Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 27, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus

p. 615

# Dubia circa litteram Magistri

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illa definitione, quam ponit Magister, qua dicit: Caritas est dilectio, qua diligitur Deus propter se, et proximus propter Deum; et quaeritur iuxta hoc, cum multae inveniantur definitiones de caritate — cum «unius rei unica sit definitio^p615-5» — quomodo ab invicem distinguantur. Praeter enim praedictam definitionem invenitur definiri ab Augustino in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae^p615-6 sic: «Caritas est animi rectissima affectio, coniungens nos cum Deo». — Item, Augustinus in Soliloquiis^p615-7: «Caritas est virtus, qua Deum videre eoque perfrui desideramus». — Item, in libro de Spiritu et anima^p615-8: «Caritas est vita copulans amantem cum amato». — Postremo, definitur ab Apostolo primae ad Timotheum primo^p615-9: Finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro, conscientia bona et fide non ficta.

Contra primam definitionem sic obiicitur: idem est dilectio et caritas: ergo cum Magister definit caritatem per dilectionem, definit idem per se ipsum^p615-10. — Item, amori naturali in statu innocentiae conveniebat ista definitio^p615-11: ergo non videtur esse convertibilis cum caritate.

Contra secundam definitionem obiicitur sic: affectio animi est ab ipsa anima; caritas autem non est ab ipsa anima, sed a Deo^p615-12: ergo male dicitur caritas affectio animi. — Item, haec definitio potest competere spei^p615-13: ergo non recte assignatur de caritate.

Contra tertiam obiicitur sic: quia visio respondet ipsi fidei, et frui commune est ad omnem virtutem^p615-14: ergo male definitur caritas per videre et frui. — Item, desiderium est rei absentis^p615-15 et quodam modo imperfectum: cum ergo caritas sit perfectissima, male definitur per actum desiderandi.

Contra quartam obiicitur sic: Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus^p615-16, definiens amorem generaliter, dicit, quod est «virtus unitiva»: ergo copulare amantem cum amato non est proprium caritatis, cum sit commune amori naturali et animali. — Item, vita est perfectio absoluta^p615-17, copulatio amantis cum amato est qualitas respectiva: ergo male dicitur caritas esse vita copulans.

p. 616

Contra ultimam obiicitur sic: caritas est radix virtutum et principium merendi et pondus, quo quis inclinatur et tendit ad finem^p616-1: ergo non videtur, quod caritas debeat dici finis.

Item, quaeritur de illis tribus membris, quae adduntur, pro quibus stant, et quomodo distinguuntur? — Item quaeritur, quare cordi attribuitur puritas et conscientiae bonitas et fidei stabilitas, cum puritas cordis sit ex fide, Actuum decimo quinto^p616-2: Fide purificans corda eorum? — Et quare fides ponitur ultima, cum ipsa sit prima?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod caritas secundum multiplicem sui comparationem habet multipliciter definiri. Habet enim caritas comparari ad obiectum; et sic assignatur definitio prima, posita a Magistro. — Potest iterum considerari per comparationem ad finem ultimum; et sic definitur ab Augustino in Soliloquiis. — Potest etiam comparari ad actum proprium, qui est unire^p616-3 et adhaerere; et sic definitur ab Augustino in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae et in libro de Spiritu et anima, per actum uniendi et copulandi amantem cum amato, videlicet affectum nostrum cum Deo. — Potest iterum comparari ad habitum sibi adiunctum, qui quodam modo est ipsius caritatis principium; et sic definitur ab Apostolo, cum dicitur: Caritas est finis praecepti etc. Et hoc patet ex ipsius notificationis explanatione. Nam caritas comparata ad habitus aliarum virtutum theologicarum, quia unit eas fini, principatum tenet inter eas, et ideo movet et informat et terminat sive consummat^p616-4; et propterea dicitur esse finis praecepti; et quia finis est aliarum, actus aliarum disponunt ad actum caritatis, et ipsa caritas immediate elicit. Et ideo tres ponuntur ibi conditiones, et per primam, qua dicitur esse caritas de corde puro, tangitur conditio ipsius caritatis, cuius est depurare affectum cordis ab omni terrenitate. Per secundam, scilicet de conscientia bona, tangitur conditio spei^p616-5; per tertiam conditio fidei; et secundum hoc ordinantur, secundum quod principalius ad actum caritatis disponunt. Et sic patet distinctio et intellectus praepositarum definitionum.

Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur contra definitionem Magistri, quod idem est dilectio et caritas; dicendum, quod etsi sint idem re, tamen aliqua differentia rationis est; dilectio enim in plus est quam caritas. Unde consuevit assignari differentia, quod amor est naturae, dilectio est voluntatis deliberativae, et caritas gratiae. — Alia etiam est differentia, quia caritas nominat habitum, sed dilectio nominat actum; et ita definitur caritas per dilectionem, tanquam minus commune per magis commune, et habitus per suum actum^p616-6.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illa notificatio convenit dilectioni in statu innocentiae; dicendum, quod differentia est in modo diligendi Deum propter se, secundum quod dicitur de dilectione naturali et ipsa caritate, sicut in secundo libro^p616-7 ostensum fuit. Et ideo ex hoc non ostenditur illa ratio non esse bene assignata.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de notificatione Augustini de Moribus Ecclesiae, quod caritas est animi affectio; dicendum, quod ibi est praedicatio materialis^p616-8; ideo in ratione illa est sophisma secundum accidens. — Ad hoc vero quod subiungit, quod illa notificatio convenit spei; dicendum, quod spei, proprie loquendo, non convenit unire, sed magis erigere; fidei enim est dirigere, et spei est erigere, et caritatis adhaerere^p616-9.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de definitione Augustini de Soliloquiis, quod caritas non debet definiri per videre et frui; dicendum, quod sicut fides cognoscit sibi et aliis virtutibus, sic caritas desiderat sibi et aliis. Et quoniam perfectio mercedis consistit in visione et fruitione Dei; hinc est, quod caritas definitur per desiderium utriusque, non quia videre sit eius proprium, sed quia desiderium habendi Deum est proprium caritatis^p616-10.

p. 617

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod desiderium est rei absentis et imperfectus motus; dicendum, quod definitur ibi caritas viae, quae habet secum annexam imperfectionem. — Posset etiam nihilominus dici, quod desiderium, prout excludit fastidium, non solummodo est rei absentis, immo est praesentis^p617-1; et hoc modo large accipitur in proposito.

