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Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
p. 560

Quaestio III. Utrum spes sit virtus cardinalis, an theologica.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum spes sit virtus cardinalis, an theologica. Et quod theologica, videtur.

1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio1: Nunc manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec: igitur ab Apostolo spes numeratur inter virtutes theologicas: si ergo vere et proprie, necesse est, spem reperiri in genere virtutis theologicae.

2. Item, illa virtus est theologica, quae habet finem cardinalium virtutum pro obiecto2; sed spes habet finem omnium virtutum pro obiecto — exspectat enim summam beatitudinem et perfectam remunerationem — ergo est virtus theologica.

3. Item, virtus, quae maxime subservit contemplationi et facit sursum tendere, est virtus theologica: p. 561 sed spes est huiusmodi, quoniam, sicut dicit Apostolus ad Hebraeos sexto3, spes incedit usque ad interiora velaminis: ergo spes est virtus theologica.

4. Item, spirituale aedificium per virtutem theologicam inchoatur, utpote per fidem, et per virtutem theologicam consummatur, utpote per caritatem: ergo per virtutem theologicam habet erigi, quia «eiusdem naturae debet esse medium cum extremis». Si ergo erigitur per spem, restat, quod spes est virtus theologica.

5. Item, imago creationis reformatur per imaginem recreationis: si ergo imago creationis necessario requirit tres potentias naturales, videtur similiter, quod imago recreationis necessario requirat tres virtutes. Ergo si imago habet reformari per virtutes theologicas, necesse est, virtutes theologicas esse tres: sed non est aliam dare praeter fidem et caritatem nisi ipsam spem: ergo spes est virtus theologica4.

Sed contra: 1. Nulla virtus, circa cuius actum contingit reperire excessum, est virtus theologica, immo potius cardinalis5 — quod patet, quia impossibile est nimis credere, impossibile est etiam nimis amare — sed circa actum spei contingit reperire excessum, sicut patet in eo qui praesumit et plus sperat, quam merita sua exigant: ergo videtur, quod spes sit virtus cardinalis, non theologica.

2. Item, virtus, quae est medium duarum malitiarum, est virtus cardinalis6, non theologica; sed spes est media inter duas malitias, videlicet inter desperationem et praesumtionem: ergo spem non est reducere ad virtutem theologicam, sed magis ad cardinalem.

3. Item, consuevit multipliciter spes distingui, videlicet spes veniae, spes gratiae et spes gloriae7; sed venia et gratia sunt bona ordinata ad finem, virtus autem cardinalis consistit circa ea quae sunt ad finem: si ergo spes consistit circa talia, spes est virtus cardinalis, non theologica.

4. Item, sustinere et exspectare sunt actus longanimitatis et patientiae; sed «habitus distinguuntur per actus8»: ergo cum exspectare sit proprius actus ipsius spei, longanimitas et spes sunt habitus iidem et in eodem genere virtutis habent reponi. Sed longanimitas reponitur sub genere virtutis cardinalis: ponitur enim et assignatur esse pars fortitudinis: ergo videtur, quod et ipsa spes sit virtus cardinalis.

5. Item, ad fortitudinem cardinalem spectat recte ordinare et fortificare contra affligentia et contra deterrentia; sed spes est huiusmodi, quia facit hominem in tribulatione gaudere et stabilem esse9: ergo videtur, quod spes sit pars fortitudinis cardinalis: ergo non est in genere virtutis theologicae.

Conclusio.

