Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 27
Quaestio III. Utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsius complementum.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum contingat per gratiam mereri ipsius complementum, hoc est ipsum praemium gloriae, et hoc quantum ad meritum condigni, quia de merito congrui non est dubium. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Secundae ad Timotheum quarto1: De reliquo reposita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet mihi Dominus in illa die, iustus iudex. Si ergo quod redditur secundum iustitiam meritis debetur, et respectu eius praecessit meritum; ergo si talis corona, quam exspectabat Apostolus, est gloriae praemium, videtur, quod illud contingat mereri per gratiae donum.
2. Item, Zachariae quarto2: Adaequabit gratiam gratiae; et exponunt Sancti et doctores, quod adaequabit gratiam patriae gratiae viae. Et hoc expressius habetur Matthaei septimo: In qua mensura mensi fueritis, remetietur vobis. Si igitur ubi est adaequatio meriti et praemii, ibi contingit reperiri meritum condigni; videtur etc.
3. Item, sicut se habet culpa ad poenam, sic se habet gratia ad gloriam; sed per culpam ex condigno meretur quis aeternam damnationem: ergo per gratiam econtra ex condigno meretur quis aeternam beatitudinem.
4. Item, aeque dignus est qui vincit adversarium honore et gloria, sicut qui vincitur est dignus ignominia: si ergo ille qui permittit se a diabolo superari, dignus est aeterno improperio; videtur, quod qui vincit ex condigno mereatur regnum supernum.
5. Item, aut per servitium, quod homo facit Deo, meretur aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo stultus est qui Deo servit. Si aliquid: cum praemium sit maioris dignitatis quam meritum, et nihil sit excellentius gratia nisi gloria, et per nihil potest opus meritorium sufficienter remunerari nisi per gloriam; ergo loquendo de merito condigni, contingit per gratiam gloriam mereri.
Sed contra: 1. Ad Romanos octavo3: Non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam, quae revelabitur in nobis: ergo per eas non contingit futuram gloriam mereri merito condigni.
2. Item, ad Romanos sexto4: Stipendia peccati mors, gratia Dei vita aeterna; Glossa: « Maluit dicere, gratia Dei vita aeterna, ut intelligeremus, Deum ad vitam aeternam pro sua miseratione nos perducere, non nostris meritis »: ergo si non perducit nos nostris meritis, videtur etc.
3. Item, per rationem. Nullum servitium, quod debetur, dum redditur, obligat eum cui fit, in aliquo. Unde Dominus Lucae decimo septimo5: Quis vestrum habens servum etc.; sed homo totum, quod facit et quod potest facere, totum debet Deo: ergo videtur, quod non obliget Deum ad reddendum sibi aliquid: ergo nihil meremur apud Deum merito condigni.
4. Item, nullum servitium, quod gratis fit, obligat eum cui fit, in aliquo; sed opera facta ex gratia fiunt gratis: ergo non obligant eum cui fiunt, ad retribuendum ex debito, sed solum de congruo6: ergo idem quod prius.
5. Item, ubi est meritum ex condigno, ibi est ratio dati et accepti; sed Deus nihil potest a nobis accipere, quia bonorum nostrorum non indiget7: ergo praemium gloriae, quod est excellentissimum, non possumus ex condigno mereri apud Deum.
Conclusio.
Per gratiam praemium gloriae mereri possumus, non solum merito congrui, sed etiam merito condigni.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa istam quaestionem aliqui doctores senserunt diversimode.
Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod quia meritum condigni dicit quandam obligationem in retribuente et quandam commensurationem in servitio et retributione; et Deus non potest alicui obligari, et praemio gloriae8 nihil aliud potest commensurari: ideo dixerunt, quod nullus potest caelestem gloriam mereri ex condigno, sed si meretur, hoc tantum est ex congruo. Et ad istam suam positionem astruendam multis fulciuntur auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae et etiam expositorum, qui hoc sentire videntur.
