← Back to Distinction 29

Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
p. 643

Quaestio III. Utrum secundum ordinem caritatis praeponendum sit bonum proprium bono ipsius proximi.

Tertio quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem nostri ad proximum, et est quaestio, utrum secundum ordinem caritatis praeponendum sit bonum proprium bono ipsius proximi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per auctoritatem Augustini et Ambrosii in littera1, qui immediate post dilectionem Dei ordinant dilectionem sui.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo quarto2: Qui sibi nequam est, cui alii bonus erit? Per hoc videtur, quod non potest aliquis alium ordinate diligere, nisi prius ordinate diligat se.

3. Item, Augustinus in Enchiridio3, tractans illud verbum: Date eleemosynam, et omnia munda sunt vobis: « Qui vult ordinate eleemosynam dare a se debet incipere et eam sibi primo dare. Est enim eleemosyna opus misericordiae, verissimeque dictum est: Miserere animae tuae, placens Deo ». Si ergo prius debet homo sibi misereri quam alii, videtur, quod secundum ordinem caritatis amor sui sit amori proximi praeponendus.

4. Item, sicut natura appetit suam conservationem, sic caritas suam perfectionem; sed natura magis appetit conservationem sui in se quam in suo simili4: ergo et caritas plus appetit perfici in se ipsa et in anima, in qua est, quam caritatem aliam appetat perfici in anima aliena: ergo secundum rectum ordinem caritatis amor sui praemitti debet amori ipsius proximi.

Sed contra: 1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio5: Caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt; et iterum alibi: Nullus quod suum est quaerat, sed quod alterius: ergo videtur, quod caritas secundum suam perfectionem magis inclinet ad amandum alterum quam ad amandum se ipsum.

p. 644

2. Item, Matthaei vigesimo secundo6: Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum; hoc quod est sicut aut est nota similitudinis, aut aequalitatis. Si similitudinis tantum, eadem ratione posset dicere: diliges proximum tuum sicut Deum. Si aequalitatis: ergo non videtur, quod sit ordo dilectionis respectu nostri ad dilectionem respectu proximi.

3. Item, Gregorius in quadam homilia7: « Nemo ad se ipsum habere caritatem dicitur. Ad hoc enim, quod caritas sit, necesse est, ut dilectio in alterum tendat »: ergo caritas per prius ordinat hominem ad alterum quam ad se ipsum: ergo in ordine caritatis videtur quod nobis praemitti debeat proximus.

4. Item, caritas est amor liberalis8; sed liberalitas magis attenditur respectu alterius quam respectu sui: ergo amor caritatis magis consistit in amando alterum quam in amando se ipsum.

5. Item, amor caritatis superveniens tollit curvitatem ipsi naturae9, sicut patet: quia, cum homo plus diligat se quam Deum ante caritatem, post adventum caritatis vertitur ordo, ut plus diligat Deum quam se ipsum: si ergo mutat ordinem quantum ad dilectionem Dei, pari ratione quantum ad dilectionem proximi: videtur ergo, quod dilectio proximi praemittenda sit secundum ordinem caritatis dilectioni respectu nostri.

6. Item, caritas facit, nos conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae; sed Deus non magis diligit nos quam proximos nostros, immo magis diligit proximos nostros, si sint meliores nobis: ergo videtur, quod secundum ordinem caritatis plus debeo diligere proximum quam me ipsum. Si tu dicas, quod Deus non vult, quod conformemus voluntatem nostram sibi in hoc10; obiicitur contra hoc, quia Deus vult, quod nos magis desideremus honorem suum quam commodum proprium; vult etiam, quod magis amemus et appretiemur illud quod magis est amandum et appretiandum; sed salus centum animarum magis facit ad honorem Dei et magis appretianda est quam salus unius animae: si ergo « nomine proximi intelligitur omnis homo11 », videtur, quod amor proximi praeponendus sit amori sui. Et hoc confirmatur per illud quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos: Optabam enim ego ipse anathema esse a Christo pro fratribus meis.

