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Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 6

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio VI. Utrum ordo caritatis attendatur penes effectum tantum, an simul penes affectum et effectum.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum ordo caritatis attendatur penes effectum tantum, an simul penes affectum et effectum. Et quod penes utrumque, videtur:

1. Primae Ioannis tertio1: Diligamus non verbo neque lingua, sed opere et veritate: non est ergo vera dilectio, nisi sit in corde et opere, in affectu et in effectu: ergo pari ratione non est verus dilectionis ordo, nisi penes illorum utrumque attendatur.

2. Item, Gregorius in quadam homilia2: « Probatio dilectionis exhibitio est operis »: ergo ubi est maior operis exhibitio, ibi probatur maior esse dilectio, et e converso: si ergo caritas ordinata est in diligendo, videtur, quod ordinari debeat in corde et in facto.

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3. Item, ordinatio in effectu ortum habet ab ordinatione in affectu: si ergo caritas ordinari debet in effectu, necesse est, quod primo ordinetur in affectu. Sed caritas ordinata est quantum ad effectum, sicut patet per illud quod dicit Apostolus3: Operemur bonum ad omnes, maxime autem ad domesticos: ergo necesse est, caritatem ordinatam esse quantum ad affectum.

4. Item, « magis pensat Deus, ex quanto homo facit, quam quantum facit4 »: ergo si ordo caritatis est Deo acceptus, videtur, quod non solum consistat in opere exteriori, sed etiam in affectu interiori.

Sed contra: 1. Quod non consistat in affectu, videtur per illud quod dicitur in Proverbiis, decimo octavo5: Vir amicabilis ad societatem magis erit amicus quam frater; sed constat, quod ista amicitia, de qua Sapiens loquitur, non adversatur ipsi caritati, immo potius est ei consona; sed secundum istam dicit, quod magis diligitur homo bonae societatis quam frater secundum carnem: videtur ergo, quod secundum praeassignatas differentias non attendatur ordo dilectionis quantum ad affectum.

2. Item, delectatio in familiaritate consequitur ad dilectionem et affectum diligendi6; sed multi sunt, qui plus delectantur loqui cum amico suo quam per orationem loqui cum Deo: ergo videtur, quod nullus talis caritatem habeat ordinatam; quod valde durum videtur dicere.

3. Item, quod non attendatur penes effectum, videtur, quia multi sunt impotentes ad impendenda opera dilectionis: ergo tales non possunt habere ordinem caritatis; quodsi hoc est falsum, restat etc.

4. Item, si ordo caritatis attendatur penes effectum, ergo recte et secundum ordinem caritatis agit qui praebendale beneficium potius dat suo consanguineo quam alicui extraneo; quod tamen reprehendit propheta Michaeas, tertio7: Vae! qui aedificat Sion in sanguinibus; et Ezechiel, quadragesimo quarto: Sufficiat vobis domus Israel, qui introducitis incircumcisos in sanctuarium Dei; ubi reprehenduntur illi qui beneficia ecclesiastica magis conferunt domesticis quam aliis.

