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Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 5

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
p. 647

Quaestio V. Utrum domesticus sit extraneo praeponendus.

Quinto quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem domestici ad extraneum, et est quaestio, utrum domesticus sit extraneo praeponendus. Et quod sic, videtur1:

1. Per illud quod dicitur ad Galatas ultimo2: Operemur bonum ad omnes, maxime autem ad domesticos fidei; et primae ad Timotheum quinto: Si quis suorum et maxime domesticorum curam non habet, fidem negavit et est infideli deterior. Ex utraque istarum auctoritatum ostendi potest, quod domesticus extraneo debeat praeferri; per unam ostenditur positive et per aliam destructive.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur auctoritate Ambrosii, quae ponitur in littera3, qui dicit, domesticos collocandos esse quinto loco in ordine caritatis, extraneos vero in sexto.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per rationem. Diffusio caloris corporalis prius est ad loca propinquiora quam ad remotiora: ergo a simili, communicatio amoris spiritualis prius respicit naturaliter quod est propinquum, quam quod est remotum: si ergo domestici sunt propinquiores nobis quam extranei, vel inimici; videtur, quod in ordine caritatis primo sint collocandi4.

p. 648

4. Item, ad illos prius et principalius caritas ordinat, quibus magis astringimur et ligamur — ordo enim caritatis consonat legi iustitiae5 — sed secundum legem iustitiae magis obligamur domesticis quam extraneis: ergo domestici praeferri debent extraneis in ordine caritatis.

Sed contra: 1. Ad Colossenses tertio6: Renovamini secundum novum hominem, ubi non est masculus et femina, gentilis et Iudaeus, sed omnia in omnibus Christus: ergo secundum hoc homini habenti caritatem nemo est extraneus: ergo secundum legem caritatis nulla est distinctio, nullus ordo inter domesticum et extraneum.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Vera Religione7: « Non sic homo ab homine diligendus est, ut diliguntur carnales fratres vel filii vel coniuges vel cognati vel affines aut cives; nam ista dilectio est temporalis. Non enim tales necessitates haberemus, quae nascendo et moriendo contingunt, si nostra natura, in praeceptis et imagine Dei manens, in istam corruptionem non relegaretur »: ergo videtur, quod ordo caritatis penes extraneum et domesticum et propinquum nullatenus attendatur.

3. Item, ratio diligendi proximum ex caritate est ipsa imago Dei8: si ergo domesticus et extraneus aequaliter sunt imago Dei, videtur, quod ex caritate aequaliter sunt diligendi.

4. Item, caritas diligit bonum, quia bonum: ergo ille qui est magis bonus, magis est ex caritate diligendus, sive sit domesticus sive extraneus9: ergo propinquitas et familiaritas, vel extraneitas nihil videntur facere ad ordinem caritatis.

### Conclusio. Secundum ordinem caritatis domestici praeponendi sunt extraneis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod praedictus ordo, qui assignatur secundum has differentias, quae sunt propinquum et remotum, domesticum et extraneum, a quibusdam dicitur esse ipsius dilectionis naturalis, caritatis autem non est nisi tolerantis; sustinet enim caritas in via, cum sit imperfecta, imperfectionem ipsius naturae. Unde hi voluerunt dicere, quod ordo caritatis, qui competit ei secundum se, attenditur penes maius bonum et minus bonum, non autem secundum propinquum et remotum. — Sed hic modus dicendi non videtur concordare verbis Ambrosii nec verbis Magistri. Nam Ambrosius hunc ordinem assignat in ipsa dilectione gratuita, de qua dicit sponsa in Canticis10: Introduxit me rex in cellam vinariam, ordinavit in me caritatem. Et Magister in principio distinctionis dicit, quod « peccat qui praepostere agit » et hunc ordinem pervertit; quod non esset, si talis ordo solummodo esset caritatis sicut tolerantis.