Spes est in genere virtutis theologicae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio spes est in genere virtutis theologicae. — Et ratio huius sumitur ex parte obiecti et ex parte subiecti: ex parte quidem obiecti, quoniam, sicut fides in credendo assentit ipsi Deo ut dictanti vera, sic spes ei innititur ut promittenti magna. Unde sicut obiectum ipsius fidei, quod habet rationem motivi, est quid increatum, quod Deus est, ratione cuius etiam fides ponitur esse in genere virtutis theologicae; sic etiam dicendum est et intelligendum de ipsa spe9. — Sumi etiam potest ratio ex parte subiecti: quia, cum anima secundum superiorem faciem reformari habeat per virtutes theologicas, et spes sit una de virtutibus, faciens ad reformationem imaginis et perfectionem animae secundum partem superiorem, necesse est, spem esse virtutem theologicam. — Unde p. 562 quemadmodum in patria tres erunt dotes secundum tres animae vires, quarum una reformabit et consummabit rationalem, videlicet ipsa visio, alia concupiscibilem, videlicet dilectio, tertia irascibilem, videlicet ipsa perfecta tentio1; sic et in via necesse est ponere circa virtutes theologicas, quibus dotes habent correspondere.

Et sic tam ex parte subiecti quam ex parte obiecti colligitur, quod spes sub genere virtutis theologicae debet reponi. Theologicae enim virtutes Deum habent pro obiecto, et superiorem partem animae pro subiecto. — Concedendae sunt ergo rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod circa actum spei contingit reperire excessum; dicendum, quod circa actum spei nunquam contingit reperire excessum propter nimietatem et intensionem ipsius actus; nemo enim potest nimis confidere in Domino; sed si habet excessum, hoc est propter defectum alicuius conditionis, quae requiritur2 in actu sperandi, utpote si, neglectis meritis, omnino praesumit de misericordia Dei. Sed hoc non facit, ipsam spem esse in genere virtutis cardinalis; quia, quod dicitur virtus theologica differre a cardinali in hoc, quod non est in theologica reperire excessum, sicut in cardinali, intelligitur de illo excessu, qui quidem consistit in actus intensione, non de eo qui est in debitae conditionis omissione. Nam huiusmodi excessus, secundo3 dictus, repugnantiam habet cum omni virtute; primus vero non habet repugnantiam cum virtute theologica, quae habet obiectum infinitum, ita quod nec potest nimis amari nec nimis desiderari; sed repugnantiam habet cum virtute cardinali, cuius obiectum est bonum creatum et finitum et limitatum; ac per hoc exigitur, quod in actu sit modus determinatus, ultra quem si procedat, egreditur limitem sibi secundum determinationem virtutis statutum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spes est media duarum malitiarum; dicendum, quod aliqua virtus potest dici esse medium duarum malitiarum dupliciter: aut sicut utriusque eliminativa et destructiva, aut sicut ex utrisque constituta quantum ad ea quae sunt in eis bona. Si sit media sicut constituta, quemadmodum largitas habet aliquid de avaritia4 in hoc, quod tenet tenenda, et aliquid de prodigalitate in hoc, quod dat danda5; sic est in genere virtutis cardinalis. Si autem sit media solum sicut eliminativa; sic non oportet, eam esse virtutem cardinalem; et hoc modo media est spes inter desperationem et praesumtionem. Liberat enim ab illo duplici malo, sicut fides de Trinitate et Unitate liberat ab errore Arii et ab errore Sabellii6. Et ideo non cogit illa ratio, quod spes non sit virtus theologica.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spe non tantum speratur gloria, sed etiam gratia et venia; dicendum, quod non determinatur genus vel species ipsius virtutis penes obiectum quodcumque, sed penes illud obiectum, quod habet rationem motivi. Quamvis autem spes versetur circa bona creata, quae exspectat; ratio tamen movens non est aliquod creatum, sed aliqua immensitas7 illius summi Boni increati, cui innititur. Et ideo, quamvis per spem exspectat quis gratiam plenam et veniam perfectam, quia ad ipsam comparatur spes tanquam circa materiam; propter illa non oportet eam reponi in genere virtutis cardinalis, sicut in praecedentibus8 habitum est de fide. — Et si tu obiicias, quod obedientia ponitur esse virtus cardinalis, et etiam latria, quia non tantummodo considerant obiectum increatum, sed etiam aliquid creatum concernunt, videlicet obedientia praeceptum, et latria cultum debitum, ac per hoc, quod ita debeat esse in spe; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia tam latria quam obedientia concernit aliquod creatum tali modo, quod ratione illius respiciunt actum exteriorem9. Non sic autem est de spe; spes enim solummodo consistit in affectu interiori, qui praecipuam movendi rationem sumit ex parte superiori, videlicet ex parte obiecti increati.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod longanimitatis est exspectare, secundum quod spei; dicendum, quod alia est exspectatio longanimitatis, quae est pars fortitudinis, quam sit expectatio spei. Nam exspectatio spei consistit in quadam protensione ad bona aeterna, quae quidem consurgit ex confidentia, qua anima innititur ipsi Deo ex tota virtute sua10. Sed exspectatio longanimitatis est, qua anima constantia mentis et robore animi exspectat de omnibus affligentibus et deterrentibus triumphare: et sic actus p. 563 longanimitatis, secundum quod est fortitudinis, differt ab actu spei et quantum ad obiectum circa quod et quantum ad motivum. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si longanimitas est in genere virtutis cardinalis, quod propter hoc virtus spei debeat sub eodem genere reponi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spes fortificat contra affligentia; dicendum, quod aliquis actus potest esse alicuius virtutis tripliciter: vel sicut elicientis, vel sicut imperantis, vel sicut adminiculantis. Fortiter autem perferre terribilia est ipsius virtutis fortitudinis sicut elicientis; sed fidei est sicut imperantis et dictantis, iuxta illud quod dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimo1 de viris sanctis, quod per fidem vicerunt regna et fortes facti sunt in bello; sed ipsius spei et caritatis est sicut adminiculantis. Amor enim Dei et certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis multum adiuvant virtutem fortitudinis, ut possit omnia mala perferre, iuxta illud beati Gregorii2: «Spes praemii minuit vim flagelli».

