Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 36, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus

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# DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: Ubi est caritas, quid est quod possit deesse? Si enim hoc verum est, quicumque habet caritatem, habet omne quod sufficit ad salutem: ergo videtur, quod superfluant ceterae virtutes. Si dicas, quod hoc dicitur, quia caritas habet alias virtutes sibi annexas¹; tunc similiter potest dici de qualibet aliarum virtutum; omnes enim connectuntur cuilibet virtuti, sicut et caritati. — Item, gratiae gratis datae non necessario connexae sunt ipsi caritati: et tamen ipsae sunt valde utiles et opportunae ipsi Ecclesiae²: videtur ergo, quod etiam ubi caritas reperitur, multa deesse possint.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicit³, quod ubi est caritas, nihil deest; hoc intelligit de his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem — nam iste defectus proprie defectus est, aliorum vero defectus pro modico est habendus — hoc autem attribuit ipsi caritati ratione connexionis aliarum virtutum. Qui enim habet caritatem habet unde possit Legem implere⁴, habet etiam per consequens ceteras virtutes, quae habilitant ad Legis impletionem.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod similiter posset dici de qualibet alia virtute; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia caritas non tantum aliis connectitur, sed etiam est principium connexionis, cum sit vinculum perfectionis et quodam modo « mater omnis boni », sicut ipse Magister dicit⁵.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, non placuisse auctoribus nostris, immo ipsi Veritati, omnia peccata esse paria. Videtur enim hoc debere placere ipsi Veritati: quia, secundum quod dicit Anselmus⁶, « peccatum nihil est »; in his autem, quae nihil sunt, unum non est maius altero: ergo videtur, quod peccatum unum non possit alterum excellere, igitur habent paritatem. — Item, quodlibet peccatum mortale totaliter privat hominem gratia et inducit mortem; sed in privatione omnimoda non est ponere maius et minus — quia in his quae mortua sunt, non est dicere magis mortuum unum quam reliquum⁷ — ergo in genere peccatorum mortalium unum peccatum non excedit alterum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quia peccatum est privatio ordinis et diminutio habilitatis, et per unum genus peccati anima magis deordinatur et inhabilior efficitur quam per aliud, sicut manifeste apparet⁸; indubitanter est verum, quod peccata aequalia non sunt; concupiscentia enim plus inclinat ad unum appetibile quam ad reliquum; et ideo magis facit Deum contemnere et ab ipso elongari et recedere in uno genere peccati quam in alio.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum nihil est; dicendum, quod etsi nihil sit, essentialiter loquendo; alicuius tamen est sicut subiecti, et alicuius sicut oppositi; unde ratione boni maioris vel minoris, quod privatur in diversis peccatis, peccatum unum habet excedere alterum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod totaliter privat gratiam et inducit mortem; dicendum, quod licet omne peccatum totaliter privet gratiam, non tamen totaliter tollit habilitatem ad gratiam; licet omne peccatum inducat mortem, non tamen tollit habilitatem ad vitam: et ideo, licet aliquid non sit magis et minus mortuum et magis et minus gratia privatum per diversa peccata quantum ad ipsam gratiam et vitam gratiae in se; est tamen magis et minus quantum ad habilitatem naturae respectu gratiae; et ratione illius diversa peccata habent sese invicem excedere. Unde non est simile de corporali morte, in qua totaliter fit privatio et impossibilitas redeundi ad vitam⁹.