Et ideo est alius modus dicendi, quod ordo, qui attenditur penes praedictas differentias, non tantum est ipsius caritatis sicut tolerantis, sed etiam est ipsius sicut regulantis naturam et ei consonantis. Quod enim primo diligantur propinqui quam extranei, hoc non est naturae inordinatae, sed potius de ordinatione11 naturae. — Sicut enim prius tactum est, rectus ordo diffusionis est, ut prius communicetur propinquiori et deinde remotiori. Quoniam ergo caritas rectum ordinem a natura non aufert; hinc est, quod caritas superveniens illum ordinem naturae perficit, et perficiendo dicitur eodem ordine ordinari, non quia ordo ille competat sibi secundum se, sed quia competit ei ratione naturae, in qua est.

Propter quod attendendum est, quod duplex ordo attenditur in caritate: unus, qui ei competit secundum se ipsam; et iste ordo attenditur penes bonum et magis bonum et maxime bonum. Unde caritas de se magis movet ad amandum spiritum quam corpus, et Deum summum quam spiritum creatum. Alius vero est ordo, qui competit ei ratione naturae substratae; et hic attenditur secundum has differentias, quae sunt proprium et alienum, propinquum et extraneum. Affectus enim caritatis substernit sibi affectum naturae et illum perficit et regit secundum id quod habet in se rectitudinis. — Concedendum est ergo, quod secundum ordinem caritatis domestici praeponendi sunt extraneis; rationes etiam, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

p. 649

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Christo Iesu non est distinctio masculi et feminae, immo omnes unum in Christo; dicendum, quod Apostolus per hoc non vult excludere distinctionem et gradum et ordinem in membris Christi, sed hoc vult ostendere, quod in omni sexu et aetate et de omni conditione quisque potest per Christum pervenire ad salutem, ita quod nullus excludendus est a fide. Et propterea ex hoc non habetur, quod caritas in diligendo membra Christi non servet ordinem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini de Vera Religione12, responderi potest, quod illam auctoritatem ipse retractat in primo Retractationum13. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod Augustinus non vult removere a caritate considerationem illarum conditionum simpliciter; sed hoc vult dicere, quod caritas illas conditiones non considerat primo et principaliter, secundum quod amor naturalis et carnalis. Et hoc patet per illud quod subiungit: « Amare enim in homine quod filius est, hoc non est in eo amare quod ad Deum pertinet, sed quod pertinet ad se »; constat, quod de eo intelligit, qui diligit filium principaliter, quia est ab eo genitus, non quia est ad Dei imaginem factus. Et propterea ex auctoritate illa non habetur, quod penes illas conditiones non attendatur ordo caritatis, sed quod non sunt principales rationes diligendi ex caritate. Quamvis autem non sint principales, possunt tamen esse annexae et concomitantes, et ex hoc ad caritatis ordinem facientes.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio diligendi proximum est imago; dicendum, quod ista est ratio communis et generalis, sed praeter hanc possunt esse aliae speciales. Ordo autem et distinctio, quamvis non attendatur penes conditiones14 generales, attendi potest penes speciales. Et propterea, quamvis domesticus et extraneus sint uniformiter ad imaginem Dei, non tamen sequitur, quod sint uniformiter diligendi.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod caritas diligit bonum, quia bonum; dicendum, quod verum est de ipsa caritate secundum se. Sicut enim praetactum est, ordo eius in se attenditur penes bonitatem maiorem, vel minorem; sed in caritate non tantum attenditur ordo secundum se, sed etiam ratione naturae substratae; et ratione illius assignatur ordo inter domesticum et extraneum. Et sic patet, quod ratio illa non repugnat ordini caritatis.

Scholion

I. Huic quaestioni, utrum ordo caritatis respiciat etiam affectum, de qua plura refert Magister (hic c. 2.), fomentum fortasse praebuerunt verba S. Bernardi (Serm. in Cantic. serm. 50. n. 3.), quae affirmare videntur, ipsum praeceptum caritatis respicere potius effectum quam affectum, sive, ut ipse loquitur, caritatem actualem quam affectualem. Sed ipse minime voluit excludere affectum, cum dicat (ibid. n. 4.): « Neque hoc dico, ut sine affectione simus et corde arido solas moveamus manus ad opera » etc.

