Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

Quaestio II. Utrum praecepta Decalogi obligent ad opera formata.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum praecepta Decalogi obligent ad opera formata. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Deuteronomii decimo sexto¹: Iuste quod iustum est exsequeris. Ex hoc verbo colligitur, quod Legislator non solum praecipiebat iustitiam in facto, sed etiam iustitiam in modo; opus autem, quod est iustum in facto et modo, est opus formatum: ergo per mandata Legis obligatur homo ad opera formata.

2. Item, Matthaei decimo nono²: Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata: observatio igitur mandatorum Decalogi introducit ad vitam; sed nemo introducitur ad vitam per aliqua opera, nisi fiant ex caritate, et talia sunt opera formata: cum ergo per Legem obligemur ad praecepta Decalogi observanda, videtur, quod per eandem obligemur ad opera formata.

3. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in fine distinctionis praecedentis³, quod omnia praecepta Decalogi reducuntur ad duo praecepta; sed illa praecepta nemo implet nisi ex caritate — sicut patet de praecepto, quo praecipitur: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo etc. — videtur ergo similiter, quod omnia mandata Decalogi teneamur implere ex caritate: ergo per Legem obligamur ad opera formata.

4. Item, ad opera mandatorum obligamur secundum intentionem praecipientis; sed intentio praecipientis fuit dare illa mandata, ut per illa ei serviamus et serviendo placeamus⁴; hoc autem non fit nisi per opera caritate et gratia informata: ergo etc.

5. Item, informatio et deformatio sunt opposita, praeceptio et prohibitio sunt opposita; et « si oppositum de opposito, et propositum de proposito⁵ »; cum ergo deformatio operum sit in prohibitione, eorundem informatio erit in praecepto.

Sed contra: 1. Dicit Hieronymus⁶, quod « anathema sit qui dicit, Deum praecepisse impossibile »: cum ergo praecepta illa obligent tam iustos quam peccatores, et in potestate peccatoris non sit informare opera sua, cum illud habeat fieri per caritatem et gratiam; videtur, quod ad hoc nemo obligetur per divina mandata.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in Glossa super illud Psalmi⁷: Declina a malo et fac bonum: « Declinare a malo semper vitat poenam, quamvis non semper promereatur palmam »; sed quotiescumque declinat homo a malo ex caritate, promeretur palmam: ergo non semper tenetur homo ex caritate a malo declinare. Sed declinando a malo, observantur praecepta negativa: ergo non videtur, quod obligent ad opera formata.

3. Item, aliquis filius, habens parentes et existens in peccato mortali, honorat eos ex naturali pietate, cum se offert locus et tempus et opportunitas; constat, quod iste non peccat parentes honorando, nec committendo nec omittendo: ergo mandatum illud, quo Dominus praecepit⁸: Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam; non obligabat ad hoc, quod opus illud ex caritate impenderetur: pari ratione nec alia mandata.

4. Item, opera formata non sunt nisi per gratiam; sed nemo scit, utrum gratiam Spiritus sancti habeat⁹: ergo nemo scit, utrum eius opera sint formata, vel informata. Sed nemo obligatur ad id quod non potest scire: ergo mandata Decalogi ad opera formata non obligant.

5. Item, quicumque obligatur ad aliquid, obligatur per consequens ad id quod est illi inseparabiliter annexum¹⁰; sed opera non possunt formari ab aliquo, nisi habeatur gratia: ergo quicumque obligatur ad opera formata, obligatur ad habendam gratiam. Cum ergo habere gratiam respiciat omne tempus indifferenter, tam tempus dormitionis quam tempus vigiliae; videtur, quod homo omittat in quolibet instanti et in quolibet tempore, ac per hoc in uno die peccabit infinities. Quodsi hoc est manifeste falsum, restat, quod mandata Decalogi ad opera formata non habeant obligare.

Conclusio.

