← Back to Distinction 29

Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
p. 641

QUAESTIO II. Utrum caritas in diligendo praeponat Deum nobis.

Secundo quaeritur de ordine caritatis per comparationem nostri ad Deum, et est quaestio, utrum caritas in diligendo praeponat Deum nobis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per illud mandatum, Deuteronomii sexto1: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua; hoc dicitur esse2 primum et summum mandatum: si ergo nulli alii praecipitur ut impendamus totum affectum nisi soli Deo; videtur, quod in dilectione caritatis Deus teneat primum et summum locum.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per Augustinum et Ambrosium, quorum uterque, sicut in littera ponitur, in ordine diligendi Deum nobis praeponit.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per rationem: quoniam «propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis3»; sed caritas, quidquid diligit, diligit propter Deum: ergo primo et principaliter et maxime diligit ipsum Deum: ergo secundum ordinem caritatis Deus praeponitur nobis.

4. Item, secundum quod vult philosophicum documentum4, «finis magis est eligendus, quam ea quae sunt ad finem»; sed ad ordinem caritatis spectat, ut magis diligat ea quae sunt magis eligenda: si ergo Bonum increatum est finis, et bonum creatum est quod est ad finem; videtur, quod in ordine caritatis semper bonum increatum, quod est Deus, praeponatur bono creato, quod nos sumus.

Sed contra: 1. Gratia est perfectio naturae, natura autem carens gratia magis diligit se ipsam quam Deum5: si ergo perfectio non pervertit ordinem sui perfectibilis, videtur, quod idem ordo in caritate habeat salvari: igitur caritate magis debemus diligere nosmetipsos quam Deum.

2. Item, «si aliquod unum addatur aliquibus aequalibus, necesse est, illa post additionem esse aequalia6»: ergo pari ratione, si addatur inaequalibus, post additionem erunt inaequalia; sed amor nostri ante adventum caritatis praeponderat amori Dei, ergo et post ipsius adventum: igitur secundum ordinem caritatis magis debemus nos diligere quam Deum.

3. Item, affectus amoris sequitur notitiam cognitionis, «incognita enim non possumus diligere7»; sed magis cognoscimus nosmetipsos, quam cognoscamus Deum, quamdiu sumus in statu viae: videtur ergo, quod ad ordinem caritatis spectet plus nos quam Deum diligere, secundum statum praesentem.

4. Item, videtur, quod saltem aequaliter: quia quantum aliquis diligit Deum, tantum appetit frui Deo et beatificari in ipso8; et quantum appetit frui Deo, tantum appetit suam beatitudinem; et quantum suam beatitudinem appetit, tantum se diligit: ergo videtur, quod quantum quis diligit Deum, tantum diligat semetipsum.

5. Item, motus caritatis in Deum finitus est, cum sit a virtute finita; similiter motus caritatis in se ipsum; et possibile est, motum caritatis in Deum remitti, et motum caritatis in se ipsum intendi; sed quando aliqua duo sunt finita, quorum unum intenditur, et aliud remittitur9, possibile est, illa pervenire ad aequalitatem: ergo videtur, quod ex caritate possumus nos et Deum aequaliter diligere: et sic redit idem quod prius.

6. Item, amor est «vis unitiva10»; sed impossibile est, quod aliquis uniatur alii magis quam sibi: ergo impossibile est, magis alium amare quam se: igitur non videtur, quod in caritatis ordine Deus nobis ipsis sit praeponendus.

p. 642

CONCLUSIO.

Secundum ordinem caritatis Deus praeponendus est nobis in tantum, ut amor respectu nostri nec aequari possit nec praeponi amori Dei, salva substantia habitus caritatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum ordinem caritatis Deus praeponendus est nobis in tantum, ut amor respectu nostri nec aequari possit nec praeponi amori Dei, salva substantia habitus caritatis.