Ad illud quod obiicitur contra definitionem Augustini de Spiritu et anima, quod caritas est vita copulans; dicendum, quod etsi copulare conveniat omni amori quodam modo, tamen hoc totum, quod est vita copulans, est proprium ipsius caritatis; quia nullus est amor, qui animam proprie habeat vivificare, nisi amor gratuitus, qui copulat cum Deo ipsam animam vivificante^p617-2.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non possunt illa duo simul stare, vita et copula; dicendum, quod quamvis vita, prout est actus primus, sit perfectio absoluta, tamen, prout est actus secundus, habet respectum ad obiectum extra, sicut patet: quia secundum Philosophum^p617-3 alimento uti et intelligere sunt differentiae ipsius quod est vivere; et caritas est vita, secundum quod vita dicitur actus secundus, ut in praecedentibus^p617-4 fuit ostensum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de notificatione Apostoli, quod non debet dici finis, cum sit principium; dicendum, quod cum nihil prohibeat, tres causas coincidere in unum^p617-5, sicut patet in Deo respectu creaturae; nullum est inconveniens, caritatem simul esse radicem, formam et finem, secundum comparationem triplicis causae, cum nos perfecte faciat Deo conformes, secundum quod superius^p617-6 habitum est.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de sufficientia et numero et ordine et appropriatione illarum conditionum, quae superadduntur; satis patet responsio ex explanatione ipsius definitionis, et ex his quae in secundo libro determinata sunt, distinctione trigesima octava^p617-7, quae non oportet ad praesens repetere. Et ideo de illa notificatione Apostoli et de aliis sufficiat ad praesens tantum dixisse.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Pro quo etiam duo sunt mandata. Videtur enim, quod unum solum debeat esse mandatum, quia unius operis secundum unam rationem unum debet esse mandatum; sed una est ratio diligendi in Deo et in proximo^p617-8: ergo unum debet esse mandatum in utroque. — Item, si mandata numerantur secundum numerum diligibilium, cum quatuor sint diligenda ex caritate^p617-9, quatuor deberent esse mandata. — Item, qui diligit proximum Legem implevit, sicut dicitur ad Romanos decimo tertio^p617-10; et ibidem dicitur, quod omne aliud mandatum in illo verbo instauratur: ergo videtur, quod unum solum debeat esse mandatum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum mandata diversificari habeant secundum ordinem ad Deum et proximum, sicut patet per distinctionem primae tabulae a secunda^p617-11; ideo, cum caritas habeat ordinare respectu utriusque, oportuit praecepta distingui; verumtamen, quia una est ratio diligendi, unum potuit in altero implicari.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod mandata distinguuntur penes rationem ipsius habitus; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo penes modum ordinandi ad alterum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quatuor debent esse mandata; dicendum, quod in mandato proximi satis includitur dilectio sui; et quia ad hoc est homo ordinatus per naturam, non oportuit ad hoc induci per praeceptionem divinam^p617-12.

Ad illud quod obiicitur: qui diligit proximum Legem implevit; patet responsio: quia Apostolus loquitur ibi de impletione secundae tabulae. Praeterea, in mandato de dilectione proximi includitur mandatum de dilectione Dei. Quamvis enim unum in altero includatur, non tamen potest inferri, quod unum ab altero non distinguatur; hoc enim est propter connexionem et ordinem, quae non excludit distinctionem.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sic condita est mens humana, ut nunquam sui non meminerit etc. Contra primum obiicitur sic: memoria est rei absentis et praeteritae^p618-1; anima nunquam est sibi absens et praeterita: ergo nunquam meminit sui. — Item, contra illud quod sequitur, quod nunquam se non intelligit; obiicitur, quod anima intelligit alia a se; et impossibile est, quod simul plura intelligat^p618-2: ergo tunc non intelligit se. Praeterea, multi credunt, se non habere animam, quae sit substantia spiritualis: ergo videtur, quod in talibus anima non intelligat se ipsam. — Item, contra tertium quod dicit: Ut nunquam se non diligat; obiicitur sic, quod multi se ipsos interficiunt et vitam suam odiunt: ergo videtur, totum illud esse falsum. Praeterea, in auctoritate sequenti^p618-3 statim subditur contrarium: Qui diligit iniquitatem odit animam suam.

