← Back to Distinction 39

Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 39

Textus Latinus
p. 905

Articulus I. De conscientia.

Quaestio III. Utrum teneamur ad omne illud, quod conscientia dictat necessarium esse ad salutem.

Tertio quaeritur de conscientia quantum ad effectum ligationis. Et est quaestio, utrum teneamur ad omne illud, quod conscientia dictat necessarium esse ad salutem. Et quod sic, videtur.

Argg. pro parte affirmativa. 1. Ad Romanos decimo quarto1: Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est; Glossa: « Quod non est ex fide, id est contra conscientiam, ut credamus malum esse, peccatum est »; sed hoc non esset, nisi conscientia ligaret ad omne illud, quod ipsa dictat: ergo tenemur omne illud facere, quod est de conscientiae dictamine.

2. Item, lex obligat ad faciendum illud quod ipsa dictat — lex enim dicitur a ligando2 — sed « conscientia est lex intellectus nostri »: ergo tenemur ad omne illud, quod conscientia dictat ad salutem esse necessarium.

p. 906 3. Item, tenemur ad faciendum illud quod iudex mandat; sed conscientia est iudex noster, secundum quod dicitur Ecclesiastis septimo3, in Glossa: ergo tenemur ad omne illud, quod conscientia dictat.

4. Item, regula est, quod quotiescumque aliquis facit aliquid, credens esse mortale, peccat mortaliter, pro eo quod contemnit Deum: ergo si non possumus non credere ea quae dictat conscientia, videtur, quod quidquid sit illud, si contra hoc faciamus, peccamus mortaliter: videtur ergo, quod teneamur ad faciendum omne illud, quod conscientia dictat esse ad salutem necessarium.

Sed contra: Pro parte negativa. 1. Si obligamur ad omne illud, quod conscientia dictat; sed conscientia aliquando dictat faciendum aliquid contra Deum: ergo tenemur facere contra Deum. Sed nullus peccat faciendo illud, ad quod tenetur: ergo faciendo contra Deum non peccamus.

2. Item, quaedam sunt ita mala secundum se, quod Deus non potest facere ea, nec illa praecipere, quae nullo bono fine possunt fieri4; sed ad nihil potest obligare conscientia, ad quod non potest obligare Deus, cum conscientia sit infra Deum: ergo si conscientia dictet talia, videtur, quod ad talia non possit obligare: ergo non obligamur ad faciendum ea.

3. Item, quod ad nihil per se possit ligare, videtur: quia « peccatum omne est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei », sicut dicit Augustinus5: ergo si conscientia dictat aliquid, quod non sit de mandato legis divinae, facere contra illud non est peccatum, cum non sit facere contra legem Dei: ergo non tenetur quis ad illud faciendum: igitur ad nihil ligat conscientia, quantum est de virtute sua.

4. Item, nullus potest ab aliquo ligamine absolvi per dictamen conscientiae, ergo nec per illud dictamen potest aliquod vinculum incurrere: ergo videtur, quod conscientia de se et per se ad nihil possit ligare.

Quaestiones connexae. Est igitur quaestio, ad quid conscientia liget: utrum liget ad omne quod dictat; et utrum omnis conscientia liget; et utrum homo sit perplexus, quando conscientia dictat unum, et lex divina dictat contrarium; et cui magis sit obtemperandum, utrum dictamini conscientiae, an praecepto praelati, cum obviant sibi ad invicem.

