering to God; but the act of synderesis regards not only God, but also the neighbor, according as the natural law regards both.
And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that since the rational powers can be moved in two ways, namely intellect and affection, both by way of nature and by way of deliberation16; just as freedom of choice consists
in reason and will, according as it is moved deliberatively; so conscience and synderesis regard reason and will, insofar as they are moved by way of nature — both synderesis, and conscience, and also the law of nature always incline toward the good; but free choice [inclines] sometimes to good, sometimes to evil — and therefore just as free choice embraces at once reason and will, so synderesis embraces at once reason and will, and the law of nature likewise, and conscience likewise, and they can be taken for the same thing.
By appropriation, however, synderesis bespeaks the power, and conscience the habit, and the natural law the object. Or in another way of appropriating, so that synderesis bespeaks the habit with respect to good or evil in universal; conscience the habit with respect to good or evil in particular; the natural law is indifferently disposed toward both. — But because, as was held earlier1b, conscience bespeaks a habit held on the side of the intellect; either it will be necessary, besides conscience and synderesis, to posit in us some directive [principle], or it is necessary to posit that synderesis is held on the side of affection.
And therefore there is a third manner of speaking, that just as from the very creation of the soul the intellect has a light, which is to it a natural faculty of judgment, directing the intellect itself in things to be known; so the affection has a certain natural weight, directing it2b in things to be desired. But things to be desired are of two kinds: for some are in the genus of the honorable [honestum], some in the genus of the advantageous [commodum]; just as also knowable things are of two kinds: some in the genus of the speculable, and some on the side of moral things. And just as conscience does not name that faculty of judgment except insofar as it directs toward moral works; so synderesis does not name that weight of the will, or the will with that weight3b, except insofar as it has [the office] to incline it to the honorable good. And just as the name of conscience can be taken for the power with such a habit, or for the habit of such a power; so also synderesis. By the more usual manner of speaking, however, synderesis rather names the habitual power than it names the habit4b, as is clear in the authorities which were adduced above. And because that power is never separated from that habit, hence it is that habit and power are comprehended under one name, and that power, as thus enabled, takes the name of its habit.
Reply to the arguments: And from this is clear the response to the question first proposed, by which it was asked whether synderesis bespeaks something affective or cognitive. For I say that synderesis bespeaks that which goads toward the good; and therefore it is held on the side of affection, as the reasons adduced for the first part show.
To 1. But to that which is first objected on the contrary, that synderesis is the rational spirit which intercedes and pleads; it must be said that, as Gregory says on the first [book] on Job5b, we speak to God not only by thoughts and by exterior words, but also by affections and desires; and therefore, while synderesis by continually goading makes us desire the good, it is said to intercede with God with unutterable groanings.
To 2. To that which is objected concerning the sense of reason, it must be said that by "rational sense"6b is rather understood there the natural faculty of judgment than synderesis is understood. But if anyone should contend that by that sense synderesis is taken; it must be distinguished that "reason" is sometimes taken properly for the cognitive part, sometimes taken commonly, insofar as it comprehends the whole rational spirit; and so the sense of reason is taken not only on the side of the cognitive, but also on the side of the affective; as is clear concerning spiritual taste and touch; and therefore from this it does not follow that synderesis is held on the side of cognition.
To 3. To that which is objected, that synderesis is the spark of conscience; it must be said that it is called a spark for this reason, that conscience, as far as it is of itself, cannot move nor prick nor goad except by means of synderesis, which is as it were its goad and little fire. Hence just as reason cannot move except by means of the will, so neither can conscience except by means of synderesis; and therefore from this it does not follow that it is on the side of the cognitive, but rather that it is on the side of the affective.
To 4. To that which is asked, whether it is a power, or a passion, or a habit; it must be said that it is properly a power, yet it does not name the power of the will generally, but only the will insofar as it is moved naturally; nor even7b universally, but only with respect to the honorable good, or its opposite. Nonetheless it can also bespeak a habit; but that [habit] ought to be called neither a virtue nor a vice, for this reason, that virtue and vice properly regard free choice and the will insofar as it is deliberative, not insofar as it is natural.