II. Iam Gulielm. Antissiodorensis (Sum. III. tr. 6. c. 2. q. 2.) primam opinionem reprobavit; item posteriores Scholastici communiter tenent, quod licet ordo caritatis primo et principaliter attendat gradum similitudinis sive propinquitatis, quem dilectus habet ad ipsum Deum, secundario tamen etiam respiciat « naturam substratam », scilicet gradum similitudinis et propinquitatis, quem dilectus in ordine naturae habet cum diligente. In communicatione autem vitae naturalis et socialis inter homines plures sunt « differentiae » (cfr. infra dub. 3.), quarum quatuor cum S. Thoma sic distinguit Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 7.): « Est quaedam communicatio... naturalis in origine naturali, qua communicant propinqui; quaedam oeconomica in officiis domesticis, qua communicant domestici; quaedam politica in uno corpore civitatis unius, vel populi, qua communicant omnes cives; quaedam divina in operibus gratiae, qua communicant omnes homines [saltem potentia]. Et super quamlibet harum communicationum fundatur amicitia quaedam: super primam amicitia propinquorum, super secundam domesticorum, super tertiam extraneorum, super quartam omnium hominum, etiam inimicorum. Quanto vero plures includuntur modi communicandi, tanto est maior communicatio, et tanto debet esse maior dilectio; et ideo cum modus primus omnes alios contineat, maiorem importat communicationem, et ideo maiorem dilectionem simpliciter, quamvis secundum quid, ratione alicuius communicantiae maioris specialis, aliter contingat » etc. — Quae principia ut melius intelligantur et applicari possint, observanda est doctrina de triplici affectu et effectu, in sequenti quaestione explicata. De hac quaestione praeter laudatos: S. Thom., hic a. 6; S. II. II. q. 26. a. 7. 8; Qq. disp. de Caritate, a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 7. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Durand., hic q. 4.

III. Conclusio sequentis (6.) quaestionis conformis est principiis communiter approbatis. Notatu dignae sunt observationes de triplici affectu et effectu. De eadem quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3.

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English Translation

Question V. Whether a member of one's household is to be preferred to a stranger.

Fifthly it is asked about the order of charity in respect to the comparison of the member of the household to the stranger, and the question is whether a member of one's household is to be preferred to a stranger. And that [it is] so, seems [the case]1:

1. By that which is said to the Galatians at the last2: Let us work good toward all, but most of all toward those of the household of faith; and First to Timothy five: If anyone has not care of his own and most of all of those of his household, he has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever. From each of these authorities it can be shown that a member of one's household ought to be preferred to a stranger; by the one it is shown positively and by the other destructively.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the authority of Ambrose, which is set down in the littera3, who says that those of the household are to be placed in the fifth rank in the order of charity, but strangers in the sixth.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [evident] by reason. The diffusion of bodily heat is sooner to nearer places than to more remote ones: therefore from a like [case], the communication of spiritual love naturally regards sooner that which is near, than that which is remote: if therefore those of the household are nearer to us than strangers, or enemies; it seems that in the order of charity they are to be placed first4.

4. Likewise, charity sets in order [its love] sooner and more principally toward those to whom we are more bound and tied — for the order of charity is consonant with the law of justice5 — but according to the law of justice we are more obligated to those of our household than to strangers: therefore those of the household ought to be preferred to strangers in the order of charity.

On the contrary: 1. To the Colossians three6: Be renewed according to the new man, where there is not male and female, gentile and Jew, but all things in all is Christ: therefore according to this, to a man having charity no one is a stranger: therefore according to the law of charity there is no distinction, no order between a member of one's household and a stranger.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On True Religion7: « A man is not to be loved by a man as carnal brothers or sons or spouses or kinsmen or relations or fellow-citizens are loved; for that love is temporal. For we would not have such necessities, which befall by being born and by dying, if our nature, remaining in the precepts and image of God, had not been relegated to this corruption »: therefore it seems that the order of charity is in no way to be attended to in respect to stranger and member-of-household and neighbor.