Conclusio. Omnis conscientia aut ligat ad faciendum quod dictat, aut ligat ad deponendum ipsam, si est erronea.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod conscientia aliquando dictat aliquid, quod est secundum legem Dei, aliquando aliquid, quod est praeter legem Dei, aliquando aliquid, quod est contra legem Dei; et loquimur hic de dictamine per modum praeceptionis vel prohibitionis, non per modum consilii sive persuasionis. — In primis quidem conscientia simpliciter ligat et universaliter, pro eo quod homo ad illa ligatus est per legem divinam, et conscientia, quae illi concordat, ligatum ostendit. In secundis vero conscientia ligat, quamdiu manet; unde vel tenetur homo conscientiam deponere, vel tenetur illud quod dictat conscientia, adimplere, utpote si dictat, quod necessarium est ad salutem festucam de terra levare. In tertiis vero conscientia non ligat ad faciendum, vel non faciendum, sed ligat ad se deponendum, pro eo quod, cum talis conscientia sit erronea errore repugnante legi divinae, necessario, quamdiu manet, ponit hominem extra statum salutis; et ideo necesse est ipsam deponere, quia, sive homo faciat quod dictat, sive eius oppositum, mortaliter peccat. — Si enim faciat quod conscientia dictat, et illud est contra legem Dei, et facere contra legem Dei sit mortale peccatum; absque dubio mortaliter peccat. Si vero facit oppositum eius quod conscientia dictat, ipsa manente, adhuc peccat mortaliter, non ratione operis, quod facit, sed quia malo modo facit. Facit enim in contemptum Dei, dum credit, dictante sibi conscientia, hoc Deo displicere, quamvis Deo placeat. Et hoc est quod dicit Glossa super illud ad Romanos decimo quarto6: Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est; ibi Glossa: « Omne quod ad conscientiam pertinet, si aliter fiat, dicit Apostolus esse peccatum. Quamvis enim fiat etiam quod bonum est, si non faciendum credatur, peccatum est ». Et ratio huius est, quia non tantum attendit Deus, quid homo faciat, sed quo animo faciat7; et iste

p. 907 qui facit quod Deus iubet, credens facere contra ipsius Dei voluntatem, non facit bono animo, sed malo; et ideo peccat mortaliter. — Sic igitur patet, quod omnis conscientia aut ligat ad faciendum quod dictat, aut ligat ad se deponendum. Non tamen omnis conscientia ligat ad faciendum, quod dictat; sicut illa quae dictat, non esse faciendum illud, ad quod homo alias tenetur; sed talis conscientia dicitur erronea. — His visis, patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et etiam ad obiecta pro parte.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa: 1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod omne quod non est ex fide, id est contra conscientiam; iam patet responsio. Dico enim, quod facere contra conscientiam semper est peccatum, quia semper est in Dei contemptum, non tamen facere secundum conscientiam semper est bonum, utpote cum conscientia dictat aliquid, quod est contra Deum. Unde haec habet duas causas veritatis: facere contra conscientiam est peccatum, aut quia conscientia ligat ad illud faciendum, aut quia illud non potest bene fieri, tali conscientia manente; et ideo est ibi sophisma secundum consequens8, quia proceditur ex pluribus causis veritatis ad unam in ratione illa.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod conscientia est lex intellectus nostri; dicendum, quod verum est, quod lex est, sed non est lex suprema; supra ipsam enim est lex alia, scilicet lex divina. Cum autem dicitur, quod lex ligat ad faciendum omne illud, quod dictat; dicendum, quod verum est, quando lex inferior non dictat contrarium legi superiori; hoc autem saepe facit conscientia. — Et similiter respondendum est ad sequens, quod opponit de iudice.

4. Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur, quod quicumque credit peccare mortaliter, peccat mortaliter; dicendum, quod hoc verum est. Illud enim generaliter verum est, quod dicitur: « Qui facit contra conscientiam, aedificat ad gehennam »9. Sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod tenemur facere omne quod conscientia dictat faciendum, quia, sicut dictum est, illud habet duas causas veritatis.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa: 1. 2. Ad illas autem rationes primas, quae in contrarium adducuntur, respondere non est opportunum, pro eo quod10 verum concludunt; ostendunt enim, quod conscientia non ligat in omnibus.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod ad nihil ligat per se, quia11 non dicitur peccatum, quod fit contra conscientiam, sed contra legem Dei; dicendum, quod facere contra legem Dei hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel vere, vel interpretative, sive secundum veritatem, sive secundum reputationem; et utroque modo est peccatum mortale; utroque enim modo contemnitur Deus. Et quamvis faciens contra conscientiam non faciat semper contra legem Dei secundum veritatem, facit tamen vel secundum veritatem, vel secundum reputationem; quia conscientia est sicut praeco Dei et nuntius, et quod dicit, non mandat ex se, sed mandat quasi ex Deo, sicut praeco, cum divulgat edictum regis. Et hinc est, quod conscientia habet virtutem ligandi in his quae possunt aliquo modo bene fieri.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest ab aliquo absolvere; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia conscientia non potest aliam legem infringere; unde nec potest a praecepto Dei absolvere nec a praecepto praelati, cui homo se obligavit ex lege voti. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod non possit ligare finaliter, immo est argumentum a minori destruendo12. Unde sicut istud argumentum non valet aliquid: conscientia non potest super superiorem: ergo non potest super inferiorem; ita illud non valet: conscientia non potest absolvere hominem a mandato superioris: ergo non potest eum obligare. Bene tamen sequitur, quod non potest13 obligare contra mandatum superioris. Ad aliquid tamen potest nos obligare, pro eo quod quodam modo supra nos est et media inter nos et Deum, sicut praeco medius est inter regem et populum.

Ex his patent ea quae ultimo quaerebantur, videlicet quando conscientia liget, et quando non liget. — Patet etiam, quod nemo ex conscientia perplexus est nisi ad tempus, videlicet quamdiu conscientia manet; non tamen est perplexus simpliciter, pro eo quod debet illam conscientiam deponere; et si nescit per se de illa iudicare, pro eo quod nescit legem Dei, debet sapientiores consulere, vel per orationem se ad Deum convertere, si humanum consilium deest. Alioquin, si negligens est, verificatur in eo quod dicit Apostolus14: Qui ignorat, ignorabitur. — Patet etiam, quod plus standum est praecepto praelati quam conscientiae, maxime quando praelatus praecipit quod potest et debet praecipere.

Scholion

I. Exploratum est apud omnes, quod conscientia, etiam erronea, ligat; item, si ignorantia sit vincibilis, quod conscientia erronea non excuset a peccato, quod fiat contra legem Dei. In hoc sensu intelligenda sunt verba (hic in corp.): « Si faciat quod conscientia dictat, et illud est contra legem Dei... absque dubio mortaliter peccat »; quae sententia invenitur etiam apud p. 908 S. Thomam (hic q. 3. a. 3. in corp. et ad 5.), Petrum a Tar., Richardum a Med. aliosque, qui non nisi in modo loquendi et rem explicandi aliquatenus dissentiunt. — Aliter autem iudicandum est, si ignorantia sit prorsus invincibilis (cfr. S. Alphonsus a Liguori, Theol. moralis, libr. I. tr. 1. c. 1. n. 1.). Verba: « Plus standum est praecepto praelati quam conscientiae », intelligenda sunt cum restrictione, scilicet quando legitime praecipitur, ut verbis seqq. insinuatur, vel quando conscientia est dubia, cum in dubio praesumptio stet pro superiore (cfr. infra d. 44. a. 3. q. 2. et dub. 2, et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 121. m. 3. a. 2.). Hinc dictum S. Thomae (hic q. 3. a. 3. ad 3.): « Dictamen conscientiae plus obligat quam praeceptum praelati » non nisi verbo et in speciem recedit ab iis quae Seraphicus hic docet.

II. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 1. — Scot., II. Report. d. 39. q. 2. n. 10. — S. Thom., hic art. cit.; S. I. II. q. 19. a. 5; de Verit. q. 1. a. 4. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 5. 6. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

English Translation

Article I. On conscience.

Question III. Whether we are bound to everything that conscience dictates to be necessary for salvation.