Sed quoniam in Scriptura etiam saepe reperitur, quod Deus unicuique retribuet secundum opera sua9, et in parabola, in qua exprimitur meritum et retributio, Matthaei vigesimo, dicitur: Tolle quod tuum est etc., et plura consimilia reperiuntur; ideo alia rum positio est, quod gloriam non tantum contingit mereri merito congrui — tale enim meritum reperiri potest in gratia gratis data — sed etiam contingit mereri merito condigni, pro eo quod gratiae et gloriae quaedam est commensuratio, et in Deo quaedam cadit obligatio, non ex necessitate, sed ex sua mera benignitate, qua voluit promittere et pactum firmare cum his qui eum diligerent, quod se ipsum mercedem eis retribueret, sicut in Abraham apparet10.
Si autem velimus considerare, quis istorum modorum dicendi sit verior; inveniemus, quod secundum diversas comparationes operis meritorii reperitur in eo et meritum congrui et meritum condigni. Opus enim meritorium comparationem habet ad principium, a quo exit, et ad finem, pro quo fit, et ad statum, in quo fit. — Si loquamur de ipso per comparationem ad principium, sic opus et ortum habet a voluntate libera et ortum habet a gratia. Et in quantum ortum habet a voluntate libera, est meritorium merito congrui; sic enim quodam modo nostrum est et quasi alterius generis est, quam sit ipsum praemium, quod debet ei retribui. In quantum autem ortum habet a gratia, sic, cum gratia reddat hominem acceptum Deo et sit quid divinum, et ad hoc sit ordinata, ut ducat ad Deum; opus illud est meritorium merito condigni.
Si autem comparemus opus meritorium ad eum pro quo fit, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel ad largitatem dispensantis, vel ad veritatem pollicentis. Si comparetur ad largitatem dispensantis, sic est meritorium merito congrui; nam pro suae liberalitatis immensitate decet ipsum pro modico obsequio retribuere magnum praemium11. Si vero comparetur ad veritatem pollicentis, ex qua promisit et quodam modo se voluntarie obligavit, quod tanto operi tantum redderet12 praemium; sic opus illud meritorium est merito condigni.
Si autem tertio modo comparemus opus meritorium ad statum, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut quantum ad temporis opportunitatem, aut quantum ad operis difficultatem. Si quantum ad temporis opportunitatem, quia nunc est tempus seminandi, sicut dicit Apostolus13, et qui facit opera meritoria semen proiicit in terram bonam: congruum est, ut ex hac terra magnum fructum suscipiat. Et ideo recte Deus ei, qui in praesenti dimittit modicum, promittit reddere centuplum14. Si autem consideretur operis arduitas; quia opus tale sic est in voluntate facientis, ut sit supra vires; et homo elevetur in faciendo ipsum supra se, et bono proprio praeponat bonum aeternum: hinc est, quod tale genus operis aeterna remuneratione est dignum, et sic per ipsum mereri contingit merito condigni.
Patet igitur, quod opus meritorium, consideratum in comparatione ad voluntatis libertatem et dispensatoris liberalitatem et temporis opportunitatem, est meritorium merito congrui. Comparatum vero ad gratiae dignitatem, ad pollicentis veritatem et ad sui ipsius difficultatem, est meritorium merito condigni. — Et per hoc solvi possunt rationes et auctoritates ad utramque partem inductae, pro eo quod secundum diversas vias procedunt. Nam rationes, quae probant, quod per gratiam contingit mereri praemium aeternum merito condigni, procedunt secundum alteram istarum considerationum15. — Illa tamen ratio, quae fit de simili comparatione culpae ad poenam, ad gratiae comparationem non cogit: tum quia gloria multo plus excellit in bono, quam poena in malo: tum etiam, quia facilius est descendere quam ascendere. — Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt secundum aliam viam, videlicet prout opus habet comparari ad voluntatem nostram; sic enim non est de se sufficiens ad merendum; nam omnes iustitiae nostrae sicut pannus menstruatae16; prout etiam habet comparari ad liberalitatem divinam,
quae nulli potest obligari, sed quidquid facit ex mera liberalitate facit; et hoc modo concludunt verum, quod non sit ibi meritum condigni; aliter enim rationes illae non cogerent.