p. 618

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illa tria, quae tanguntur in littera, dupliciter possunt attribui animae, videlicet actu vel habitu. Si habitu, sic vere et semper attribuuntur ei, quoniam anima per se ipsam nata est sui meminisse, se intelligere et se diligere. Si autem intelligatur in actu; sic non semper sibi attribuuntur, quia non semper se cogitat nec semper super se convertitur. Augustinus^p618-4 ergo loquitur quantum ad habitum, non quantum ad actum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod memoria est respectu praeteritorum; dicendum, quod Augustinus largius accipit memoriam quam Philosophus, sicut in primo libro^p618-5 fuit ostensum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non semper se cogitat, immo de aliis; iam patet responsio: quia non loquitur de intelligere, secundum quod dicit actualem cognitionem et conversionem super se.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de dilectione; dicendum, quod diligere est dupliciter, affectu scilicet et effectu. Affectu nullus est qui se ipsum odiat, immo si se ipsum interimit, hoc est, ut quietem maiorem inveniat; si peccat, hoc est, quia appetit delectationem suam^p618-6. Si autem loquamur de dilectione quantum ad effectum, sic multi se ipsos odiunt, quia inordinate se diligendo faciunt sibi ipsis malum et inimicantur, sicut multi, qui volentes fugere confusionem vel tribulationem, se ipsos interficiunt corporaliter; et qui volunt satisfacere desideriis carnis interficiunt se ipsos spiritualiter et inimicantur sibi valde crudeliter^p618-7.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Dilectionis modus insinuatur, cum dicitur: ex toto corde, id est ex toto intellectu; ex tota anima, id est ex tota voluntate; ex tota mente, id est ex tota memoria. Diligere enim pertinet ad affectum, non ad intellectum: ergo male dicitur diligere ex intellectu et memoria. — Item, Bernardus de Amore Dei^p618-8: «Quid est amor nisi vehemens et bene ordinata voluntas»: ergo videtur, quod ex quo dixit: ex tota anima, superfluat addere alias conditiones. — Item, beatus Ioannes non ponit nisi duas conditiones, primae Ioannis tertio^p618-9: Diligamus opere et veritate: ergo videtur, quod in istis tribus conditionibus sit superfluitas. — Item, videtur, quod sit diminutio, quia Deuteronomii sexto^p618-10 ponitur ista conditio: Et ex tota fortitudine, quae non ponitur hic. — Item, Marci duodecimo^p618-11 additur ista conditio praeter conditiones praedictas: Ex tota virtute tua: ergo videtur, quod ibi sit diminutio, vel hic superfluitas. Similiter Lucae decimo^p618-12 additur ista conditio: Ex omnibus viribus tuis. — Quaeritur ergo de illorum trium distinctione et ordine, numero et sufficientia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis caritas immediate respiciat actum concupiscibilis, circa quem primo consistit, nihilominus tamen actus aliarum virium respicit ut disponentes. Unde omnes vires animae quodam modo ordinantur ad ipsam dilectionem, sicut ad illud quod habet rationem completionis respectu omnium virtutum^p618-13. Et quoniam superiores vires animae tres sunt, ideo tres apponuntur conditiones. — Et rursus, quia ternarius virium animae dupliciter habet distingui, ita quod unus illorum modorum non discordat ab alio; ideo conditiones circa actum diligendi, respicientes vires animae, duplici modo apponi et distingui habent. Uno enim modo distinguuntur vires animae, secundum quod in eis consistit imago, et dicuntur in mente esse tres potentiae, videlicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntas; et sic secundum istas tres vires apponuntur tres conditiones, quarum una respicit intelligentiam, scilicet ex toto corde; altera voluntatem, scilicet ex tota anima; tertia memoriam, videlicet ex tota mente.

p. 619

— Et sic assignantur istae tres conditiones in Matthaei vigesimo secundo^p619-1 et exponuntur ab Augustino sic: ex toto corde, id est ex toto intellectu sine errore; ex tota anima, id est ex tota voluntate sine contradictione; ex tota mente, id est ex tota memoria sine oblivione.

Alio modo distinguuntur vires animae sic: in rationalem, irascibilem et concupiscibilem; et secundum has tres apponuntur conditiones, quarum una respicit rationalem, videlicet ex toto corde, et alia concupiscibilem, videlicet ex tota anima, et tertia irascibilem, videlicet ex tota fortitudine. — Et sic assignantur in Deuteronomii sexto^p619-2 et exponuntur a Bernardo sic: ex toto corde, id est sapienter; ex tota anima, id est dulciter; ex tota fortitudine, id est fortiter; ut non seducamur fallaciis, non abducamur blanditiis, non frangamur iniuriis. Et ad haec tria reduci possunt illa tria, quae tanguntur primae ad Timotheum primo^p619-3: Ex corde puro, conscientia bona et fide non ficta. — Nec est in istis aliqua repugnantia, pro eo quod potentia irascibilis et ipsa memoria conformantur in actu; et ideo una virtus est utriusque reformativa, et una dos utriusque perfectiva, et unam respicit principaliter et aliam ex consequenti^p619-4. Et ideo, ubi in Deuteronomio dicitur ex tota fortitudine, in Matthaeo dicitur ex tota mente. Et haec est ratio, quare haec conditio ex tota mente ultimo loco ponitur. — Et sic patet sufficientia, numerus et distinctio illorum quae assignantur circa modum dilectionis, et quod nihil est superfluum et nihil diminutum; patet etiam solutio obiectorum^p619-5.

English Translation

p. 615

# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that definition which the Master sets down, by which he says: Charity is love by which God is loved for his own sake, and one's neighbor for God's sake; and in connection with this it is asked, since many definitions of charity are found — since «of one thing there is a single definition^p615-5» — how they are distinguished from one another. For besides the aforesaid definition it is found to be defined by Augustine in the book On the Morals of the Church^p615-6 thus: «Charity is the most upright affection of the soul, joining us with God». — Likewise, Augustine in the Soliloquies^p615-7: «Charity is the virtue by which we desire to see God and to enjoy him fully». — Likewise, in the book On the Spirit and the Soul^p615-8: «Charity is the life joining the lover with the beloved». — Lastly, it is defined by the Apostle in the first chapter of the first letter to Timothy^p615-9: The end of the precept is charity from a pure heart, a good conscience, and unfeigned faith.

Against the first definition it is objected thus: love and charity are the same: therefore since the Master defines charity through love, he defines the same through itself^p615-10. — Likewise, that definition befitted natural love in the state of innocence^p615-11: therefore it does not seem to be convertible with charity.

Against the second definition it is objected thus: the affection of the soul is from the soul itself; but charity is not from the soul itself, but from God^p615-12: therefore charity is badly called the affection of the soul. — Likewise, this definition can fit hope^p615-13: therefore it is not rightly assigned of charity.

