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Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
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ARTICULUS UNICUS. De ordine caritatis.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum ordo sit in caritate respectu diligibilium.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum ordo sit in caritate respectu diligibilium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Canticorum secundo1: Ordinavit in me caritatem; sed ordo caritatis non attenditur nisi in diligendo: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus de Doctrina christiana2 dicit, quod «primo diligendus est Deus, qui est supra nos, secundo, quod nos sumus, tertio, quod iuxta nos, quarto, quod infra nos»: ergo secundum hoc patet, quod ordo est in caritate respectu diligendorum. Constat enim, quod illa non ordinantur ad invicem secundum ordinem temporis, sed secundum ordinem excellentiae et dignitatis.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur auctoritate Ambrosii, qui assignat in littera3 ordinem caritatis in diligendo: si ergo recte, videtur, quod ordo sit ponendus in caritate respectu eorum quae ex caritate diliguntur.

4. Item, hoc videtur ratione: caritatis est rectificare affectum4; sed affectus non est rectus, nisi praeponat maius bonum minori bono, et hoc dicit ordinem: ergo in caritate ponendus est ordo.

5. Item, caritas diligit plura diligibilia; aut ergo aeque primo, aut non aeque primo. Non aeque primo; hoc constat, cum caritas habitus sit unus5, et unus habitus unum principale habet obiectum. Si non aeque primo: ergo unum per prius, et alterum per posterius: ergo est ibi necessarius ordo.

6. Item, magis competit ordo amori deliberativo quam naturali; sed videmus, amorem naturalem ordinatum esse respectu diligibilium6: ergo multo fortius videtur esse circa amorem deliberativum. Sed talis est amor caritatis: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Ordo praesupponit distinctionem7: ergo ubi non est distinctio, ibi non est ordo; sed caritas respectu diversorum diligibilium non est distincta nec multiplicata: ergo nec respectu eorundem erit ordinata.

2. Item, ubicumque est ordo, ibi est proportio; sed diligibilium ex caritate nulla est proportio, quia nulla est proportio creati ad increatum8, modica, vel nulla est proportio corporis ad spiritum: ergo si non est ordo vel proportio inter diligibilia, videtur, quod caritas respectu eorum non sit ordinata.

3. Item, ordo maxime spectat ad cognitionem, quia «sapientis est ordinare9»: ergo si non ponitur ordo in cognitione respectu cognoscendorum, multo minus debet poni ordo in caritate respectu diligendorum. Si tu dicas, quod immo ordo est in scientiis; obiicitur de ipsa fide, quae est habitus cognitivus, qua etiam creduntur diversi articuli, se invicem excedentes secundum gradum et dignitatem, sicut illi qui sunt de divinitate, excellentiores sunt, quam illi qui sunt de humanitate10: si ergo non ponitur ordo in fide respectu credibilium, non debet poni ordo in caritate respectu diligibilium.

4. Item, sicut in fide una est ratio credendi, scilicet summa Veritas, sic in caritate una est ratio diligendi, videlicet summa Bonitas11; sed propter unicam rationem credendi fides omnibus articulis assentit aequaliter: ergo pari ratione videtur de caritate, quod et ipsa omnia diligenda debeat aequaliter diligere.

5. Item, caritas naturali quadam inclinatione inclinat ad diligendum bonum: si ergo ipsa est habitus unus et idem, et «idem, manens idem, semper est natum facere idem12» in his quae naturaliter

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inclinant ad aliquid: videtur ergo, quod caritas omnino uniformiter et aequaliter moveat ad amandum omne diligibile.

6. Item, si ordo attenditur in caritate, aut attenditur quantum ad habitum, aut quantum ad actum. Quantum ad habitum non; constat, cum ille sit unus et idem. Si quantum ad actum: ergo videtur, quod in dormiente non sit caritas ordinata, cum in eo non exerceat actum suum.

Est igitur quaestio, penes quid attendatur ordo in caritate; et quare magis attendatur ordo in ipsa quam in alia virtute, cum omnis virtus, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae13, sit «amor ordinatus»; et rursus, cum circa omne bonum sit modus, species et ordo; cur potius caritas dicitur ordinata quam modificata?