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Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Omnia ad duo mandata caritatis pertinent, quia per caritatem implentur et ad caritatem tanquam ad finem referri debent. Videtur enim duo opposita in se implicare. Si enim per caritatem implentur, potius debent referri ad caritatem sicut ad principium quam sicut ad finem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut tactum fuit supra, distinctione vigesima septima¹⁰, caritas simul ponitur ipsarum virtutum quantum ad opera meritoria principium sive caput, et forma sive vinculum, et finis, ad quem ordinantur; et hoc est, quia ipsa caritas, dum immediate coniungit ipsi summo Bono, quodam modo supereminet ceteris et ceteras virtutes movet et imperat; et ideo caput et principium est earum. Ulterius, quia movendo facit opera eorum meritoria; ideo dicitur esse forma¹¹. Postremo, quia ideo facimus opera meritoria, ut Deo fruamur et per caritatem in Deo quiescamus; hinc est, quod caritas ceterarum virtutum et praeceptorum est finis. — Et sic « tres causae incidunt in unum et idem¹² »; nec mirum, cum caritas faciat Deo conformem, qui habet in se respectu creaturae intentionem triplicis causae. Unde nulla est contrarietas cum eo quod Magister dicit in littera¹³.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Inimicus enim iustitiae est qui poenae timore non peccat. Nullus enim iustitiae effectus iustitiae inimicatur; sed poena est iustitiae effectus¹⁴: cum ergo poena faciat se timeri, videtur, quod non faciat divinae iustitiae inimicari. — Item, nihil quod facit declinare a malo, facit inimicari iustitiae; sed timor poenae, quo quis cessat a peccato, facit declinare a malo¹⁵: ergo talis non est inimicus iustitiae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod verbum illud intelligitur praecise et per concomitantiam: praecise, ut dicatur inimicus iustitiae, qui timore poenae non peccat, hoc est, qui a peccato recedit solo timore poenae, non amore iustitiae; talis, inquam, qui ex solo timore movetur, dicitur iustitiae inimicus, non per causam, sed per concomitantiam. Licet enim timor ille non causet inimicitiam, concomitatur tamen ipsam concupiscentiam malam, per quam sumus inimici Dei; nam qui amicus est huius mundi, inimicus Dei constituitur¹⁶. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa duo, quae obiicit; quoniam ipse opponit, ac si verbum illud intelligeretur dictum esse per causam¹⁷.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod ultimo concludit, quod omnium divinarum Scripturarum plenitudo est dilectio Dei et proximi. Si enim « natura operatur, quanto brevius potest, et non facit per plura quod potest facere per pauciora¹⁸ »; videtur similiter, quod hoc modo operari debeat divina Sapientia. Si ergo in tota Scriptura nihil plus continetur quam verbum de mandato caritatis, videtur tunc, quod circa hoc solum sacra Scriptura deberet versari, et de nullo alio ibi tractari.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod plenitudinem alicuius contineri in aliquo, hoc est dupliciter: vel integraliter, vel causaliter. Plenitudo autem divinorum Eloquiorum in caritate non continetur integraliter, quia multae aliae virtutes ibi docentur et praecipiuntur, quae sunt diversae et distinctae a caritate; sed quod¹⁹ dicitur contineri, hoc est causaliter, quia tota sacra Scriptura finaliter ordinatur ad hoc, ut diligamus Deum et proximum.

Et si tu obiicias, quod qui diligit proximum Legem implevit²⁰: ergo illud solum mandatum deberet in Lege contineri; dicendum, quod mandata et documenta in sacra Scriptura multiplicantur propter duo, videlicet propter removendam caecitatem ex parte intellectus, et propter excludendum fastidium ex parte ipsius affectus. Necesse est enim, quod sciamus modos, secundum quos debemus ordinari ad proximum et ad Deum; et quia illi varii sunt, et nos ignorantes sumus nec possumus simul illa capere: ideo oportuit divisim per diversa documenta distinguere. — Rursus, quia affectus noster fastidit unum et delectatur in varietate²¹: ideo diversis modis Scriptura docet et insinuat unum et idem, ut affectus noster, dum in diversis et variis idem invenit, proficiat in unitate et delectetur in varietate, ut tanto profectus sit maior, quanto delectabilior. Et propterea modo in ipsa sacra Scriptura reperiuntur mandata obligatoria, modo exempla²² attractiva, modo monita salutaria, modo documenta Prophetarum, modo Evangelistarum, ut ex omnibus his excludatur fastidium, et homo perfectius dirigatur ad unum. Et ex hoc convinci potest, quod sacra Scriptura, etsi magna sit, tamen optime tradita est et nihil continet superfluum, nihil etiam diminutum²³.

English Translation

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# DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about this which is said: Where charity is, what is there that can be lacking? For if this is true, whoever has charity has everything that suffices for salvation: therefore it seems that the other virtues are superfluous. If you say that this is said because charity has the other virtues annexed to it¹; then likewise it can be said of any of the other virtues; for all are connected to any virtue whatever, just as to charity. — Likewise, the gratuitously given graces are not necessarily connected to charity itself: and yet they are very useful and opportune to the Church²: it seems, therefore, that even where charity is found, many things can be lacking.