Scholion

I. Responsio ad hanc et seq. quaestionem non est controversiae exposita. Observatione digna est secunda ratio (hic in corp. et Fundam. 5.), sumta ex parte subiecti secundum superiorem faciem animae, quae etiam in Breviloq. p. V. c. 4. typt ponitur. — Qua ratione aliquis possit aliquatenus sperare in homine, docetur I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 9, et IV. Sent. d. 5. dub. 1, et consentit S. Thom., s. II. II. q. 17. a. 4. — Argg. 1. et 2. ad oppos. eodem modo solvuntur a S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 64. a. 4, et II. II. q. 17. a. 5. ad 1.), scilicet quod spes non habeat infinitum et extremum ex parte principalis et proprii obiecti, sed tantum per accidens ex parte modi, quo fit actus, sive ut dicit S. Bonav., propter defectum alicuius conditionis, nempe ex parte subiecti sperantis. Aliis verbis idem dicit Scotus (hic q. unica n. 24.).

De hac quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; s. II. II. q. 17. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.

II. Ad seq. quaestionem solvendam serviunt eadem principia, quae de fide informi, supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1-4, applicata sunt. — De solutione ad 1. cfr. infra a. 2. q. 2.

De hac (4.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., s. p. III. q. 65. m. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 2, et tangitur in S. loc. cit. a. 5. ad 1. 2. 3. — D. Albert., hic a. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether hope is a cardinal virtue or a theological one.

Thirdly it is asked whether hope is a cardinal virtue or a theological one. And it seems that it is theological.

1. 1 Corinthians 131: Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three: therefore by the Apostle hope is numbered among the theological virtues: if then truly and properly, it is necessary that hope be found in the genus of a theological virtue.

2. Likewise, that virtue is theological which has the end of the cardinal virtues for its object2; but hope has the end of all the virtues for its object — for it awaits the highest beatitude and the perfect reward — therefore it is a theological virtue.

3. Likewise, the virtue which most of all serves contemplation and makes one tend upward is a theological virtue: but hope is of this kind, since, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 63, hope enters even to the interior of the veil: therefore hope is a theological virtue.