Against the third it is objected thus: because vision corresponds to faith, and to enjoy is common to every virtue^p615-14: therefore charity is badly defined through to see and to enjoy. — Likewise, desire is of an absent thing^p615-15 and in some way imperfect: since therefore charity is most perfect, it is badly defined through the act of desiring.

Against the fourth it is objected thus: Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names^p615-16, defining love generally, says that it is a «unitive power»: therefore to join the lover with the beloved is not proper to charity, since it is common to natural and animal love. — Likewise, life is an absolute perfection^p615-17, the joining of lover with beloved is a relative quality: therefore charity is badly said to be a joining life.

p. 616

Against the last it is objected thus: charity is the root of the virtues and the principle of meriting and the weight by which one is inclined and tends toward the end^p616-1: therefore it does not seem that charity ought to be called the end.

Likewise, it is asked about those three members which are added, for what they stand, and how they are distinguished? — Likewise it is asked, why to the heart is attributed purity, and to the conscience goodness, and to faith stability, since purity of heart is from faith, in the fifteenth chapter of Acts^p616-2: Purifying their hearts by faith? — And why is faith placed last, since it is itself first?

I respond: It must be said that charity, according to its manifold comparison, can be defined in manifold ways. For charity can be compared to the object; and thus the first definition is assigned, set down by the Master. — Again it can be considered through comparison to the ultimate end; and thus it is defined by Augustine in the Soliloquies. — It can also be compared to its proper act, which is to unite^p616-3 and to adhere; and thus it is defined by Augustine in the book On the Morals of the Church and in the book On the Spirit and the Soul, through the act of uniting and joining the lover with the beloved, namely our affection with God. — Again it can be compared to the habit joined to it, which in some way is the principle of charity itself; and thus it is defined by the Apostle, when it is said: Charity is the end of the precept etc. And this is clear from the explanation of the notification itself. For charity, compared to the habits of the other theological virtues, because it unites them to the end, holds the primacy among them, and therefore moves and informs and terminates or consummates^p616-4; and on that account it is said to be the end of the precept; and because it is the end of the others, the acts of the others dispose toward the act of charity, and charity itself immediately elicits [it]. And therefore three conditions are set down there, and by the first, by which it is said to be charity from a pure heart, the condition of charity itself is touched on, whose [office] is to purify the affection of the heart from all earthliness. By the second, namely from a good conscience, the condition of hope is touched on^p616-5; by the third the condition of faith; and according to this they are ordered, according as they more principally dispose toward the act of charity. And thus the distinction and understanding of the foregoing definitions is clear.

To that, therefore, which is first objected against the definition of the Master, that love and charity are the same; it must be said that although they are the same in reality, yet there is some difference of account; for love extends to more than charity. Whence a difference is wont to be assigned, that love belongs to nature, love [as choice] to the deliberative will, and charity to grace. — There is also another difference, because charity names a habit, but love names an act; and so charity is defined through love, as the less common through the more common, and the habit through its act^p616-6.

To that which is objected, that that notification fits love in the state of innocence; it must be said that the difference is in the mode of loving God for his own sake, according as it is said of natural love and of charity itself, as was shown in the second book^p616-7. And therefore from this that account is not shown not to be well assigned.

To that which is objected concerning the notification of Augustine On the Morals of the Church, that charity is the affection of the soul; it must be said that there the predication is material^p616-8; therefore in that reasoning there is a sophism according to accident. — But to that which he adds, that this notification fits hope; it must be said that to hope, properly speaking, it does not belong to unite, but rather to raise up; for it belongs to faith to direct, and to hope to raise up, and to charity to adhere^p616-9.

To that which is objected concerning the definition of Augustine of the Soliloquies, that charity ought not to be defined through to see and to enjoy; it must be said that just as faith knows for itself and for the other virtues, so charity desires for itself and for the others. And since the perfection of the reward consists in the vision and fruition of God; hence it is that charity is defined through the desire of both, not because to see is proper to it, but because the desire of having God is proper to charity^p616-10.

p. 617

To that which is objected, that desire is of an absent thing and an imperfect motion; it must be said that there charity of the way is defined, which has imperfection annexed to it. — It could nonetheless also be said that desire, inasmuch as it excludes weariness, is not only of an absent thing, but also of a present one^p617-1; and in this way it is taken broadly in the matter proposed.

To that which is objected against the definition of Augustine On the Spirit and the Soul, that charity is a joining life; it must be said that although to join befits every love in some way, yet this whole, which is joining life, is proper to charity itself; because there is no love which properly has [the power] to vivify the soul, except gratuitous love, which joins with God who vivifies the soul itself^p617-2.

To that which is objected, that those two cannot stand together, life and joining; it must be said that although life, inasmuch as it is first act, is an absolute perfection, yet, inasmuch as it is second act, it has a respect to an object outside, as is clear: because according to the Philosopher^p617-3 to use food and to understand are differences of that which is to live; and charity is life, according as life is called second act, as in the preceding [discussions]^p617-4 was shown.

To that which is objected concerning the notification of the Apostle, that it ought not to be called end, since it is principle; it must be said that since nothing prevents three causes from coinciding in one^p617-5, as is clear in God with respect to the creature; there is no unfittingness in charity being at once root, form and end, according to the comparison of the threefold cause, since it makes us perfectly conformed to God, according as above^p617-6 was had.

To that which is asked concerning the sufficiency and number and order and appropriation of those conditions which are superadded; the response is clear enough from the explanation of the definition itself, and from those things which in the second book were determined, in the thirty-eighth distinction^p617-7, which need not be repeated for the present. And therefore concerning that notification of the Apostle and the others let it suffice for the present to have said only this much.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: For which also there are two commandments. For it seems that there ought to be one commandment only, because of one work according to one account there ought to be one commandment; but there is one account of loving in God and in one's neighbor^p617-8: therefore there ought to be one commandment in both. — Likewise, if commandments are numbered according to the number of things lovable, since there are four things to be loved out of charity^p617-9, there ought to be four commandments. — Likewise, he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law, as is said in the thirteenth chapter to the Romans^p617-10; and in the same place it is said that every other commandment is restored in that word: therefore it seems that there ought to be one commandment only.

