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Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 37

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De mandatorum Decalogi obligatione.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Quaestio I. Utrum Deus debuerit homini imponere mandata obligatoria.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Deus debuerit homini imponere mandata obligatoria. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicitur ad Romanos septimo1: Peccatum, occasione accepta per mandatum, operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam; sed Deus nihil debet imponere, quod faciat ad augmentum concupiscentiae: ergo non debuit hominem per mandata obligare.

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2. Item, super illud primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto2: Virtus peccati lex; Glossa: « Lex prohibendo auget peccati cupiditatem »: si ergo Deus nihil debet nobis imponere, quod faciat ad cupiditatis augmentum, sed potius ad diminutionem; videtur, quod per mandata nullo modo debuit nos obligare.

3. Item, Augustinus dicit super Genesim ad litteram3: « Meliores iudicavit homines, qui ei liberaliter deservirent »; sed debitum obligationis repugnat libertati obsequii: si ergo Deus a principio hominem reliquit in manu consilii sui, dando ei libertatem arbitrii; videtur, quod nullo modo debuerit addere obligationem praecepti.

4. Item, liberalius dat aliquod donum qui dat sine onere, quam qui cum oneris impositione: si ergo obligatio praeceptorum magnum onus est, et Deus est liberalissimus; videtur, quod gratiam et gloriam debuit dare4 homini, ita quod ipsum non obligaret ad aliquod mandatum.

Sed contra:

1. Decet Conditorem cunctis operibus suis legem certam et limitem praefigere, ultra quam non debeant progredi; sicut patet, quia omnes creaturae reguntur secundum leges sibi a Creatore impositas5: si ergo hoc est dignitatis in creatura, videtur, quod decens et conveniens fuit, homini legem imponi, extra quam non liceret homini progredi. Hoc autem fit per mandata obligatoria: ergo talia mandata fuerunt homini danda.

2. Item, decet rectorem in subditis servare debitum ordinem6: si ergo homo per libertatem suae voluntatis poterat inordinari, opportunum et convenientissimum fuit, ipsum ad rectum ordinem astringi. Hoc autem fit per obligationem mandatorum Decalogi: decens igitur fuit, talia mandata homini dari.

3. Item, decens est, dominum a servo suo obsequium exigere7; sed tunc dominus a servo suo obsequium exigit, quando leges et praecepta eidem imponit: si ergo decens fuit, quod Deus ab homine tanquam a servo exigeret talia obsequia, decens fuit, ut ei imponeret mandata obligatoria.

4. Item, decens est, iustum iudicem secundum merita retribuere8; sed meritum et demeritum non habet locum, ubi nulla cadit obligatio legis: si ergo conveniens fuit Deo hominem, cui contulerat liberum arbitrium, secundum iustitiam iudicare, decens etiam fuit, ut regulam iustitiae eidem praefigeret. Sed hoc fit secundum mandatorum impositionem: ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Decalogus debuit dari per modum praecepti, tum quia decebat divinam aequitatem et maiestatem, tum quia nobis expediebat ad gloriam nostram augendam et pacem conservandam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio verba Decalogi debuerunt dari per modum praecepti, ita quod in eis homo non solum instrueretur, verum etiam obligaretur. — Et ratio huius est: tum quia Deum decebat, tum quia nobis expediebat.

Deum utique decebat, quia in his verbis Decalogi consistit regula iustitiae, secundum quod dictat lumen rationis rectae9. Et quoniam Deus tanquam iustus debet esse aemulator rectitudinis et iustitiae et in subditis et in se ipso; hinc est, quod homini leges iustitiae imposuit, ad quas ipsum obligavit, ut nullo modo liceret, ipsum eas impune praetergredi. Verba igitur Decalogi per modum obligationis debuerunt dari, quia sic decebat divinam aequitatem. — Nec tantum decebat aequitatem, immo etiam maiestatem. Sicut enim decet summam Maiestatem a creatura rationali omni reverentia coli, sic etiam decet, quod rationalis creatura ad manifestationem illius summae Maiestatis per obedientiam famuletur10. Et propterea decuit ipsum imponere homini leges et mandata obligatoria.

