Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 33
ARTICULUS UNICUS. De virtutibus cardinalibus in generali.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum opportunum sit praeter virtutes theologicas cardinales ponere.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum opportunum sit praeter virtutes theologicas cardinales ponere. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Sapientiae octavo1 dicitur in commendationem sapientiae, quod sobrietatem et prudentiam et iustitiam et virtutem docet, quibus utilius in vita nihil est hominibus; sed per illa quatuor intelliguntur quatuor virtutes cardinales: ergo sunt nobis maxime utiles et opportunae.
2. Item, privationes harum virtutum sive vitia eis opposita perducunt ad mortem, sicut gula, luxuria et avaritia; sed sicut privationes sunt perniciosae, sic positiones sunt utiles et opportunae: ergo videtur, quod magna sit necessitas habendi virtutes cardinales.
3. Item, nullus potest pertingere ad regnum caelorum nisi per impletionem mandatorum Dei2; sed quaedam sunt mandata, ad quorum impletionem virtutes cardinales habilitant, utpote sunt mandata secundae tabulae: ergo videtur, quod ad obtinendam salutem valde sunt nobis necessariae.
4. Item, sicut perdit quis vitam per peccatum in Deum, ita etiam potest perdere per peccatum in proximum3: ergo sicut necessarium est habere virtutes ordinantes ad Deum, ita necessarium est habere virtutes ordinantes ad proximum et ad se ipsum: sed virtutes ordinantes ad Deum sunt theologicae, ordinantes ad se et ad proximum sunt cardinales: ergo virtutes cardinales sunt necessariae.
Sed contra: 1. Ad Romanos decimo tertio4: Qui diligit proximum Legem implevit; sed qui Legem implet habet omne illud quod sibi necessarium est ad salutem: ergo qui habet caritatem non indiget alia virtute ad proximum ordinante: habitis ergo virtutibus theologicis, videtur, quod superfluant cardinales.
2. Item, virtutes sunt necessariae principaliter ad ordinandum animae affectiones, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro de Spiritu et anima5; sed omnium affectionum principium est amor, secundum quod dicitur in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei: cum ergo caritas sufficienter ordinet amorem, videtur,
quod qui habet rectitudinem caritatis non indiget rectitudine alterius virtutis.
3. Item, virtutes sunt ad reformandum potentias animae; sed potentiae animae reformantur per gratiam et tres virtutes theologicas, in quibus attenditur imago reformationis per gratiam6: ergo videtur, quod illis habitis, nulla sit necessitas vel utilitas cardinalis virtutis.
4. Item, virtutes sunt ad dirigendum in actionibus et passionibus7; sed per fidem sufficienter dirigitur intellectus, et per caritatem dirigitur affectus: ergo virtutibus theologicis habitis, videtur, quod cardinales superfluant.
CONCLUSIO.
Praeter habitus virtutum theologicarum ponendi sunt habitus virtutum cardinalium.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod generalis necessitas virtutis est ad rectificandum potentias animae contra obliquitatem et ad vigorandum contra difficultatem. Virtus enim facit potentiam rectam et vigorosam. Et quoniam contingit, hominem ordinari ad Deum, contingit nihilominus, hominem ordinari ad proximum et se ipsum; et in his eisdem potest obliquari et impediri sive retardari: hinc est, quod non solum indiget habitibus ipsum vigorantibus et rectificantibus, prout directe tendit in Deum, cuiusmodi sunt habitus virtutum theologicarum, sed etiam indiget habitibus ipsum regulantibus et rectificantibus, prout ordinatur ad se ipsum et ad proximum. Et tales sunt habitus virtutum cardinalium. Unde sicut praeter praecepta primae tabulae, quae directe ordinant in Deum, opportunum fuit ponere praecepta secundae tabulae, quae ordinant ad proximum; sic etiam in habitibus est intelligendum. Et propterea praeter habitus virtutum theologicarum necessarium est ad salutem ponere habitus virtutum cardinalium; sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt, quae concedendae sunt, quoniam verum concludunt8.