4. Likewise, the spiritual edifice is begun through a theological virtue, namely through faith, and is consummated through a theological virtue, namely through charity: therefore it must be raised up through a theological virtue, because «the middle ought to be of the same nature as the extremes». If then it is raised up through hope, it remains that hope is a theological virtue.

5. Likewise, the image of creation is reformed through the image of re-creation: if then the image of creation necessarily requires three natural powers, it seems likewise that the image of re-creation necessarily requires three virtues. Therefore if the image must be reformed through the theological virtues, it is necessary that the theological virtues be three: but there is no other to be given besides faith and charity except hope itself: therefore hope is a theological virtue4.

On the contrary: 1. No virtue concerning whose act an excess can be found is a theological virtue, but rather a cardinal one5 — which is plain, because it is impossible to believe too much, and impossible also to love too much — but concerning the act of hope an excess can be found, as is plain in the one who presumes and hopes for more than his merits demand: therefore it seems that hope is a cardinal virtue, not a theological one.

2. Likewise, the virtue which is a mean between two vices is a cardinal virtue6, not a theological one; but hope is a mean between two vices, namely between despair and presumption: therefore hope is not to be reduced to a theological virtue, but rather to a cardinal one.

3. Likewise, hope is wont to be distinguished in manifold ways, namely the hope of pardon, the hope of grace, and the hope of glory7; but pardon and grace are goods ordered to the end, whereas a cardinal virtue is concerned with the things that are ordered to the end: if then hope is concerned with such things, hope is a cardinal virtue, not a theological one.

4. Likewise, to endure and to await are acts of longanimity and patience; but «habits are distinguished through their acts8»: therefore since to await is the proper act of hope itself, longanimity and hope are the same habits and must be placed in the same genus of virtue. But longanimity is placed under the genus of cardinal virtue: for it is posited and assigned to be a part of fortitude: therefore it seems that hope too is a cardinal virtue.

5. Likewise, it pertains to cardinal fortitude rightly to order and to strengthen against afflicting things and against deterring things; but hope is of this kind, because it makes a person rejoice in tribulation and be steadfast9: therefore it seems that hope is a part of cardinal fortitude: therefore it is not in the genus of theological virtue.

Conclusion.

Hope is in the genus of theological virtue.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt hope is in the genus of theological virtue. — And the ground of this is taken from the side of the object and from the side of the subject: from the side of the object indeed, because, just as faith in believing assents to God himself as the one dictating things true, so hope leans upon him as the one promising great things. Hence just as the object of faith itself, which has the character of a motive, is something uncreated, which is God, by reason of which faith too is posited to be in the genus of theological virtue; so too must it be said and understood concerning hope itself9. — The ground can also be taken from the side of the subject: because, since the soul according to its higher face must be reformed through the theological virtues, and hope is one of the virtues, contributing to the reformation of the image and the perfecting of the soul according to its higher part, it is necessary that hope be a theological virtue. — Hence just as in the fatherland there will be three endowments according to the three powers of the soul, of which one will reform and consummate the rational, namely vision itself, another the concupiscible, namely love, the third the irascible, namely perfect holding1; so too on the way it is necessary to posit them concerning the theological virtues, to which the endowments must correspond.

And thus both from the side of the subject and from the side of the object it is gathered that hope must be placed under the genus of theological virtue. For the theological virtues have God for their object, and the higher part of the soul for their subject. — Therefore the arguments that are for that side must be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that concerning the act of hope an excess can be found; it must be said that concerning the act of hope an excess can never be found by reason of the excessiveness and intensity of the act itself; for no one can trust too much in the Lord; but if it has an excess, this is on account of the defect of some condition which is required2 in the act of hoping, as when, his merits being neglected, one altogether presumes upon the mercy of God. But this does not make hope itself to be in the genus of cardinal virtue; because, as for what is said — that a theological virtue differs from a cardinal one in this, that in the theological no excess can be found, as in the cardinal — this is understood of that excess which consists in the intensity of the act, not of that which lies in the omission of a due condition. For an excess of this kind, said in the second sense3, has a repugnance with every virtue; but the first has no repugnance with a theological virtue, which has an infinite object, so that it can neither be loved too much nor desired too much; but it has a repugnance with a cardinal virtue, whose object is a created and finite and limited good; and on this account it is required that in the act there be a determinate measure, beyond which if it proceed, it goes out from the limit established for it according to the determination of the virtue.