I respond: It must be said that since commandments must be diversified according to the order toward God and one's neighbor, as is clear by the distinction of the first tablet from the second^p617-11; therefore, since charity has to order with respect to both, it was necessary that the precepts be distinguished; nevertheless, because there is one account of loving, one could be implied in the other.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that commandments are distinguished by the account of the habit itself; it must be said that this is false, but rather by the mode of ordering toward another.

To that which is objected, that there ought to be four commandments; it must be said that in the commandment concerning one's neighbor love of oneself is sufficiently included; and because man is ordered to this by nature, it was not necessary to be led to this by a divine precept^p617-12.

To that which is objected: he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law; the response is clear: because the Apostle there speaks of the fulfillment of the second tablet. Furthermore, in the commandment concerning the love of neighbor is included the commandment concerning the love of God. For although one is included in the other, yet it cannot be inferred that one is not distinguished from the other; for this is on account of the connection and order, which does not exclude the distinction.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: The human mind is so constituted that it never fails to remember itself etc. Against the first it is objected thus: memory is of an absent and past thing^p618-1; the soul is never absent and past to itself: therefore it never remembers itself. — Likewise, against that which follows, that it never fails to understand itself; it is objected that the soul understands things other than itself; and it is impossible that it understand many things at once^p618-2: therefore then it does not understand itself. Furthermore, many believe that they do not have a soul which is a spiritual substance: therefore it seems that in such people the soul does not understand itself. — Likewise, against the third which says: That it never fails to love itself; it is objected thus, that many kill themselves and hate their own life: therefore it seems that all that is false. Furthermore, in the following authority^p618-3 the contrary is at once subjoined: He who loves iniquity hates his own soul.

p. 618

I respond: It must be said that those three things which are touched on in the text can be attributed to the soul in two ways, namely in act or in habit. If in habit, thus they are truly and always attributed to it, since the soul by its very self is born to remember itself, to understand itself, and to love itself. But if it is understood in act; thus they are not always attributed to it, because it does not always think of itself nor always turn upon itself. Augustine^p618-4 therefore speaks as to habit, not as to act.

To that which is objected, that memory is with respect to past things; it must be said that Augustine takes memory more broadly than the Philosopher, as in the first book^p618-5 was shown.

To that which is objected, that it does not always think of itself, but rather of other things; the response is already clear: because he does not speak of to understand, according as it signifies actual cognition and the turning upon oneself.

To that which is objected concerning love; it must be said that to love is in two ways, namely by affect and by effect. By affect there is no one who hates himself, but rather if he kills himself, this is that he may find greater rest; if he sins, this is because he seeks his own delight^p618-6. But if we speak of love as to effect, thus many hate themselves, because by loving themselves inordinately they do evil to themselves and are hostile [to themselves], like many who, wishing to flee confusion or tribulation, kill themselves bodily; and those who wish to satisfy the desires of the flesh kill themselves spiritually and are hostile to themselves very cruelly^p618-7.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: The mode of love is intimated, when it is said: from the whole heart, that is, from the whole intellect; from the whole soul, that is, from the whole will; from the whole mind, that is, from the whole memory. For to love pertains to the affect, not to the intellect: therefore it is badly said to love from the intellect and memory. — Likewise, Bernard On the Love of God^p618-8: «What is love but a vehement and well-ordered will»: therefore it seems that, from the fact that he said from the whole soul, it is superfluous to add the other conditions. — Likewise, blessed John sets down only two conditions, in the third chapter of the first letter of John^p618-9: Let us love in deed and in truth: therefore it seems that in those three conditions there is superfluity. — Likewise, it seems that there is diminution, because in the sixth chapter of Deuteronomy^p618-10 this condition is set down: And from the whole strength, which is not set down here. — Likewise, in the twelfth chapter of Mark^p618-11 this condition is added besides the aforesaid conditions: From thy whole power: therefore it seems that there is diminution there, or superfluity here. Likewise in the tenth chapter of Luke^p618-12 this condition is added: From all thy powers. — It is asked therefore concerning the distinction and order, number and sufficiency of those three.

I respond: It must be said that although charity immediately regards the act of the concupiscible [power], about which it first consists, nevertheless it regards the acts of the other powers as disposing. Whence all the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to love itself, as to that which has the character of completion with respect to all the virtues^p618-13. And since the higher powers of the soul are three, therefore three conditions are set down. — And again, because the threefold set of the soul's powers can be distinguished in two ways, such that one of those modes does not disagree with the other; therefore the conditions concerning the act of loving, regarding the powers of the soul, must be set down and distinguished in a twofold mode. For in one mode the powers of the soul are distinguished, according as in them the image consists, and they are said to be three potencies in the mind, namely memory, intelligence and will; and thus according to those three powers three conditions are set down, of which one regards intelligence, namely from the whole heart; another the will, namely from the whole soul; the third memory, namely from the whole mind.

p. 619

— And thus these three conditions are assigned in the twenty-second chapter of Matthew^p619-1 and are expounded by Augustine thus: from the whole heart, that is, from the whole intellect without error; from the whole soul, that is, from the whole will without contradiction; from the whole mind, that is, from the whole memory without forgetfulness.