CONCLUSIO.

Caritas ordinata est respectu eorum quae sunt ex caritate diligenda.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod caritas est vinculum ligans, iuxta illud quod dicit Apostolus ad Colossenses tertio1, ubi vocat eam vinculum perfectionis; et Dionysius in capitulo quarto de Divinis Nominibus dicit, quod «amor est virtus unitiva». Unde cum amor caritatis sit amor maxime liberalis, multa circumplectitur et in unum colligit. Unde caritas non tantum unit fini eum, in quo est, sed etiam quodam modo ligat ei quod natum est ad eundem finem pervenire.

Nec tantum est caritas vinculum ligans, sed etiam pondus inclinans; «quod enim est pondus in corporibus, hoc est amor in spiritibus2». Quoniam igitur unumquodque per suum pondus habet ordinari, et caritas pondus est et aequa ponderatrix: hinc est, quod ipsi caritati maxime competit ratio ordinis. Et quoniam ipsa est vinculum ligans et circumplectens multa; ideo non tantum ordinat ipsum diligentem in finem, sed etiam ad ipsa dilecta, secundum quod ratio diligendi et ipse3 habitus caritatis diversimode comparatur ad illa. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes ostendentes, caritatem esse ordinatam respectu eorum quae sunt ex caritate diligenda.

1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur, quod ordo praesupponit distinctionem; dicendum, quod ordo attenditur in caritate ratione habitus relati ad actum et obiectum. Quamvis autem in caritate non sit distinctio ex parte habitus, est tamen distinctio ex parte ipsorum diligendorum et ex parte actuum, ratione cuius diversitatis mandata caritatis habent multiplicari, et ipsa caritas habet ordinari4.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi est ordo, ibi est proportio; dicendum, quod proportio dupliciter accipitur: stricte et large. Si stricte dicatur proportio, sic dicit quandam commensurationem et est rerum eiusdem generis; et hoc modo non habet veritatem praedicta propositio, quod ubicumque est ordo, ibi sit proportio. Si vero accipiatur large, ut dicatur proportio quaecumque habitudo, quae attenditur secundum convenientiam analogiae: hoc modo proportio est boni creati ad increatum, et etiam ordo secundum rationem causalitatis et primitatis5. Finis enim dignior est et excellentior et praeponitur his quae sunt ad finem, et quantum ad hoc attenditur ordo in caritate.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ordo maxime videtur spectare ad actum cognitivae, cum sapientis sit ordinare; responderi potest primo distinguendo, quod duplex est ordo: quidam partium in toto et rerum in universo, quidam vero eorum quae sunt in finem ad ipsum finem6. Et quamvis primus ordo principaliter sit circa cognitionem, secundus tamen principalius consistit circa affectionem et dilectionem, cuius est in finem inclinare. Ordo autem caritatis attenditur per comparationem ad finem; et ideo non est simile de ipsa et de habitu cognitivae.

Aliter potest dici, quod ordo in habitu attenditur per comparationem ad actum et obiectum, sicut prius dictum est. Quoniam igitur summa Bonitas aliter et aliter habet comparari diversis diligibilibus