2. To that which is objected, that hope is a mean between two vices; it must be said that some virtue can be said to be a mean of two vices in two ways: either as eliminative and destructive of both, or as constituted out of both as regards the goods that are in them. If it is a mean as constituted, just as liberality has something of avarice4 in this, that it keeps the things to be kept, and something of prodigality in this, that it gives the things to be given5; thus it is in the genus of cardinal virtue. But if it is a mean only as eliminative; then it is not necessary that it be a cardinal virtue; and in this manner hope is a mean between despair and presumption. For it frees from that twofold evil, just as faith concerning Trinity and Unity frees from the error of Arius and from the error of Sabellius6. And therefore that argument does not compel one to hold that hope is not a theological virtue.

3. To that which is objected, that by hope not only glory is hoped for, but also grace and pardon; it must be said that the genus or species of a virtue is not determined by any object whatever, but by that object which has the character of a motive. Now although hope is concerned with created goods, which it awaits; nevertheless the moving ground is not anything created, but some immensity7 of that highest uncreated Good on which it leans. And therefore, although through hope one awaits full grace and perfect pardon, because hope is compared to it as to its matter; on account of these it is not necessary to place it in the genus of cardinal virtue, just as in the foregoing8 it was held concerning faith. — And if you object that obedience is posited to be a cardinal virtue, and likewise latria, because they not only consider an uncreated object but also concern something created — namely obedience the precept, and latria the worship due — and on this account it ought so to be with hope; it must be said that the case is not alike, because both latria and obedience concern something created in such a way that by reason of it they regard an exterior act9. But it is not so with hope; for hope consists only in the interior affection, which takes its chief ground of movement from the higher side, namely from the side of the uncreated object.

4. To that which is objected, that it belongs to longanimity to await, in the way it belongs to hope; it must be said that the awaiting of longanimity, which is a part of fortitude, is other than the awaiting of hope. For the awaiting of hope consists in a certain stretching-out toward eternal goods, which indeed arises from the confidence by which the soul leans upon God himself with its whole strength10. But the awaiting of longanimity is that by which the soul, with constancy of mind and strength of spirit, awaits to triumph over all afflicting and deterring things: and thus the act of longanimity, insofar as it is of fortitude, differs from the act of hope both as regards the object about which and as regards the motive. And therefore it does not follow that, if longanimity is in the genus of cardinal virtue, the virtue of hope must on this account be placed under the same genus.

5. To that which is objected, that hope strengthens against afflicting things; it must be said that some act can belong to a virtue in three ways: either as eliciting, or as commanding, or as assisting. Now to bear terrible things bravely belongs to the virtue of fortitude as eliciting; but it belongs to faith as commanding and dictating, according to what is said in Hebrews 111 concerning the holy men, that by faith they conquered kingdoms and were made strong in war; but it belongs to hope and charity as assisting. For the love of God and the certain awaiting of future beatitude greatly aid the virtue of fortitude, so that it may be able to bear all evils, according to that saying of blessed Gregory2: «The hope of reward lessens the force of the lash».

Scholion

I. The response to this and the following question is not set forth as controverted. Worthy of note is the second ground (here in the body and in Fundamentum 5), taken from the side of the subject according to the higher face of the soul, which is also set down in the Breviloquium p. V, c. 4. — By what ground someone can in some measure hope in a man is taught in I Sent., d. 1, dub. 9, and IV Sent., d. 5, dub. 1, and S. Thomas agrees, S. II-II, q. 17, a. 4. — Arguments 1 and 2 to the contrary are solved in the same way by S. Thomas (S. I-II, q. 64, a. 4, and II-II, q. 17, a. 5, ad 1), namely that hope does not have the infinite and the extreme from the side of its principal and proper object, but only per accidens from the side of the mode by which the act comes about, or as S. Bonaventure says, on account of the defect of some condition, namely from the side of the one hoping. Scotus says the same in other words (here, the single question, n. 24).