Non solum autem Deum decebat, sed etiam nobis expediebat, tum propter gloriam nostram augendam, tum propter pacem conservandam.

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Propter gloriam utique augendam, quia gloriosius est homini obtinere beatitudinem per merita quam sine meritis11. Et quoniam, cum aliquid redditur ex meritis, quodam modo homo, qui meretur, obligat sibi retribuentem; et magis decet, hominem obligari Deo, quam Deum homini: hinc est, quod ad opera, per quae contingebat mereri, debuit homo per praecepta obligari, ut, dum obligatus obediret, in merito proficeret et ad maiorem cumulum gloriae perveniret. — Alia ratio est propter pacem conservandam, quae « tantum bonum est, sicut dicit Augustinus12, ut cuncta pacem appetant »; pax autem servari non potest, ubi homo usurpat sibi quod est alienum: ideo, ut pax servaretur inter homines, debuit Deus mandata homini tradere, in quibus obligaretur, ne quod est alienum usurparet, sed redderet Deo et proximo quod eis deberet, ne aliter iniuriam faciendo pacem frangeret, et frangendo pacem ipse in se pacem amitteret13. — Sic ergo decuit, verba Decalogi tradi per modum obligationis et praecepti, tum quia decens erat ex parte Dei, tum quia expediens erat ex parte nostri. Et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, possunt concedi.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium ex auctoritate Apostoli, quod mandatum intendit concupiscentiam; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet, sed valde per accidens et occasionaliter. Ex hoc enim, quod per Legem erat peccati cognitio, tamen14 per ipsam non erat gratiae collatio, concupiscentia nitente in vetitum, et homine scienter perpetrante peccatum; ex hoc occasionaliter fiebat et ipsius concupiscentiae intensio et peccati aggravatio. Sed hoc non erat de principali intentione ferentis mandata nec de ipsorum mandatorum obligatione. Nam Dominus sic tribuit mandata obligatoria, quod semper fuit promptus tribuere gratiam adiutricem ad illa implenda. Unde quod per mandatorum obligationem augeretur concupiscentia, hoc non erat ex ipsis mandatis, sed potius ex negligentia et culpa hominis; Dominus autem propter negligentiam hominis non debuit dimittere, quin diligentiam circa salutem hominis exerceret15.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Lex prohibendo auget peccati cupiditatem; dicendum, quod Glossa non dicit illud simpliciter, sed addit hanc conditionem: « nisi diffundat Spiritus caritatem16 ». Unde quamvis per se Lex non esset utilis nisi ad cognitionem, tamen cum gratia ipsa mandatorum obligatio multum conferebat ad salutem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod obligatio repugnat libertati; potest responderi, quod obligatio ad bonum non repugnat libertati simpliciter, sed repugnat libertati peccandi. « Posse autem peccare nec est libertas nec pars libertatis17 »; et ideo, dum obligatio mandati repugnabat libertati male faciendi, libertatem non minuebat, sed potius augebat. — Aliter etiam potest responderi, quod est obligatio, quae aufert potestatem, et est obligatio, quae aufert impunitatem. Prima obligatio, quae potestatem aufert, minuit libertatem; secunda vero, quae potestatem non aufert, sed tollit impunitatem, libertatem arbitrii salvat et superaddit iustitiae aequitatem. Hoc autem secundo modo mandata Dei sunt obligatoria; et propterea in nullo libertati arbitrii derogabant, quin potius divinam iustitiam commendabant.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris liberalitatis18 est dare aliquid sine merito quam cum meritis; dicendum, quod etsi maioris liberalitatis sit ex parte dantis, non tamen est tantae gloriae et excellentiae ex parte suscipientis. Et quoniam Dominus in conferendo praemium non tantum attendit suae liberalitatis manifestationem, immo etiam gloriae nostrae promotionem; hinc est, quod maluit nobis dare aeternam beatitudinem per impletionem mandatorum et meritum obedientiae, quam nullo merito praecedente. — Praeterea, merita nostra in nullo derogant divinae liberalitati, immo potius eam manifestant, tum quia ipse bonorum nostrorum non eget19, tum quia omnia merita nostra procedunt ex munere gratiae suae. Et propterea dicit Apostolus ad Romanos sexto: Gratia Dei vita aeterna.