### Conclusio. Amor salutis propriae praeferendus est amori salutis alienae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum ordinem caritatis amor salutis propriae praeponendus est amori salutis alienae, secundum quod auctoritates Sanctorum innuunt manifeste, et secundum etiam quod consonat et dictat iudicium rationis rectae et instinctus naturae. — Ratio enim huius est: quoniam unumquodque plus appetit perfectionem in se ipso quam in suo simili; et quodlibet pondus plus trahit corpus, in quo est, ad situm sibi debitum, quam trahat aliud corpus illi annexum: hinc est, quod caritas per prius desiderat, Deum nobis uniri et in nobis habitare, et nos in ipsum Deum tendere et in ipso quiescere, quam appetat in aliquo alio, qui nobiscum habeat aliquam similitudinem12.

Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod in ordine caritatis praefertur dilectio sui dilectioni ipsius proximi. Et huius signum est, quia illi dupliciter reprehenduntur et stulti reputantur, qui salutem propriam negligunt, ut procurent alienam13. Huius etiam signum est, quia, si homo ex caritate deberet diligere proximum quantum se ipsum, ita quod esset ibi omnimoda aequalitas, iam duos proximos deberet diligere duplo quam se ipsum, et tres in triplo, et sic ulterius ascendendo; quod in nullo habente caritatem reperiri contingit, quantumcumque perfecto.

Ad oppositorum solutionem:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt; dicendum, quod suum idem est quod proprium. Proprium autem quaerere hoc est dupliciter: uno modo, prout proprium dicitur cum praecisione; et sic excludit bonum commune, et isto modo sonat in vitium, et secundum istam acceptionem consuevit dici, quod libido est amor boni proprii; et quantum ad hunc modum dicit Apostolus, quod caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt14. Alio modo dicitur bonum proprium bonum, quod pertinet ad se, ita quod in appetitu illius boni voluntas nec repugnat divinae voluntati nec praeiudicat communi utilitati, sicut est appetitus salutis propriae; et isto modo diligit quis se ex caritate;

p. 645

et sic accipiendo non negat Apostolus, quin homo per caritatem debeat quod suum est quaerere, cum ipsemet cuperet dissolvi et esse cum Christo, sicut dicitur ad Philippenses primo15.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum divinum mandatum debet homo diligere proximum sicut semetipsum; dicendum, quod sicut non est nota perfectae aequalitatis sive commensurationis, sed expressae similitudinis, quae in hoc attenditur, quod homo debet diligere proximum ad illud bonum, ad quod diligit se ipsum, et post salutem propriam nihil tantum debet desiderare, sicut salutem alienam: et ideo non valet illud quod obiicit, quod similiter deberet dici in mandato illo, quod diligat proximum sicut Deum16.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Gregorii, quod caritas magis proprie ordinat ad proximum quam ad se ipsum; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur, quod caritas per prius respiciat ordinem hominis ad proximum quam ad se ipsum, sed quia non sufficit, quod aliquis amor sit caritas, ut homo amet se ipsum; licet enim amor caritatis a se ipso incipiat, debet tamen17 in alterum protendi.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est amor liberalis; dicendum, quod quamvis liberalitas quantum ad suam completionem respiciat alterum, tamen quantum ad suum initium prius respicit ipsum, qui liberalitatem impendit, sicut et misericordia, de qua dictum est18, quod primo debet homo sui ipsius misereri.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor caritatis superveniens tollit curvitatem naturae; dicendum, quod quaedam est curvitas naturae, quae sonat in vitium et corruptionem; quaedam, quae respicit ipsius naturae intrinsecam inclinationem. Prima est, qua quis diligit se plus quam Deum; secunda est, qua quis diligit se plus quam proximum. Gratia autem superveniens primam corrigit et tollit, secundam vero dirigit et cum ea currit; et sic ratio illa non valet, quoniam non est simile hinc inde.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod debemus voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae conformare; dicendum, quod Deus cum dicitur alterum altero magis diligere, hoc non est, quia intensius diligat unum quam reliquum, cum circa amorem ipsius nec cadat intensio nec remissio; sed hoc dicitur, quia unum ordinat ad maius bonum quam reliquum19; et hoc bene potest concedi, quod quis magis debet diligere proximum quam se, cum proximus ipsum excedat in merito; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod amor proximi melioris praeponderet amori sui. Ordo enim caritatis non attenditur penes magnitudinem boni optabilis, sed penes praeponderationem affectionis diligentis. — Et si tu obiicias, quod Deus vult, quod magis amemus honorem suum quam commodum nostrum, et magis appretiemur quod est magis appretiandum; dicendum, quod verum est, quod Dei honor plus debet in corde nostro praeponderare quam nostrum commodum; tamen caritas nunquam separat honorem Dei a commodo nostro spirituali; nec est voluntatis divinae, ut nos appetamus aliquid, quod sit in detrimentum salutis nostrae, propter honorem suum. Sicut enim essentiale est naturae appetere esse, sic essentiale est gratiae appetere Deo placere et Deo adhaerere; ideo Deus nunquam illud a nobis exigit, ut magis salutem alienam quam propriam diligamus. — Et quod dicit Apostolus, quod optabat anathema a Christo esse pro fratribus, illud intelligitur ad tempus, vel sub conditione, videlicet si optabile esset20.