Praecepta Decalogi non obligant ad opus proprie formatum obligatione absoluta, si loquimur de quolibet opere singillatim; tamen de eis in unum collectis hoc concedi potest, et etiam loquendo de obligatione conditionali.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est triplex modus dicendi.

Quibusdam enim visum est, quod mandata Decalogi obligant ad opera formata, obligatione tamen praecepti affirmativi, non praecepti negativi. Obligatio enim praecepti negativi est semper et ad semper; obligatio vero praecepti affirmativi, quamvis sit semper, non tamen ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore. Propter quod dixerunt, quod mandata Decalogi obligant hominem ad opera formata pro eo tempore, quo habet caritatem et gratiam; tunc enim potestatem habet exeundi in opera meritoria et tenetur bene uti gratia accepta.

Alius autem modus dicendi est, quod mandata Decalogi non obligant nisi ad opera bona in genere¹¹. Opera enim formata sunt supra nostram potestatem et supra cognitionis certitudinem; et propterea ad talia opera non debemus obligari per mandata Decalogi, sed solum ad opera bona in genere. Cuius signum est, quia, si aliquis existens in caritate honoret parentes ex naturali pietate, huiusmodi opere absolvitur a mandati obligatione.

Sed quoniam primus modus dicendi videtur excedere, in hoc videlicet, quod ponit, hominem¹² obligari ad id, de quo non potest habere certitudinem; secundus vero modus dicendi videtur nimis parum dicere, in hoc videlicet, quod ponit, hominem per mandata Decalogi solummodo obligari ad ea quae potest quis implere existens in statu peccati, cum observatio mandatorum Dei sit via deveniendi ad statum gratiae¹³ et iustitiae: ideo est adhuc tertius dicendi modus, qui quasi medium tenet inter utrumque, et ad quaestionem propositam respondet per distinctionem hoc modo. Cum quaeritur, utrum mandata Decalogi obligent ad opera formata; respondendum est, quod opera formata possunt dici dupliciter: uno modo per exclusionem deformitatis peccati, alio modo per positionem dignitatis meriti. Si primo modo accipiantur opera formata; sic utique ad opera formata obligant; obligant enim ad vitandum omnia peccata mortalia. — Si autem dicantur alio modo opera formata; sic accipiuntur proprie, et tunc distinguendum est in ipsa obligatione: est enim obligatio absoluta et obligatio conditionalis. Obligatio absoluta est, qua quis simpliciter ad aliquid faciendum obligatur, ita quod, si illud non faciat, incurrit omissionis reatum; obligatio vero conditionalis est, qua quis obligatur ad aliquid faciendum, si vult pervenire ad praemium. Et haec obligatio in eo qui omittit, non inducit omissionis peccatum, sed ponit implicitae conditionis defectum.

Si igitur loquamur de obligatione conditionali; mandata Decalogi obligant ad opera formata. Si quis enim vult ad vitam ingredi, necesse est ex caritate servare mandata, quae quidem caritas est meriti principium¹⁴. — Si autem loquamur de obligatione absoluta; tunc distinguendum est in ipsis mandatis, quod dupliciter contingit de eis loqui: aut de eis in unum collectis, prout habent reduci ad duo mandata caritatis, aut de quolibet per se singillatim¹⁵. Si de eis collectis in unum; cum in eis contineatur regula iustitiae secundum ordinem ad Deum et ad proximum, per quam excluditur omne peccatum; sic concedi potest, quod obligant ad aliquod opus formatum vel in se, si homo habet unde possit in illud exire, vel in dispositione sive praeparatione