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et ab eis habet participari secundum plus et minus, ut patet in corpore et spiritu1; hinc est, quod amor caritatis dicitur ordinatus. Per hunc etiam modum, si quis habitus cognitivus consideret aliqua, in quibus sit maior et minor veritatis evidentia, utique in tali habet reperiri ordo, sicut prior est scientia principiorum quam conclusionum2; et sic potest ad illud responderi per interemptionem. Et si obiiciat de fide, dicendum, quod non est simile: omnes enim articuli ad summam Veritatem uniformiter comparantur, secundum quod a fide creduntur. Fides enim in credendo omnes articulos assentit primae Veritati, tanquam dictanti et asserenti; ideo uniformiter et aequaliter omnes illos credit3.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una est ratio diligendi in caritate, sicut una ratio credendi in fide; dicendum, quod etsi una sit, non tamen sic uniformiter habet comparari ipsa Caritas ad diligibilia, sicut ipsa Veritas ad credibilia; plus enim est optabilis ipsa summa Bonitas Deo quam nobis, et spiritui nostro quam corpori4; ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem, manens idem, natum est facere idem; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de eo quod naturaliter inclinatur5, tam ratione sui quam ratione sibi adiuncti, et hoc respectu eiusdem obiecti. Nam secundum diversitatem obiectorum fit diversificatio operationum6; unde sol amplius illuminat crystallum, quam illuminet lapidem vel lignum; utrumque autem horum deficit in caritate. Nam ipsa caritas regitiva est ipsius voluntatis et simul cum illa habet moveri, quae quidem voluntas voluntarie inclinatur ad ipsa volita. Praeterea, unum obiectorum est magis amabile quam reliquum, sicut unum corpus est magis illuminabile quam aliud et ab eodem lumine magis illustratur7.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, utrum attendatur8 quantum ad habitum, aut quantum ad actum; dicendum, quod attenditur quantum ad habitum comparatum. Unde quamvis habitus caritatis sit unus, tamen dicitur ordinatus, etiam si non sit in actu, quia habilitat animam ad hoc, ut ordinate moveatur; unde iustus dormiens dicitur habere caritatem ordinatam. — Ex his autem, quae dicta sunt, patet, quare caritas magis dicitur ordinata quam virtus alia, magis etiam dicitur ordinata quam modificata. Hoc enim est, quia proprium est ipsius simul habere rationem vinculi ligantis et ponderis inclinantis; pondus autem ordini correspondet9.

Scholion

I. Cum motus caritatis sit duplex: interior in affectu et exterior in effectu, et affectus se habeat ad effectum ut eius principium; atque dubitatum fuerit respectu affectus, utrum dilectio proximi habeat ordinem: ideo ordo caritatis in hac tota distinctione consideratur principaliter secundum affectum (cfr. infra q. 6. et q. 3. ad 6.). Porro ordo «includit in se aliquem modum prioris et posterioris»; et «prius et posterius dicitur secundum relationem ad aliquod principium» (S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 26. a. I.). Cum autem principium dilectionis sub diverso respectu sit duplex, scilicet Deus ut ratio motiva, et ipse diligens (ibid. a. 6.); hinc recte S. Bonav. (infra q. 5, et cfr. dub. 3. 4.) duplicem distinguit ordinem in caritate: «unus, qui ei competit secundum se ipsam; et iste ordo attenditur penes bonum et magis bonum et maxime bonum... Alius vero est ordo, qui competit ei ratione naturae substratae; et hic attenditur secundum has differentias, quae sunt proprium et alienum, propinquum et extraneum». — Observatione dignum est etiam quod infra q. 6. dicitur de triplici affectu et effectu, et quod II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. dictum est de triplici modo magis aliquem diligendi.

De hac (I.) quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. I; S. loc. cit. a. I; Qq. disp. de caritate, a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic q. I. — Durand., hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

II. In conclusione et solutione obiectorum magistri satis conveniunt.

III. Circa sequentem (2.) quaestionem nulla potest esse controversia respectu supernaturalis caritatis, cuius ratio motiva est ipsum divinum et infinitum bonum. Sed respectu naturalis dilectionis Dei, duplex fuit opinio, ut notat S. Thom. (hic n. 4.). Prima igitur opinio, quam sequuntur Ss. Thom. et Bonav. (hic ad I, infra q. 3. ad 3, et II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. I.) ac Scot. (III. Sent. d. 27. q. unica n. 13.), docet, quod in statu naturae institutae sive ante lapsum «etiam amore amicitiae naturaliter Deus ab homine plus se ipso diligitur. Et quia caritas naturam perficit, ideo etiam secundum caritatem Deum super se ipsum diligit et super omnia alia particularia bona» (S. Thom., loc. cit.). Idem (ibid.) pro hac assertione affert hoc generale principium, quod «etiam naturali amore pars plus tendit ad conservationem sui totius quam sui ipsius. Unde etiam naturaliter animal opponit brachium ad defensionem capitis, ex quo pendet salus totius» (cfr. Sum. loc. cit. a. 3, et Durand., hic q. 2, qui diffuse de his disputat). — Alia vero opinio utitur hic distinctione inter amorem concupiscentiae et amorem benevolentiae sive amicitiae, et tenet, quod amore benevolentiae homo naturaliter plus diligat se quam Deum, quia magis appetit esse et conservari bonum proprium quam divinum; quod autem amore concupiscentiae possit amare plus Deum quam se, quatenus bonum divinum sit magis expetendum et delectabile quam proprium. Durandus insuper recenset et refutat alios, qui dicunt generaliter, «quod naturali dilectione homo debet diligere se ipsum plus quam Deum; sed per caritatem elevatur ad diligendum Deum plus quam se ipsum». — Notatu digna est doctrina in solut. ad I–II.