Scholion

I. Conclusio est manifesta et communis; est intelligi debet de bonis, quae pertinent ad interiorem hominem. Quoad bona vero exteriora saepe virtutis est, ut quis ea sibi subtrahat aliisque impendat, ut infra q. 6. explicatur (cfr. etiam infra dub. 5.); immo si salus proximi collidit cum meis bonis exterioribus, ordo caritatis vult, ut, per se loquendo, praeponam superius bonum proximi inferiori bono proprio. Hoc S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 26. a. 5.) cum Richardo a Med. (hic q. 4.) speciali quaestione probat respectu ipsius vitae corporalis, ita concludens: « Et ideo proximum quantum ad salutem animae magis debemus diligere quam proprium corpus ». Sed quod quis proprium corpus morti exponat pro salute proximi, non urget ut praeceptum nisi vel in casu necessitatis, vel in casu, quo quis tenetur saluti proximi providere, sicut ibid. ad 3. docetur. — De hac quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. 5; S. loc. cit. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2.

---

English Translation

Question III. Whether according to the order of charity one's own good is to be preferred to the good of one's neighbor.

Thirdly it is asked about the order of charity in respect to the comparison of ourselves to our neighbor, and the question is whether according to the order of charity one's own good is to be preferred to the good of one's neighbor. And that it is so, seems [the case]:

1. First, by the authority of Augustine and Ambrose in the littera1, who immediately after the love of God set in order the love of self.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus fourteen2: He who is wicked to himself, to whom will he be good? By this it seems that one cannot love another in an ordered way unless he first love himself in an ordered way.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the Enchiridion3, treating that word: Give alms, and all things are clean unto you: « He who wishes to give alms in an ordered way ought to begin from himself and give to himself first. For almsgiving is a work of mercy, and most truly it has been said: Have mercy on your soul, pleasing God ». If therefore a man ought to have mercy on himself before another, it seems that according to the order of charity the love of self is to be preferred to the love of neighbor.

4. Likewise, just as nature desires its own conservation, so charity [desires] its own perfection; but nature more desires the conservation of itself in itself than in its like4: therefore charity too more desires to be perfected in itself and in the soul in which it is, than it desires another charity to be perfected in another's soul: therefore according to the right order of charity the love of self ought to be set before the love of one's neighbor.

On the contrary: 1. First to the Corinthians thirteen5: Charity seeks not the things that are its own; and again elsewhere: Let no one seek what is his own, but what is another's: therefore it seems that charity according to its perfection inclines more to loving another than to loving itself.

2. Likewise, Matthew twenty-two6: You shall love your neighbor as yourself; this as is either a mark of likeness or of equality. If of likeness only, by the same reasoning he could say: you shall love your neighbor as God. If of equality: then it does not seem that there is an order of love in respect to ourselves over against love in respect to our neighbor.

3. Likewise, Gregory in a certain homily7: « No one is said to have charity toward himself. For in order that there be charity, it is necessary that love tend toward another »: therefore charity orders man first toward another rather than toward himself: therefore in the order of charity it seems that the neighbor ought to be set before us.

4. Likewise, charity is a liberal love8; but liberality is regarded rather in respect to another than in respect to oneself: therefore the love of charity consists more in loving another than in loving oneself.

5. Likewise, the love of charity, when it supervenes, takes away the curvature in nature9, as is evident: because, since a man loves himself more than God before charity, after the coming of charity the order is reversed, so that he loves God more than himself: if therefore it changes the order as regards the love of God, by parity of reasoning [it does so] as regards the love of neighbor: therefore it seems that the love of neighbor is to be set, according to the order of charity, before love in respect to ourselves.