From the foregoing is clear the response to those questions which were last asked. — For to that which is asked, how synderesis is related to conscience and the natural law; it must be said that synderesis is related to conscience as charity is related to faith, or as the habit of the affection itself to the habit of the practical intellect, according as it is a habit. But the natural law is related commonly to both, namely to synderesis and to conscience. For the natural law can be taken in two ways: in one way, insofar as it bespeaks a habit in the soul1c; and so, because by the natural law we are instructed and by the natural law we are rightly ordered, it bespeaks a habit which comprehends intellect and affection, and thus comprehends synderesis and conscience. In another way the natural law is called the collection of the precepts of natural right; and so it names the object of synderesis and of conscience, of the one as dictating, and of the other as inclining2c. For conscience dictates, and synderesis desires or shuns. And in both of these ways the natural law is found in diverse places; this last way, however, is taken more properly. And so, that we may speak properly, synderesis bespeaks the affective power, insofar as it is naturally apt for the good and tends toward the good; but conscience bespeaks the habit of the practical intellect; the natural law bespeaks the object of both.
And by this is clear the response to the last question, how synderesis is related to the concupiscible, the rational, and the irascible. For those three powers indifferently name powers of the soul, whether according as they are moved naturally, or according as they are moved deliberatively. But synderesis names the affective power, according as it is moved naturally and rightly; and therefore it is not distinguished from those powers according to the essence of the power, but according to the mode of moving; and because according to that mode of moving it always moves rightly: hence it is that it is said to fly above the others and not to mingle itself with the others when they err, but to correct them3c.
I. St. Bonaventure teaches that synderesis is properly the power of the will with a certain habit which moves with a natural motion, and indeed toward the honorable good. We have already observed (scholion to a. 1, q. 1) that St. Thomas here (as in the determination of free choice) dissents somewhat from our Doctor, in that he places synderesis in the practical intellect. For he says (On Truth q. 16, a. 1): "It remains, therefore, that this name 'synderesis' either name absolutely a natural habit [namely of reason], similar to the habit of [first] principles, or name the power of reason itself with such a habit. Whichever of these it be, it does not much differ, because this does not make a difficulty except concerning the signification of the name" (cf. here q. 3, a. 1; S. I, q. 79, a. 12; I-II, q. 94, a. 1, ad 2). — Hence the same author judges otherwise than St. Bonaventure (here, to 3) concerning the relation which synderesis has to conscience and the natural law (cf. St. Thomas, in the place last cited). With St. Bonaventure, besides Alexander of Hales, agrees Peter of Tarentaise, who (here q. 1, a. 1) sums up the doctrine of St. Bonaventure concisely and lucidly after his manner thus: "Just as the speculative intellect needs a double habit in order to know, namely a general innate one, that is, a certain light of [first] principles, although the species of them are not innate, and a special acquired one, that is, knowledge; and the practical intellect needs the natural law as a general innate habit, and conscience as a special acquired habit: so the affection needs a double regulating habit in order to operate, namely an innate general habit, which is synderesis, and a special acquired habit, which is some virtue. The first indeed has the natural will as its subject, the second the deliberative will." It must be noted, however, that St. Bonaventure (here at the end) determines the relation of the natural law to conscience otherwise than Peter. — Scotus (here q. 2, n. 4) favors the opinion of St. Thomas, likewise B. Albert and Aegidius Romanus. But Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 3, q. 1) proceeds by a certain middle way, distinguishing a double sense of this word and saying: "If synderesis is said [to be] something inclining to the good absolutely by way of persuading, not necessitating, then it is in the intellect; but if it is said [to be] something inclining to the good absolutely or in general by way of necessitating, then it is in the affection." Some Scotists also interpret Scotus thus. — But although synderesis is placed by St. Thomas in the practical intellect, nevertheless in this very thing there is a relation and extension to the will, as B. Albert and Aegidius Romanus note. — Besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 73, m. 2. — B. Albert, Summa p. II, tr. 16, q. 99, m. 2, a. 1, incidental q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
II. The two following questions, the foregoing being supposed, have no difficulty nor controversy among the later Scholastics. — On each (2, 3) question: Alexander of Hales, in the place cited, m. 3, 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1; On Truth q. 16, a. 2, 3. — B. Albert, in the place cited, a. 2, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2, 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 2, 3. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.
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- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Vox synderesis, Graece συντήρησις, etymon habet a συντηρεῖν i. e. conservare. — Paulo inferius pro cognitivi vel affectivi Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 cognitivae vel affectivae.Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — The word "synderesis," in Greek συντήρησις, has its etymology from συντηρεῖν, i.e. "to preserve." — A little below, for of the cognitive or of the affective the Vatican edition with editions 3 and 4 [reads] cognitivae vel affectivae.
- Vers. 10. — Glossa, cuius verba alludunt ad Rom. 8, 26, habetur apud Lyranum et sumta est ex Hieronymi Expos. in Ezech. 1, 7.Verse 10. — The Gloss, whose words allude to Romans 8:26, is found in Lyra and is drawn from Jerome's Exposition on Ezekiel 1:7.