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning conscience as to the effect of binding. And the question is whether we are bound to everything that conscience dictates to be necessary for salvation. And that we are, it seems.

Arguments for the affirmative side. 1. To the Romans, chapter fourteen1: Everything that is not of faith is sin; the Gloss: "What is not of faith, that is, against conscience, so that we believe it to be evil, is sin"; but this would not be so, unless conscience bound to everything that it itself dictates: therefore we are bound to do everything that is of conscience's dictate.

2. Likewise, law obliges to doing that which it itself dictates — for law (lex) is so called from binding (a ligando)2 — but "conscience is the law of our intellect": therefore we are bound to everything that conscience dictates to be necessary for salvation.

3. Likewise, we are bound to doing that which the judge commands; but conscience is our judge, according to what is said in Ecclesiastes, chapter seven3, in the Gloss: therefore we are bound to everything that conscience dictates.

4. Likewise, it is a rule that whenever anyone does something, believing it to be mortal, he sins mortally, on the ground that he despises God: therefore if we cannot but believe the things that conscience dictates, it seems that, whatever that thing be, if we act against it, we sin mortally: it seems therefore that we are bound to do everything that conscience dictates to be necessary for salvation.

On the contrary: For the negative side. 1. If we are obliged to everything that conscience dictates; but conscience sometimes dictates doing something against God: therefore we are bound to act against God. But no one sins by doing that to which he is bound: therefore by acting against God we do not sin.

2. Likewise, certain things are so evil in themselves that God cannot do them, nor command them, things that can be done with no good end4; but conscience can oblige to nothing to which God cannot oblige, since conscience is below God: therefore if conscience should dictate such things, it seems that it cannot oblige to such things: therefore we are not obliged to do them.

3. Likewise, it seems that it can bind to nothing of itself: because "all sin is something said, or done, or desired against the law of God," as Augustine says5: therefore if conscience dictates something that is not of the command of the divine law, to act against it is not sin, since it is not to act against the law of God: therefore one is not bound to do it: therefore conscience binds to nothing, as far as concerns its own power.

4. Likewise, no one can be absolved from any bond through the dictate of conscience, therefore neither through that dictate can one incur any bond: therefore it seems that conscience of itself and through itself can bind to nothing.

Connected questions. There is therefore the question, to what conscience binds: whether it binds to everything that it dictates; and whether every conscience binds; and whether a man is perplexed when conscience dictates one thing, and the divine law dictates the contrary; and which is rather to be obeyed, whether the dictate of conscience, or the precept of the prelate, when they conflict with one another.

Conclusion. Every conscience either binds to doing what it dictates, or binds to laying itself aside, if it is erroneous.

I respond: It must be said that conscience sometimes dictates something that is according to the law of God, sometimes something that is beside the law of God, sometimes something that is against the law of God; and we are speaking here of a dictate by way of precept or prohibition, not by way of counsel or persuasion. — In the first kind, indeed, conscience binds simply and universally, on the ground that man is bound to those things by the divine law, and conscience, which agrees with it, shows him to be bound. In the second kind, however, conscience binds as long as it remains; whence either man is bound to lay aside conscience, or he is bound to fulfill that which conscience dictates, as for instance if it dictates that it is necessary for salvation to lift a straw from the ground. In the third kind, however, conscience does not bind to doing or not doing, but binds to laying itself aside, on the ground that, since such a conscience is erroneous with an error repugnant to the divine law, it necessarily, as long as it remains, places man outside the state of salvation; and therefore it is necessary to lay it aside, because, whether a man does what it says, or its opposite, he sins mortally. — For if he does what conscience dictates, and that is against the law of God, and to act against the law of God is mortal sin; without doubt he sins mortally. But if he does the opposite of what conscience dictates, while it remains, he still sins mortally, not by reason of the work that he does, but because he does it in a bad manner. For he acts in contempt of God, while he believes, conscience dictating to him, that this displeases God, although it pleases God. And this is what the Gloss says upon that text to the Romans, chapter fourteen6: Everything that is not of faith is sin; there the Gloss: "Everything that pertains to conscience, if it be done otherwise, the Apostle says to be sin. For although even what is good be done, if it be believed not to be done, it is sin." And the reason of this is that God attends not only to what a man does, but with what mind he does it7; and that man