ad illud¹⁶. Tenetur enim homo sic mandata Decalogi implere, ut per ipsorum impletionem praeparet locum ipsi gratiae; qua obtenta, exeat, cum locus et tempus est, in opera meritoria, adimplendo duo caritatis praecepta. — Si autem loquamur de quolibet singillatim et per se; sic accipiendo proprie opus formatum, hoc est opus meritorium, et loquendo de obligatione absoluta, mandata Decalogi non obligant ad opera formata, sicut rationes ostendunt, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur, et propterea concedendae sunt¹⁷.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Legislator praecipit non solummodo facere opus iustum, sed etiam iuste; dicendum, quod modus iustitiae quidam est, qui facit opus Deo placitum et meritorium: et hic proprie reddit opus formatum. Alius autem est modus iustitiae, qui excludit circa actum viri iusti deordinationem intentionis, quae facit animum iniustum, et praeposterationem operis¹⁸; et hic modus est in praecepto, non primus. Ab hoc autem modo non dicitur opus formatum, nisi accipiendo large, sicut prius tactum est in respondendo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Domini in Matthaeo: Si vis ad vitam ingredi etc; patet responsio per iam dicta: quia ex verbo illo non potest colligi, quod homo obligetur ad opera meritoria facienda nisi obligatione conditionali, videlicet si vult ingredi ad vitam. Si autem de obligatione conditionali ad absolutam velit procedere; non valet ratio, immo est ibi sophisma secundum quid et simpliciter¹⁹.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia mandata reducuntur ad duo praecepta caritatis; similiter patet responsio: quia praecepta duo caritatis non implentur in quocumque mandato singillatim accepto, sed ex quodam plenario intellectu et perfectione, consurgente ex omnium mandatorum aggregatione et integra observatione. Et hoc modo verum est, quod mandata obligant²⁰ ad opus formatum in se, vel in sua dispositione. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod ad hoc obliget quodlibet mandatum per se. Sicut enim non sequitur, decem homines trahunt navem, ergo quilibet per se trahit; quia plus possunt decem quam unus; sic et in proposito suo modo est intelligendum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenemur observare mandata secundum intentionem praecipientis; dicendum, quod hoc est verum de obligatione conditionali, si volumus ingredi ad vitam. — Posset tamen et aliter dici, quod intentio Legislatoris non solummodo fuit ad hoc, ut homo perveniret ad gloriam, sed²¹ ut vitaret poenam; mandata autem, si observentur, quantum ad opera extra gratiam facta sufficiunt ad vitandum poenam; et propterea non sequitur, quod per mandata obligetur quis absolute ad opera meritoria.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod deformatio est in prohibitione, ergo informatio²² in praecepto; dicendum, quod secundum quod informatio proprie accipitur, ratio non valet, pro eo quod informatio et deformatio non sunt opposita immediate, immo inter opus meritorium et opus peccati cadit medium bonum in genere et bonum ex circumstantia²³. Cum autem dicitur, quod si aliquid est in prohibitione, eius oppositum est in praecepto; hoc intelligitur de oppositis immediatis, sicut furari est prohibitum, et non furari est in praecepto; et propterea consequentia illa non habet locum in proposito.

Question II. Whether the precepts of the Decalogue obligate to formed works.

Secondly it is asked whether the precepts of the Decalogue obligate to formed works. And that they do, it seems.

1. Deuteronomy 16¹: Thou shalt justly pursue what is just. From this word it is gathered that the Lawgiver commanded not only justice in the deed, but also justice in the manner; but a work that is just in deed and in manner is a formed work: therefore through the commandments of the Law man is obligated to formed works.

2. Likewise, Matthew 19²: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments: the observance therefore of the commandments of the Decalogue leads to life; but no one is led to life through any works unless they be done out of charity, and such are formed works: since therefore through the Law we are obligated to observe the precepts of the Decalogue, it seems that through the same we are obligated to formed works.

3. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found at the end of the preceding distinction³, that all the precepts of the Decalogue are reduced to two precepts; but those precepts no one fulfills except out of charity — as is plain of the precept by which it is commanded: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, etc. — it seems therefore likewise that we are bound to fulfill all the commandments of the Decalogue out of charity: therefore through the Law we are obligated to formed works.