- Hic c. 3. — De iis quae in hoc arg. de conscientia proferuntur, cfr. art. praeced.Here c. 3. — On the things which are brought forward in this argument concerning conscience, cf. the preceding article.
- Eccli. 33, 15. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 767, nota 4.Ecclesiasticus 33:15. — On the minor [premise] cf. above p. 767, note 4.
- Cfr. August., 1. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 2-5. n. 38. nec non supra pag. 76, nota 6. — Paulo inferius pro affectiva Vat. exhibet affectivae.Cf. Augustine, On the Merits and Remission of Sins etc., bk. 1, c. 2–5, n. 38; and also above p. 76, note 6. — A little below, for affectiva the Vatican edition has affectivae.
- Vers. 15. — Ipsa oratio Hieronymi, verbis in corde pluribus adiectis, post sed rationalis sic prosequitur: Unde rursum ingeritur: Custodite spiritum vestrum, non carnem, in qua qui sunt, Deo placere non possunt [Rom. 8, 8.], non animam: animalis enim homo non recipit [sic] ea quae spiritus sunt [I. Cor. 2, 14.], sed spiritum, quia spiritus interpellat pro nobis gemitibus ineffabilibus [Rom. 8, 26.]. — De voce synderesis cfr. Glossa Hieronymi supra in I. fundam. posita. — Paulo inferius pro se teneat codd. K T bb cc ee et alii cum edd. 1, 2 se tenet.Verse 15. — Jerome's own discourse, with several words added in the heart, after but the rational [part] continues thus: "Whence again it is urged: Keep your spirit, not your flesh, in which those who are can not please God [Rom. 8:8], not your soul: for the animal man does not receive [sic] the things which are of the spirit [1 Cor. 2:14], but the spirit, for the spirit intercedes for us with unutterable groanings [Rom. 8:26]." — On the word "synderesis" cf. the Gloss of Jerome set down above in the first fundamentum. — A little below, for se teneat the codices K T bb cc ee and others, with editions 1, 2, [read] se tenet.
- Vers. 30. — Glossa, quam Lyranus exhibet, est Bedae in hunc loc. Cfr. supra pag. 506, nota 3. Apud Bedam sic sonat: Immortalitatem... non possunt. Ex qua enim parte sapere et cognoscere Deum potest, vivus est homo etc.Verse 30. — The Gloss which Lyra presents is Bede's on this passage. Cf. above p. 506, note 3. In Bede it runs thus: Immortality... they could not. For from that part by which he can be wise and know God, the man is alive etc.
- Art. I. q. 2. — Verbo Glossae super Ezech. 1, 10, quae in seqq. memoratur et quae reddit expositionem Hieronymi in Ezech. 1, 7, videsis hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Edd. praeter 1 et nonnulli codd. maiorem sic transformarunt: Item, scintilla conscientiae est conscientia, etsi non in eadem parte.Article I, q. 2. — For the wording of the Gloss on Ezekiel 1:10, which is mentioned in what follows and which renders Jerome's exposition on Ezekiel 1:7, see here in the text of the Master, c. 3. — The editions besides 1 and several codices transformed the major [premise] thus: Likewise, the spark of conscience is conscience, even if not in the same part.
- Vide supra pag. 893, nota 6.See above p. 893, note 6.
- Edd., excepta 1, cum non paucis codd. voluntas, cod. Q (a secunda manu) quae est voluntas, cod. bb et voluntas... habent.The editions, except 1, with not a few codices [read] voluntas; codex Q (by a second hand) quae est voluntas; codex bb has both voluntas... [readings].
- Vers. 10. — In Comment. Hieronymi (in Ezech. 1, 7. seq.), ex quo Glossa delibata est, legitur sic: « Plerique iuxta Platonem rationale animae et irascitivum et concupiscitivum, quod ille λογικόν et θυμικόν et ἐπιθυμητικόν vocat, ad hominem et leonem ac vitulum referunt ». Adiunctis deinde non paucis de triplicis huius potentiae actibus, ipsa oratio Hieronymi post in Cain quoque haec quoque addit: pectore, postquam eiectus est de paradiso et deinde pro ipsa errantia habet tria, errantia. — Pro iuxta Platonem plures codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 substituunt iuxta praelationem et pro victi voluptatibus exhibent victis voluptatibus.Verse 10. — In the Commentary of Jerome (on Ezekiel 1:7 ff.), from which the Gloss is drawn, it is read thus: "Most, following Plato, refer the rational [part] of the soul and the irascible and the concupiscible, which he calls λογικόν and θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν, to the man and the lion and the calf." Then, with not a few things added concerning the acts of this threefold power, Jerome's own discourse, after in Cain also, adds also this: in the breast, after he was cast out of paradise; and then for those things going astray it has three, the things going astray. — For following Plato several codices, and also editions 1 and 2, substitute following preference [praelationem]; and for overcome by pleasures they present with pleasures overcome.