who does what God commands, believing himself to act against the will of God himself, does not act with a good mind, but with a bad one; and therefore he sins mortally. — Thus therefore it is plain that every conscience either binds to doing what it dictates, or binds to laying itself aside. Yet not every conscience binds to doing what it dictates; such as that one which dictates that what is not to be done is that to which a man is otherwise bound; but such a conscience is called erroneous. — These things seen, the response to the proposed question is plain, and also to the objections for the side.

To the arguments for the affirmative side: 1. To that which is first objected, that everything which is not of faith, that is, against conscience; the response is now plain. For I say that to act against conscience is always sin, because it is always in contempt of God; yet to act according to conscience is not always good, as for instance when conscience dictates something that is against God. Whence this has two grounds of truth: to act against conscience is sin, either because conscience binds to doing it, or because it cannot be well done, while such a conscience remains; and therefore there is in it a sophism according to the consequent8, because it proceeds from several grounds of truth to one in that argument.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that conscience is the law of our intellect; it must be said that it is true that it is a law, but it is not the supreme law; for above it is another law, namely the divine law. But when it is said that law binds to doing everything that it dictates; it must be said that this is true, when the lower law does not dictate the contrary to the higher law; but this conscience often does. — And similarly the response is to be made to what follows, which objects concerning the judge.

4. To that which is last objected, that whoever believes himself to sin mortally, sins mortally; it must be said that this is true. For that is generally true which is said: "He who acts against conscience builds toward gehenna."9 But nevertheless from this it does not follow that we are bound to do everything that conscience dictates to be done, because, as has been said, that has two grounds of truth.

To the arguments for the negative side: 1. 2. To those first arguments, which are adduced to the contrary, it is not fitting to reply, on the ground that10 they conclude truly; for they show that conscience does not bind in all things.

3. To that which is objected, that it binds to nothing of itself, because11 that is not called sin which is done against conscience, but against the law of God; it must be said that to act against the law of God can be twofold: either truly, or interpretively, that is, either according to truth, or according to estimation; and in either way it is mortal sin; for in either way God is despised. And although one acting against conscience does not always act against the law of God according to truth, he yet acts either according to truth, or according to estimation; because conscience is like the herald of God and his messenger, and what it says, it does not command of itself, but commands as if from God, like a herald, when he proclaims the edict of the king. And hence it is that conscience has the power of binding in those things that can in some way be well done.

4. To that which is objected, that it cannot absolve from anything; it must be said that it is not alike, because conscience cannot infringe another law; whence neither can it absolve from the precept of God nor from the precept of a prelate, to whom a man has obliged himself by the law of a vow. From this, however, it does not follow that it cannot bind finally; rather it is an argument from the lesser by destroying12. Whence just as that argument is worth nothing: conscience cannot reach above a superior: therefore it cannot reach an inferior; so that one is not valid: conscience cannot absolve a man from the command of a superior: therefore it cannot oblige him. Yet it does well follow that it cannot13 oblige against the command of a superior. To something, however, it can oblige us, on the ground that in a certain way it is above us and a mean between us and God, just as a herald is a mean between the king and the people.

From these things are plain those things which were last inquired, namely when conscience binds, and when it does not bind. — It is plain also that no one is perplexed from conscience except for a time, namely as long as conscience remains; yet he is not perplexed simply, on the ground that he ought to lay aside that conscience; and if he does not know how to judge of it by himself, on the ground that he does not know the law of God, he ought to consult the wiser, or through prayer to turn himself to God, if human counsel is lacking. Otherwise, if he is negligent, that which the Apostle14 says is verified in him: He who is ignorant shall be held ignorant. — It is plain also that the precept of the prelate is rather to be stood by than conscience, especially when the prelate commands what he can and ought to command.