### Conclusio. Caritatis ordo respectu diligibilium diversorum non solum attenditur quantum ad effectum exteriorem, sed etiam quantum ad interiorem affectum, quod intelligitur, ceteris paribus.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, secundum quod dicit Magister in littera8, aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod huiusmodi ordo caritatis attendatur solum quantum ad effectum exteriorem, non quantum ad affectum interiorem nisi per comparationem nostri ad Deum; per comparationem autem proximi ad proximum solum consistit ordo quantum ad exteriorem effectum. Et innituntur his auctoritatibus Augustini, quae in littera9 ponuntur, in quibus videtur expresse sentire, quod ordo caritatis respectu proximi attendatur solum in exterioris operis exhibitione. Et hoc ipsum videtur dicere in libro de Vera Religione10, ubi dicit, quod « haec est perfecta iustitia, ut plus potiora bona et minus minora diligamus ». Ex quo videtur posse elici, quod istae differentiae propinquitatis nihil faciant ad affectum dilectionis. — Verumtamen, sicut dicit Magister in littera11, et verba Ambrosii sonant, et rationes prius inductae comprobant, ordo caritatis per comparationem nostri ad proximum et unius proximi ad alterum non solum attenditur secundum effectum, verum etiam secundum affectum; et hoc idem intelligendum est, ceteris aliis paribus. Si enim in duobus dilectis est par dignitas et necessitas, quantum est de istis proprietatibus et conditionibus, aequaliter sunt amandi effectu et affectu; sed si in altero illorum superaddatur sanguinis propinquitas, facit ipsum magis amabilem utroque modo. Et isto modo intendit Ambrosius caritatis ordinem assignare respectu proximorum; quod notat, cum dicit12, « quod domestici, si boni sunt, malis filiis sunt praeponendi ».

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Et si tu quaeras: cum ad ordinem caritatis concurrant meriti dignitas et indigentiae opportunitas, sicut et propinquitas13, quare magis Ambrosius assignat ordinem caritatis penes propinquitatem quam penes bonitatem, vel indigentiae necessitatem? dicendum, quod conditio bonitatis nec est nobis ita nota nec est in se ita stabilis et firma, sicut propinquitatis conditio. Aliquis enim, qui hodie est malus, cras erit bonus, et qui hodie est minus bonus, cras forsassis erit melior; similiter est de necessitate et opportunitate. Ideo penes gradus necessitatis, bonitatis et opportunitatis non potuit ita certitudinaliter ordo caritatis assignari, sicut penes conditiones propinquitatis.

Concedendum est ergo, quod ordo caritatis secundum differentias praeassignatas non solum attenditur quantum ad effectum exteriorem, sed etiam quantum ad affectum interiorem; et hoc intelligendum est, aliis paribus. Unde et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

Ad evidentiam autem rationum14, quae adducuntur in contrarium, notandum est, quod multipliciter contingit affectum nostrum accipi, et effectum multiplicem reperiri, ita quod ordo caritatis nec omnem affectum respicit uniformiter nec omnem effectum. Accipitur enim aliquando affectus pro passione, aliquando vero pro motu, ita quod affectus-passio dicitur quaedam mulcebris complacentia, affectus vero motus dicitur quaedam rationalis eligentia15. — Affectus autem motus dupliciter adhuc accipitur. Nam quidam est a caritate elicitus, quidam vero imperatus. Affectus a caritate elicitus est ille quo quis optat alteri summum Bonum; affectus vero imperatus est ille quo quis optat alii aliquod bonum temporale, quod est ordinatum ad conservationem naturae. — Sic igitur triplex est affectus: unus a caritate elicitus, quo quidem opto alicui summum Bonum; alius imperatus, quo opto alicui aliquod bonum terrenum; tertius vero annexus, quo delector in alterius bono, qui magis tenet rationem passionis quam motus.

Et cum sit triplex16 affectus, ordo caritatis praeassignatus respicit affectum a caritate elicitum principaliter, quia magis mihi debeo optare beatam vitam quam alii; et post me magis patri meo quam alii, et sic ulterius procedendo. Affectum vero imperatum respicit minus principaliter; unde pro diversis opportunitatibus et conditionibus ordo quantum ad illum affectum potest variari et praeposterari. Affectum vero annexum, qui est passio mulcebris, minime respicit ordo caritatis; ille enim potius respicit sensibilem experientiam quam rationis eligentiam, sicut patet: quia plus delectatur aliquis et gaudet in respiciendo socium, quem videt praesentem, quam in recolendo patrem, qui absens est, quamvis ipsum magis diligat; cuius signum est, quod17 pro patre faceret multo maiora.