- De quo vide supra d. 24. p. 1. a. 2, q. 1. seqq., ubi et videre est de portione superiore animae, de qua in seqq. sermo est. Cfr. etiam supra d. 8. p. II. q. 2. in corp. — De prima opinione cfr. infra q. 3.On which see above d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1 ff., where one may also see concerning the superior portion of the soul, of which there is discourse in what follows. Cf. also above d. 8, p. II, q. 2, in the body [of the article]. — On the first opinion cf. below q. 3.
- Edd., excepta 1, cum cod. ee et paucis aliis convertit.The editions, except 1, with codex ee and a few others, [read] convertit.
- Edd. praeter 1 cum cod. ee omittunt quae dicit, et prima mox eaedem edd. post non se inserunt etiam.The editions besides 1, with codex ee, omit which says; and the same editions soon after not itself insert even.
- Vide supra d. 24. p. II. a. 1. et 2.See above d. 24, p. II, a. 1 and 2.
- Cfr. supra d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 33. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. De propos. seq. vide supra d. 28. p. 1. q. 2. seqq. — Paulo ante Vat. omittit scilicet intellectus et affectus.Cf. above d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 and d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, in the body. On the following proposition see above d. 28, p. 1, q. 2 ff. — A little before, the Vatican edition omits namely intellect and affection.
- Art. 1. q. 1.Article 1, q. 1.
- Vat. repetit affectum.The Vatican edition repeats affectum.
- In edd., excepta 1, et nonnullis codd., O ee etc., desiderantur verba sive voluntatem cum illo pondere.In the editions, except 1, and in several codices, O ee etc., the words or the will with that weight are lacking.
- De significatione habitus et potentiae habitualis vide supra a. 1. q. 1. seq. et d. 25. p. I. q. 4. seq.On the signification of "habit" and "habitual power" see above a. 1, q. 1 f. and d. 25, p. I, q. 4 f.
- In expositione v. 8, sive II. Moral. c. 7. n. 11, ubi modum exponens, quo Deus ad animas loquitur et animae ad Deum, ait: Tanto enim quisque minus clamat, quanto minus desiderat, et tanto maiorem vocem in aures incircumscripti Spiritus exprimit, quanto se in eius desiderium plenius fundit. Animarum igitur verba ipsa sunt desideria etc. Cfr. ibid. XI. c. 42. n. 57. et XXXV. c. 3. n. 4.In the exposition of verse 8, that is, Morals bk. II, c. 7, n. 11, where, expounding the manner in which God speaks to souls and souls to God, he says: "For the less one cries out, the less he desires; and the greater the voice he utters in the ears of the uncircumscribed Spirit, the more fully he pours himself out into desire of Him. The very words of souls, therefore, are their desires" etc. Cf. ibid. bk. XI, c. 42, n. 57 and bk. XXXV, c. 3, n. 4.
- Pro sensum rationalem codd. C O P R S T ce et ed. 2 speciem rationalem, codd. F M V sensum rationis. Paulo inferius post sensum illum edd., excepta 1, et nonnulli codd. subiiciunt aliquando.For rational sense the codices C O P R S T ce and edition 2 [read] rational species; codices F M V sense of reason. A little below, after that sense, the editions, except 1, and several codices add sometimes.
- Edd., excepta 1, hic et sola Vat. subinde post sed solummodo inserunt in quantum movetur.The editions, except 1, here, and the Vatican alone thereafter, after but only insert insofar as it is moved.
- Cfr. a. 1. q. 2. arg. 1. pro I. parte.Cfr. a. 1, q. 2, arg. 1, for the first part.
- Cum Vat. et cod. bb lectionem inclinantis praeferendam duximus lectioni inchoantis, quae in plurimis codd. et edd. habetur. Cfr. hic in corp. et ad 3. et Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 27. m. 2. a. 2. seq.With the Vatican [edition] and cod. bb we have judged the reading inclinantis ("inclining") to be preferred to the reading inchoantis ("beginning"), which is found in very many codices and editions. Cfr. here in the body and at [the reply to] 3, and Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 27, m. 2, a. 2 and following.
- Cod. bb alias.Cod. bb [reads] otherwise. ---