On this question: S. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; S. II-II, q. 17, a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2, little-question 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.

II. For solving the following question the same principles serve which were applied concerning unformed faith above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1–4. — On the solution to objection 1, cf. below, a. 2, q. 2.

On this (fourth) question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III, q. 65, m. 1, 2. — S. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 4, little-question 2, and it is touched on in S. at the cited place, a. 5, ad 1, 2, 3. — D. Albert, here a. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here the single question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 13. (1 Cor. 13, 13.) — Hoc footer p. 560 n. 9.
    Verse 13. (1 Cor. 13:13.) — This is p. 560, footer n. 9.
  2. Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1, praecipue ad 3. Ibid. ad 4. videsis de maiori arg. seq. — (P. 560, n. 10.)
    Cf. below, d. 33, q. 1, especially ad 3. There, ad 4, see on the major of the following argument. — (P. 560, n. 10.)
  3. Vers. 19. (Hebr. 6, 19.) — (P. 561, n. 1.)
    Verse 19. (Hebr. 6:19.) — (P. 561, n. 1.)
  4. Secundum Aristot. Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 7. — Paulo superius pro utpote per caritatem, quod habent codd. A K, in aliis ut per caritatem. Paulo inferius pro erigitur Vat. erigit. — (P. 561, n. 2.)
    According to Aristotle. Cf. above, p. 470, note 7. — A little above, for utpote per caritatem ("namely through charity"), which codd. A K have, others read ut per caritatem. A little below, for erigitur ("is raised up") the Vatican edition reads erigit. — (P. 561, n. 2.)
  5. Principia huius arg. vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. n. 1. q. 1, et II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. — (P. 561, n. 3.)
    For the principles of this argument see I Sent., d. 3, p. II, n. 1, q. 1, and II Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 3. — (P. 561, n. 3.)
  6. Cfr. supra pag. 217, nota 2, et tom. II. pag. 671, nota 9. — Minor insinuatur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Paulo inferius ante nimis amare edd. cum nonnullis codd. omittunt etiam. — (P. 561, n. 4.)
    Cf. above, p. 217, note 2, and tom. II, p. 671, note 9. — The minor is intimated here in the Master's text, c. 1. — A little below, before nimis amare ("to love too much"), the editions, with some codices, omit etiam. — (P. 561, n. 4.)
  7. Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq. — Mox pro media cod. V medium. — (P. 561, n. 5.)
    See Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6 ff. — Soon, for media cod. V reads medium. — (P. 561, n. 5.)
  8. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 118. serm. 15. n. 2: Sed aeternorum est spes ista praemiorum; est et alia spes, quae in humilitate tribulationis plurimum consolatur, quae Sanctis data est in verbo Dei adiutorium gratiae pollicentis, ne quisque deficiat etc. Bernard., Serm. 45. de Diversis (alias I. ex Parvis), n. 5: Est igitur fides alia praeceptorum, alia signorum, alia promissorum, id est, qua credimus in Deum, qua credimus Deum, qua credimus Deo... Similiter quoque spes triplex est et procedit de praedicta triplici fide. Nam de fide praeceptorum oritur spes veniae, de fide signorum spes gratiae, de fide promissorum spes gloriae. Caritas itidem ternario numero colligitur de corde puro et de conscientia bona et fide non ficta (1 Tim. 1, 5). Puritatem debemus proximo, conscientiam nobis, fidem Deo. — Pro multipliciter edd. cum pluribus codd. multiplex. — (P. 561, n. 6.)