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Scholion

I. Licet haec quaestio specialiter agat de opportuna promulgatione Decalogi, allata tamen principia et solutiones obiectorum serviunt ad praecipua Antinomistarum sophismata solvenda, simulque eadem militant contra errores novatorum saeculi XVI, qui negabant, Christum ut Legislatorem leges evangelicas tulisse, eoque progrediebantur, ut libertatem christianam (qua liberi sumus a servitute peccati, a lege Moysaica, a spiritu timoris) detorquerent ad exemptionem Christianorum ab obligatione Decalogi. Eadem auctoris doctrina valet etiam contra Kantii figmentum, quo humanae rationi autonomiam ipsique formaliter inhaerentem auctoritatem legiferam vindicare impio et vano conatu nititur.

Eandem quaestionem, sed sumtam sensu universaliori, ut totam legem Moysaicam complectatur, solvunt Alex. Hal., Sum. p. III. q. 28. m. I, et Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Alii antiqui auctores rem tangunt passim in tractatu de legibus; cfr. S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 98. a. I, q. 99, praesertim a. 2. ad 2, et q. 100. a. 7. — Quoad solutionem ad 3. cfr. ibid. q. 93. a. 6. ad I.

Generaliter observamus, S. Bonaventuram in quaestionibus et dubiis huius distinctionis breviter exhibere substantiam diffusae disputationis, quam de Decalogo instituit Alex. Hal. (Sum. p. III. q. 19–38.) et de aliis praeceptis legis Mosaicae (ibid. q. 46. 49. 54. 55.); qui etiam de lege aeterna (ibid. q. 26.), de lege naturali (q. 27.), de lege evangelica (q. 56–60) copiose tractat.

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English Translation

Article I. On the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue.

Concerning the first point three things are asked.

Question I. Whether God ought to have imposed obligatory commandments on man.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether God ought to have imposed obligatory commandments on man. And that he ought not, it seems:

1. First, through what is said in Romans 71: Sin, taking occasion through the commandment, wrought in me all concupiscence; but God ought to impose nothing that makes for the increase of concupiscence: therefore he ought not to have obligated man through commandments.

2. Likewise, on that text of 1 Corinthians 152: The strength of sin is the law; the Gloss: « The law, by forbidding, increases the desire for sin »: if therefore God ought to impose nothing on us that makes for the increase of desire, but rather for its diminution; it seems that he ought in no way to have obligated us through commandments.

3. Likewise, Augustine says on Genesis literally3: « He judged those men better who served him freely »; but the debt of obligation is repugnant to the freedom of service: if therefore God from the beginning left man in the hand of his own counsel, giving him freedom of choice; it seems that he ought in no way to have added the obligation of a precept.

4. Likewise, he who gives some gift without a burden gives more liberally than he who gives with the imposition of a burden: if therefore the obligation of precepts is a great burden, and God is most liberal; it seems that he ought to have given grace and glory4 to man in such a way that he would not obligate him to any commandment.

On the contrary:

1. It befits the Maker to set for all his works a fixed law and limit, beyond which they ought not to advance; as is plain, since all creatures are governed according to the laws imposed on them by their Creator5: if therefore this belongs to the dignity of a creature, it seems that it was fitting and suitable that a law be imposed on man, beyond which it would not be permitted to man to advance. But this is done through obligatory commandments: therefore such commandments were to be given to man.

2. Likewise, it befits a ruler to preserve due order among his subjects6: if therefore man through the freedom of his will could become disordered, it was opportune and most suitable that he be bound to right order. But this is done through the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue: it was therefore fitting that such commandments be given to man.

3. Likewise, it is fitting that a lord exact service from his servant7; but a lord exacts service from his servant when he imposes laws and precepts on him: if therefore it was fitting that God should exact such service from man as from a servant, it was fitting that he impose obligatory commandments on him.