In another mode the powers of the soul are distinguished thus: into rational, irascible and concupiscible; and according to these three the conditions are set down, of which one regards the rational, namely from the whole heart, and another the concupiscible, namely from the whole soul, and the third the irascible, namely from the whole strength. — And thus they are assigned in the sixth chapter of Deuteronomy^p619-2 and are expounded by Bernard thus: from the whole heart, that is, wisely; from the whole soul, that is, sweetly; from the whole strength, that is, bravely; that we be not seduced by deceits, not led away by flatteries, not broken by injuries. And to these three can be reduced those three which are touched on in the first chapter of the first letter to Timothy^p619-3: From a pure heart, a good conscience, and unfeigned faith. — Nor is there in these any repugnance, for the reason that the irascible power and memory itself are conformed in act; and therefore one virtue is reformative of both, and one endowment perfective of both, and it regards one principally and the other as a consequence^p619-4. And therefore, where in Deuteronomy it is said from the whole strength, in Matthew it is said from the whole mind. And this is the reason why this condition from the whole mind is placed last. — And thus the sufficiency, number and distinction of those things which are assigned concerning the mode of love is clear, and that nothing is superfluous and nothing diminished; the solution of the objections is also clear^p619-5.

Apparatus Criticus

Secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.). Vide supra pag. 504, nota 2.
According to Aristotle, VI Topics c. 3 (c. 4). See above p. 504, note 2.
Libr. I. c. 11. n. 19. Cfr. supra pag. 397, nota 9. Pro affectio rectissima edd. affectio iustissima.
Book I, c. 11, n. 19. Cf. above p. 397, note 9. In place of affectio rectissima the editions read affectio iustissima [most just affection].
Libr. I. c. 6. n. 13. Vide supra pag. 583, nota 4.
Book I, c. 6, n. 13. See above p. 583, note 4.
Cap. 16: «Manete, inquit, in dilectione mea (Ioan. 15, 9.). Per dilectionem namque sibi rationalem creaturam copulavit, ut eum semper haberet et in ipso maneret, de eo et in eo delectans, gaudens et exsultans. Per dilectionem Creatori suo et sibi invicem rationalis creatura copulata est» etc. Ibid. c. 38: «Caritas est concordia mentium et societas electorum, vita beatarum animarum et Angelorum, quia nec animae nec Angeli nisi per caritatem vivunt». — In Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 58. a. 1. pro hac definitione allegatur August., VIII. de Trin. c. 7. (c. 10. n. 14.), ubi legitur: Quid est ergo amor, nisi quaedam vita duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur? Cfr. Hugo a S. Vict., de Arrha animae.
Chapter 16: «Abide, he says, in my love (John 15:9). For through love he joined the rational creature to himself, that it might always have him and abide in him, delighting in him and concerning him, rejoicing and exulting. Through love the rational creature was joined to its Creator and to itself in turn» etc. Ibid. c. 38: «Charity is the concord of minds and the society of the elect, the life of the blessed souls and of the Angels, because neither souls nor Angels live except through charity». — In the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 58, a. 1, for this definition Augustine is adduced, VIII On the Trinity c. 7 (c. 10, n. 14), where it is read: What then is love, but a certain life joining two things together, or seeking to join them, namely the lover and that which is loved? Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, On the Pledge of the Soul.
Vers. 5.
Verse 5.
Definire idem per se ipsum vitium est, quod Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.) reprehendit his verbis: Si eodem usus est ei quod definitur. Latet autem, cum non eodem definire nomine utitur, ut si solem stellam in die apparentem definivit; nam qui die utitur sole utitur etc.
To define the same through itself is a fault, which Aristotle, VI Topics c. 3 (c. 4), censures in these words: [it is a fault] if one uses the same [term] as the thing defined. But it is concealed, when one uses to define a non-identical name, as if he defined the sun as the star appearing in the day; for he who uses the day uses the sun, etc.
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1, ubi ostenditur, quod a tempore naturae institutae tam homo quam Angelus habilis erat ad diligendum Deum propter se et super omnia. — Post Item cod. K interserit cum.
Cf. II Sentences, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, where it is shown that from the time of nature's institution both man and the Angel was fit for loving God for his own sake and above all things. — After Item codex K inserts cum.
Rom. 5, 5: Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum etc.
Romans 5:5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit etc.
Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. et dub. 2.
Cf. above, d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, and doubt 2.
Omnis enim virtus delectatur et quietatur, cum unitur suo obiecto, de quo Aristot., X. Ethic. c. 4. — Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. — Pro frui commune est edd. fruitio est.
For every virtue is delighted and brought to rest when it is united to its object, on which see Aristotle, X Ethics c. 4. — Cf. above, d. 26, a. 1, q. 2, to 4. — In place of frui commune est the editions read fruitio est.
Cfr. supra pag. 877, nota 2. — Edd. desiderium est in absens.
Cf. above p. 877, note 2. — The editions read desiderium est in absens.
Cap. 4. § 15.
Chapter 4, § 15.
Cfr. tom. I. pag. 164, nota 6. et pag. 624, nota 7.
Cf. vol. I, p. 164, note 6, and p. 624, note 7.
Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro membris, quae edd. modis, qui. Post pauca pro stant Vat. stent, et pro distinguuntur multi codd. et edd. distinguantur.
Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1. — A little below, in place of membris, quae the editions read modis, qui. After a little, in place of stant the Vatican edition reads stent, and in place of distinguuntur many codices and the editions read distinguantur.
Vers. 9.
Verse 9.
Cod. Z vivere pro unire itemque mox vivendi pro uniendi, quo loco in cod. X sic scriptum est: per actum copulandi uniendo amantem etc.
Codex Z reads vivere [to live] for unire [to unite], and likewise soon vivendi for uniendi; in which place in codex X it is so written: through the act of joining by uniting the lover etc.
Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 3, q. 3. ad 1. et infra d. 36. q. 6.
See above, a. 1, q. 1, to 3; q. 3, to 1; and below, d. 36, q. 6.
Cfr. supra pag. 371, nota 5. et pag. 578, nota 2. — Caritatis definitio, quae hic quarto loco respicitur, explanata fuit II. Sent. d. 38. dub. 2. — Paulo inferius pro distinctio edd. cum nonnullis codd. definitio.
Cf. above p. 371, note 5, and p. 578, note 2. — The definition of charity which is regarded here in the fourth place was explained in II Sentences, d. 38, doubt 2. — A little below, in place of distinctio the editions with some codices read definitio.
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 10. dub. 1, ubi etiam alia differentia affertur. Isidor., II. Differentiar. (alias de Differentiis spiritual.) c. 37. n. 142. (alias c. 32.) ait: Inter amorem et dilectionem sive caritatem hoc differt, quod amor et dilectio media [i. e. communia] sunt et ad utrumque parata, modo in bonum, modo in malum vertuntur. Caritas autem non nisi in bonum; cuius etiam nomen eo usque extollitur, ut ipse Deus caritas appelletur.
Cf. I Sentences, d. 10, doubt 1, where also another difference is brought forward. Isidore, II Differences (alias On the Differences of Spiritual Things) c. 37, n. 142 (alias c. 32) says: Between love and affection or charity this differs, that love and affection are intermediate [i.e. common] and ready for either, now turning to good, now to evil. But charity is only to good; whose name too is so far exalted that God himself is called charity.
Dist. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3, ubi triplex differentia assignatur.
D. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, to 3, where a threefold difference is assigned.
Id est: caritas invenitur in animo tanquam in subiecto, quod ab ipsa afficitur. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XVII. c. 6. — Pro materialis codd. C D G N W X et edd. 1, 2 naturalis, Vat. causalis. In Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 58. a. 4. ad eandem obiectionem respondetur sic: Respondeo dicendum, quod caritas est affectio, materialiter loquendo, ut dicunt quidam, vel effective, ut volunt alii; caritas enim efficit affectionem animi; et sive sic dicatur sive sic, primum argumentum non cogit, immo posset ibi assignari fallacia accidentis. (De fallacia accidentis supra pag. 179, nota 1 et de praedicatione causali pag. 528, n. 5.)
That is: charity is found in the soul as in a subject, which is affected by it. Cf. I Sentences, the text of the Master, d. XVII, c. 6. — In place of materialis codices C D G N W X and editions 1, 2 read naturalis, the Vatican edition causalis. In the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 58, a. 4, to the same objection it is answered thus: I respond, it must be said that charity is an affection, speaking materially, as some say, or effectively, as others hold; for charity effects the affection of the soul; and whether it is said in this way or that, the first argument does not compel, but rather the fallacy of accident could be assigned there. (On the fallacy of accident see above p. 179, note 1, and on causal predication p. 528, n. 5.)
Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1, d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 26. a. 2. q. 1.
Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1; d. 23, a. 1, q. 1; and d. 26, a. 2, q. 1.
De quo fusius disseritur I. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 1.
On which it is discussed more fully in I Sentences, d. 1, a. 2, q. 1.
Vide supra pag. 585, nota 13. — Paulo superius pro secum annexam codd. uz sibi annexam.
See above p. 585, note 13. — A little above, in place of secum annexam codices uz read sibi annexam.
Ex codd. M N O X bb supplevimus vivificante, pro quo codd. A K aa vivificantem, codd. H L vivificatam, alii codd. vivificare.
From codices M N O X bb we have supplied vivificante [vivifying], in place of which codices A K aa read vivificantem, codices H L vivificatam, other codices vivificare.
Libr. II. de Anima, text. 13. (c. 2.). Cfr. supra pag. 444, nota 7. Aristot., loc. cit. text. 2. seqq. (c. 1.), etiam insinuat duplicem acceptionem vitae, in actum scil. primum et secundum. — Paulo ante edd. omittunt extra.
Book II On the Soul, text 13 (c. 2). Cf. above p. 444, note 7. Aristotle, at the place cited, text 2 ff. (c. 1), also intimates a twofold sense of life, namely into first and second act. — A little before, the editions omit extra.
Art. 1. q. 2. ad 3. — Pro secundum quod vita edd. et secundum quod est vita.
Article 1, q. 2, to 3. — In place of secundum quod vita the editions also read secundum quod est vita.
Aristot., II. Physic. text. 70. (c. 7.): Veniunt autem tres [causae, scil. efficiens, finalis et formalis, quae est vel intrinseca, vel extrinseca sive exemplaris] in unam plerumque.
Aristotle, II Physics text 70 (c. 7): But three [causes — namely the efficient, the final, and the formal, which is either intrinsic, or extrinsic, i.e. exemplary —] for the most part come together into one.
Art. 2. q. 1. in corp. Cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. et 3.
Article 2, q. 1, in the body. Cf. also II Sentences, d. 38, a. 1, q. 2 and 3.
Dub. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 561, nota 6. — Pro Ad illud quod quaeritur edd. cum pluribus codd. Ad illud quod obiicitur. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 58. per totam; B. Albert., hic a. 4.
Doubt 2. Cf. above p. 561, note 6. — In place of Ad illud quod quaeritur the editions with several codices read Ad illud quod obiicitur. — Cf. on this doubt the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 58, throughout; Blessed Albert, here a. 4.
Vide supra a. 1. q. 5. — Edd. diligendi Deum et proximum. Superius cod. K omittit unam.
See above, a. 1, q. 5. — The editions read diligendi Deum et proximum [of loving God and neighbor]. Above, codex K omits unam.
De quibus vide infra d. 28. q. 6.
Concerning which see below, d. 28, q. 6.
Vers. 8. — Seq. Scripturae locus est ibid. v. 9: Et si quod est aliud mandatum, in hoc verbo instauratur: Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum. — Paulo inferius pro debeat codd. I L T V Z bb debebat.
Verse 8. — The following passage of Scripture is ibid. v. 9: And if there be any other commandment, it is restored in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. — A little below, in place of debeat codices I L T V Z bb read debebat.