1. Nam quod dicitur, quod passiones huius temporis non sunt condignae etc.; hoc verum est, in quantum sunt passiones; sunt tamen condignae, in quantum fiunt ex caritate, quae actionibus et passionibus dat efficaciam et valorem.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non perducit nos ad gloriam nostris meritis; exponendum est, quod hoc intelligitur, secundum quod merita mere comparantur ad voluntatem nostram, non secundum quod habent ortum a gratia.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod totum, quod homo facit, debet Deo; dicendum, quod etsi opus illud sit debitum, in quantum est creaturae; est tamen gratuitum, in quantum fit ex gratia et caritate. Et ideo, sicut ratio debiti non tollit rationem gratuiti, sic etiam non tollit rationem meriti. — Et si ipse obiiciat, quod nec opus gratuitum nec debitum potest obligare Deum; dicendum, quod etsi non possit Deus nobis obligari in ratione dati et accepti, sicut ostendit etiam ratio ultima; obligari tamen dicitur quodam modo ex sua mera benignitate, qua voluit promittere se ipsum diligentibus se17. Praeterea, meritum condigni non necessario ponit obligationem in retribuente, sed ponit sufficientem ordinationem eius qui remuneratur, ad ipsam remunerationem mediante aliqua laudabili operatione. Gratia autem sufficientem ordinationem ponit in viatore ad obtinendam gloriam, tum ratione suae dignitatis, ex qua totum hominem reddit Deo et acceptum et carum, tum etiam ratione divinae pactionis, tum ratione arduae operationis, sicut prius tactum est.
4. 5. Et sic patet responsio ad duas rationes sequentes. Nam quod obiicitur: quod gratis fit, non obligat; dicendum, esto quod non obliget, propter hoc non tollitur a merito, quin possit esse condignum. Praeterea, etsi non obliget eum, cuius est retribuere et remunerare servitium sibi factum, pensata propria utilitate; obligat tamen eum quodam modo, qui retribuit, pensata servitutis fidelitate. Unde magis meretur apud Deum, qui servit ei ex amore filiali et liberali, quam qui servit ex amore mercenario, exspectans mercedem et retributionem18. — Si autem aliquis obiiciat, quod non potest ibi esse meritum condigni, quia non est ibi commensuratio; dicendum, quod etsi non sit commensuratio per omnimodam aequalitatem, est tamen commensuratio per quandam convenientem proportionabilitatem19, sicut fructus dicitur recte commensurari semini, quando tantum excedit, sicut conveniebat fecunditati seminis et terrae germinanti. Unde sicut aliquis non esset contentus, si de semine non reciperet decuplum, sic nullus posset esse contentus ex operibus meritoriis factis, nisi pro eis reciperet praemium perfectum, quod complet et terminat totum desiderium.
I. Durand. (hic q. 2.), primam opinionem (in corp.) secutus, non admisit « meritum de condigno stricte et proprie sumtum, videlicet pro actione voluntaria, propter quam debetur merces ex iustitia sic, quod, si non reddatur, ille ad quem pertinet reddere, iniuste faciat ». Haec opinio communiter, praesertim post Concilium Tridentinum, reprobatur. Cum autem inter Deum et hominem non possit esse ratio iustitiae secundum absolutam aequalitatem, sed tantum secundum quandam aequalitatem proportionis et quandam analogiam; theologi aliquatenus dissentiunt in explicanda ratione debiti et iustitiae, quae implicatur in merito de condigno; in specie disputatur, utrum ibi sit iustitia commutativa, vel distributiva, vel utraque. De illo autem debito, quod oritur ex promissione, qua Deus sibi est quasi debitor, non est difficultas, sed de alia radice debiti, quae in proportione operis meritorii ad praemium ponitur. S. Bonav. ad rem explicandam praeter pollicentis veritatem adducit gratiae dignitatem et operis arduitatem (cfr. infra d. 29. a. 3. q. 2, d. 40. a. 2. q. 1-3.). — Distinctio illa inter operis substantiam, quatenus est a libero arbitrio et non habet nisi quandam congruitatem, et opus meritorium, quatenus procedit a gratia Spiritus S., affertur etiam a S. Thoma (S. I. II. q. 114. a. 3.).