1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod qui diligit proximum Legem implevit; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur propter hoc, quod implere Legem sit ipsius dilectionis tantum ratione sui, sed hoc est, quia habet alios habitus annexos, qui, ad ipsius dilectionis et caritatis imperium quodam modo moti, dirigunt et habilitant ad observanda opera mandatorum, sicut mandatum de non fornicando observat quis per castitatem elicitive, sed per caritatem imperative. Hoc autem attribuit Apostolus dilectioni et caritati, quoniam ipsa est mater, forma et finis omnium virtutum, sicut superius9 fuit tactum et in sequentibus suo loco melius explanabitur.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis affectio ortum habet ab amore; dicendum, quod etsi omnis affectio ortum habeat ab amore tanquam ex affectione principali ipsius animae, amor tamen non est tota causa aliarum affectionum; ideo nec regula ipsius amoris in se sufficit ad rectificationem animae, nisi sint virtutes in ea alios affectus regulantes et dirigentes. Et propterea illa ratio potest dissolvi, quia procedit ab insufficienti10.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtutes sunt ad reformandum potentias; dicendum, quod verum est; sed facies potentiarum animae duplex est secundum duplicem portionem11 et duplicem eius conversionem, videlicet ad inferius et ad superius, ad bonum creatum et ad bonum increatum, et ad finem et ad id quod est ad finem. Ideo, cum dicit, quod anima sufficienter formatur et reformatur per virtutes theologicas; dicendum, quod verum est per comparationem ad superius; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod cardinales virtutes superfluant, quia ipsam animam informant et reformant per comparationem ad creatum12 et ad id quod est ad finem ordinatum. Et si tu obiicias, quod virtutes theologicae non tantum in finem, sed etiam in his quae sunt ad finem, ordinant, sicut patet in caritate; dicendum, quod illud non est principaliter, sed ex consequenti[^13].
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtutes sunt ad dirigendum actus potentiarum; dicendum, quod vires animae quosdam actus habent ordinatos ad vitam contemplativam, quosdam ad vitam activam; et utrosque actus necessarium est ordinare, quia uterque modus vivendi necessarius est ad hoc, quod possit quis beatitudinem promereri14. Cum ergo dicit, quod fides et caritas dirigunt actus potentiarum animae; dicendum, quod etsi hoc possit concedi in actibus, qui spectant ad vitam contemplativam, non tamen verum est in agendis sive in actibus, qui spectant ad vitam activam; et ideo non sequitur, quod virtutes cardinales superfluant.
I. De definitionibus virtutum cardinalium vide hic dub. 1-4. Quoad definitiones Magistri B. Albert. (hic a. 3.) cum nostro auctore (hic dub. I.) bene observat, «quod Magister non nititur definire istas virtutes nisi secundum conformitatem ad Christum, in quo in maximo statu fuerunt». Hoc in primis elucet ex definitione iustitiae (loc. cit.). Plura optima de virtutibus cardinalibus docentur in Hexaem. serm. 6. et etiam 5. 7. Hanc (I.) quaestionem plurimi antiqui doctores explicite non tractant, sed eam supponendo principia hic allata tangunt in aliis de virtutibus cardinalibus quaestionibus. Cfr. S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 61. a. 3, q. 62. a. 2. Tamen de hac et seq. q. specialim tractant Dionys. Carth., hic q. I; Biel, hic q. unica.
II. Quod virtutes cardinales acquisitae inter se specie differant, omnino constat. Quod autem eaedem, etiam quatenus sunt a Deo supernaturaliter infusae, realiter distinguantur et a virtutibus acquisitis et ab invicem, tenent etiam ii qui cum schola S. Thomae contra Scotum ponunt virtutes morales per se infusas, de qua controversia et de sententia S. Bonaventurae vide infra q. 5. in scholio. — Quoad fundamenta observamus, quod similia adhibita sunt supra d. 27. a. I. q. I. Tota quaestio magis explicatur d. 36. q. I. 3. 6. et supra d. 27. a. I. q. I; cfr. etiam de distinctione habituum et reductione eorum ad unitatem quandam II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. I. ad 8.