Vide infra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. seq.
See below, d. 37, a. 2, q. 1 f.
Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXVIII. c. 1, et Comment. dub. 1. — Mox pro patet responsio edd. dicendum quod. Inferius non pauci codd. includit pro includitur, et permulti codd. Quamvis tamen pro Quamvis enim.
Cf. below, the text of the Master, d. XXVIII, c. 1, and the Commentary, doubt 1. — Soon, in place of patet responsio the editions read dicendum quod. Below, not a few codices read includit for includitur, and very many codices Quamvis tamen for Quamvis enim.
Vide supra pag. 336, nota 4. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 503, nota 8. et pag. 504, nota 1. — Obiectionem ipsam August., XIV. de Trin. c. 11. n. 14. sic exprimit: Sed dicet aliquis: Non est ista memoria, qua mens sui meminisse perhibetur, quae sibi semper est praesens. Memoria enim praeteritorum est, non praesentium. — Pro anima cod. A memoria, et mox pro meminit sui edd. meminit sibi.
See above p. 336, note 4. — On the minor [premise] cf. above p. 503, note 8, and p. 504, note 1. — The objection itself Augustine, XIV On the Trinity c. 11, n. 14, expresses thus: But someone will say: That memory by which the mind is said to remember itself, which is always present to itself, is not [memory]. For memory is of past, not of present, things. — In place of anima codex A reads memoria, and soon in place of meminit sui the editions read meminit sibi.
Vide sententiam Aristot., supra pag. 114, nota 5. allatam.
See the judgment of Aristotle adduced above p. 114, note 5.
Psalm. 10, 6, qui deinde in notula a Magistro allegatur.
Psalm 10:6, which is then adduced by the Master in the little note.
Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 14. n. 18, unde textus huius dubii sumtus est.
Book XIV On the Trinity c. 14, n. 18, whence the text of this doubt is taken.
Dist. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. — Ad hanc obiectionem August. ipse respondet, XIV. de Trin. c. 11. n. 14, respiciens illa verba Virgilii (Aen. III. 628. seq.): «Nec talia passus Ulysses, oblitusve sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto». Dicit enim: «Virgilius enim, cum sui non oblitum diceret Ulyssen, quid aliud intelligi voluit, nisi quod meminerit sui? Cum ergo sibi praesens esset, nullo modo sui meminisset, nisi ad res praesentes memoria pertineret. Quapropter sicut in rebus praeteritis ea memoria dicitur, qua fit, ut valeant recoli et recordari, sic in re praesenti quod sibi est mens memoria sine absurditate dicenda est, qua sibi praesto est, ut sua cogitatione possit intelligi» etc. Quibus verbis etiam solutio praecedens confirmatur. — Paulo inferius pro cognitionem multi codd. cogitationem.
D. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, to 3. — To this objection Augustine himself responds, XIV On the Trinity c. 11, n. 14, regarding those words of Virgil (Aeneid III, 628 f.): «Nor did Ulysses endure such things, nor was the Ithacan forgetful of himself in so great a peril». For he says: «For Virgil, when he said that Ulysses was not forgetful of himself, what else did he wish to be understood, but that he remembered himself? Since therefore he was present to himself, he would in no way have remembered himself, unless memory pertained to present things. Wherefore just as in past things that is called memory by which it comes about that they can be recalled and remembered, so in a present thing that which the mind is to itself is to be called, without absurdity, memory, by which it is at hand to itself, so that it can be understood by its own thinking» etc. By which words also the preceding solution is confirmed. — A little below, in place of cognitionem many codices read cogitationem.
Cfr. supra d. 17. dub. 1, et August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 8. n. 23. — Paulo ante pro interimit, hoc est cod. Z interimat, facit.
Cf. above, d. 17, doubt 1, and Augustine, III On Free Choice c. 8, n. 23. — A little before, in place of interimit, hoc est codex Z reads interimat, facit.
Ibid. notulam, quae habetur in textu Magistri, simulque hoc 3. dubium in seq. distinctionem transtulerunt.
Ibid. the little note, which is had in the text of the Master, and at the same time they transferred this third doubt into the following distinction.
Cfr. supra pag. 596, nota 7. Iisdem verbis amor definitur in Libro de Contemplando Deo (inter opera Bernardi), c. 7. n. 14: Nihil enim aliud est amor quam vehemens et bene ordinata voluntas. — Mox pro superfluat, quod habent codd. A K aa bb, in aliis et edd. superfluit.
Cf. above p. 596, note 7. In the same words love is defined in the Book On Contemplating God (among the works of Bernard), c. 7, n. 14: For love is nothing else than a vehement and well-ordered will. — Soon, in place of superfluat, which codices A K aa bb have, in the others and the editions superfluit.
Vers. 18.
Verse 18.
Vers. 5.
Verse 5.
Vers. 30. — Complures codd. erronee allegant Matth. 12.
Verse 30. — Several codices erroneously cite Matthew 12.
Vers. 27.
Verse 27.
Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. et infra d. 36. q. 6. — Pro rationem completionis edd. rationem completam. Paulo superius pro aliarum virium, quae lectio habetur in codd. A K W aa bb, alii codd. et edd. illarum virium.
Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1, and below, d. 36, q. 6. — In place of rationem completionis the editions read rationem completam. A little above, in place of aliarum virium, which reading is had in codices A K W aa bb, the other codices and the editions read illarum virium.
Vers. 37. — Quoad expositionem huius loci, quae hic Augustino tribuitur, cfr. supra pag. 643, nota 7.
Verse 37. — As to the exposition of this passage, which is here attributed to Augustine, cf. above p. 643, note 7.
Vers. 5, quem versum fere hoc modo exponit Bernard., Serm. 20. in Cant. n. 4. et Serm. 29. de Diversis, n. 1. et 4.
Verse 5, which verse Bernard expounds in nearly this manner, Sermon 20 on the Canticle, n. 4, and Sermon 29 On Various Matters, n. 1 and 4.
Vers. 5.
Verse 5.
Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. ad 2. — Paulo ante codd. A K post dos utriusque supplent partis.
Cf. above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 5, to 2. — A little before, codices A K after dos utriusque supply partis.
Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 9; St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

← Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 6