Ratio autem huius est ista: quoniam caritas facit, Deum diligi1 tanquam finem ultimum et tanquam summum bonum; et quia finis ultimus est unus solus, et summum bonum similiter non habens aliquid superius se, vel sibi aequale: hinc est, quod secundum caritatis legem impossibile est aliquid plus Deo, vel aequaliter ipsi Deo amare. Caritas enim, quia diligit Deum sicut summum bonum, diligit eum super omnia; quia diligit ipsum sicut finem ultimum, diligit eum propter se. Quod autem diligitur propter se et super omnia diligitur dilectione fruitionis; quod vero propter aliud diligitur diligitur dilectione usus2. Cum ergo caritatis sit omnia ad Deum tanquam ad finem ultimum referre, sicut ponderis est corpus ad locum proprium inclinare; hinc est, quod caritas facit, nos Deum plus quam nosmetipsos diligere. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem illam.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia est perfectio naturae; dicendum, quod in natura est considerare aliquid per modum positionis, et aliquid per modum privationis et defectus et corruptionis. Illud autem, quod est3 in natura per modum positionis, a gratia habet perfici et salvari; quod autem est ibi per modum corruptionis et privationis a gratia habet corrigi et suppleri. Cum ergo dicitur, quod naturae est plus se ipsam quam Deum diligere; dicendum, quod haec non est conditio reperta in natura, spectans ad ipsius perfectionem, sed potius ad ipsius corruptionem; ideo non sequitur, quod per gratiam habeat salvari, immo potius sequitur, quod per gratiam habeat amoveri.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si unum addatur inaequalibus, adhuc erunt inaequalia eadem inaequalitate qua prius; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, quando illud additum aequaliter respicit utrumque illorum inaequalium: sic autem non est in proposito. Nam caritas principalius respicit illum affectum hominis, qui est in Deum, quam illum qui est in semetipsum; unde in adventu caritatis minuitur amor sui et intenditur amor Dei.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod affectio sequitur cognitionem; dicendum, quod affectio dicitur sequi cognitionem non solum a parte claritatis in cognoscendo, sed etiam a parte bonitatis consideratae in ipso cognito. Licet autem clarius cognoscat se ipsum homo quam Deum, tamen nullus habens caritatem aestimat se tam bonum et tam amabilem, quantum aestimat Deum. Et ideo dilectio sequens cognitionem praeponit ipsum Deum nobis in diligendo magis quam e converso.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quantum quis diligit Deum, tantum desiderat frui Deo; dicendum, quod duplici motu dilectionis contingit Deum diligere, videlicet affectu amicitiae et affectu concupiscentiae sive desiderii4. Cum ergo dicitur: quantum quis diligit Deum, tantum desiderat frui Deo; diligere potest dicere motum amicitiae, vel motum concupiscentiae. Si dicat motum concupiscentiae, absque dubio veritatem habet; sed hic motus non ponit in numerum cum dilectione nostri: et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod aequaliter Deum et nos diligamus. Diligere enim nos ex caritate non est aliud, quam summum Bonum nobis optare5. — Si vero diligere Deum dicat motum amicitiae; tunc hoc quod est tantum et quantum, possunt importare proportionalitatem, ut sit sensus: si multum vis Deo bonum, multum desideras Deo frui; vel potest importare proportionis commensurationem sive aequalitatem. Primo modo habet veritatem, secundo vero modo veritatem non habet. Per caritatem enim diligo summum bonum Deo et6 summum bonum mihi, ita quod volo, quod Deus habeat summum bonum et sit summum bonum per essentiam, mihi vero per participationem; et multo magis opto sibi quam mihi. Et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod amor Dei possit aequari amori nostri, salva caritate, vel etiam amori alicuius creaturae, utpote amori gloriae et fruitionis Dei sive beatitudinis creatae.

Posset etiam responderi aliter per interemptionem ad illam7: quantum desideras frui Deo, tantum diligis temetipsum, secundum quod tantum et quantum dicunt commensurationem, quia potest quis desiderare frui Deo propter se et super omnia, quamvis nullo modo concedendum sit, quod ex caritate diligat se propter se et super omnia8.