De hac (2.) quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. I. a. I; S. I. II. q. 61. a. 4; Q. disp. de Virt. in communi a. 12; item de Virtutibus cardinal. a. I. — B. Albert., hic a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 7. — Durand., hic q. 5.
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Article, Single. On the cardinal virtues in general.
Question I. Whether it is fitting to posit cardinal virtues besides the theological ones.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether it is fitting to posit cardinal virtues besides the theological ones. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].
1. In Wisdom 81 it is said, in commendation of wisdom, that she teaches sobriety and prudence and justice and virtue, than which nothing is more useful to men in life; but by those four are understood the four cardinal virtues: therefore they are most useful and fitting for us.
2. Likewise, the privations of these virtues, or the vices opposed to them, lead to death, as gluttony, lust, and avarice; but just as the privations are pernicious, so the positings [of them] are useful and fitting: therefore it seems that there is great necessity of having the cardinal virtues.
3. Likewise, no one can reach the kingdom of heaven except by the fulfillment of the commandments of God2; but there are certain commandments to whose fulfillment the cardinal virtues dispose, namely the commandments of the second table: therefore it seems that they are greatly necessary for us to obtain salvation.
4. Likewise, just as one loses life through a sin against God, so also one can lose it through a sin against the neighbor3: therefore just as it is necessary to have virtues ordering [us] to God, so it is necessary to have virtues ordering [us] to the neighbor and to oneself: but the virtues ordering to God are the theological ones, those ordering to oneself and to the neighbor are the cardinal ones: therefore the cardinal virtues are necessary.
On the contrary: 1. Romans 134: He who loves the neighbor has fulfilled the Law; but he who fulfills the Law has all that is necessary for him unto salvation: therefore he who has charity does not need another virtue ordering [him] to the neighbor: therefore, the theological virtues being had, it seems that the cardinal ones are superfluous.
2. Likewise, the virtues are principally necessary for ordering the affections of the soul, as Augustine says in the book On the Spirit and the Soul5; but the principle of all the affections is love, as is said in book fourteen On the City of God: since therefore charity sufficiently orders love, it seems
that he who has the rectitude of charity does not need the rectitude of any other virtue.
3. Likewise, the virtues are for reforming the powers of the soul; but the powers of the soul are reformed through grace and the three theological virtues, in which is attended the image of reformation through grace6: therefore it seems that, these being had, there is no necessity or utility of a cardinal virtue.
4. Likewise, the virtues are for directing in actions and passions7; but through faith the intellect is sufficiently directed, and through charity the affect is directed: therefore, the theological virtues being had, it seems that the cardinal ones are superfluous.
CONCLUSION.
Besides the habits of the theological virtues, the habits of the cardinal virtues are to be posited.
I respond: It must be said that the general necessity of virtue is for rectifying the powers of the soul against crookedness and for invigorating [them] against difficulty. For virtue makes a power upright and vigorous. And since it happens that man is ordered to God, it happens nonetheless that man is ordered to the neighbor and to himself; and in these same [orderings] he can be made crooked and impeded or held back: hence it is that he needs not only habits invigorating and rectifying him, insofar as he tends directly to God — of which kind are the habits of the theological virtues — but he also needs habits regulating and rectifying him, insofar as he is ordered to himself and to the neighbor. And such are the habits of the cardinal virtues. Hence, just as besides the precepts of the first table, which order [us] directly to God, it was fitting to posit the precepts of the second table, which order [us] to the neighbor; so also it must be understood in the habits. And therefore, besides the habits of the theological virtues, it is necessary unto salvation to posit the habits of the cardinal virtues; as the reasons adduced for the first part show, which are to be granted, since they conclude truly8.