6. Likewise, charity makes us conform our will to the divine will; but God does not love us more than our neighbors, nay rather he loves our neighbors more, if they are better than we: therefore it seems that according to the order of charity I ought to love my neighbor more than myself. If you say that God does not will that we conform our will to his in this10; it is objected against this, that God wills that we desire his honor more than our own advantage; he wills also that we love and esteem more that which is more to be loved and esteemed; but the salvation of a hundred souls makes more for the honor of God and is more to be esteemed than the salvation of one soul: if therefore « by the name of neighbor every man is understood11 », it seems that the love of neighbor is to be preferred to the love of self. And this is confirmed by what the Apostle says to the Romans: For I myself wished to be anathema from Christ for my brethren.

### Conclusion. The love of one's own salvation is to be preferred to the love of another's salvation.

I respond: It must be said that according to the order of charity the love of one's own salvation is to be preferred to the love of another's salvation, according as the authorities of the Saints manifestly intimate, and according also as the judgment of right reason and the instinct of nature agree and dictate. — For the ground of this is: that each thing more desires perfection in itself than in its like; and any weight draws the body in which it is more toward the place owed to it than it draws another body annexed to it: hence it is that charity first desires that God be united to us and dwell in us, and that we tend toward God himself and rest in him, more than it desires [the same] in any other who may have some likeness with us12.

The reasons showing that in the order of charity the love of self is preferred to the love of one's neighbor are therefore to be granted. And a sign of this is that those are doubly reprehended and reputed foolish who neglect their own salvation in order to procure another's13. A sign of this is also that, if a man ought out of charity to love his neighbor as much as himself, so that there were complete equality there, then he ought to love two neighbors twice as much as himself, and three threefold, and so ascending further; which is found in no one having charity, however perfect.

To the solution of the objections:

To 1. To that which is first objected, that charity seeks not the things that are its own; it must be said that one's own is the same as proper. But to seek what is proper is twofold: in one way, as proper is said with exclusion; and thus it excludes the common good, and in this way it tends to vice, and according to this acceptation it is wont to be said that lust is the love of one's own good; and as regards this mode the Apostle says that charity seeks not the things that are its own14. In another way a proper good is called a good which pertains to oneself, in such a way that in the desire of that good the will neither resists the divine will nor prejudices the common utility, as is the desire of one's own salvation; and in this way one loves oneself out of charity;

and taking it so the Apostle does not deny that man through charity ought to seek what is his own, since he himself desired to be dissolved and to be with Christ, as is said to the Philippians one15.

To 2. To that which is objected, that according to the divine commandment man ought to love his neighbor as himself; it must be said that as is not a mark of perfect equality or commensuration, but of express likeness, which is attended to in this: that a man ought to love his neighbor unto that good unto which he loves himself, and after his own salvation he ought to desire nothing so much as another's salvation: and therefore that which he objects has no force, namely that it would similarly have to be said in that commandment that he love his neighbor as God16.

To 3. To that which is objected from the authority of Gregory, that charity more properly orders [one] to the neighbor than to oneself; it must be said that this is not stated to mean that charity first regards the order of man to his neighbor rather than to himself, but because it does not suffice that some love be charity in order that a man love himself; for although the love of charity begins from oneself, it ought nevertheless17 to extend to another.

To 4. To that which is objected, that charity is a liberal love; it must be said that although liberality as regards its completion regards another, nevertheless as regards its beginning it first regards the one himself who bestows the liberality, just as also mercy, of which it has been said18 that a man ought first to have mercy on himself.

To 5. To that which is objected, that the love of charity, when it supervenes, takes away the curvature of nature; it must be said that there is a certain curvature of nature which tends to vice and corruption; and a certain one which regards the intrinsic inclination of nature itself. The first is that by which one loves himself more than God; the second is that by which one loves himself more than his neighbor. But supervening grace corrects and takes away the first, while it directs the second and runs along with it; and thus that argument has no force, since the case is not alike on both sides.