De hac 2. quaestione praeter laudatos: B. Albert. (de hac et seqq. qq.), hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

SOLE ARTICLE. On the order of charity.

QUESTION I. Whether there is an order in charity with respect to the things to be loved.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether there is an order in charity with respect to the things able to be loved. And that there is, it seems.

1. Song of Songs, chapter two1: He has set charity in order within me; but the order of charity is observed only in loving: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine in On Christian Doctrine2 says that «first God is to be loved, who is above us; second, that which we are; third, that which is beside us; fourth, that which is beneath us»: therefore from this it is plain that there is an order in charity with respect to the things to be loved. For it is established that these are not ordered to one another according to the order of time, but according to the order of excellence and dignity.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the authority of Ambrose, who assigns in the text3 an order of charity in loving: if therefore he does so rightly, it seems that an order must be posited in charity with respect to those things which are loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, this seems to follow by reason: it belongs to charity to rectify the affection4; but the affection is not right unless it sets the greater good before the lesser good, and this expresses an order: therefore an order must be posited in charity.

5. Likewise, charity loves many things able to be loved; either, then, equally primarily, or not equally primarily. Not equally primarily; this is established, since charity is a single habit5, and a single habit has a single principal object. If not equally primarily: therefore one is prior, and the other posterior: therefore there is a necessary order there.

6. Likewise, an order belongs more to deliberative love than to natural love; but we see that natural love is ordered with respect to the things able to be loved6: therefore much more strongly does it seem to be so concerning deliberative love. But the love of charity is of this kind: therefore, etc.

On the contrary: 1. Order presupposes distinction7: therefore where there is no distinction, there is no order; but charity with respect to the diverse things able to be loved is not distinct nor multiplied: therefore neither will it be ordered with respect to them.

2. Likewise, wherever there is order, there is proportion; but among the things loved out of charity there is no proportion, because there is no proportion of the created to the uncreated8, and the proportion of body to spirit is slight or none: therefore if there is no order or proportion among the things able to be loved, it seems that charity is not ordered with respect to them.

3. Likewise, order pertains most of all to cognition, because «it belongs to the wise man to order9»: therefore if no order is posited in cognition with respect to the things to be known, much less should an order be posited in charity with respect to the things to be loved. If you say that on the contrary there is order in the sciences; it is objected concerning faith itself, which is a cognitive habit, by which also the diverse articles are believed, exceeding one another according to degree and dignity, as those which concern the divinity are more excellent than those which concern the humanity10: if therefore no order is posited in faith with respect to the things to be believed, no order should be posited in charity with respect to the things able to be loved.

4. Likewise, just as in faith there is one ground of believing, namely the supreme Truth, so in charity there is one ground of loving, namely the supreme Goodness11; but on account of the single ground of believing, faith assents equally to all the articles: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems with regard to charity that it too ought to love all the things to be loved equally.

5. Likewise, charity by a certain natural inclination inclines to loving the good: if therefore it is one and the same habit, and «the same, remaining the same, is always apt to do the same12» in those things which naturally

incline toward something: it seems therefore that charity moves altogether uniformly and equally to loving every thing able to be loved.

6. Likewise, if an order is observed in charity, either it is observed as regards the habit, or as regards the act. As regards the habit, no; this is established, since the habit is one and the same. If as regards the act: then it seems that in one who is asleep charity is not ordered, since in him it does not exercise its act.