1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that he who loves the neighbor has fulfilled the Law; it must be said that this is not said for this reason, that to fulfill the Law belongs to love alone by reason of itself, but it is because [love] has other habits annexed [to it], which, moved in a certain way at the command of love and charity itself, direct and dispose to the observing of the works of the commandments — as one observes the commandment of not committing fornication elicitively through chastity, but imperatively through charity. And the Apostle attributes this to love and charity because it is the mother, form, and end of all the virtues, as was touched on above9 and will be better explained below in its place.
2. To that which is objected, that every affection has its origin from love; it must be said that, although every affection has its origin from love as from the principal affection of the soul itself, love nonetheless is not the whole cause of the other affections; therefore neither does the rule of love itself in itself suffice for the rectification of the soul, unless there be in it virtues regulating and directing the other affects. And therefore that reasoning can be dissolved, because it proceeds from an insufficient [ground]10.
3. To that which is objected, that the virtues are for reforming the powers; it must be said that it is true; but the face of the powers of the soul is twofold according to the twofold portion11 and its twofold conversion, namely toward the lower and toward the higher, toward the created good and toward the uncreated good, and toward the end and toward that which is unto the end. Therefore, when he says that the soul is sufficiently formed and reformed through the theological virtues; it must be said that this is true by comparison to the higher; but from this it does not follow that the cardinal virtues are superfluous, because they inform and reform the soul itself by comparison to the created12 and to that which is ordered unto the end. And if you object that the theological virtues order not only to the end, but also in those things which are unto the end, as is clear in charity; it must be said that this is not principally, but consequentially.[^13]
4. To that which is objected, that the virtues are for directing the acts of the powers; it must be said that the powers of the soul have certain acts ordered to the contemplative life, certain ones to the active life; and it is necessary to order both acts, because each mode of living is necessary for this, that one may be able to merit beatitude14. Since therefore he says that faith and charity direct the acts of the powers of the soul; it must be said that, although this can be granted in the acts which pertain to the contemplative life, it is nonetheless not true in things to be done or in the acts which pertain to the active life; and therefore it does not follow that the cardinal virtues are superfluous.
I. On the definitions of the cardinal virtues see here dub. 1-4. As to the definitions of the Master, B. Albert (here a. 3) well observes, with our author (here dub. I), «that the Master does not endeavor to define these virtues except according to conformity to Christ, in whom they were in their highest state». This shines forth especially from the definition of justice (loc. cit.). Many excellent things on the cardinal virtues are taught in the Hexaemeron sermon 6 and also 5, 7. This (I.) question very many ancient doctors do not treat explicitly, but, presupposing it, they touch the principles here adduced in other questions on the cardinal virtues. Cf. S. Thom., S. I-II q. 61 a. 3, q. 62 a. 2. Yet of this and the following question Dionysius Carthusianus treats specially, here q. I; Biel, here q. unica.
II. That the acquired cardinal virtues differ among themselves in species is entirely settled. But that these same [virtues], even insofar as they are supernaturally infused by God, are really distinguished both from the acquired virtues and from one another, is held also by those who, with the school of S. Thomas against Scotus, posit moral virtues infused per se, on which controversy and on the opinion of S. Bonaventure see below q. 5 in the scholion. — As to the fundamenta, we observe that similar [arguments] were employed above d. 27 a. I q. I. The whole question is more fully explained d. 36 q. I, 3, 6, and above d. 27 a. I q. I; cf. also on the distinction of habits and their reduction to a certain unity Sentences II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. I, ad 8.
On this (2.) question: S. Thom., here q. I a. I; S. I-II q. 61 a. 4; Q. disp. de Virt. in communi n. 12; likewise de Virtutibus cardinal. n. I. — B. Albert, here a. I. — Petr. a Tar., here q. I a. I. — Richard. a Med., here a. I q. 7. — Durand., here q. 5.