To 6. To that which is objected, that we ought to conform our will to the divine will; it must be said that when God is said to love one [thing] more than another, this is not because he loves one more intensely than the other, since concerning his love there falls neither intension nor remission; but it is said for this reason, that he orders one to a greater good than the other19; and this can well be granted, that one ought to love his neighbor more than himself, when the neighbor exceeds him in merit; but from this it does not follow that the love of a better neighbor outweighs the love of self. For the order of charity is not regarded according to the magnitude of the desirable good, but according to the preponderance of the affection of the one loving. — And if you object that God wills that we love his honor more than our own advantage, and esteem more what is more to be esteemed; it must be said that it is true that the honor of God ought to preponderate in our heart more than our own advantage; nevertheless charity never separates the honor of God from our spiritual advantage; nor is it of the divine will that we desire anything which is to the detriment of our salvation for the sake of his honor. For just as it is essential to nature to desire to be, so it is essential to grace to desire to please God and to cleave to God; therefore God never demands this of us, that we love another's salvation more than our own. — And as for what the Apostle says, that he wished to be anathema from Christ for his brethren, that is understood for a time, or under a condition, namely if it were desirable20.

Scholion

I. The conclusion is manifest and common; but it must be understood of the goods which pertain to the interior man. As to exterior goods, however, it is often [a mark] of virtue that one withdraw them from himself and bestow them on others, as is explained below in q. 6 (cf. also below, dub. 5); nay, if the salvation of one's neighbor collides with my exterior goods, the order of charity wills that, speaking in itself, I prefer the higher good of my neighbor to the lower good of my own. This St. Thomas (S. II–II, q. 26, a. 5), together with Richard of Mediavilla (here, q. 4), proves by a special question in respect to bodily life itself, concluding thus: « And therefore we ought to love our neighbor, as regards the salvation of the soul, more than our own body ». But that one should expose his own body to death for the salvation of his neighbor is not binding as a precept except either in a case of necessity, or in a case in which one is bound to provide for the salvation of his neighbor, as is taught there, ad 3. — On this question: St. Thomas, here a. 5; the same, loc. cit. a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 2.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic c. 1. et 2.
    Here c. 1 and 2.
  2. Vers. 5. — Paulo post pro videtur cod. Z patet.
    Verse 5. — A little after, for videtur codex Z reads patet.
  3. Cap. 76. n. 20. — Primum Scripturae testimonium, in quo cod. Z cum Vulgata pro et omnia exhibet et ecce omnia, est Luc. 11, 41; secundum est Eccli. 30, 24. — In conclus. pro alii cod. A alteri.
    Chapter 76, n. 20. — The first scriptural testimony, in which codex Z with the Vulgate reads et ecce omnia for et omnia, is Luke 11:41; the second is Ecclesiasticus 30:24. — In the conclusion, for alii codex A reads alteri.
  4. Cfr. Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 39. (c. 10.), I. de Anima, text. 34. seq. (c. 4.) et IX. Ethic. c. 4. Cfr. etiam Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11.
    Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 39 (c. 10), On the Soul I, text 34 ff. (c. 4), and Ethics IX, c. 4. Cf. also Boethius, Consolation [of Philosophy] III, prose 11.
  5. Vers. 5. — Seq. Scripturae locus ibid. 10, 21. ubi cod. Z cum Vulgata Nemo pro Nullus. — In fine arg. pro se ipsum non pauci codd. perperam se ipsam.
    Verse 5. — The following scriptural passage [is] ibid. 10:21, where codex Z with the Vulgate [reads] Nemo for Nullus. — At the end of the argument, for se ipsum not a few codices wrongly [read] se ipsam.
  6. Vers. 39. — Pro quod est cod. Z quod dicit. In fine arg. ante proximi cod. A et Supplement Alex. Hal. omittunt respectu.
    Verse 39. — For quod est codex Z [reads] quod dicit. At the end of the argument, before proximi, codex A and the Supplement of Alexander of Hales omit respectu.
  7. Libr. I. Homil. in Evang. homil. 17. n. 1, qui locus in textu origin. sic sonat: Nemo... dicitur, sed dilectio in alterum tendit, ut caritas esse possit. Pro quod caritas sit codd. A K ut caritas sit.