4. Likewise, it is fitting that a just judge repay according to merits8; but merit and demerit have no place where no obligation of law falls: if therefore it was suitable for God to judge man, on whom he had conferred free choice, according to justice, it was also fitting that he set before him a rule of justice. But this is done by the imposition of commandments: therefore etc.

Conclusion.

The Decalogue had to be given by way of precept, both because it befitted the divine equity and majesty, and because it was expedient for us, for the increasing of our glory and the preserving of peace.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt the words of the Decalogue had to be given by way of precept, in such a way that in them man should not only be instructed but also be obligated. — And the reason for this is: both because it befitted God, and because it was expedient for us.

It befitted God indeed, because in these words of the Decalogue consists the rule of justice, according as the light of right reason dictates9. And since God, as just, ought to be a zealous defender of rectitude and justice both in his subjects and in himself; hence it is that he imposed on man the laws of justice, to which he obligated him, so that it would in no way be permitted for him to transgress them with impunity. The words of the Decalogue, therefore, had to be given by way of obligation, because thus it befitted the divine equity. — Nor did it befit equity only, but rather majesty also. For just as it befits the supreme Majesty to be worshipped with all reverence by the rational creature, so too it befits that the rational creature should, for the manifestation of that supreme Majesty, do service through obedience10. And therefore it was fitting that he impose on man laws and obligatory commandments.

Now not only did it befit God, but it was also expedient for us, both for the increasing of our glory and for the preserving of peace.

For the increasing of glory indeed, because it is more glorious for man to obtain beatitude through merits than without merits11. And since, when something is repaid out of merits, in a certain way the man who merits obligates the one repaying him to himself; and it is more fitting that man be obligated to God than God to man: hence it is that with regard to the works through which it befell him to merit, man had to be obligated through precepts, so that, while obligated he obeyed, he might advance in merit and arrive at a greater accumulation of glory. — Another reason is for the preserving of peace, which « is so great a good, as Augustine says12, that all things desire peace »; but peace cannot be preserved where man usurps for himself what is another's: therefore, that peace might be preserved among men, God had to hand over commandments to man, in which he might be obligated not to usurp what is another's, but to render to God and to neighbor what was owed to them, lest otherwise, by doing injury, he break the peace, and by breaking the peace himself lose peace within himself13. — Thus therefore it was fitting that the words of the Decalogue be handed over by way of obligation and precept, both because it was fitting on the part of God, and because it was expedient on the part of us. And the reasons that show this can be granted.

To the arguments:

1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary from the authority of the Apostle, that the commandment intends concupiscence; it must be said that this holds true, but very much per accidens and occasionally. For from this, that through the Law there was knowledge of sin, yet14 through it there was no conferral of grace, with concupiscence striving toward the forbidden, and man knowingly perpetrating sin; from this there occasionally came about both the intensifying of concupiscence itself and the aggravation of sin. But this was not part of the principal intention of the one bearing the commandments, nor of the obligation of the commandments themselves. For the Lord so bestowed obligatory commandments that he was always ready to bestow helping grace for fulfilling them. Hence that concupiscence was increased through the obligation of the commandments, this was not from the commandments themselves, but rather from the negligence and fault of man; but the Lord, on account of man's negligence, ought not to have refrained from exercising diligence concerning man's salvation15.

2. To that which is objected, that the Law by forbidding increases the desire for sin; it must be said that the Gloss does not say this absolutely, but adds this condition: « unless the Spirit pour out charity16 ». Hence although the Law of itself was not useful except for knowledge, nevertheless with grace the very obligation of the commandments contributed much to salvation.

3. To that which is objected, that obligation is repugnant to freedom; it can be answered that obligation to the good is not repugnant to freedom absolutely, but is repugnant to the freedom of sinning. « But to be able to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom17 »; and therefore, since the obligation of the commandment was repugnant to the freedom of acting wrongly, it did not diminish freedom, but rather increased it. — In another way too it can be answered, that there is an obligation that takes away power, and there is an obligation that takes away impunity. The first obligation, which takes away power, diminishes freedom; but the second, which does not take away power but removes impunity, preserves freedom of choice and adds to it the equity of justice. Now in this second way the commandments of God are obligatory; and therefore they in no way derogated from freedom of choice, but rather commended the divine justice.