De variis speciebus meriti, praesertim de triplici specie, scilicet de merito condigni, digni et congrui, cfr. I. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 4. a. 2. q. 2, d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. — Quod merita nostra non derogent divinae liberalitati, explicatur III. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. ad ult. — Multa alia de merito invenies III. Sent. d. 18. per totam. — De acceptatione ex parte Dei cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1.
Scot., I. Sent. d. 17. q. 3. n. 22. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 3; S. I. II. q. 14. a. 3; I. q. 21. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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Question III. Whether through grace it happens that one merits its completion.
Thirdly it is asked whether it happens through grace that one merits its completion, that is, the very reward of glory, and this as regards the merit of condignity, since concerning the merit of congruity there is no doubt. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].
1. Second to Timothy, chapter four1: For the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day. If therefore what is rendered according to justice is owed to merits, and with respect to it merit went before; therefore if such a crown, which the Apostle was awaiting, is the reward of glory, it seems that it happens that one merits it through the gift of grace.
2. Likewise, Zachariah, chapter four2: He will make grace equal to grace; and the Saints and doctors expound that he will make the grace of the fatherland equal to the grace of the way. And this is had more expressly in Matthew, chapter seven: With what measure you have measured, it shall be measured back to you. If therefore where there is an equating of merit and reward, there it happens that the merit of condignity is found; it seems [so], etc.
3. Likewise, as guilt stands to punishment, so grace stands to glory; but through guilt one merits eternal damnation from condignity: therefore, conversely, through grace one merits eternal beatitude from condignity.
4. Likewise, he who conquers the adversary is equally worthy of honor and glory as he who is conquered is worthy of ignominy: if therefore he who allows himself to be overcome by the devil is worthy of eternal reproach; it seems that he who conquers merits from condignity the kingdom above.
5. Likewise, either through the service which a man does to God he merits something, or nothing. If nothing: then he is foolish who serves God. If something: since the reward is of greater dignity than the merit, and nothing is more excellent than grace except glory, and a meritorious work cannot be sufficiently rewarded by anything except by glory; therefore, speaking of the merit of condignity, it happens that one merits glory through grace.
On the contrary: 1. To the Romans, chapter eight3: The sufferings of this time are not condign [worthy] of the glory to come, which shall be revealed in us: therefore through them it does not happen that one merits the glory to come by the merit of condignity.
2. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter six4: The wages of sin is death, the grace of God life everlasting; the Gloss: « He preferred to say, the grace of God life everlasting, that we might understand that God leads us to eternal life for his mercy's sake, not by our merits »: therefore if he does not lead us by our merits, it seems [so], etc.
3. Likewise, by reason. No service which is owed, when it is rendered, obligates in anything the one to whom it is done. Hence the Lord in Luke, chapter seventeen5: Which of you having a servant etc.; but a man owes to God all that he does and all that he can do: therefore it seems that he does not obligate God to render him anything: therefore we merit nothing before God by the merit of condignity.
4. Likewise, no service which is done gratuitously obligates in anything the one to whom it is done; but works done from grace are done gratuitously: therefore they do not obligate the one to whom they are done to make return out of debt, but only out of congruity6: therefore the same as before.
5. Likewise, where there is merit from condignity, there is the account of giving and receiving; but God can receive nothing from us, since he has no need of our goods7: therefore the reward of glory, which is the most excellent thing, we cannot merit from condignity before God.
Conclusion.
Through grace we can merit the reward of glory, not only by the merit of congruity, but also by the merit of condignity.
I respond: It must be said that concerning this question certain doctors have held diverse views.