    Book I, Homilies on the Gospel, homily 17, n. 1, which passage in the original text runs thus: No one... is said [to have charity], but love tends toward another, that charity may be able to exist. For quod caritas sit codices A K [read] ut caritas sit.
  8. Cfr. 1. Ioan. 3, 17. seq.
    Cf. 1 John 3:17 ff.
  9. De curvitate naturae vide verba Bernardi, tom. II. pag. 124, nota 3. allata. Vide etiam August., Enarrat. in Ps. 50. n. 15. et serm. 2. in Ps. 68. n. 8. — Edd. ipsius naturae. In initio arg. pro amor caritatis cod. bb caritas.
    On the curvature of nature, see the words of Bernard, vol. II, p. 124, note 3, cited [there]. See also Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms, on Ps. 50, n. 15, and sermon 2 on Ps. 68, n. 8. — The editions [read] ipsius naturae. At the beginning of the argument, for amor caritatis codex bb [reads] caritas.
  10. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2: Utrum teneamur voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae conformare in volito. — Paulo superius pro si sint meliores codd. A H K si sunt meliores; paulo inferius pro proprium cod. Z nostrum.
    Cf. I Sent., d. 48, a. 2, q. 2: Whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed. — A little above, for si sint meliores codices A H K [read] si sunt meliores; a little below, for proprium codex Z [reads] nostrum.
  11. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 11. n. 3, et de Disciplina christ. c. 3. n. 3. — Locus Scripturae est Rom. 9, 3.
    Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms, on Ps. 11, n. 3, and On Christian Discipline, c. 3, n. 3. — The scriptural passage is Rom. 9:3.
  12. Cfr. supra pag. 638, nota 3, — Aliquanto superius pro Ratio enim edd. Ratio autem.
    Cf. above, p. 638, note 3. — Somewhat above, for Ratio enim the editions [read] Ratio autem.
  13. Cfr. I. Cor. 9, 27, et Bernard., I. de Consider. c. 5. n. 6.
    Cf. 1 Cor. 9:27, and Bernard, On Consideration I, c. 5, n. 6.
  14. Vide supra pag. 607, nota 2. — Paulo superius pro excludit cod. G excluditur.
    See above, p. 607, note 2. — A little above, for excludit codex G [reads] excluditur.
  15. Vers. 23. — Quantum ad verbum Apostoli, Bernard., Serm. in Cantic. serm. 18. n. 3. ait: Sed caritas, inquis, non quaerit quae sua sunt. Et tu scis, quam ob rem? Non quaerit quae sunt sua, profecto quia non desunt. Quisnam quaerat quod habet? Caritas quae sua sunt, id est propriae saluti necessaria, nunquam non habet; nec modo habet, sed etiam abundat. Vult abundare sibi, ut possit et omnibus; servat sibi, quantum sufficiat, ut nulli deficiat. Alioquin si plena non est, perfecta non est.
    Verse 23. — As regards the word of the Apostle, Bernard, Sermons on the Canticle, sermon 18, n. 3, says: But charity, you say, seeks not the things that are its own. And do you know why? It seeks not the things that are its own, surely because they are not lacking. Who would seek what he has? Charity never fails to have the things that are its own, that is, the things necessary for its own salvation; nor does it merely have them, but even abounds. It wishes to abound for itself, that it may be able [to serve] all also; it keeps for itself as much as suffices, that it may be lacking to none. Otherwise, if it is not full, it is not perfect.
  16. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro diligat cod. A diligeret, cod. W debet diligere.
    Cf. here the Master's littera, c. 2. — For diligat codex A [reads] diligeret, codex W debet diligere.
  17. Plurimi codd. et Supplement. Alex. Hal. collat. 68. a. 3. omittunt tamen.
    Most codices and the Supplement of Alexander of Hales, collation 68, a. 3, omit tamen.
  18. Hic in fundam. 3. — Superius pro quamvis liberalitas cod. Y quamvis amor liberalis.
    Here in fundamentum 3. — Above, for quamvis liberalitas codex Y [reads] quamvis amor liberalis.
  19. Vide infra d. 32. q. 3.
    See below, d. 32, q. 3.
  20. In Comment. super hunc loc. (Rom. 9, 3.), Ambrosio olim ascripto, haec observantur: Optabam ait, non opto: quia scit fieri non posse, ut tam honestum membrum, nullo praecedente vitio, abscinderetur a corpore christiano, affectum tamen et dilectionem circa genus suum ostendit.
    In the Commentary on this passage (Rom. 9:3), formerly ascribed to Ambrose, these things are observed: "I wished," he says, "not I wish": because he knows it cannot come to pass that so honorable a member, with no preceding vice, should be cut off from the Christian body; nevertheless he shows his affection and love toward his own kindred.
← Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 4→