Scholion

I. It is established among all that conscience, even an erroneous one, binds; likewise, if the ignorance be vincible, that an erroneous conscience does not excuse from the sin that is done against the law of God. In this sense are to be understood the words (here in the body): "If he does what conscience dictates, and that is against the law of God... without doubt he sins mortally"; which opinion is found also in St. Thomas (here q. 3 a. 3 in the body and ad 5), Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and others, who dissent only in the mode of speaking and somewhat in the manner of explaining the matter. — But it is to be judged otherwise, if the ignorance be utterly invincible (cf. St. Alphonsus of Liguori, Moral Theology, bk. I, tr. 1, c. 1, n. 1). The words: "The precept of the prelate is rather to be stood by than conscience," are to be understood with a restriction, namely when it is lawfully commanded, as is intimated by the following words, or when conscience is in doubt, since in doubt the presumption stands for the superior (cf. below, d. 44, a. 3, q. 2, and dub. 2, and Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 121, m. 3, a. 2). Hence the saying of St. Thomas (here q. 3 a. 3 ad 3): "The dictate of conscience obliges more than the precept of a prelate" departs only in word and in appearance from those things which the Seraphic Doctor here teaches.

II. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 1. — Scotus, II. Reportata d. 39 q. 2 n. 10. — St. Thomas, here art. cit.; S. I-II q. 19 a. 5; de Veritate q. 1 a. 4, 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3 a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2 q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 3 a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 5, 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 23. — Glossa habetur apud Petr. Lombardum in hunc loc., apud Lyranum ut interlinearis; de qua cfr. quae annotantur ad Glossam similem, quae infra occurrit in corp. quaest.
    Verse 23. — The Gloss is found in Peter Lombard on this passage, in Lyra as interlinear; concerning which cf. what is noted on the similar Gloss, which occurs below in the body of the question.
  2. Communiorem huius verbi originationem Augustinus exhibet, qui III. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 20. n. 2. ait: Legem a legendo i. e. ab eligendo Latini auctores [Varro, Cicero; vide Forcellini, Lexicon etc., sub vocabulo Lex, et Isidor., V. Etymolog. c. 3. n. 2.] appellatam esse dixerunt. S. Thom. consentit etymo vocabuli legis a S. Bonav. hic proposito. Ait enim S. I. II. q. 90. a. 1: « Dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad agendum ». Aristot., X. Ethic. c. 9. ait: Lex, cum ex prudentia quadam et mente profecta oratio sit, cogendi vim habet. — Verba minoris sunt Damasceni, de quibus vide supra pag. 899, nota 1.
    Augustine sets forth the more common derivation of this word, who in Questions on the Pentateuch III, q. 20, n. 2 says: Latin authors [Varro, Cicero; see Forcellini, Lexicon etc., under the word Lex, and Isidore, Etymologies V, c. 3, n. 2] said that lex (law) was named from legendo (reading), i.e. from eligendo (choosing). St. Thomas agrees with the etymology of the word lex proposed by St. Bonaventure here. For he says in S. I-II q. 90 a. 1: "For law (lex) is so called from binding (a ligando), because it obliges to acting." Aristotle, Ethics X, c. 9, says: Law, since it is a discourse proceeding from a certain prudence and mind, has the force of compelling. — The words of the minor premise are Damascene's, concerning which see above p. 899, note 1.
  3. Vers. 23. — Glossa interlinearis apud Lyranum: Scit enim conscientia tua, qua iudice nemo nocens absolvitur.
    Verse 23. — Interlinear Gloss in Lyra: For your conscience knows, by whose judgment no guilty person is absolved.