3. Likewise, the ground of loving one's neighbor out of charity is the image of God itself8: if therefore a member of one's household and a stranger are equally the image of God, it seems that out of charity they are equally to be loved.

4. Likewise, charity loves the good, because [it is] good: therefore he who is more good is more to be loved out of charity, whether he be a member of one's household or a stranger9: therefore nearness and familiarity, or strangeness, seem to do nothing toward the order of charity.

### Conclusion. According to the order of charity those of the household are to be preferred to strangers.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the aforesaid order, which is assigned according to these differences, which are near and remote, of-the-household and stranger, is said by some to be [a matter] of natural love itself, but it is not of charity except as [charity is] tolerating; for charity, being on the way [and] imperfect, bears with the imperfection of nature itself. Whence these [men] wished to say that the order of charity which belongs to it in itself is attended to in respect to greater good and lesser good, but not according to near and remote. — But this manner of speaking does not seem to agree with the words of Ambrose nor with the words of the Master. For Ambrose assigns this order in gratuitous love itself, of which the spouse says in the Canticle10: The king brought me into the wine-cellar, he set charity in order in me. And the Master at the beginning of the distinction says that « he sins who acts preposterously » and perverts this order; which would not be [so], if such an order belonged only to charity as tolerating.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that the order which is attended to in respect to the aforesaid differences is not only [a matter] of charity as tolerating, but is also [a matter] of it as regulating nature and being consonant with it. For that those who are near are loved sooner than strangers — this is not [a matter] of disordered nature, but rather of the ordering11 of nature. — For as was touched on earlier, the right order of diffusion is that there be communicated sooner to the nearer and then to the more remote. Since therefore charity does not take away from nature the right order; hence it is that supervening charity perfects that order of nature, and in perfecting it is said to be ordered by the same order, not because that order belongs to it in itself, but because it belongs to it by reason of the nature in which it is.

On account of which it must be attended to that a twofold order is attended to in charity: one, which belongs to it in respect to itself; and this order is attended to in respect to good and more good and most good. Whence charity of itself moves more to loving the spirit than the body, and the highest God than a created spirit. But there is another order, which belongs to it by reason of the underlying nature; and this is attended to according to these differences, which are own and another's, near and stranger. For the affection of charity makes the affection of nature subordinate to itself and perfects and rules it according to that of rectitude which it has in itself. — It must therefore be granted that according to the order of charity those of the household are to be preferred to strangers; the reasons also, which show this, are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that in Christ Jesus there is no distinction of male and female, nay all are one in Christ; it must be said that the Apostle by this does not wish to exclude distinction and degree and order in the members of Christ, but wishes to show this, that in every sex and age and of every condition everyone can through Christ attain to salvation, in such a way that no one is to be excluded from the faith. And therefore from this it is not had that charity, in loving the members of Christ, does not keep order.

2. To that which is objected concerning the authority of Augustine On True Religion12, it can be answered that he retracts that authority in the first [book] of the Retractations13. — It can also be said otherwise, that Augustine does not wish to remove from charity the consideration of those conditions simply; but he wishes to say this, that charity does not consider those conditions first and principally, as does natural and carnal love. And this is evident from that which he subjoins: « For to love in a man that he is a son, this is not in him to love that which pertains to God, but that which pertains to oneself »; it is established that he understands it of him who loves a son principally, because he is begotten from him, not because he is made to the image of God. And therefore from that authority it is not had that the order of charity is not attended to in respect to those conditions, but that they are not the principal grounds of loving out of charity. But although they are not principal, they can nevertheless be annexed and concomitant, and from this contributing to the order of charity.

3. To that which is objected, that the ground of loving one's neighbor is the image; it must be said that this is the common and general ground, but besides this there can be other special [grounds]. But order and distinction, although it be not attended to in respect to general conditions14, can be attended to in respect to special ones. And therefore, although a member of one's household and a stranger are uniformly [made] to the image of God, it does not yet follow that they are uniformly to be loved.