There is therefore a question: by what is order observed in charity; and why is an order observed in it more than in another virtue, since every virtue, as Augustine says in the book On the Morals of the Church13, is «ordered love»; and again, since concerning every good there is measure, species, and order; why is charity called ordered rather than measured?

CONCLUSION.

Charity is ordered with respect to those things which are to be loved out of charity.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that charity is a binding bond, according to that which the Apostle says to the Colossians, chapter three1, where he calls it the bond of perfection; and Dionysius in chapter four of On the Divine Names says that «love is a unitive power». Hence, since the love of charity is a most liberal love, it embraces many things and gathers them into one. Hence charity not only unites to the end him in whom it is, but also in a certain way binds to him that which is apt to attain to the same end.

Nor is charity only a binding bond, but also an inclining weight; for «what weight is in bodies, that love is in spirits2». Since therefore each thing is ordered through its own weight, and charity is a weight and an even balancer: hence it is that the formal character of order belongs most of all to charity. And since it is a bond binding and embracing many things, therefore it not only orders the one loving toward the end, but also toward the things loved themselves, according as the ground of loving and the habit of charity itself3 are compared in diverse ways to them. — Therefore the reasons showing that charity is ordered with respect to those things which are to be loved out of charity are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first, that order presupposes distinction; it must be said that order is observed in charity by reason of the habit related to act and object. For although in charity there is no distinction on the part of the habit, there is nevertheless distinction on the part of the things to be loved themselves and on the part of the acts, by reason of which diversity the commandments of charity must be multiplied, and charity itself must be ordered4.

2. To that which is objected, that where there is order, there is proportion; it must be said that proportion is taken in two ways: strictly and broadly. If proportion is said strictly, then it expresses a certain commensuration and is of things of the same genus; and in this way the aforesaid proposition does not hold true, that wherever there is order, there is proportion. But if it is taken broadly, so that proportion is called any relation observed according to the agreement of analogy: in this way there is proportion of the created good to the uncreated, and also order according to the formal character of causality and priority5. For the end is more worthy and more excellent and is set before those things which are toward the end, and as regards this an order is observed in charity.

3. To that which is objected, that order seems to pertain most of all to the act of the cognitive power, since it belongs to the wise man to order; it can be answered first by distinguishing that order is twofold: one of the parts in a whole and of things in the universe, and another of those things which are toward the end with respect to the end itself6. And although the first order is principally about cognition, the second consists more principally about affection and love, whose office it is to incline toward the end. But the order of charity is observed by comparison to the end; and therefore the case of charity and of the cognitive habit is not alike.

Otherwise it can be said that order in the habit is observed by comparison to act and object, as was said before. Since therefore the supreme Goodness is compared in one way and another to the diverse things able to be loved

and is participated by them according to more and less, as is plain in body and spirit1; hence it is that the love of charity is called ordered. By this manner too, if any cognitive habit considers certain things in which there is greater and lesser evidence of truth, certainly in such a one an order can be found, just as the science of principles is prior to that of conclusions2; and thus that objection can be answered by removal. And if one objects concerning faith, it must be said that the case is not alike: for all the articles are compared uniformly to the supreme Truth, according as they are believed by faith. For faith in believing assents to all the articles as to the first Truth, as to one dictating and asserting; therefore it believes them all uniformly and equally3.

4. To that which is objected, that there is one ground of loving in charity, just as one ground of believing in faith; it must be said that although it be one, nevertheless Charity itself is not compared so uniformly to the things able to be loved as Truth itself is to the things able to be believed; for the supreme Goodness itself is more desirable for God than for us, and for our spirit than for our body4; therefore the case is not alike on the one side and the other.

5. To that which is objected, that the same, remaining the same, is apt to do the same; it must be said that this holds true of that which is naturally inclined5, both by reason of itself and by reason of what is joined to it, and this with respect to the same object. For according to the diversity of objects there comes about a diversification of operations6; hence the sun illumines crystal more than it illumines stone or wood; but each of these falls short in charity. For charity itself is the ruler of the will itself and must be moved together with it, which will indeed is voluntarily inclined toward the things willed themselves. Moreover, one of the objects is more lovable than the other, just as one body is more illuminable than another and is more brightly lit by the same light7.

