Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 29
Quaestio IV. Utrum magis diligendi sint parentes quam filii, an e converso.
Quarto quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem patris ad filium, et quaeritur, utrum magis sint diligendi parentes quam filii, an e converso. Et quod primo1 sint diligendi parentes, videtur:
1. Primo per mandatum Domini; praecipit enim honorare parentes, Exodi vigesimo2: Honora patrem tuum etc.: si ergo mandata Dei tradita sunt secundum ordinem caritatis, videtur, quod amor caritatis principalius ad parentes quam ad filios habet ordinare.
2. Item, auctoritate Ambrosii, quae habetur in littera3; dicit enim, quod « primo diligendus est Deus, secundo parentes, deinde filii ».
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quoniam secundum legem caritatis grati debemus esse de beneficiis acceptis4; sed plura beneficia accipimus a parentibus quam a filiis: ergo magis debemus eis esse grati. Sed qui magis est gratus alii magis ipsum diligit: ergo parentes in ordine caritatis sunt filiis praeponendi.
4. Item, principiatum plus pendet a principio quam e converso; sed ubi est maior dependentia, ibi est maior inclinatio; et ubi maior inclinatio, ibi maior amoris conversio: cum ergo habens patrem et filium ad patrem comparatur5 sicut principiatum ad principium, ad filium vero sicut principium ad principiatum; videtur, quod secundum regulam amoris magis debet converti ad patrem quam ad filium.
Sed contra: 1. Secundae ad Corinthios duodecimo6: Non debent filii thesaurizare parentibus, sed parentes filiis; sed nemo debet thesaurizare nisi ei quem debet diligere: si ergo magis debent thesaurizare parentes filiis quam e converso, magis debent secundum caritatis ordinem parentes filios diligere, quam filii parentes.
2. Item, secundum ordinem naturae humor procedit a radice ad ramos, non e converso: si ergo conversio amoris in rationalibus similis est derivationi humoris in vegetabilibus, et pater comparatur ad filios, sicut radix ad ramos7; videtur, quod secundum rectum ordinem amplius sint diligendi filii quam parentes.
3. Item, caritas respicit boni communicationem secundum convenientiam et conformitatem; sed plus boni communicant parentes filiis quam e converso8: ergo videtur, quod amor caritatis secundum rectum ordinem prius et abundantius reddat habilem ad diligendum filios quam parentes.
4. Item, gratia est perfectio naturae; sed videmus, quod naturaliter homines plus diligunt filios quam parentes9: ergo videtur, quod consimilis ordo debeat esse in amore gratuito.
### Conclusio. Secundum ordinem caritatis parentes plus diligendi sunt quam filii, ceteris paribus.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Ambrosius, secundum ordinem caritatis parentes praeponendi sunt filiis; et hoc intelligendum est ceteris paribus, sicut infra10 manifestabitur. — Ratio enim huius est: quia amor gratuitus facit memorem esse perceptorum beneficiorum — propter quod et sacra Scriptura11 praecipiendo et admonendo inducit nos ad paterna beneficia recolenda — et quia plura beneficia percipimus a parentibus quam a filiis: ideo secundum ius divinum plus eis tenemur et magis eorum salutem diligere et procurare debemus. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.
Ad rationes autem, quae ad oppositum adducuntur, respondendum est, quod illae rationes currunt de dilectione naturali, secundum quam magis inclinatur affectus hominis ad filios quam ad patrem. Et ratio huius est, quia natura appetit conservari in suo simili12 et magis diligit illud, in quo habet principalius salvari; et quoniam pater habet salvari in filio secundum ordinem naturae, non e converso: hinc est, quod secundum naturae ordinem maiorem habet ad filium inclinationem, quia magis vult ipsum quam patrem habere superstitem. Dilectio autem gra-
tuita magis respicit beneficiorum collationem et supernorum civium completionem, ad quam indifferenter parentes et filii comparantur.
1. 2. 3. Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa tria, quae primo obiiciebantur.
4. Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur, quod gratia debet esse conformis naturae; dicendum, quod natura in quibusdam currit via consona cum gratia, in quibusdam currit via opposita, in quibusdam currit via disparata. In hoc enim quod homo plus diligit se quam proximum, natura gratiae concordat, sicut supra13 ostensum est; in hoc quod diligit se plus quam Deum, ipsi gratiae repugnat; in hoc autem quod diligit filium plus quam patrem, quia intendit salvari in illo, procedit quasi via diversa. Et ideo gratia superveniens ordinem in primo affectu salvat et perficit, in secundo simpliciter mutat, in tertio vero novum ordinem dat, ita tamen, quod affectum illum non exterminat. Unde aestimo, quod homo habens caritatem et habens parentes et filios; dum movetur affectu gratuitae dilectionis, magis desiderat parentum salutem; dum movetur affectu naturae, magis desiderat filii sanitatem. Nec est hic oppositio dilectionis naturalis ad gratuitam propter considerationem diversam.
I. In hac quaestione solvenda S. Thom. (hic a. 7; S. II–II. q. 26. a. 9.) dupliciter recedit a nostro auctore. Hic enim sine distinctione cum Origene (non Ambrosio) resolvit, quod secundum ordinem caritatis parentes praeponendi sint filiis; tamen in solut. ad 1. 2. 3. et ad 4. contrarium dicit de inclinatione naturalis dilectionis. Sed S. Thomas quoad primum respondet distinguendo, ut infra dicetur; secundo vero non admittit, quod naturalis dilectio aliter inclinet ac caritas. Hinc de illa assertione, quod magis amantur filii affectu naturali, in suo Comment. dicit: « Sed hoc non placet mihi, quia nihil naturalium inordinatum est; esset autem inclinatio inordinata, si inclinaret in diligendum magis quod minus diligendum est » etc. Concludit autem: « Unde constat, quod etiam secundum naturalem inclinationem et secundum caritatis distinctione opus est ». Hinc distinguit (in Sum. loc. cit.) gradus dilectionis tum ex parte obiecti, tum ex parte ipsius diligentis, et asserit, quod sub primo respectu pater magis diligendus quam filius, sub secundo vero respectu « magis diligitur quod est coniunctius, et secundum hoc filius est magis diligendus quam pater ». Hinc idem (loc. cit. ad 1.) docet, quod « parentibus a filiis magis debetur honor, filiis autem debetur magis cura provisionis »; « quamvis in articulo necessitatis filius obligatus sit ex beneficiis susceptis, ut parentibus magis provideat » (ibid. ad 3.). — Porro Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 6.) quoad dictam obligationem cum S. Bonav. docet, quod magis tenetur filius ad dilectionem patris, quam pater filii; etiam quoad inclinationem naturae, alia ac S. Thom. usus distinctione, dicit: « Secundum considerationem naturae specialis homo plus ad diligendum patrem ex ratione inclinatur; sed secundum considerationem naturae generalis e contrario »; quod convenit cum doctrina nostri auctoris in solut. ad 4. — Richard. a Med. (hic q. 7.) e illa solutione S. Thomae censet, quod « non satisfacit quaestioni, quia per hoc non clare ostenditur, quem homo magis debeat diligere, omnibus computatis ». Ipse autem Richardus pro solvenda quaestione, quem duorum hominum homo magis debeat diligere, censet, respiciendam esse « non tantum eorum bonitatem et eorum ad diligentem propinquitatem, sed etiam eorum ad diligentem dilectionem, et ad beneficia, quae recepit diligens per eorum procreationem et operationem ». Idem cum S. Bonav. simpliciter determinat, in dilectione praeferendum esse patrem. — Denique Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.) aliorum refert solutiones, nihil determinans.
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Question IV. Whether parents are more to be loved than children, or conversely.
Fourthly it is asked about the order of charity in respect to the comparison of father to son, and it is asked whether parents are more to be loved than children, or conversely. And that parents are first1 to be loved, seems [the case]:
1. First, by the commandment of the Lord; for he commands [us] to honor parents, Exodus twenty2: Honor your father etc.: if therefore the commandments of God have been handed down according to the order of charity, it seems that the love of charity has principally to set in order [the love] toward parents rather than toward children.
2. Likewise, by the authority of Ambrose, which is had in the littera3; for he says that « first God is to be loved, secondly parents, then children ».