Similiter et ex parte effectus distinguendum est. Nam quidam est effectus sive beneficium, quod respicit utilitatem communem18, sicut collatio ecclesiastici beneficii; quoddam, quod respicit personam singularem, et istud duplex est: quoddam enim est, quod respicit animae salutem; aliud vero, quod respicit sustentationem vitae praesentis. Et sic triplex est effectus exterior: unus, qui est procuratio salutis aeternae; alius, qui est relevatio temporalis necessitatis; tertius vero, qui est commissio beneficii ecclesiastici, qui est quodam modo spiritualis. — Primum autem istorum effectuum respicit ordo caritatis principaliter; primo enim debeo procurare salutem meam19 quam salutem proximi, et primo salutem patris quam alicuius alterius, et sic deinceps procedendo. — Secundum vero effectum respicit minus principaliter, quia secundum diversas opportunitates potest et debet homo magis et minus esse beneficus in collatione alicuius commodi temporalis. — Tertium vero effectum, qui est collatio alicuius beneficii ecclesiastici, minime respicit ordo caritatis; in collatione enim talium beneficiorum multum attendenda est meriti dignitas, et parum aut nihil sanguinis proximitas. Verendum enim valde est, ne sub pallio caritatis affectus lateat carnalitatis. — Ex his patent omnia quae obiecta20 sunt.

1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de affectu amicabili, qui est ad socium magis quam ad fratrem: iam patet responsio: quia illud intelligitur de affectu, qui est cuiusdam mulcebris complacentiae, ratione cuius plus delectatur homo habitare21 cum bono socio quam cum fratre vel cum consanguineo.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de hoc, quod plus delectatur homo loqui cum amico quam loqui cum Deo; similiter iam patet responsio: quia talis delectatio sequitur sensibilem experientiam; et quia proximum suum videt, Deum autem non videt: hinc est, quod plus delectatur aliquando alloqui proximum quam orare Deum, licet multo plus Deum diligat quam amicum suum. Licet autem iste affectus in viris carnalibus, qui huic mundo dediti sunt, aliquo modo sit tolerabilis; in viris tamen spiritualibus, quorum est experiri, quam suavis et dulcis est Dominus22, valde est reprehensibilis et cum magna diligentia debet exstirpari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod effectus non est in potestate nostra; dicendum, quod etsi non sit in potestate nostra effectum exterius impendere, est tamen in potestate nostra ipsum effectum velle; et quando voluntas perfecta est, pro facto reputatur23: et ideo defectus potentiae in exsequendo non tollit ordinem caritatis, qui quantum ad effectum exteriorem habet attendi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de beneficio praebendali, iam patet responsio: quia quantum ad illum effectum24 minime, ut dictum est, attenditur caritatis ordo.

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English Translation

Question VI. Whether the order of charity is attended to in respect to effect only, or at the same time in respect to affect and effect.

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether the order of charity is attended to in respect to effect only, or at the same time in respect to affect and effect. And that [it is attended to] in respect to both, seems [the case]:

1. First [Epistle] of John three1: Let us love not in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth: therefore there is no true love unless it be in the heart and in the deed, in affect and in effect: therefore by parity of reasoning there is no true order of love unless it be attended to in respect to both of them.

2. Likewise, Gregory in a certain homily2: « The proof of love is the showing forth of work »: therefore where there is a greater showing forth of work, there a greater love is proved [to be], and conversely: if therefore charity is ordered in loving, it seems that it ought to be ordered in the heart and in the deed.

3. Likewise, the ordering in effect takes its rise from the ordering in affect: if therefore charity ought to be ordered in effect, it is necessary that it first be ordered in affect. But charity is ordered as regards effect, as is evident by that which the Apostle says3: Let us work good toward all, but most of all toward those of the household: therefore it is necessary that charity be ordered as regards affect.

4. Likewise, « God weighs more from how much a man does than how much he does4 »: therefore if the order of charity is acceptable to God, it seems that it consists not only in the exterior work, but also in the interior affect.