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- Vers. 7. — August., I. Retract. c. 7. n. 3: His enim nominibus Latinus interpres quatuor illas virtutes, quae maxime in usu philosophorum esse adsolent, nominavit, sobrietatem appellans temperantiam, prudentiae imponens nomen sapientiam, fortitudinem vero virtutis vocabulo enuntians, solam iustitiam suo nomine interpretatus est. Mox pro in commendationem edd. et plures codd. in commendatione.Verse 7. — Augustine, Retractations I, c. 7, n. 3: «For by these names the Latin translator named those four virtues, which are most commonly in use among the philosophers, calling sobriety temperance, imposing on prudence the name wisdom, declaring fortitude indeed by the word of virtue, and rendering justice alone by its own name.» Presently, for in commendationem the editions and many codices [read] in commendatione.
- Matth. 19, 17: Si autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata. — De mandatis secundae tabulae vide infra d. 37. a. 2. q. I. — Pro pertingere cod. Z pervenire.Matthew 19:17: But if you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments. — On the commandments of the second table see below d. 37, a. 2, q. I. — For pertingere codex Z [reads] pervenire.
- Cfr. Matth. 5, 22, et August., Serm. 82. (alias 16. de Verbis Domini) c. 3. n. 5.Cf. Matthew 5:22, and Augustine, Sermon 82 (alias 16, On the Words of the Lord), c. 3, n. 5.
- Vers. 8.Verse 8.
- Cap. 4. Seq. locus est XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2, de quo cfr. supra pag. 338, nota 3. — Quod caritas ordinet amorem, ostensum est supra d. 29. q. 1; cfr. etiam supra pag. 590, nota 1. in fine.Chapter 4. The following passage is from book XIV On the City of God, c. 7, n. 2, on which cf. above p. 338, note 3. — That charity orders love was shown above d. 29, q. 1; cf. also above p. 590, note 1, at the end.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.Cf. Sentences II, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
- Vide supra pag. 472, nota 2. — In multis codd. nec non in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 76. a. I. hoc arg. sic terminatur: habitis, ut videtur, cardinales [cod. K supplet virtutes] superfluunt.See above p. 472, note 2. — In many codices, as also in the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 76, a. I, this argument is so terminated: the [theological virtues] being had, the cardinals seem [cod. K supplies virtues] to be superfluous.
- Vide Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. I, ubi tum ex Ss. Patribus tum ex philosophis probatur harum virtutum necessitas.See the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation I, where the necessity of these virtues is proved both from the holy Fathers and from the philosophers.
- Lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 9; Comment. ibid. dub. 6; d. 27. a. I. q. I. ad I. et q. 3. ad I. nec non a. 2. q. I; d. 28. q. I. in corp.; d. 36. q. 6.Text of the Master, d. XXIII, c. 9; Commentary on the same, dub. 6; d. 27, a. I, q. I, ad I, and q. 3, ad I, as also a. 2, q. I; d. 28, q. I, in the body; d. 36, q. 6.
- Vide supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. ad 2. — Superius voci tanquam codd. F G R L R V W aa praefigunt et. Deinde pro rectificationem codd. A K bb substituunt rectitudinem, et pro alios affectus codd. A H T U bb alias affectiones.See above d. 26, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2. — Above, to the word tanquam codices F G R L R V W aa prefix et. Then for rectificationem codices A K bb substitute rectitudinem, and for alios affectus codices A H T U bb [read] alias affectiones.
- Scil. superiorem et inferiorem. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. et pag. 641, nota I. — Plurimi codd. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. nec non edd. 1, 2 perperam proportionem.Namely the higher and the lower. Cf. Sentences II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, and p. 641, note I. — Very many codices and the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, as also editions 1, 2, wrongly [read] proportionem.
- Ita codd. A H K T U Z bb, in aliis et in edd. omittitur et ad id.Thus codices A H K T U Z bb; in the others and in the editions et ad id is omitted.
- Cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. 2. ad I.Cf. above d. 27, a. I, q. 2, ad I.
- Vide supra pag. 610, nota 2. — Pro modus vivendi cod. A modus uniendi. Paulo inferius pro etsi hoc possit idem cod. A etsi hoc posset.See above p. 610, note 2. — For modus vivendi codex A [reads] modus uniendi. A little below, for etsi hoc possit the same codex A [reads] etsi hoc posset.