3. Likewise, this same thing seems [evident] by reason: for according to the law of charity we ought to be grateful for benefits received4; but we receive more benefits from parents than from children: therefore we ought to be more grateful to them. But he who is more grateful to another loves him more: therefore parents are to be preferred to children in the order of charity.
4. Likewise, that which proceeds from a principle depends on the principle more than conversely; but where there is greater dependence, there is greater inclination; and where there is greater inclination, there is greater conversion of love: since therefore one having a father and a son is compared to the father5 as that-which-proceeds-from-a-principle to the principle, but to the son as the principle to that-which-proceeds-from-it; it seems that according to the rule of love one ought to be turned more toward the father than toward the son.
On the contrary: 1. Second to the Corinthians twelve6: Children ought not to lay up treasure for their parents, but parents for their children; but no one ought to lay up treasure except for him whom he ought to love: if therefore parents ought to lay up treasure for children more than conversely, they ought according to the order of charity to love children more, than children [love] parents.
2. Likewise, according to the order of nature the sap proceeds from the root to the branches, not conversely: if therefore the conversion of love in rational beings is like the derivation of sap in vegetative things, and the father is compared to the children as the root to the branches7; it seems that according to the right order children are to be loved more than parents.
3. Likewise, charity regards the communication of good according to fittingness and conformity; but parents communicate more good to children than conversely8: therefore it seems that the love of charity according to the right order first and more abundantly renders [one] apt to love children than parents.
4. Likewise, grace is the perfection of nature; but we see that naturally men love children more than parents9: therefore it seems that a like order ought to be in gratuitous love.
### Conclusion. According to the order of charity parents are to be loved more than children, other things being equal.
I respond: It must be said that, as Ambrose says, according to the order of charity parents are to be preferred to children; and this is to be understood other things being equal, as will be made clear below10. — For the ground of this is: that gratuitous love makes [one] mindful of benefits received — on account of which sacred Scripture11 too, by commanding and admonishing, induces us to recall the paternal benefits — and because we receive more benefits from parents than from children: therefore according to the divine law we are more bound to them and ought to love and procure their salvation more. And the reasons which show this are to be granted.
But to the reasons which are adduced to the opposite, it must be answered that those reasons run [their course] concerning natural love, according to which the affection of man is inclined more toward children than toward the father. And the ground of this is that nature desires to be conserved in its like12 and loves more that in which it has principally to be preserved; and since the father has to be preserved in the son according to the order of nature, not conversely: hence it is that according to the order of nature he has a greater inclination toward the son, because he wills rather that [the son] than the father survive him. But gratuitous love
regards rather the conferring of benefits and the completion of the heavenly citizens, to which parents and children are compared indifferently.
1. 2. 3. And by this is evident the response to those three [objections] which were objected first.
4. But to that which is objected last, that grace ought to be conformed to nature; it must be said that nature in some [cases] runs a way consonant with grace, in some runs a way opposed, in some runs a way disparate. For in this, that a man loves himself more than his neighbor, nature agrees with grace, as was shown above13; in this, that he loves himself more than God, it resists grace; but in this, that he loves the son more than the father, because he intends to be preserved in him, it proceeds as it were by a diverse way. And therefore supervening grace, in the first affection, preserves and perfects the order; in the second, simply changes [it]; in the third, however, gives a new order, yet in such a way that it does not destroy that affection. Hence I judge that a man having charity and having parents and children, while he is moved by the affection of gratuitous love, more desires the salvation of his parents; while he is moved by the affection of nature, more desires the health of his son. Nor is there here an opposition of natural love to gratuitous [love], on account of the diverse consideration.