4. Likewise, we are obligated to the works of the commandments according to the intention of the one commanding; but the intention of the one commanding was to give those commandments so that through them we might serve him and by serving please him⁴; but this is not done except through works informed by charity and grace: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, information and deformation are opposites, command and prohibition are opposites; and « if the opposite [is said] of the opposite, then the proposite [is said] of the proposite⁵ »; since therefore the deformation of works is in the prohibition, the information of the same will be in the command.

On the contrary: 1. Jerome says⁶ that « let him be anathema who says that God commanded what is impossible »: since therefore those precepts obligate the just as well as sinners, and it is not in the power of the sinner to inform his works, since that must come about through charity and grace; it seems that to this no one is obligated by the divine commandments.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found in the Gloss on that text of the Psalm⁷: Turn away from evil and do good: « To turn away from evil always avoids punishment, although it does not always earn the palm »; but as often as a man turns away from evil out of charity, he earns the palm: therefore a man is not always bound to turn away from evil out of charity. But by turning away from evil, the negative precepts are observed: therefore it does not seem that they obligate to formed works.

3. Likewise, a certain son, having parents and existing in mortal sin, honors them out of natural piety, when place and time and opportunity present themselves; it is established that this man does not sin in honoring his parents, neither by commission nor by omission: therefore that commandment by which the Lord commanded⁸: Honor thy father and thy mother; did not obligate to this, that the work be rendered out of charity: by parity of reasoning, neither do the other commandments.

4. Likewise, formed works are not [done] except through grace; but no one knows whether he has the grace of the Holy Spirit⁹: therefore no one knows whether his works are formed or unformed. But no one is obligated to that which he cannot know: therefore the precepts of the Decalogue do not obligate to formed works.

5. Likewise, whoever is obligated to something is obligated consequently to that which is inseparably annexed to it¹⁰; but works cannot be formed by anyone unless grace be had: therefore whoever is obligated to formed works is obligated to have grace. Since therefore having grace regards every time indifferently, the time of sleeping as well as the time of waking; it seems that man omits at every instant and at every time, and through this in one day he will sin infinitely. But if this is manifestly false, it remains that the precepts of the Decalogue do not obligate to formed works.

Conclusion.

The precepts of the Decalogue do not obligate to a properly formed work by an absolute obligation, if we speak of any single work taken singly; nevertheless of them collected into one this can be granted, and also speaking of conditional obligation.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that here there are three modes of speaking.

For to some it has seemed that the commandments of the Decalogue obligate to formed works, yet by the obligation of an affirmative precept, not of a negative precept. For the obligation of a negative precept is always and unto always; but the obligation of an affirmative precept, although it is always, is nevertheless not unto always, but according to place and time. On account of which they said that the commandments of the Decalogue obligate man to formed works for that time in which he has charity and grace; for then he has the power to go forth into meritorious works and is bound to make good use of the grace received.

But there is another mode of speaking, that the commandments of the Decalogue do not obligate except to works good in their kind¹¹. For formed works are above our power and above the certitude of cognition; and therefore we ought not to be obligated to such works through the commandments of the Decalogue, but only to works good in their kind. The sign of this is that, if someone existing in charity honors his parents out of natural piety, by such a work he is absolved from the obligation of the commandment.

But since the first mode of speaking seems to go too far, in this namely, that it posits man¹² to be obligated to that of which he cannot have certitude; while the second mode of speaking seems to say too little, in this namely, that it posits man to be obligated through the commandments of the Decalogue only to those things which one can fulfill while existing in the state of sin, whereas the observance of the commandments of God is the way of arriving at the state of grace¹³ and justice: therefore there is yet a third mode of speaking, which holds as it were a middle between the two, and answers the proposed question by a distinction in this manner. When it is asked whether the commandments of the Decalogue obligate to formed works; it must be answered that formed works can be spoken of in two ways: in one way by the exclusion of the deformity of sin, in another way by the positing of the dignity of merit. If formed works are taken in the first way; then they certainly obligate to formed works; for they obligate to the avoiding of all mortal sins. — But if formed works are spoken of in the other way; then they are taken properly, and then a distinction must be made in the obligation itself: for there is absolute obligation and conditional obligation. Absolute obligation is that by which one is simply obligated to do something, in such a way that, if he does not do it, he incurs the guilt of omission; but conditional obligation is that by which one is obligated to do something, if he wishes to attain a reward. And this obligation, in him who omits it, does not induce the sin of omission, but posits the defect of an implicit condition.