6. To that which is objected lastly, whether it is observed8 as regards the habit, or as regards the act; it must be said that it is observed as regards the habit compared. Hence although the habit of charity be one, nevertheless it is called ordered, even if it be not in act, because it disposes the soul to this, that it be moved in an ordered way; hence the just man asleep is said to have ordered charity. — From these things which have been said, it is plain why charity is called ordered more than another virtue, and is also called ordered more than measured. For this is because it is proper to it to have at once the formal character of a binding bond and of an inclining weight; but weight corresponds to order9.

Scholion

I. Since the motion of charity is twofold: interior in affection and exterior in effect, and the affection stands to the effect as its principle; and since it had been doubted with respect to the affection whether the love of neighbor has an order: therefore the order of charity in this whole distinction is considered principally according to affection (cf. below q. 6 and q. 3 ad 6). Furthermore, order «includes in itself a certain mode of prior and posterior»; and «prior and posterior is said according to a relation to some principle» (St. Thomas, S. II–II q. 26 a. I). But since the principle of love under a diverse respect is twofold, namely God as the motive ground, and the one loving himself (ibid. a. 6); hence rightly St. Bonaventure (below q. 5, and cf. dub. 3, 4) distinguishes a twofold order in charity: «one, which belongs to it according to itself; and this order is observed by reference to the good and the more good and the most good... another is the order which belongs to it by reason of the underlying nature; and this is observed according to those differences which are one's own and another's, near and foreign». — It is also worthy of note what is said below in q. 6 concerning the threefold affection and effect, and what was said in II Sent. d. 3 p. II a. 3 q. 2 concerning the threefold manner of loving someone more.

On this (first) question: St. Thomas, here a. I; S. loc. cit. a. I; Disputed Questions on Charity a. 9. — B. Albert, here a. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. I. — Richard of Middleton, here q. I. — Durandus, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. I. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. unica.

II. In the conclusion and the solution of the objections the masters agree well enough.

III. Concerning the following (2nd) question there can be no controversy with respect to supernatural charity, whose motive ground is the divine and infinite good itself. But with respect to the natural love of God, there was a twofold opinion, as St. Thomas notes (here n. 4). The first opinion, then, which Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure follow (here ad I, below q. 3 ad 3, and II Sent. d. 3 p. II a. 3 q. I) and Scotus (III Sent. d. 27 q. unica n. 13), teaches that in the state of instituted nature, that is, before the fall, «even by the love of friendship God is naturally loved by man more than himself. And because charity perfects nature, therefore also according to charity he loves God above himself and above all other particular goods» (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). The same author (ibid.) brings forward for this assertion this general principle, that «even by natural love a part tends more to the conservation of its whole than of itself. Hence also naturally an animal sets its arm against the defense of its head, on which the safety of the whole depends» (cf. Sum. loc. cit. a. 3, and Durandus, here q. 2, who disputes about these things at length). — But the other opinion here uses the distinction between the love of concupiscence and the love of benevolence or friendship, and holds that by the love of benevolence man naturally loves himself more than God, because he desires more to be and to preserve his own good than the divine; but that by the love of concupiscence he can love God more than himself, inasmuch as the divine good is more to be sought and more delightful than his own. Durandus moreover recounts and refutes others, who say generally «that by natural love man ought to love himself more than God; but by charity he is elevated to loving God more than himself». — Worthy of note is the doctrine in the solution ad I–II.