p. 643

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motus caritatis in Deum est finitus et in nos ipsos similiter, et ita per intensionem et remissionem possunt aequari; dicendum, quod licet uterque sit finitus, quia a virtute finita procedit; tamen ratione ipsius obiecti unum excedit reliquum in infinitum. Nec hoc est inconveniens, quia finitum potest aliud finitum excedere in infinitum, sicut linea punctum, et superficies lineam1. Unde sicut infinita puncta non possunt lineae aequari, sic nec amor ipsarum creaturarum secundum legem caritatis potest aequari amori Creatoris. Sicut enim ex punctis nunquam potest constitui linea, sic nec ex infinitis bonis creatis potest constitui summum bonum animae rationalis2. Amor autem Dei, salva caritate, nunquam potest sic remitti, quin Deus diligatur ut finis et ut summum bonum; nec amor creaturae potest ita intendi, quin creatura diligatur ut bonum ad summum Bonum ordinatum: et ideo non sequitur, quod motus illi ad aequalitatem venire possint.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil potest alii magis uniri quam sibi; responderi potest dupliciter: primum, quod hoc potest intelligi de unione quantum ad naturalem convenientiam, vel quantum ad amoris inhaerentiam. Primo modo verum est, secundo modo falsum, quia hoc secundo modo amor dicitur virtus unitiva.

Aliter potest dici, quod Deus magis est intimus unicuique rei quam ipsa sibi; et plus pendet esse rei a Deo conservante quam ab ipsis principiis intrinsecis3; et complementum beatitudinis spiritus rationalis habet a Deo, non a se ipso. Et ideo, cum dicitur, quod nihil potest alteri magis uniri quam sibi ipsi; si hoc intelligatur de ipsis creaturis, veritatem habere potest; si vero intelligatur de ipso Deo, veritatem non habet. Deus enim intime illabitur ipsi animae4; et ideo anima ex intimis medullis affectionis habet Deo adhaerere; et cum habet caritatem, amplius tendit in ipsum quam in se, et in eo requiescit amplius quam in se, quia melius est Deus ei quam ipsa sibi5.

---

English Translation

QUESTION II. Whether charity in loving sets God before us.

Secondly it is asked concerning the order of charity by comparison of ourselves to God, and the question is whether charity in loving sets God before us. And that it does, it seems:

1. First, by that commandment, Deuteronomy six1: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart and with your whole soul; this is said to be2 the first and greatest commandment: if therefore it is enjoined upon no other thing that we should expend our whole affection except on God alone; it seems that in the love of charity God holds the first and highest place.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by Augustine and Ambrose, each of whom, as is set down in the text, in the order of loving sets God before us.

3. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason: since «on account of which each thing is such, that thing itself is so all the more3»; but charity, whatever it loves, loves on account of God: therefore first and principally and most of all it loves God himself: therefore according to the order of charity God is set before us.

4. Likewise, according to what the philosophical doctrine maintains4, «the end is more to be chosen than those things which are toward the end»; but it pertains to the order of charity that it love more those things which are more to be chosen: if therefore the uncreated Good is the end, and the created good is that which is toward the end; it seems that in the order of charity the uncreated good, which is God, is always set before the created good, which we are.

On the contrary: 1. Grace is the perfection of nature, but nature lacking grace loves itself more than God5: if therefore perfection does not pervert the order of that which it perfects, it seems that the same order ought to be preserved in charity: therefore by charity we ought to love ourselves more than God.

2. Likewise, «if some one thing be added to certain equal things, it is necessary that those, after the addition, be equal6»: therefore by parity of reasoning, if it be added to unequal things, after the addition they will be unequal; but the love of ourselves before the coming of charity outweighs the love of God, therefore also after its coming: therefore according to the order of charity we ought to love ourselves more than God.

3. Likewise, the affection of love follows the knowledge of cognition, «for we cannot love things unknown7»; but we know ourselves more than we know God, so long as we are in the state of the wayfarer: it seems therefore that it pertains to the order of charity to love ourselves more than God, according to the present state.

4. Likewise, it seems that at least equally: because as much as one loves God, so much does he desire to enjoy God and to be made blessed in him8; and as much as he desires to enjoy God, so much does he desire his own blessedness; and as much as he desires his own blessedness, so much does he love himself: therefore it seems that as much as one loves God, so much does he love himself.

5. Likewise, the motion of charity toward God is finite, since it is from a finite power; likewise the motion of charity toward oneself; and it is possible that the motion of charity toward God be remitted, and the motion of charity toward oneself be intensified; but when two things are finite, of which one is intensified and the other remitted9, it is possible that they arrive at equality: therefore it seems that out of charity we can love ourselves and God equally: and thus the same conclusion returns as before.