I respond: It must be said that when he says³ that where charity is, nothing is lacking, he understands this of those things which are necessary for salvation — for that lack is properly a lack, whereas the lack of the others is to be reckoned as of little account — and he attributes this to charity by reason of the connection of the other virtues. For he who has charity has whereby he can fulfill the Law⁴; he has also, consequently, the other virtues, which enable [one] to fulfill the Law.

But to that which is objected, that the same could likewise be said of any other virtue; it must be said that it is not alike: because charity is not only connected to the others, but is also the principle of the connection, since it is the bond of perfection and in a certain manner « the mother of all good », as the Master himself says⁵.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that it was not pleasing to our authorities, nay rather to Truth itself, that all sins are equal. For it seems that this ought to please Truth itself: because, according to what Anselm says⁶, « sin is nothing »; but among those things which are nothing, one is not greater than another: therefore it seems that one sin cannot excel another, and so they have parity. — Likewise, any mortal sin whatever totally deprives a man of grace and brings on death; but in total privation there is no positing of greater and less — because among those things which are dead, one cannot be called more dead than another⁷ — therefore in the genus of mortal sins one sin does not exceed another.

I respond: It must be said that, since sin is a privation of order and a diminution of capacity, and through one genus of sin the soul is more disordered and rendered less capable than through another, as plainly appears⁸; it is undoubtedly true that sins are not equal; for concupiscence inclines more to one desirable object than to another; and therefore it makes [one] despise God and be estranged and withdraw from him more in one genus of sin than in another.

To that which is objected, that sin is nothing; it must be said that even if it is nothing, essentially speaking; yet it belongs to something as to a subject, and to something as to an opposite; whence by reason of the greater or lesser good which is taken away in the diverse sins, one sin has [the property] of exceeding another.

To that which is objected, that it totally deprives [one] of grace and brings on death; it must be said that, although every sin totally deprives [one] of grace, yet it does not totally take away the capacity for grace; although every sin brings on death, yet it does not take away the capacity for life: and therefore, although a thing is not more and less dead and more and less deprived of grace through diverse sins as regards grace itself and the life of grace in itself; yet it is more and less as regards the capacity of nature with respect to grace; and by reason of this, diverse sins have [the property] of exceeding one another. Hence it is not like bodily death, in which the privation occurs totally, and the impossibility of returning to life⁹.

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Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: All things pertain to the two commandments of charity, because they are fulfilled through charity and ought to be referred to charity as to their end. For it seems to imply two opposites in itself. For if they are fulfilled through charity, they ought rather to be referred to charity as to a principle than as to an end.

I respond: It must be said that, as was touched upon above, in the twenty-seventh distinction¹⁰, charity is at once posited as, with respect to meritorious works, the principle or head of the virtues themselves, and their form or bond, and their end, to which they are ordered; and this is because charity itself, while it immediately joins [the soul] to the highest Good, in a certain manner rises above the others and moves and commands the other virtues; and therefore it is their head and principle. Further, because by moving it makes their works meritorious; therefore it is said to be their form¹¹. Lastly, because we do meritorious works in order that we may enjoy God and through charity rest in God; hence it is that charity is the end of the other virtues and precepts. — And thus « three causes coincide in one and the same thing¹² »; nor is it to be wondered at, since charity makes [one] conformed to God, who has in himself, with respect to the creature, the intention of the threefold cause. Hence there is no contrariety with that which the Master says in the letter¹³.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: For he is an enemy of justice who does not sin from fear of punishment. For no effect of justice is opposed to justice; but punishment is an effect of justice¹⁴: since therefore punishment makes itself feared, it seems that it does not make [one] opposed to divine justice. — Likewise, nothing that makes [one] turn away from evil makes [one] opposed to justice; but the fear of punishment, by which one ceases from sin, makes [one] turn away from evil¹⁵: therefore such a one is not an enemy of justice.