I. In solving this question St. Thomas (here a. 7; S. II–II, q. 26, a. 9) departs in two [respects] from our author. For here [Bonaventure] resolves without distinction, with Origen (not Ambrose), that according to the order of charity parents are to be preferred to children; yet in the solution to 1, 2, 3 and to 4 he says the contrary concerning the inclination of natural love. But St. Thomas, as to the first, responds by distinguishing, as will be said below; while as to the second he does not admit that natural love inclines otherwise than charity. Hence concerning that assertion, that children are loved more by natural affection, in his Commentary he says: « But this does not please me, because nothing natural is inordinate; but the inclination would be inordinate, if it inclined to loving more that which is less to be loved » etc. And he concludes: « Whence it is established that even according to natural inclination and according to charity there is need of distinction ». Hence he distinguishes (in the Summa, loc. cit.) the degrees of love both on the part of the object and on the part of the one loving himself, and asserts that under the first respect the father is more to be loved than the son, but under the second respect « that which is more closely joined is loved more, and according to this the son is more to be loved than the father ». Hence the same [author] (loc. cit. ad 1) teaches that « to parents more honor is owed by children, but to children more is owed the care of provision »; « although in a case of necessity the son is bound by the benefits received to provide more for his parents » (ibid. ad 3). — Moreover Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 6), as to the said obligation, teaches with St. Bonaventure that the son is more bound to the love of the father than the father to [the love] of the son; and even as to the inclination of nature, using a distinction other than St. Thomas's, he says: « According to the consideration of special nature man is by reason inclined more to loving the father; but according to the consideration of general nature, the contrary »; which agrees with the doctrine of our author in the solution to 4. — Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 7), from that solution of St. Thomas, judges that « it does not satisfy the question, because by it there is not clearly shown whom a man ought to love more, all things computed ». But Richard himself, for solving the question of which of two men a man ought to love more, judges that one must regard « not only their goodness and their nearness to the one loving, but also their love toward the one loving, and the benefits which the one loving has received through their procreation and operation ». He too, with St. Bonaventure, simply determines that the father is to be preferred in love. — Finally Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 2) reports the solutions of others, determining nothing.
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- Cod. M plus.Codex M [reads] plus.
- Vers. 12. — In fine arg. pro ordinare edd. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 68. a. 4. ordinari.Verse 12. — At the end of the argument, for ordinare the editions and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 68, a. 4, [read] ordinari.
- Hic c. 2; sed verba sunt Origenis, non Ambrosii.Here c. 2; but the words are Origen's, not Ambrose's.
- Coloss. 3, 14. seq.: Super omnia autem haec caritatem habete... et grati estote. Cfr. etiam Aristot., Rhetor. ad Alexandrum, c. 1, et VIII. Ethic. c. 12. et 14, ubi et de seq. arg. videsis. — Mox pro accipimus edd. cum nonnullis codd. accepimus.Colossians 3:14 f.: But above all these have charity... and be thankful. Cf. also Aristotle, Rhetoric to Alexander, c. 1, and Ethics VIII, c. 12 and 14, where you may also look as to the following argument. — A little after, for accipimus the editions with some codices [read] accepimus.
- Cod. Z comparetur. Paulo inferius pro debet codd. A U oportet.Codex Z [reads] comparetur. A little below, for debet codices A U [read] oportet.
- Vers. 14.Verse 14.
- Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 12. loquens de fratribus, ait: Unde inquiunt eundem sanguinem eandemque radicem. — Pro sicut codd. A K tanquam.Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 12, speaking of brothers, says: Whence they say [there is] the same blood and the same root. — For sicut codices A K [read] tanquam.
- Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 14: Quidquid fecerit filius, nihil dignum collatis beneficiis fecit.Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 14: Whatever the son may have done, he has done nothing worthy of the benefits conferred.
- Cfr. Aristot., IX. Ethic. c. 7.Cf. Aristotle, Ethics IX, c. 7.
- Quaest. 6.Question 6.
- Tob. 4, 3. seqq.; Eccli. 3, 7. seqq. et 7, 29. seq.Tobit 4:3 ff.; Ecclesiasticus 3:7 ff. and 7:29 f.
- Vide Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.), et II. de Anima, text. 34. seq. (c. 4.).See Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 59 (c. 10), and On the Soul II, text 34 f. (c. 4).
- [p.647, footer 1, q4-portion] Mox post in hoc omisimus cum edd. 1, 2 enim, quod habent codd., pro quo Vat. substituit autem. Subinde pro ipsi gratiae repugnat cod. F currit via opposita.[p.647, footer 1, q4-portion] A little after, post in hoc we have omitted, with editions 1 and 2, enim, which the codices have, in place of which the Vatican [edition] substituted autem. Then for ipsi gratiae repugnat codex F [reads] currit via opposita. (The head of p.647 footer 1 — Quaest. 3. — De propos. seq. vide supra q. 2 ad 1. — pertains to q5's opening fundamentum and is rendered with q5.)