6. Likewise, love is a «unitive power10»; but it is impossible that anyone be united to another more than to himself: therefore it is impossible to love another more than oneself: therefore it does not seem that in the order of charity God is to be set before our very selves.

CONCLUSION.

According to the order of charity God is to be set before us to such a degree that love with respect to ourselves can neither be made equal to nor set before the love of God, the substance of the habit of charity being preserved.

I respond: It must be said that according to the order of charity God is to be set before us to such a degree that love with respect to ourselves can neither be made equal to nor set before the love of God, the substance of the habit of charity being preserved.

Now the ground of this is the following: since charity causes God to be loved1 as the ultimate end and as the supreme good; and since the ultimate end is one only, and likewise the supreme good has nothing above itself or equal to itself: hence it is that according to the law of charity it is impossible to love anything more than God, or equally with God himself. For charity, because it loves God as the supreme good, loves him above all things; because it loves him as the ultimate end, it loves him for his own sake. But that which is loved for its own sake and above all things is loved with the love of fruition; whereas that which is loved for the sake of another is loved with the love of use2. Since therefore it belongs to charity to refer all things to God as to the ultimate end, just as it belongs to weight to incline a body to its proper place; hence it is that charity causes us to love God more than ourselves. — Whence the reasons which are for that side are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that grace is the perfection of nature; it must be said that in nature one may consider something by way of position, and something by way of privation and defect and corruption. But that which is in nature by way of position is perfected and preserved by grace; whereas that which is there by way of corruption and privation is corrected and supplied by grace. Since therefore it is said that it belongs to nature to love itself more than God; it must be said that this is not a condition found in nature looking to its perfection, but rather to its corruption; therefore it does not follow that it ought to be preserved by grace, but rather it follows that it ought to be removed by grace.

2. To that which is objected, that if one thing be added to unequal things, they will still be unequal by the same inequality as before; it must be said that this holds true when the thing added regards equally both of those unequal things: but it is not so in the present case. For charity more principally regards that affection of man which is toward God than that which is toward himself; whence at the coming of charity the love of self is diminished and the love of God is intensified.

3. To that which is objected, that affection follows cognition; it must be said that affection is said to follow cognition not only on the side of the clarity in knowing, but also on the side of the goodness considered in the very thing known. But although a man know himself more clearly than God, nevertheless no one having charity esteems himself as good and as lovable as he esteems God. And therefore love following cognition sets God himself before us in loving rather than the contrary.

4. To that which is objected, that as much as one loves God, so much does he desire to enjoy God; it must be said that it happens to love God by a twofold motion of love, namely by the affection of friendship and by the affection of concupiscence or desire4. Since therefore it is said: as much as one loves God, so much does he desire to enjoy God; to love can denote the motion of friendship, or the motion of concupiscence. If it denotes the motion of concupiscence, it has the truth without doubt; but this motion is not reckoned together with the love of ourselves: and therefore it does not follow from this that we love God and ourselves equally. For to love ourselves out of charity is nothing else than to wish the supreme Good for ourselves5. — But if to love God denotes the motion of friendship; then this as much and how much can import proportionality, so that the sense is: if you greatly wish good to God, you greatly desire to enjoy God; or it can import the commensuration of proportion or equality. In the first way it has the truth, but in the second way it does not have the truth. For by charity I love the supreme good for God and6 the supreme good for myself, in such wise that I will that God have the supreme good and be the supreme good by essence, but I [have it] by participation; and I wish much more for him than for myself. And therefore it does not follow from this that the love of God can be made equal to the love of ourselves, the substance of charity being preserved, or even to the love of any creature, such as the love of the glory and fruition of God or of created blessedness.

It could also be answered otherwise by removal to that objection7: as much as you desire to enjoy God, so much do you love yourself, according as as much and how much denote commensuration, because one can desire to enjoy God for his own sake and above all things, although it is in no way to be conceded that out of charity he loves himself for his own sake and above all things8.