On this 2nd question, besides those praised: B. Albert (on this and the following questions), here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. I. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 4.
    Verse 4.
  2. Libr. I. c. 23. n. 22. — De ordine temporis et dignitatis cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori, et V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. II.).
    Book I, c. 23, n. 22. — On the order of time and of dignity cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On the Prior, and Metaphysics V, text 16 (IV, c. II).
  3. Hic c. 2. Loco nominis Ambrosius rectius haberetur Origenes. — Inferius post recte Vat. supplet assignat.
    Here c. 2. In place of the name Ambrose one would more rightly have Origen. — Below, after rightly, the Vatican edition supplies assigns.
  4. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. I. et pag. 596, nota 7.
    Cf. above d. 27 a. I q. I and p. 596, note 7.
  5. Vide supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2, ubi etiam alia tanguntur, quae hic proponuntur.
    See above d. 27 a. I q. 2, where also other things are touched on which are proposed here.
  6. Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 7. et 12.
    Cf. Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 7 and 12.
  7. Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori. August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. I. ordinem sic definit: Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. — De minori cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2.
    See Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On the Prior. Augustine, City of God XIX, c. 13, n. I, defines order thus: Order is the disposition of equal and unequal things assigning to each its own place. — On the lesser cf. above d. 27 a. I q. 2.
  8. Cfr. supra pag. 9, nota I. — Edd. creati enim ad increatum modica vel nulla est proportio, nec corporis ad spiritum.
    Cf. above p. 9, note I. — The editions read for of the created to the uncreated there is slight or no proportion, nor of body to spirit.
  9. Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 2. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 685, nota I. — Mox post multo minus multi codd. nec non edd. perperam addunt non.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 2. Cf. vol. I, p. 685, note I. — Soon after much less many codices and also editions wrongly add not.
  10. Cfr. supra d. 25. dub. I.
    Cf. above d. 25, dub. I.
  11. Vide supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2. De fide cfr. d. 24. a. I. q. 2. — In Conclus. pro diligenda codd. T U V exhibent diligibilia.
    See above d. 27 a. I q. 2. On faith cf. d. 24 a. I q. 2. — In the Conclusion, for to be loved codices T U V give able to be loved.
  12. Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 383, nota 8. — Quod caritas sit habitus unus, ostensum est supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2; — Pro idem, et idem, manens Vat. cum pluribus codd. idem manens.
    Aristotle, on whom see above p. 383, note 8. — That charity is a single habit was shown above d. 27 a. I q. 2; — For the same, and the same, remaining the Vatican edition with several codices reads remaining the same.
  13. Libr. I. c. 15. n. 24; sed cfr. IV. supra pag. 173, nota I. — In seq. propos. respici videtur illud August., de Genesi ad litteram (de Natura boni, c. 3): Haec ergo tria: modus, species, ordo, tanquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo factis, sive in spiritu, sive in corpore... Haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt, ubi parva sunt, parva bona sunt, ubi nulla sunt, nullum bonum est. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 35. a. 2. q. I. seqq.
    Book I, c. 15, n. 24; but cf. IV above p. 173, note I. — In the following proposition there seems to be a reference to that of Augustine, in On the Nature of the Good, c. 3: These three, then — measure, species, order — are as it were general goods in the things made by God, whether in spirit or in body... These three, where they are great, are great goods; where they are small, are small goods; where they are none, there is no good. Cf. II Sent. d. 35 a. 2 q. I and following.
  14. Vers. 14. — Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 12.
    Verse 14. — Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4, § 12.
  15. Secundum August., de quo videsis supra pag. 289, nota 5. In libro de Natura et dignit. amoris (inter opera Bernardi), c. I. dicuntur haec: Est quippe amor vis animae, naturali quodam pondere ferens eam in locum vel finem suum. Omnis enim creatura, sive spiritualis sive corporea, et certum habet locum, quo naturaliter fertur, et naturale quoddam pondus, quo fertur. Pondus enim, ut aliquidam unus philosophus (August., XIII. Confess. c. 9. n. 10; Enarrat. 8. in Ps. 89. n. 10.), non semper fert ad ima: ignem sursum, aqua deorsum, et de ceteris. Nam et hominem agit pondus suum, naturaliter spiritum ferens sursum, corpus deorsum, unumquodque in locum vel finem suum etc.