4. To that which is objected, that it is of greater liberality18 to give something without merit than with merits; it must be said that although it is of greater liberality on the part of the giver, nevertheless it is not of such great glory and excellence on the part of the receiver. And since the Lord, in conferring a reward, attends not only to the manifestation of his liberality, but rather also to the promotion of our glory; hence it is that he preferred to give us eternal beatitude through the fulfillment of the commandments and the merit of obedience, rather than with no merit preceding. — Moreover, our merits in no way derogate from the divine liberality, but rather manifest it, both because he himself has no need of our goods19, and because all our merits proceed from the gift of his grace. And therefore the Apostle says in Romans 6: The grace of God is life eternal.

Scholion

I. Although this question deals specially with the opportune promulgation of the Decalogue, nevertheless the principles brought forward and the solutions of the objections serve for resolving the chief sophisms of the Antinomians, and the same at once contend against the errors of the innovators of the sixteenth century, who denied that Christ as Legislator bore the evangelical laws, and went so far as to twist Christian liberty (by which we are free from the servitude of sin, from the Mosaic law, from the spirit of fear) into an exemption of Christians from the obligation of the Decalogue. The same doctrine of the author avails also against the fiction of Kant, by which he strives with impious and vain effort to claim autonomy for human reason and a law-giving authority formally inhering in it.

The same question, but taken in a more universal sense, so as to embrace the whole Mosaic law, is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Sum. p. III, q. 28, m. I, and by Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. I. — Other ancient authors touch upon the matter here and there in the treatise on laws; cf. St. Thomas, S. I-II, q. 98, a. I, q. 99, especially a. 2, ad 2, and q. 100, a. 7. — As to the solution to objection 3, cf. ibid. q. 93, a. 6, ad I.

We observe in general that St. Bonaventure, in the questions and doubts of this distinction, briefly sets forth the substance of the diffuse disputation that Alexander of Hales conducts concerning the Decalogue (Sum. p. III, q. 19–38) and concerning the other precepts of the Mosaic law (ibid. q. 46, 49, 54, 55); he also treats copiously of the eternal law (ibid. q. 26), of the natural law (q. 27), and of the evangelical law (q. 56–60).