5. To that which is objected, that the motion of charity toward God is finite and toward ourselves likewise, and so by intensification and remission they can be made equal; it must be said that although each be finite, since it proceeds from a finite power; nevertheless by reason of the object itself the one exceeds the other to infinity. Nor is this unfitting, because the finite can exceed another finite to infinity, as a line exceeds a point, and a surface a line1. Whence just as infinite points cannot be made equal to a line, so neither can the love of creatures themselves according to the law of charity be made equal to the love of the Creator. For just as a line can never be constituted out of points, so neither can the supreme good of the rational soul be constituted out of infinite created goods2. But the love of God, the substance of charity being preserved, can never be so remitted that God be not loved as end and as supreme good; nor can the love of a creature be so intensified that the creature be not loved as a good ordered to the supreme Good: and therefore it does not follow that those motions can come to equality.

6. To that which is objected, that nothing can be more united to another than to itself; it can be answered in two ways: first, that this can be understood of union as regards natural agreement, or as regards the inherence of love. In the first way it is true, in the second way false, because in this second way love is called a unitive power.

Otherwise it can be said that God is more intimate to each thing than the thing itself is to itself; and the being of a thing depends more on God conserving it than on the intrinsic principles themselves3; and the completion of the blessedness of the rational spirit it has from God, not from itself. And therefore, when it is said that nothing can be more united to another than to itself; if this be understood of creatures themselves, it can have the truth; but if it be understood of God himself, it does not have the truth. For God enters intimately into the soul itself4; and therefore the soul out of the inmost marrow of its affection cleaves to God; and when it has charity, it tends toward him more than toward itself, and rests in him more than in itself, because God is better to it than it is to itself5.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 5. — Matth. 22, 38: Hoc est maximum et primum mandatum.
    Verse 5. — Matthew 22:38: This is the greatest and first commandment.
  2. Hic c. 1. et 2. — Pro quorum edd. quod.
    Here c. 1 and 2. — For quorum the editions read quod.
  3. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. — Edd. unumquodque tale, et ipsum magis.
    Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 2. — The editions read each thing such, and itself more.
  4. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1. Vide supra pag. 639, nota 6. — Sententia minoris probata est in quaest. praeced. — Pro philosophicum documentum cod. M Philosophus, cod. O item, secundum Philosophum. Pro eligendus cod. A diligendus; similiter paulo inferius pro eligenda codd. K bb diligenda.
    Aristotle, Topics III, c. 1. See above p. 639, note 6. — The statement of the minor was proved in the preceding question. — For philosophical doctrine codex M reads the Philosopher, codex O likewise according to the Philosopher. For to be chosen codex A reads to be loved; likewise a little below, for to be chosen codices K bb read to be loved.
  5. Cfr. Bernard., Epist. 11. n. 8, et de Diligendo Deo, c. 15. n. 39.
    Cf. Bernard, Letter 11, n. 8, and On Loving God c. 15, n. 39.
  6. Euclides, I. Geometr.
    Euclid, Geometry I.
  7. August., X. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1, et de Spiritu et lit. c. 36. n. 64. — In fine arg. pro secundum statum praesentem cod. F quamdiu sumus in statu praesenti.
    Augustine, On the Trinity X, c. 1, n. 1, and On the Spirit and the Letter c. 36, n. 64. — At the end of the argument, for according to the present state codex F reads as long as we are in the present state.
  8. Cfr. secunda definitio caritatis, supra d. 27. dub. 1. allata. — In fine arg. pro diligat bene multi codd. diligit.
    Cf. the second definition of charity, adduced above d. 27, dub. 1. — At the end of the argument, for love [diligat] many codices rightly read loves [diligit].
  9. Codd. F G H I L N T V aa et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 68. 3. 2. adiiciunt ita.
    Codices F G H I L N T V aa and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 68, 3, 2, add thus.
  10. Secundum Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 15.
    According to Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4, § 15.
  11. Cod. U diligere.
    Codex U reads to love.