I respond: It must be said that that statement is understood precisely and by concomitance: precisely, so that he is called an enemy of justice who does not sin from fear of punishment, that is, who withdraws from sin from fear of punishment alone, not from love of justice; such a one, I say, who is moved from fear alone, is called an enemy of justice, not by cause, but by concomitance. For although that fear does not cause enmity, yet it accompanies that evil concupiscence by which we are enemies of God; for he who is a friend of this world is constituted an enemy of God¹⁶. — And by this is made clear the response to those two things which he objects; for he raises the objection as if that statement were understood to be said by way of cause¹⁷.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about this which he concludes last, that the fullness of all the divine Scriptures is the love of God and of neighbor. For if « nature operates as briefly as it can, and does not do through many things what it can do through fewer¹⁸ »; it seems likewise that divine Wisdom ought to operate in this manner. If, therefore, in all of Scripture nothing more is contained than the word about the commandment of charity, it seems then that sacred Scripture ought to be concerned with this alone, and that nothing else ought to be treated of in it.

I respond: It must be said that for the fullness of something to be contained in something is twofold: either integrally, or causally. Now the fullness of the divine Oracles is not contained in charity integrally, because many other virtues are taught and enjoined there, which are diverse and distinct from charity; but what¹⁹ is said to be contained, this is causally, because all of sacred Scripture is finally ordered to this, that we may love God and neighbor.

And if you object that he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law²⁰: therefore that commandment alone ought to be contained in the Law; it must be said that the commandments and instructions in sacred Scripture are multiplied for two reasons, namely for removing blindness on the part of the intellect, and for excluding distaste on the part of the affection itself. For it is necessary that we know the ways according to which we ought to be ordered toward neighbor and toward God; and because those are various, and we are ignorant and cannot grasp them all at once: therefore it was fitting to set them out separately through diverse instructions. — Again, because our affection becomes weary of one thing and delights in variety²¹: therefore in diverse manners Scripture teaches and insinuates one and the same thing, so that our affection, while it finds the same thing in diverse and varied [forms], may advance in unity and delight in variety, so that its progress may be the greater the more delightful it is. And on this account, sometimes in sacred Scripture itself there are found obligatory commandments, sometimes attractive examples²², sometimes salutary warnings, sometimes the teachings of the Prophets, sometimes [those] of the Evangelists, so that from all these distaste may be excluded, and man may be more perfectly directed to the one. And from this it can be proved that sacred Scripture, although it is great, is yet excellently handed down and contains nothing superfluous, nothing also lacking²³.

Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. supra q. 1. et 6. — Superius pro ceterae virtutes cod. U aliae virtutes, et dein pro alias (deest in edd.) cod. Z ceteras. Mox verbo dici, pro quo cod. bb quaeri, edd. praemittunt hoc.
Cf. above, q. 1 and 6. — Above, for the other virtues codex U [reads] other virtues, and then for others (which is absent in the editions) codex Z [reads] the rest. Soon, before the word to be said, in place of which codex bb [reads] to be asked, the editions prefix this.
Cfr. supra pag. 742, nota 9.
Cf. above, p. 742, note 9.
Cod. A supplet Augustinus relate ad textum huius dubii; cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. Deinde pro nihil deest cod. Z nihil deesse potest.
Codex A supplies Augustine in relation to the text of this doubt; cf. here, the letter of the Master, ch. 1. Then for nothing is lacking codex Z [reads] nothing can be lacking.
Rom. 13, 8: Qui enim diligit proximum Legem implevit; et v. 10: Plenitudo ergo Legis est dilectio.
Rom. 13:8: For he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law; and v. 10: Love therefore is the fullness of the Law.
Supra d. XXV. c. 5. Cfr. etiam d. XXIII. c. 9. atque hic c. 1. et 3., nec non d. 33. q. 5, scholion — Quod caritas est vinculum perfectionis, dicitur Colos. 3, 14. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
Above, d. 25, ch. 5. Cf. also d. 23, ch. 9, and here ch. 1 and 3, as well as d. 33, q. 5, scholion. — That charity is the bond of perfection is said in Col. 3:14. — On this doubt cf. St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here, on the letter.
De Conceptu virgin. et orig. peccat. c. 5. — De proposit. seq. et de minori seq. arg. cfr. tom. II. pag. 111, nota 3.
[Anselm,] On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, ch. 5. — On the proposition that follows and on the minor [premise] of the following argument cf. vol. 2, p. 111, note 3.
Seneca, Epist. 66. (alias 67.) n. 40: Mors quidem omnium par est. Per quae venit diversa sunt; id, in quod desinunt, unum est. Mors nulla maior aut minor est; habet enim eundem in omnibus modum: finisse vitam.
Seneca, Letter 66 (otherwise 67), n. 40: Death indeed is equal for all. The things through which it comes are diverse; that into which they end is one. No death is greater or less; for it has the same measure in all: to have finished life.
Vide II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. et 3. (praecipue ad 4. et 6, ubi etiam obiectiones solvuntur, quae hic proponuntur) nec non d. 35. a. 1. et 2. — Subinde pro peccata edd. praedicta.
See Sentences bk. 2, d. 34, art. 2, q. 2 and 3 (especially the replies to 4 and 6, where also the objections are resolved which are here proposed), as well as d. 35, art. 1 and 2. — Thereafter, for sins [read] the aforesaid editions.
Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis: Ex habitu enim in privationem mutatio fit, a privatione vero in habitum impossibile est; neque enim caecus factus aliquis rursus vidit etc. Cfr. supra pag. 802, nota 8.
Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Opposites: For change occurs from a possession into a privation, but from a privation into a possession it is impossible; for neither has anyone who has been made blind seen again, etc. Cf. above, p. 802, note 8.
Art. 2. q. 1. et dub. 1. — Mox pro ponitur cod. K potest esse.
Art. 2, q. 1, and doubt 1. — Soon, for is posited codex K [reads] can be.
Cfr. supra q. 6.
Cf. above, q. 6.
Secundum Aristot.; vide supra pag. 617, nota 5. — Cod. K sic prosequitur: et ideo nec mirum est, si caritas etc. Hic c. 3.
According to Aristotle; see above, p. 617, note 5. — Codex K continues thus: and therefore it is no wonder, if charity, etc. Here, ch. 3.
Hic c. 3.
Here, ch. 3.
Vide supra d. 33. dub. 1. Pro Nullus enim... sed etc. edd. Nulli poenae [Vat. bonae] iustitiae effectus inimicatur; sed etc.
See above, d. 33, doubt 1. For For no... but etc. the editions [read] To no punishment [the Vatican: to no good] is an effect of justice opposed; but etc.
Cfr. supra d. 34. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.
Cf. above, d. 34, pt. 2, art. 1, q. 1.
Iac. 4, 4: Quicumque ergo voluerit amicus esse saeculi huius, inimicus etc.
James 4:4: Whoever therefore wishes to be a friend of this world, an enemy etc.
Vide supra d. 34. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.
See above, d. 34, pt. 2, art. 1, q. 2.
Cfr. supra pag. 42, nota 6. et pag. 277, nota 1. — Pro brevius edd. velocius. Mox pro hoc modo cod. G eodem modo, et paulo post nisi pro quam.
Cf. above, p. 42, note 6, and p. 277, note 1. — For more briefly the editions [read] more swiftly. Soon, for in this manner codex G [reads] in the same manner, and a little after, except for than.
Pro sed quod, quae lectio est codd. M O U V, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 secundum quod, Vat. sed tantum, et subinde, in ipsa pro hoc est.
For but what, which is the reading of codices M O U V, the other codices and editions 1, 2 [read] according to which, the Vatican but only, and thereupon in it for this is.
Rom. 13, 8.
Rom. 13:8.
Quintilian., l. de Instit. oratoria, c. 12. dicit, quod « praesertim reficiat animos ac reparet varietas ipsa, contraque sit aliquanto difficilius in labore uno perseverare ».
Quintilian, in the book of the Institutes of Oratory, ch. 12, says that « especially does variety itself refresh and restore the spirits, and on the contrary it is somewhat more difficult to persevere in one labor ».
Edd. omittunt exempla. Proxime post pro attractiva cod. M excitativa. Paulo inferius pro ad unum edd. ad bonum, et dein pro convinci non pauci codd. coniici.
The editions omit examples. Immediately after, for attractive codex M [reads] exciting. A little below, for to the one the editions [read] to the good, and then for to be proved not a few codices [read] to be conjectured.
Cfr. S. Bonav., Breviloq. Prooem. §§ 1–6, et Princip. s. Scripturae (de s. Scripturae praestantia). — Quoad hoc dub. vide S. Thom., hic circa lit.
Cf. St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, Prologue, §§ 1–6, and the Principium on sacred Scripture (on the excellence of sacred Scripture). — As to this doubt, see St. Thomas, here, on the letter.

← Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 6