    Augustine, Expositions on Ps. 118, serm. 15, n. 2: But this hope is of eternal rewards; there is also another hope, which in the lowliness of tribulation consoles greatly, which was given to the saints in the word of God as an aid of the grace that promises, lest anyone fail, etc. Bernard, Sermon 45 on Diverse Subjects (otherwise I from the Lesser), n. 5: There is therefore one faith of precepts, another of signs, another of promises, that is, by which we believe in God, by which we believe God to exist, by which we believe God... Likewise too hope is threefold and proceeds from the aforesaid threefold faith. For from the faith of precepts arises the hope of pardon, from the faith of signs the hope of grace, from the faith of promises the hope of glory. Charity likewise is gathered in a threefold number from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith (1 Tim. 1:5). Purity we owe to our neighbor, conscience to ourselves, faith to God. — For multipliciter the editions with several codices read multiplex. — (P. 561, n. 6.)
  9. Secundum Aristot. Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 8. in fine. — Duo sunt actus principales fortitudinis, scil. aggredi et sustinere. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 7: «Qui igitur ea quae oportet, et cuius causa oportet, et ut oportet, sustinet ac timet et simili etiam modo confidit, fortis est; quippe cum pro dignitate, et sicut ratio praescribit, fortis vir et patiatur et agat... confidere enim bene sperantis hominis est». Cicero, II. Rhetor. c. 54: Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio [aggredi] et laborum perpessio [sustinere]. Eius partes [integrales]: magnificentia, fidentia [haec duo respiciunt actum aggrediendi], patientia, perseverantia [pro actu sustinendi]... Patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa, rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna [qua notione significatur longanimitas, de quo vide S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 136. a. 5.] perpessio. — (P. 561, n. 7.) — Spectat ad Sed-contra arg. 4 et 5 ac ad Respondeo et ad-3, quibus communis est nota 9.
    According to Aristotle. Cf. above, p. 470, note 8, at the end. — There are two principal acts of fortitude, namely to attack and to endure. Aristotle, Ethics III, c. 7: «He therefore who endures and fears the things that one ought, and for the cause one ought, and as one ought, and likewise has confidence, is brave; since indeed according to worth, and as reason prescribes, the brave man both suffers and acts... for to be confident belongs to the man of good hope». Cicero, Rhetoric II, c. 54: Fortitude is the considered undertaking of dangers [to attack] and the bearing of labors [to endure]. Its parts [integral]: magnificence, confidence [these two regard the act of attacking], patience, perseverance [for the act of enduring]... Patience is, for the sake of honor or utility, the voluntary and lasting endurance of arduous and difficult things [by which notion is signified longanimity, on which see S. Thomas, S. II-II, q. 136, a. 5]. — (P. 561, n. 7.) — This note serves Sed contra args. 4 and 5 as well as the Respondeo and reply-3, which share marker 9.
  10. Rom. 12, 12: Spe gaudentes. Col. 1, 23: Si tamen permanetis in fide fundati et stabiles et immobiles a spe Evangelii etc. — (P. 561, n. 8.)
    Rom. 12:12: Rejoicing in hope. Col. 1:23: If indeed you continue in the faith, grounded and steadfast and immovable from the hope of the Gospel, etc. — (P. 561, n. 8.) Footnote markers continue with a new per-page sequence on p. 562 (Conclusio onward) and p. 563. The Latin and English bodies reuse `1`, `2` … for those pages; the entries below resolve them in page order.
  11. Vide IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 5. — Inferius pro debet reponi cod. V habet reponi. — (P. 562, n. 1.)
    See IV Sent., d. 49, p. I, q. 5. — Below, for debet reponi ("must be placed") cod. V reads habet reponi. — (P. 562, n. 1.)
  12. Cod. K quae reperitur, cod. V qui reperitur. — (P. 562, n. 2.)