On the contrary: 1. That it does not consist in affect, seems [evident] by that which is said in Proverbs, the eighteenth5: A man friendly to society shall be more a friend than a brother; but it is established that that friendship, of which the Wise Man speaks, is not opposed to charity itself, nay rather is consonant with it; but according to that [friendship] he says that a man of good society is loved more than a brother according to the flesh: it seems therefore that according to the aforeassigned differences the order of love is not attended to as regards affect.

2. Likewise, delight in familiarity follows upon the love and affect of loving6; but there are many who delight more to speak with their friend than to speak with God through prayer: therefore it seems that no such person has ordered charity; which seems very hard to say.

3. Likewise, that it is not attended to in respect to effect seems [evident], because there are many who are powerless to expend the works of love: therefore such persons cannot have the order of charity; but if this is false, it remains etc.

4. Likewise, if the order of charity is attended to in respect to effect, then he acts rightly and according to the order of charity who gives a prebendal benefice rather to his blood-relation than to some stranger; which nevertheless the prophet Micah reproves, the third7: Woe! who builds Sion in bloods; and Ezekiel, the forty-fourth: Let the house of Israel suffice you, who bring in the uncircumcised into the sanctuary of God; where those are reproved who confer ecclesiastical benefits more on those of the household than on others.

### Conclusion. The order of charity, in respect to diverse lovable [persons], is attended to not only as regards the exterior effect, but also as regards the interior affect, which is understood, other things being equal.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, according to what the Master says in the littera8, some have wished to say that this order of charity is attended to only as regards the exterior effect, not as regards the interior affect except by comparison of ourselves to God; but by comparison of one neighbor to another the order consists only as regards the exterior effect. And they rely on these authorities of Augustine, which are set down in the littera9, in which he seems expressly to hold that the order of charity in respect to the neighbor is attended to only in the showing forth of exterior work. And this same thing he seems to say in the book On True Religion10, where he says that « this is perfect justice, that we love the weightier goods more and the lesser goods less ». From which it seems possible to elicit that these differences of nearness do nothing toward the affect of love. — Nevertheless, as the Master says in the littera11, and the words of Ambrose sound forth, and the reasons adduced earlier confirm, the order of charity, by comparison of ourselves to the neighbor and of one neighbor to another, is attended to not only as regards effect, but also as regards affect; and this same thing is to be understood, all other things being equal. For if in two beloved [persons] there is equal dignity and need, as far as concerns these properties and conditions, they are to be loved equally in effect and in affect; but if in one of them there be superadded blood-nearness, it makes him more lovable in both ways. And in this way Ambrose intends to assign the order of charity in respect to neighbors; which he notes when he says12, « that those of the household, if they are good, are to be preferred to evil sons ».

And if you should ask: since to the order of charity there concur the dignity of merit and the opportuneness of need, as also nearness13, why does Ambrose assign the order of charity in respect to nearness rather than in respect to goodness, or the necessity of need? it must be said that the condition of goodness is neither so known to us nor in itself so stable and firm as the condition of nearness. For someone who today is evil, tomorrow will be good, and he who today is less good, tomorrow perhaps will be better; likewise it is concerning need and opportuneness. Therefore in respect to the degrees of need, goodness, and opportuneness the order of charity could not be assigned so certainly as in respect to the conditions of nearness.

It must therefore be granted that the order of charity, according to the aforeassigned differences, is attended to not only as regards the exterior effect, but also as regards the interior affect; and this is to be understood, other things being equal. Whence also the reasons which show this are to be granted.