  12. Sicut docet August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 3. n. 3. seqq., de quo iam fusius agebatur I. Sent. d. 1. tum in lit. Magistri, tum in ipso Comment.
    As Augustine teaches, On Christian Doctrine I, c. 3, n. 3 ff., concerning which it was already treated more fully in I Sent. d. 1, both in the text of the Master and in the Commentary itself.
  13. Pro quod est codd. B C D W X aa quod semper est. Aliquanto inferius voci perfectionem Vat. adiungit sive positionem.
    For which is codices B C D W X aa read which always is. Somewhat below, to the word perfection the Vatican edition adds or position.
  14. Vide supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6. — Mox post frui Deo cod. A subdit dicendum, quod. Subinde pro dicere Vat. substituit dici, et post concupiscentiae cod. Z addit sive desiderii.
    See above d. 26 a. 2 q. 3 and d. 27 a. 1 q. 2 ad 6. — Soon after to enjoy God codex A adds it must be said that. Then for to denote the Vatican edition substitutes to be denoted, and after of concupiscence codex Z adds or of desire.
  15. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2, ubi etiam illustrantur quae in seq. propos. proponuntur. — Mox pro proportionalitatem cod. X proportionem, Vat. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. nec non aliquot codd. proportionabilitatem.
    Cf. above d. 27 a. 1 q. 2, where also the things proposed in the following proposition are illustrated. — Soon for proportionality codex X reads proportion, the Vatican edition and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales as well as some codices proportionability.
  16. Edd.: Per caritatem enim summum bonum diligo optoque.
    The editions read: For by charity I love and wish the supreme good.
  17. Vide supra pag. 640, nota 2. — Pro ad illam edd. ad propositionem illam.
    See above p. 640, note 2. — For to that the editions read to that proposition.
  18. In rem esse ducimus haec Guliel. Antissiod. verba, S. p. III. tr. 6. c. 1. q. 4, hic afferre: Haec est falsa: quantum aliquis desiderat Deum sibi, tantum desiderat habere Deum vel frui Deo; quoniam cum dicitur: aliquis desiderat Deum sibi, desiderium transit immediate in Deum; sed cum dicitur: iste desiderat habere Deum vel frui Deo, desiderium transit in creaturam; et ideo non est idem desiderare Deum sibi et desiderare habere Deum vel frui Deo. Per hoc patet, quod aliquis diligit se magis uno motu quam alio; quoniam magis diligit se in infinitum motu, quo desiderat Deum, quam motu, quo desiderat frui Deo.
    We deem it to the purpose to adduce here these words of William of Auxerre, Summa p. III, tr. 6, c. 1, q. 4: This is false: that as much as one desires God for himself, so much does he desire to have God or to enjoy God; because when it is said: one desires God for himself, the desire passes immediately into God; but when it is said: this one desires to have God or to enjoy God, the desire passes into a creature; and therefore it is not the same to desire God for oneself and to desire to have God or to enjoy God. By this it is plain that one loves himself more by one motion than by another; since he loves himself infinitely more by the motion by which he desires God, than by the motion by which he desires to enjoy God.
  19. Cfr. supra pag. 280, nota 5.
    Cf. above p. 280, note 5.
  20. Vide I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. — Subinde pro Amor autem edd. Amor enim.
    See I Sent. d. 1 a. 3 q. 2. — Then for But the love the editions read For the love.
  21. Vide II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. — Mox pro habet a Deo codd. A K habet esse a Deo.
    See II Sent. d. 37 a. 1 q. 2. — Soon for has from God codices A K read has being from God.
  22. De qua vide II. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 2, et Bernard., Serm. in Cantic. serm. 5. n. 8. (cfr. serm. 31. n. 6.): Illud autem sentite, nullum creaturae Spiritum per se nostris mentibus applicari... Sequestretur proinde praerogativa haec summo incircumscripto Spiritui... per se infunditur, per se innotescit, purus capitur a puris. — In fine solut. pro melius edd. cum uno alteroque cod. melior.
    Concerning which see II Sent. d. 8 p. II a. 2, and Bernard, Sermons on the Canticle serm. 5, n. 8 (cf. serm. 31, n. 6): But understand this, that no created spirit is applied of itself to our minds... Let this prerogative therefore be set apart for the supreme uncircumscribed Spirit... of itself it is infused, of itself it becomes known, pure it is received by the pure. — At the end of the solution, for better the editions with one or two codices read better [melior].
  23. Vide Scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the Scholion to the preceding question.
← Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 3→