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 14. — Minor fundatur in dicto Aristot., II. Ethic. c. I, quod legislator intendit per leges bonos reddere cives.
    Verse 14. — The minor premise is founded on the saying of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 1, that the legislator intends through laws to render the citizens good.
  2. Vers. 56. — Glossa refertur a Petr. Lombardo et a Lyrano ut ordinaria; sumta est ex August., de Perfectione iustitiae hominis, c. 6. n. 14: Quoniam Lex prohibendo auget peccati cupiditatem, nisi diffundat Spiritus caritatem etc. Cfr. XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 5.
    Verse 56. — The Gloss is reported by Peter Lombard and by Lyra as the ordinary [gloss]; it is taken from Augustine, On the Perfection of Man's Righteousness, c. 6, n. 14: Since the Law by forbidding increases the desire for sin, unless the Spirit pour out charity, etc. Cf. City of God XIII, c. 5.
  3. Haec sententia colligi posset ex iis quae lib. XI. c. 7. n. 9. seqq. proponit in solvenda quaestione, cur homo non sit talis creatus, qui nollet unquam peccare; sed si verba attendantur, invenitur in lib. de Vera Relig. c. 14. n. 27. Vide supra pag. 265, nota 7. Inferius respicitur Eccli. 15, 14.
    This sentence could be gathered from what he sets forth in book XI, c. 7, n. 9ff. in resolving the question why man was not so created that he would never will to sin; but if the words are attended to, it is found in the book On True Religion, c. 14, n. 27. See above p. 265, note 7. Below, Ecclesiasticus 15:14 is referred to.
  4. Psalm. 83, 12: Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus.
    Psalm 83:12: The Lord will give grace and glory.
  5. Secundum August., IX. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17, n. 32. Cfr. Iob 28, 26. et 38, 11, et Aristot., de Mundo, c. 7. (c. 6.), ubi dicit, hoc Deum esse in mundo, « quod in navi gubernator est, quod in curru agitator, quod in choro praecentor, quod denique lex in civitate et dux in exercitu »; et subinde ostendit, caelum, plantas, bestias regi Dei auspiciis et obtemperare divinis legibus. — Pro secundum leges cod. Z per leges. Inferius edd. fuerit pro fuit.
    According to Augustine, On Genesis Literally IX, c. 17, n. 32. Cf. Job 28:26 and 38:11, and Aristotle, On the World, c. 7 (c. 6), where he says that God is to the world « what the helmsman is in a ship, what the driver is in a chariot, what the precentor is in a choir, what finally law is in a city and the commander in an army »; and thereupon he shows that the heavens, plants, and beasts are governed under God's auspices and obey the divine laws. — For secundum leges codex Z reads per leges. Below the editions read fuerit for fuit.
  6. Cfr. Aristot., X. Ethic. c. 9; August., de Quantit. animae, c. 36. n. 80, ubi, postquam ostendit, Deum universa condita regere iuxta legem inviolabilem, et homini datum fuisse liberum arbitrium, subiungit: Nec tamen ita liberum arbitrium animae datum est, ut quodlibet eo moliens ullam partem divini ordinis legisque perturbet. Datum est enim a sapientissimo atque invictissimo totius creaturae Domino. — Codd. G Z aa rectum ordinem. In fine arg. pro dari cod. Z imponi.
    Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X, c. 9; Augustine, On the Greatness of the Soul, c. 36, n. 80, where, after showing that God governs all created things according to an inviolable law, and that free choice was given to man, he adds: Nevertheless free choice was not given to the soul in such a way that whoever attempts anything by it should disturb any part of the divine order and law. For it was given by the most wise and most invincible Lord of all creation. — Codices G Z aa read rectum ordinem. At the end of the argument, for dari codex Z reads imponi.
  7. Boeth., de Trin. c. 5, dominium definit: Potestas quaedam, qua servus coercetur. — Inferius pro imponit edd. tribuit.
    Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 5, defines lordship: A certain power by which a servant is constrained. — Below, for imponit the editions read tribuit.
  8. Vide August., I. de Ordine, c. 7. n. 19. — Finem arg. Vat. sic exhibet: ergo decens fuit, obligatoria mandata homini imponi.
    See Augustine, On Order I, c. 7, n. 19. — The Vatican edition presents the end of the argument thus: therefore it was fitting that obligatory commandments be imposed on man.
  9. Cfr. infra q. 3. — Mox respicitur Exod. 34, 14; Deut. 4, 24. et 5, 9, ubi Deus nominatur aemulator.
    Cf. below, q. 3. — Presently Exodus 34:14; Deuteronomy 4:24 and 5:9 are referred to, where God is named the jealous one.
  10. August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 11. n. 12, loquens de praecepto, quod Deus dedit Adam, ait: Oportebat autem, ut homo, sub Domino Deo positus, aliunde prohiberetur, ut ei promerendi Dominum suum virtus esset ipsa obedientia, quam possum verissime dicere solam esse virtutem omni creaturae rationali agenti sub Dei potestate... Non esset ergo, unde se homo dominium habere cogitaret atque sentiret, nisi aliquid ei iuberetur.