But for the evidence of the reasons14 which are adduced to the contrary, it must be noted that our affect can be taken in manifold ways, and effect be found to be manifold, so that the order of charity neither regards every affect uniformly nor every effect. For affect is sometimes taken for a passion, but sometimes for a motion, so that affect-as-passion is called a certain soothing complacency, but affect-as-motion is called a certain rational choosing15. — But affect-as-motion is further taken in two ways. For one is elicited from charity, but another commanded. Affect elicited from charity is that by which one wishes for another the highest Good; but affect commanded is that by which one wishes for another some temporal good, which is ordered to the conservation of nature. — Thus therefore affect is threefold: one elicited from charity, by which indeed I wish for someone the highest Good; another commanded, by which I wish for someone some earthly good; but a third annexed, by which I am delighted in another's good, which holds rather the character of passion than of motion.

And since affect is threefold16, the aforeassigned order of charity regards the affect elicited from charity principally, because I ought to wish the blessed life more for myself than for another; and after myself more for my father than for another, and so proceeding further. But it regards the commanded affect less principally; whence for diverse opportunenesses and conditions the order as regards that affect can be varied and reversed. But the annexed affect, which is a soothing passion, the order of charity by no means regards; for that [affect] regards rather sensible experience than the choosing of reason, as is evident: because one is more delighted and rejoices in looking upon a companion whom he sees present than in recalling a father who is absent, although he loves [the father] more; the sign of which is, that17 for the father he would do much greater things.

Likewise also on the part of effect a distinction must be made. For there is a certain effect or benefit which regards the common usefulness18, as the conferral of an ecclesiastical benefice; another which regards the individual person, and this is twofold: for there is one which regards the salvation of the soul; but another which regards the sustenance of the present life. And thus exterior effect is threefold: one, which is the procuring of eternal salvation; another, which is the relieving of temporal need; but a third, which is the committing of an ecclesiastical benefice, which is in a certain way spiritual. — But the first of these effects the order of charity regards principally; for I ought first to procure my own salvation19 rather than the salvation of my neighbor, and first the salvation of my father rather than of any other, and so proceeding thenceforth. — But it regards the second effect less principally, because according to diverse opportunenesses a man can and ought to be more and less beneficent in the conferral of some temporal advantage. — But the third effect, which is the conferral of some ecclesiastical benefice, the order of charity by no means regards; for in the conferral of such benefices the dignity of merit is much to be attended to, and little or nothing the nearness of blood. For it is greatly to be feared lest under the cloak of charity there lie hidden an affect of carnality. — From these things all the things which were objected20 are evident.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the friendly affect, which is toward a companion more than toward a brother: the response is already evident: because that is understood of the affect which is of a certain soothing complacency, by reason of which a man is more delighted to dwell21 with a good companion than with a brother or with a blood-relation.

2. To that which is objected concerning this, that a man is more delighted to speak with a friend than to speak with God; likewise the response is already evident: because such delight follows sensible experience; and because he sees his neighbor, but does not see God: hence it is that he is sometimes more delighted to address his neighbor than to pray to God, although he loves God much more than his friend. But although this affect in carnal men, who are given over to this world, is in some way tolerable; in spiritual men, however, whose [part] it is to experience how sweet and gentle is the Lord22, it is very reprehensible and ought to be rooted out with great diligence.

3. To that which is objected, that the effect is not in our power; it must be said that even if it is not in our power to expend the effect outwardly, it is nevertheless in our power to will the effect itself; and when the will is perfect, it is reputed as the deed23: and therefore the defect of power in carrying out does not take away the order of charity, which as regards the exterior effect has to be attended to.