If therefore we speak of conditional obligation; the commandments of the Decalogue obligate to formed works. For if anyone wishes to enter into life, it is necessary to keep the commandments out of charity, which charity indeed is the principle of merit¹⁴. — But if we speak of absolute obligation; then a distinction must be made in the commandments themselves, since it happens to speak of them in two ways: either of them collected into one, inasmuch as they are reducible to the two commandments of charity, or of each one by itself singly¹⁵. If of them collected into one; since in them is contained the rule of justice according to the order toward God and toward neighbor, by which all sin is excluded; then it can be granted that they obligate to some formed work either in itself, if a man has the means by which he can go forth into it, or in disposition or preparation

toward it¹⁶. For man is bound so to fulfill the commandments of the Decalogue that through their fulfillment he prepares a place for grace itself; which once obtained, he may go forth, when there is place and time, into meritorious works, by fulfilling the two precepts of charity. — But if we speak of each one singly and by itself; then taking a formed work properly, that is, a meritorious work, and speaking of absolute obligation, the commandments of the Decalogue do not obligate to formed works, as the reasons show that are brought forward for the second part, and therefore they are to be granted¹⁷.

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that the Lawgiver commands not only to do a just work, but also to do it justly; it must be said that there is a certain mode of justice, which makes the work pleasing to God and meritorious: and this properly renders the work formed. But there is another mode of justice, which excludes around the act of the just man the disorder of intention, which makes the soul unjust, and the perverse ordering of the work¹⁸; and this mode is in the precept, not the first. But from this mode the work is not called formed, except by taking it broadly, as was touched upon before in responding.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Lord in Matthew: If thou wilt enter into life, etc; the response is plain through what has already been said: because from that word it cannot be gathered that man is obligated to do meritorious works except by conditional obligation, namely if he wishes to enter into life. But if one wishes to proceed from conditional obligation to absolute; the reasoning does not hold, rather there is here a sophism secundum quid et simpliciter¹⁹.

3. To that which is objected, that all the commandments are reduced to the two precepts of charity; the response is likewise plain: because the two precepts of charity are not fulfilled in each commandment taken singly, but out of a certain full understanding and perfection, arising from the aggregation and entire observance of all the commandments. And in this way it is true that the commandments obligate²⁰ to a formed work in itself, or in its disposition. But from this it does not follow that any single commandment by itself obligates to this. For just as it does not follow, ten men draw a ship, therefore each one by himself draws it; because ten can do more than one; so too in the matter at hand it must be understood in its own way.

4. To that which is objected, that we are bound to observe the commandments according to the intention of the one commanding; it must be said that this is true of conditional obligation, if we wish to enter into life. — Yet it could also be said otherwise, that the intention of the Lawgiver was not only to this, that man should arrive at glory, but²¹ that he should avoid punishment; but the commandments, if they be observed, as far as concerns works done outside of grace, suffice for avoiding punishment; and therefore it does not follow that through the commandments one is obligated absolutely to meritorious works.

5. To that which is objected last, that deformation is in the prohibition, therefore information²² in the command; it must be said that according as information is taken properly, the reasoning does not hold, for the reason that information and deformation are not opposites immediately, but rather between a meritorious work and a work of sin there falls a middle, namely the good in genus and the good from circumstance²³. But when it is said that if something is in the prohibition, its opposite is in the command; this is understood of immediate opposites, as to steal is prohibited, and not to steal is in the command; and therefore that consequence does not have place in the matter at hand.