  4. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 47. q. 4. — In hac propos. codd. I K T Y Z eo perperam transponunt quae post secundum se; cod. W inter verba quod Deus interfecit quidem. Ed. 3 prorsus omittit quae ante nullo, prius substituto Item, ea quae pro Item, quaedam. Etiam Vat. omittit quae, post nullo subiiciens enim.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 47 q. 4. — In this proposition codices I K T Y Z wrongly transpose to that point the words after secundum se; codex W [places them] among the words quod Deus interfecit quidem. Edition 3 wholly omits quae before nullo, having first substituted Item for the words which stand in place of Item, quaedam. The Vatican edition too omits quae, after nullo adding enim.
  5. Libr. XXII. contra Faustum, c. 27. — In maiori edd. praeter I pro ligare exhibent obligare.
    Against Faustus book XXII, c. 27. — For the most part the editions except I give obligare (to oblige) for ligare (to bind).
  6. Vers. 23. Glossa quoad primam partem sumta est ex Comment., Ambrosio tributo, in hunc loc. Vide ed. Maurinam, quae in annotatione ad calcem reiecta plures codd. affert, qui primam propositionem Glossae fere ad verbum sic exhibent, ut hic in quaest. habetur. Glossa integra invenitur apud Petr. Lombardum, in hunc loc., ubi adduntur post credatur verba: vel sic non faciendum, ut fit.
    Verse 23. The Gloss as to its first part is taken from the Commentary, attributed to Ambrose, on this passage. See the Maurist edition, which in the annotation rejected at the foot adduces several codices that give the first proposition of the Gloss almost word for word as it is had here in the question. The whole Gloss is found in Peter Lombard on this passage, where after credatur are added the words: or that it is thus not to be done, as it is.
  7. Beda, in Luc. 21, 2: Hic nobis locus moraliter quidem intimat, quam sit acceptabile Deo quidquid bono animo obtulerimus, qui cor nimirum, et non substantiam, pensat nec perpendit, quantum in eius sacrificiis, sed ex quanto proferatur. Cfr. Comment. in Marc. (inter opera Hieronymi) 12, 42, et Gregor., I. in Evang. homil. 5. n. 2, ubi idem dicitur.
    Bede, on Luke 21:2: This passage indeed intimates to us morally how acceptable to God is whatever we offer with a good mind — he who indeed weighs the heart, and not the substance, nor considers how much is brought in his sacrifices, but from how great a store it is offered. Cf. the Commentary on Mark (among the works of Jerome) 12:42, and Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels I, hom. 5, n. 2, where the same is said.
  8. Vide tom. I. pag. 628, nota 1.
    See vol. I, p. 628, note 1.
  9. Innocent. III, Litteras tuas; 13. de restitut. spoliatorum, tit. 13. libr. 2. (Decretal. Gregorii): Quoniam omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est; et quidquid fit contra conscientiam, aedificat ad gehennam. — Circa initium solut. post credit Vat. et edd. 3, 4 adiungunt se. Mox pro tenemur codd. F T bb et alii nec non ed. 1 teneamur.
    Innocent III, Litteras tuas; 13, on the restitution of the despoiled, tit. 13, bk. 2 (Decretals of Gregory): Since everything that is not of faith is sin; and whatever is done against conscience builds toward gehenna. — Near the beginning of the solution, after credit the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add se. Soon for tenemur codices F T bb and others, and also edition 1, [read] teneamur.
  10. Cod. T commutavit pro eo quod in quia.
    Codex T changed pro eo quod into quia.
  11. Edd., excepta I, pro quia perperam et quod. Mox post non dicitur cod. T addit per se.
    The editions, except I, [read] wrongly et quod for quia. Soon after non dicitur codex T adds per se.
  12. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5.
    Cf. vol. I, p. 835, note 5.
  13. Cod. T addit eum, cod. bb nos.
    Codex T adds eum, codex bb nos.
  14. Epist. I. Cor. 14, 38: Si quis ignorat, ignorabitur.
    Epistle 1 Cor. 14:38: If anyone is ignorant, he shall be held ignorant.
← Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 1→