4. To that which is objected concerning the prebendal benefice, the response is already evident: because as regards that effect24 the order of charity is by no means attended to, as has been said.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. [p.649, footer 4] Vers. 18. — Proxime ante pro effectum tantum, codd. et edd. affectum tantum, sed minus bene, ut non solum ex verbis Magistri, verum etiam ex hac ipsa quaest. palam fit. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 637, nota 5.
    [p.649, footer 4] Verse 18. — Just before, for effectum tantum, the codices and editions [read] affectum tantum, but less well, as is plain not only from the words of the Master, but also from this very question. Cf. also above, page 637, note 5.
  2. [p.649, footer 5] Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 30. n. 1.
    [p.649, footer 5] Book II of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 30, n. 1.
  3. [p.650, footer 1] Gal. 6, 10. — Verbo domesticos codd. A K et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 68. a. 6. cum Vulgata adiiciunt fidei. Paulo ante pro quod primo edd. habent quod prius.
    [p.650, footer 1] Galatians 6:10. — To the word domesticos codices A K and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 68, a. 6, with the Vulgate add fidei. A little before, for quod primo the editions have quod prius.
  4. [p.650, footer 2] Secundum Gregor. et Bedam; cfr. tom. II. pag. 906, nota 6. — Mox pro dativo Deo non pauci codd. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. in Deo.
    [p.650, footer 2] According to Gregory and Bede; cf. tome II, page 906, note 6. — Soon after, for the dative Deo not a few codices and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [read] in Deo.
  5. [p.650, footer 3] Vers. 24.
    [p.650, footer 3] Verse 24.
  6. [p.650, footer 4] Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 8: Laetari enim ex affectionibus animae est; unicuique autem id est iucundum, ad quod spectando talis rei studiosus quispiam dicitur, ut equus equorum, spectaculum spectaculorum studioso etc. — Pro delectatio, quae lectio habetur in codd. A W et in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal., edd. cum aliis codd. dilectio.
    [p.650, footer 4] Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 8: For to rejoice is [a thing] of the affections of the soul; but to each that is pleasant, in respect to looking upon which anyone is called studious of such a thing, as the horse [is studious] of horses, the spectacle of spectacles to the one studious [of them], etc. — For delectatio, which reading is had in codices A W and in the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, the editions with other codices [read] dilectio.
  7. [p.650, footer 5] Vers. 10: Qui aedificatis Sion in sanguinibus. Edd. allegant Habacuc (2, 12: Vae, qui aedificat civitatem in sanguinibus). Nonnulli codd. perperam citant Isaiam. Pro Michaeas, tertio cod. W substituit dicens. — Seq. Script. locus est Ezech. 44, 6. seq.: Sufficiant vobis omnia scelera vestra, domus Israel, eo quod inducitis filios alienos incircumcisos corde et incircumcisos carne, ut sint in sanctuario meo etc. — Pro quod tamen codd. A K quem multum.
    [p.650, footer 5] Verse 10: You who build Sion in bloods. The editions cite Habakkuk (2:12: Woe, who builds a city in bloods). Some codices wrongly cite Isaiah. For Micah, the third, codex W substituted saying. — The following Scripture passage is Ezekiel 44:6 f.: Let all your wickednesses suffice you, house of Israel, in that you bring in foreign sons uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh, that they may be in my sanctuary, etc. — For quod tamen codices A K [read] quem multum.
  8. [p.650, footer 6] Hic c. 2. — Post pauca pro attendatur codd. I K L U bb attenditur.
    [p.650, footer 6] Here c. 2. — A little after, for attendatur codices I K L U bb [read] attenditur.
  9. [p.650, footer 7] Hic c. 2. — Paulo ante pro innituntur his cod. Z bene innituntur hi.
    [p.650, footer 7] Here c. 2. — A little before, for innituntur his codex Z rightly [reads] innituntur hi.