    Augustine, On Genesis Literally VIII, c. 11, n. 12, speaking of the precept which God gave to Adam, says: But it was fitting that man, placed under the Lord God, should be prohibited from something else, so that the virtue of meriting his Lord might be obedience itself, which I can most truly say is the only virtue for every rational creature acting under God's power... There would be, then, no source from which man might think and feel that he has a lord, unless something were commanded to him.
  11. Cfr. supra pag. 387, nota 4. — De seq. proposit. vide August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 16. n. 45.
    Cf. above p. 387, note 4. — On the following proposition see Augustine, On Free Choice III, c. 16, n. 45.
  12. Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. et 12. n. 1. — Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 cetera pro cuncta. Cfr. supra pag. 680, nota 1. Paulo inferius pro usurpat sibi cod. A usurpat aliquid, et pro servaretur cod. Z conservaretur. Subinde pro ne aliter Vat. ne alteri.
    City of God XIX, c. 11 and 12, n. 1. — Very many codices and editions 1, 2 read cetera for cuncta. Cf. above p. 680, note 1. A little below, for usurpat sibi codex A reads usurpat aliquid, and for servaretur codex Z reads conservaretur. Thereupon for ne aliter the Vatican edition reads ne alteri.
  13. August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 4. n. 15: Si autem praecepta non essent, non utique esset, ubi se homo certius inspiceret et videret, unde averteretur, quo conaretur, quare gratularetur, quid precaretur. Magna est ergo utilitas praeceptorum, si libero arbitrio tantum detur, ut gratia Dei amplius honoretur.
    Augustine, Letter 167 (otherwise 29), c. 4, n. 15: But if there were no precepts, there would surely be nothing in which a man might more surely examine himself and see from what he should turn away, toward what he should strive, for what he should give thanks, what he should pray for. Great therefore is the usefulness of the precepts, provided it be granted to free choice only so far that the grace of God may be the more honored.
  14. Edd. cum aliquot codd. cum. Paulo inferius pro nitente cod. A intense nitente, edd. 1, 2 intendit, dein pro homine scienter perpetrante peccatum non pauci codd. hominem scienter perpetrare, edd. 1, 2 melius hominem scienter fecit perpetrare.
    The editions with some codices read cum. A little below, for nitente codex A reads intense nitente, editions 1, 2 intendit; then for homine scienter perpetrante peccatum not a few codices read hominem scienter perpetrare, editions 1, 2 better hominem scienter fecit perpetrare.
  15. Haec solutio consonat cum illa expositione, quam facit August. in Expos. quarundam proposit. ex Epist. ad Rom. proposit. 37. seqq., et I. de Diversis Quaest. ad Simplic. q. I. n. I. seqq.
    This solution accords with that exposition which Augustine makes in his Exposition of Certain Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, proposition 37ff., and in book I Of Various Questions to Simplician, q. I, n. I, ff.
  16. Vide supra pag. 813, nota I. — Infra post cognitionem Vat. addit peccati.
    See above p. 813, note 1. — Below, after cognitionem the Vatican edition adds peccati.
  17. Anselm., Dialog. de lib. arb. c. I. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 613, nota 9.
    Anselm, Dialogue on Free Choice, c. 1. Cf. vol. II, p. 613, note 9.
  18. Cod. Z perfectionis; multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 hic et paulo inferius perperam libertatis.
    Codex Z reads perfectionis; many codices and editions 1, 2 here and a little below wrongly read libertatis.
  19. Respicitur Ps. 15, 2: Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. Seq. textus Scripturae est Rom. 6, 23. — August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 11. n. 24: Ille quippe nostra servitute non indiget, nos vero dominatione illius indigemus, ut operetur et custodiat nos; et ideo verus solus est Dominus, quia non illi ad suam, sed ad nostram utilitatem salutemque servimus. Nam si nobis indigeret, eo ipso non verus Dominus esset, cum per nos eius adiuvaretur necessitas, sub qua et ipse serviret. Merito ille in Psalmo: Dixi, inquit, Domino: Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges etc.
    Psalm 15:2 is referred to: Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods. The following text of Scripture is Romans 6:23. — Augustine, On Genesis Literally VIII, c. 11, n. 24: For he indeed has no need of our servitude, but we have need of his lordship, that he may work and guard us; and therefore he alone is the true Lord, because we serve not for his own benefit but for our benefit and salvation. For if he had need of us, by that very fact he would not be the true Lord, since through us his necessity would be aided, under which he himself too would be a servant. Rightly does he say in the Psalm: I said to the Lord: Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods, etc.
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