4. To that which is objected last, that charity loves the good, because [it is] good; it must be said that [this] is true of charity itself in itself. For as was touched on before, its order in itself is attended to in respect to greater or lesser goodness; but in charity not only is the order attended to in respect to itself, but also by reason of the underlying nature; and by reason of that the order between a member of one's household and a stranger is assigned. And thus it is evident that that reason is not repugnant to the order of charity.

Scholion

I. To this question, whether the order of charity regards also the affect, concerning which the Master reports many things (here c. 2), occasion was perhaps furnished by the words of St. Bernard (Sermons on the Canticle, sermon 50, n. 3), which seem to affirm that the precept of charity regards rather the effect than the affect, or, as he himself speaks, actual charity rather than affectual. But he by no means wished to exclude the affect, since he says (ibid. n. 4): « Nor do I say this, that we should be without affection and with a dry heart move only our hands to works » etc.

II. Already William of Auxerre (Summa III, tr. 6, c. 2, q. 2) reproved the first opinion; likewise the later Scholastics commonly hold that, although the order of charity primarily and principally attends to the degree of likeness or nearness which the one loved has to God himself, secondarily it nevertheless also regards « the underlying nature », namely the degree of likeness and nearness which the one loved has in the order of nature with the one loving. And in the communication of natural and social life among men there are several « differences » (cf. below, dub. 3), four of which, with St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 7) thus distinguishes: « There is a certain natural communication in natural origin, by which the near commune; a certain economic one in domestic offices, by which those of the household commune; a certain political one in the one body of one city, or people, by which all fellow-citizens commune; a certain divine one in the works of grace, by which all men commune [at least in potency]. And upon each of these communications a certain friendship is founded: upon the first the friendship of the near, upon the second of those of the household, upon the third of strangers, upon the fourth of all men, even of enemies. But the more modes of communicating are included, the greater is the communication, and the greater ought the love to be; and therefore since the first mode contains all the others, it imports a greater communication, and therefore a greater love simply, although in a certain respect, by reason of some greater special communicatedness, it happen otherwise » etc. — That these principles may be the better understood and able to be applied, the doctrine concerning the threefold affect and effect, explained in the following question, must be observed. On this question, besides those praised: St. Thomas, here a. 6; S. II–II, q. 26, a. 7, 8; Disputed Questions on Charity, a. 9. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3, 7. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 6. — Durandus, here q. 4.