    According to Augustine, on whom see above p. 289, note 5. In the book On the Nature and Dignity of Love (among the works of Bernard), c. I, these things are said: Love indeed is a force of the soul, bearing it by a certain natural weight into its place or end. For every creature, whether spiritual or corporeal, both has a fixed place to which it is naturally borne, and a certain natural weight by which it is borne. For weight, as a certain philosopher [says] (Augustine, Confessions XIII, c. 9, n. 10; Enarration 8 on Ps. 89, n. 10), does not always bear toward the depths: fire upward, water downward, and so of the rest. For a man too is driven by his own weight, naturally bearing the spirit upward, the body downward, each into its own place or end, etc.
  16. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 11. a. I. q. 3. in corp. — Superius pro ipse habitum cod. aa actum cognitionis, codd. K K actum scientiae cognitivae. Deinde pro quidam vero eorum cod. A quidam vero respectu eorum. In fine huius primae respons. pro de habitu cognitivae codd. A K de habitu cognitivo, cod. aa de habitu cognitionis.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 11 a. I q. 3 in the body. — Above, for itself codex aa has the act of cognition, codices K K the act of cognitive science. Then for but another of those things codex A reads but another with respect to those things. At the end of this first reply, for of the cognitive habit codices A K read of the cognitive habit [cognitivo], codex aa of the habit of cognition.
  17. In Vat. deest ad. Paulo inferius pro comparatur cod. U comparantur.
    In the Vatican edition ad is lacking. A little below, for is compared codex U reads are compared.
  18. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2. ad I. et 2.
    Cf. above d. 27 a. I q. 2, ad I and 2.
  19. Vide supra d. I. a. I. q. I. ad I. Cfr. etiam Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 24. seqq. (c. I.), et II. de General. et corrupt. text. 37. (c. II.). Idem ait III. Topic. c. I: Trinis iis quae sunt ad finem eligibilior videtur esse. — Pro primitatis cod. Z prioritatis. Superius pro ibi sit proportio codd. A K U ibi est proportio.
    See above d. I a. I q. I ad I. Cf. also Aristotle, Physics VII, text 24 ff. (c. I), and On Generation and Corruption II, text 37 (c. II). The same author says in Topics III, c. I: Among those things which are toward the end, the more eligible seems to be... — For priority [primitatis] codex Z reads priority [prioritatis]. Above, for there is proportion there [sit] codices A K U read there is proportion there [est].
  20. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — Locutio per interemptionem idem dicit ac per negationem.
    Cf. vol. I, p. 87, note 4. — The expression by removal says the same as by negation.
  21. Vide supra d. 28. q. 4. in corp. et ad 4.
    See above d. 28 q. 4 in the body and ad 4.
  22. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori, et I. Poster. c. 1. 2. — Locutio per interemptionem idem dicit ac per negationem; cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4.
    Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On the Prior, and Posterior Analytics I, c. 1, 2. — The expression by removal says the same as by negation; cf. vol. I, p. 87, note 4.
  23. Vide supra d. 23. a. I. q. 3. et d. 24. a. I. q. 2. — Pro ideo cod. Z unde.
    See above d. 23 a. I q. 3 and d. 24 a. I q. 2. — For therefore codex Z reads whence.
  24. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2. et d. 28. q. 4. — Cod. Z adiicit nostro.
    Cf. above d. 27 a. I q. 2 and d. 28 q. 4. — Codex Z adds our.
  25. Edd. inclinat.
    The editions read inclines.
  26. Ut docet Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 561, nota 3. — Cod. Z fit diversitas actionum et aliquanto inferius pro simul cum illa cum codd. A K simul cum ipsa.
    As Aristotle teaches, On the Soul II, text 33 (c. 4). Cf. vol. II, p. 561, note 3. — Codex Z reads there comes a diversity of actions, and somewhat below, for together with it with codices A K together with the same.
  27. Codd. B D O illuminatur. Pro magis codd. A K bb amplius.
    Codices B D O read is illuminated. For more codices A K bb read more abundantly.
  28. Supple cum cod. U ordo, vel cum edd. ordo in caritate. Mox post ad actum edd. addunt et obiectum et dein omittunt comparatum ad actum et obiectum. Pro comparatum cod. F substituit per relationem.
    Supply with codex U order, or with the editions order in charity. Soon after as regards the act the editions add and the object, and then omit compared as regards act and object. For compared codex F substitutes by relation.
  29. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 828, nota 5. — Paulo ante pro proprium cod. A proprietas.
    Cf. vol. II, p. 828, note 5. — A little before, for proper codex A reads a property.
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