    Cod. K reads quae reperitur, cod. V qui reperitur. — (P. 562, n. 2.)
  13. Vat. adiicit modo. — (P. 562, n. 3.)
    The Vatican edition adds modo. — (P. 562, n. 3.)
  14. Cfr. infra d. 27. a. 2. q. 5. in corp. — Paulo superius pro exigitur cod. A exegi, et dein cum cod. K procedit pro procedat. — (P. 562, n. 4.)
    Cf. below, d. 27, a. 2, q. 5, in the body. — A little above, for exigitur ("is required") cod. A reads exegi, and then with cod. K procedit for procedat. — (P. 562, n. 4.)
  15. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 7: Circa donationem acceptionemque pecuniarum mediocritas est liberalitas; excessus et defectus prodigalitas et illiberalitas seu avaritia, in quibus contrario modo excedunt et deficiunt homines. Prodigus enim in largiendo excedit, in accipiendo deficit; avarus contra excedit in accipiendo, in dando deficit. Cfr. ibid. IV. c. 1. seqq. — Pro de prodigalitate edd. de largitate. — (P. 562, n. 5.)
    Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 7: Concerning the giving and receiving of money, the mean is liberality; the excess and the defect are prodigality and illiberality or avarice, in which men exceed and fall short in a contrary manner. For the prodigal exceeds in giving, falls short in receiving; the avaricious on the contrary exceeds in receiving, falls short in giving. Cf. ibid. IV, c. 1 ff. — For de prodigalitate the editions read de largitate. — (P. 562, n. 5.)
  16. Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. in fine corp. — (P. 562, n. 6.)
    Cf. above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, at the end of the body. — (P. 562, n. 6.)
  17. Verbi gratia: immensa potentia, immensa clementia etc. — Paulo superius post vel species ipsius virtutis codd. A K minus bene addunt cardinalis. — (P. 562, n. 7.)
    For example: immense power, immense clemency, etc. — A little above, after vel species ipsius virtutis ("or species of the virtue itself") codd. A K less well add cardinalis. — (P. 562, n. 7.)
  18. Dist. 24. a. 1. q. 2. — De obedientia cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1. ad 1. et d. 37. per totam; de latria vide supra d. 9. a. 2. q. 3. — Mox pro obedientia ponitur cdd. obedientia potest, et aliquanto inferius pro concernit codd. H Z concernunt. Deinde circa finem solut. pro qui praecipuam movendi rationem edd. quae praecipuam modificandi rationem. — (P. 562, n. 8.)
    Dist. 24, a. 1, q. 2. — On obedience cf. below, d. 33, q. 1, ad 1, and d. 37 throughout; on latria see above, d. 9, a. 2, q. 3. — Soon, for obedientia ponitur the codices read obedientia potest, and somewhat below, for concernit codd. H Z read concernunt. Then near the end of the solution, for qui praecipuam movendi rationem the editions read quae praecipuam modificandi rationem. — (P. 562, n. 8.)
  19. Scil. ut obiectum materiale, non ut formale; nec ut dicit habitum, de quo cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — (P. 562, n. 9.)
    Namely as the material object, not as the formal; nor as it denotes the habit, on which cf. II Sent., d. 27, dub. 3. — (P. 562, n. 9.)
  20. Respicitur illud Marc. 12, 30: Et diliges Dominum Deum tuum... ex tota virtute tua. — (P. 562, n. 10.)
    Reference is to that of Mark 12:30: And thou shalt love the Lord thy God... with thy whole strength. — (P. 562, n. 10.) The body markers `1` and `2` on p. 563 (the conclusion of reply-5) resolve to the two p. 563 footers below.
  21. Hebr. 11, 33-34: per fidem vicerunt regna... fortes facti sunt in bello. — (P. 563, n. 1.)
    Hebr. 11:33–34: by faith they conquered kingdoms... were made strong in war. — (P. 563, n. 1.)
  22. Gregor., Homil. — «Spes praemii minuit vim flagelli». — (P. 563, n. 2.)
    Gregory, Homily — «The hope of reward lessens the force of the lash». — (P. 563, n. 2.)
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