III. The conclusion of the following (6th) question is conformable to the commonly approved principles. Worthy of note are the observations concerning the threefold affect and effect. On the same question: St. Thomas, here a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. [p.647, footer 1, head] Quaest. 3. — De propos. seq. vide supra q. 2 ad 1.
    [p.647, footer 1, head] Question 3. — Concerning the proposition that follows, see above, question 2, [reply] to 1. (The tail of this footer — the in hoc enim / ipsi gratiae repugnat cod. F currit via opposita variant — addresses q4's Ad-4 and was rendered with q4.)
  2. [p.647, footer 2] Vers. 10. — Deinde I. Tim. 5, 8.
    [p.647, footer 2] Verse 10. — Then First Timothy 5:8.
  3. [p.647, footer 3] Hic c. 2; sed dictum est Origenis. — Pro qui dicit codd. G H V Z quae dicit.
    [p.647, footer 3] Here c. 2; but it was said by Origen. — For qui dicit codices G H V Z [read] quae dicit.
  4. [p.647, footer 4] August., in I. Epist. Ioan. tr. 8, n. 4: Qui usque ad inimicos pervenit non transilit fratres. Necesse est, sicut ignis prius occupet proxima, et sic se in longinquiora distendat. Propinquior est tibi frater quam nescio quis homo... Extende dilectionem in proximos, nec voces illam extensionem. Prope enim tu diligis etc. — In maiori pro corporalis cod. W naturalis.
    [p.647, footer 4] Augustine, on the First Epistle of John, tractate 8, n. 4: He who has reached even to enemies does not pass over brothers. It is necessary, as fire first occupies what is near, and so extends itself into more distant things. A brother is nearer to you than some man I know not whom... Extend love toward those near, and do not call it an extension. For nearby you love, etc. — In the major [premise], for corporalis codex W [reads] naturalis.
  5. [p.648, footer 1] Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 9.
    [p.648, footer 1] Cf. Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 9.
  6. [p.648, footer 2] Vers. 10. seq.: Et induentes novum [hominem]... ubi non est gentilis et Iudaeus, circumcisio et praeputium, barbarus et Scytha, servus et liber, sed omnia et in omnibus Christus. Cfr. Eph. 4, 23. seq., et Gal. 3, 28. — Inferius ante ergo secundum legem cod. A ponit si.
    [p.648, footer 2] Verse 10 f.: And putting on the new [man]... where there is not gentile and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian and Scythian, slave and free, but Christ [is] all and in all. Cf. Ephesians 4:23 f., and Galatians 3:28. — Below, before ergo secundum legem codex A places si.
  7. [p.648, footer 3] Cap. 46. n. 88. — In testimonio allato pro temporalis edd. exhibent corporalis, refragantibus codd. et textu origin. Deinde pro si nostra multi codd. perperam substituerunt sed nostra.
    [p.648, footer 3] Chapter 46, n. 88. — In the testimony adduced, for temporalis the editions exhibit corporalis, against the codices and the original text. Then for si nostra many codices have wrongly substituted sed nostra.
  8. [p.648, footer 4] Cfr. August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 22. n. 20. seq.
    [p.648, footer 4] Cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, c. 22, n. 20 f.
  9. [p.648, footer 5] Similiter et Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 7. docet, eum qui melior sit et maiorem afferat utilitatem, magis esse amandum.
    [p.648, footer 5] Likewise also Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 7, teaches that he who is better and brings greater usefulness is more to be loved.
  10. [p.648, footer 6] Cap. 2, 4. — Verba Ambrosii (Origenis) vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
    [p.648, footer 6] Chapter 2:4. — For the words of Ambrose (Origen) see here in the littera of the Master, c. 2.
  11. [p.648, footer 7] Sic codd. A G K V; alii codd. et edd. ordine.
    [p.648, footer 7] So codices A G K V; other codices and the editions [read] ordine. — [The intervening p.648 footers, namely n. 8 (Codd. A K bb ei), n. 9 (Vide supra d. 28. q. 4. in corp. Praedictam distinctionem S. Thom. — S. II. II. q. 26. a. 7. et passim — aliis verbis exprimit, scilicet per comparationem ad obiectum et ad diligentem), n. 10 (Vide supra q. 1. ad 1, q. 3. ad 5. et q. 4. ad 4. — Paulo inferius pro rationes etiam — sic codd. A K bb — edd. cum aliis codd. rationes autem), and n. 11 (Codd. A K bene supplent sumus. Inferius pro sed hoc cod. O sed in his, Vat. sed per hoc. In fine solut. pro membra Christi codd. A G K membrum Christi), attach to the Respondeo's later clauses (competat sibi secundum se, spiritum creatum, rectitudinis) and to Solutio 1 (omnes... unum in Christo); they are critical-apparatus variants without further substantive content and are grouped with this note to preserve the per-page sequence.]
  12. [p.649, footer 1] Cap. 13. n. 8.
    [p.649, footer 1] Chapter 13, n. 8.
  13. [p.649, footer 2] De Vera Relig. c. 46. n. 88. — Inferius pro sed quod cod. K secundum quod.
    [p.649, footer 2] On True Religion, c. 46, n. 88. — Below, for sed quod codex K [reads] secundum quod.
  14. [p.649, footer 3] In edd. deest conditiones et post attendi subiunctum est tamen.
    [p.649, footer 3] In the editions conditiones is wanting and after attendi tamen is subjoined.
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