  10. [p.650, footer 8] Cap. 48. n. 93: Et haec est perfecta iustitia, qua potius potiora et minus minora diligimus.
    [p.650, footer 8] Chapter 48, n. 93: And this is perfect justice, by which we love the weightier things more and the lesser things less.
  11. [p.650, footer 9] Hic c. 2, ubi et verba Ambrosii (Origenis) inveniuntur. Cfr. Bernard., Serm. in Cantic. serm. 50. n. 2. seqq., et Comment. in Cantic. ex Bernardo (inter opera Bernardi), n. 33. — Paulo post pro prius edd. primo.
    [p.650, footer 9] Here c. 2, where also the words of Ambrose (Origen) are found. Cf. Bernard, Sermons on the Canticle, sermon 50, n. 2 ff., and the Commentary on the Canticle from Bernard (among the works of Bernard), n. 33. — A little after, for prius the editions [read] primo.
  12. [p.650, footer 10] Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2.
    [p.650, footer 10] Here in the littera of the Master, c. 2.
  13. [p.651, footer 1] Vide quaest. praeced. in fine corp. et infra dub. 3.
    [p.651, footer 1] See the preceding question at the end of the body, and below, dubium 3.
  14. [p.651, footer 2] Pro rationum cod. Z omnium eorum, qui etiam superius pro aliis paribus legit ceteris paribus.
    [p.651, footer 2] For rationum codex Z [reads] omnium eorum, which also above for aliis paribus reads ceteris paribus.
  15. [p.651, footer 3] Cfr. supra d. 17. dub. 1. — Pro eligentia codd. A K T diligentia. Adiectivo mulcebris utitur etiam Alanus de Insulis (de Planctu naturae), de amore cantans: « Mulcebris infernus, tristis paradisus »; cfr. etiam Ioan. Salisburensis, l. Polycraticus (Migne, Patrol. lat. t. 199 col. 414.).
    [p.651, footer 3] Cf. above, d. 17, dubium 1. — For eligentia codices A K T [read] diligentia. The adjective mulcebris (soothing) is used also by Alan of Lille (On the Complaint of Nature), singing of love: « A soothing hell, a sad paradise »; cf. also John of Salisbury, the Policraticus (Migne, Patrologia Latina t. 199, col. 414).
  16. [p.651, footer 4] Pro triplex affectus cod. C et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. triplex ratio affectus, multi codd. triplex respectu (respectus?) affectus. Paulo superius pro tertius vero cod. bb tertius est.
    [p.651, footer 4] For triplex affectus codex C and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [read] triplex ratio affectus, many codices triplex respectu (respectus?) affectus. A little above, for tertius vero codex bb [reads] tertius est.
  17. [p.651, footer 5] Codd. A K quia. Mox pro multo maiora edd. cum paucis codd. multa maiora.
    [p.651, footer 5] Codices A K [read] quia. Soon after, for multo maiora the editions with a few codices [read] multa maiora.
  18. [p.651, footer 6] Edd. ordinem membrorum invertunt ponentes primo et secundo loco, quae codd. secundo et tertio loco exhibent. Pro respicit utilitatem communem edd. 1, 2 respicit personam spiritualem communem, Vat. respicit personam spiritualem communem vel utilitatem communem.
    [p.651, footer 6] The editions invert the order of the members, placing in the first and second place what the codices exhibit in the second and third place. For respicit utilitatem communem editions 1, 2 [read] respicit personam spiritualem communem, the Vatican [edition] respicit personam spiritualem communem vel utilitatem communem.
  19. [p.651, footer 7] Cod. Z propriam.
    [p.651, footer 7] Codex Z [reads] propriam.
  20. [p.651, footer 8] Edd. dicta.
    [p.651, footer 8] The editions [read] dicta.
  21. [p.651, footer 9] Cod. F loqui et habitare.
    [p.651, footer 9] Codex F [reads] loqui et habitare.
  22. [p.652, footer 1] Psalm. 33, 9. — Paulo superius pro amicum suum cod. Z proximum suum.
    [p.652, footer 1] Psalm 33:9. — A little above, for amicum suum codex Z [reads] proximum suum.
  23. [p.652, footer 2] Cfr. II. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. q. 3.
    [p.652, footer 2] Cf. II Sentences, d. 40, a. 1, q. 3.
  24. [p.652, footer 3] Edd. affectum. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    [p.652, footer 3] The editions [read] affectum. — See the scholion to the preceding question.
← Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 5Dist. 29, Dubia→