For some have wished to say that, because the merit of condignity implies a certain obligation in the one who rewards and a certain commensuration in the service and the recompense; and God cannot be obligated to anyone, and nothing else can be commensurated to the reward of glory8: therefore they said that no one can merit heavenly glory from condignity, but if he merits it, this is only from congruity. And to establish this position of theirs they are supported by many authorities of sacred Scripture and also of the expositors, who seem to hold this.
But since in Scripture it is also often found that God will render to each one according to his works9, and in the parable in which merit and recompense are expressed, in Matthew, chapter twenty, it is said: Take what is thine etc., and many like things are found; therefore there is another position, that it happens that glory is merited not only by the merit of congruity — for such merit can be found in grace gratuitously given — but also it happens that it is merited by the merit of condignity, for this reason, that there is a certain commensuration of grace and glory, and a certain obligation falls upon God, not from necessity, but from his mere benignity, by which he willed to promise and to confirm a covenant with those who would love him, that he would render himself as their reward, as appears in Abraham10.
But if we wish to consider which of these manners of speaking is truer; we shall find that according to the diverse comparisons of the meritorious work, both the merit of congruity and the merit of condignity are found in it. For the meritorious work has a comparison to the principle from which it proceeds, and to the end for which it is done, and to the state in which it is done. — If we speak of it by comparison to the principle, then the work both has its rise from free will and has its rise from grace. And insofar as it has its rise from free will, it is meritorious by the merit of congruity; for thus it is in a certain way ours and is, as it were, of another kind than the reward itself which must be rendered to it. But insofar as it has its rise from grace, then, since grace renders a man acceptable to God and is something divine, and is ordered to this, that it may lead to God; that work is meritorious by the merit of condignity.
But if we compare the meritorious work to him for whom it is done, this can be in two ways: either to the bounty of the one dispensing, or to the truth of the one promising. If it is compared to the bounty of the one dispensing, then it is meritorious by the merit of congruity; for on account of the immensity of his liberality it is fitting for him to render a great reward for a slight service11. But if it is compared to the truth of the one promising, by which he promised and in a certain way voluntarily obligated himself that to so great a work he would render so great a reward12; then that work is meritorious by the merit of condignity.
But if in a third manner we compare the meritorious work to the state, this can be in two ways: either as regards the opportuneness of the time, or as regards the difficulty of the work. If as regards the opportuneness of the time, since now is the time of sowing, as the Apostle says13, and he who does meritorious works casts seed into good ground: it is congruous that from this ground he should receive great fruit. And therefore God rightly promises to render a hundredfold to him who in the present remits a little14. But if the arduousness of the work is considered; since such a work is in the will of the doer in such a way that it is above his powers; and a man is lifted up in doing it above himself, and prefers the eternal good to his own good: hence it is that such a kind of work is worthy of eternal remuneration, and thus through it one happens to merit by the merit of condignity.
It is therefore clear that the meritorious work, considered in comparison to the freedom of the will and the liberality of the dispenser and the opportuneness of the time, is meritorious by the merit of congruity. But compared to the dignity of grace, to the truth of the one promising, and to its own difficulty, it is meritorious by the merit of condignity. — And by this can be resolved the reasons and authorities adduced for either side, for this reason, that they proceed by diverse ways. For the reasons which prove that through grace it happens that one merits the eternal reward by the merit of condignity, proceed according to one of these considerations15. — That reason, however, which is made from the similar comparison of guilt to punishment, does not compel for the comparison of grace: both because glory excels much more in the good than punishment in the evil: and also because it is easier to descend than to ascend. — But the reasons to the contrary proceed by another way, namely insofar as the work has to be compared to our will; for thus it is not of itself sufficient for meriting; for all our justices are as the rag of a menstruous woman16; and also insofar as it has to be compared to the divine liberality,
which can be obligated to no one, but whatever it does it does from mere liberality; and in this manner they conclude truly that there is no merit of condignity there; for otherwise those reasons would not compel.
1. For as to what is said, that the sufferings of this time are not condign etc.; this is true insofar as they are sufferings; yet they are condign insofar as they are done from charity, which gives efficacy and worth to actions and sufferings.
2. To that which is objected, that God does not lead us to glory by our merits; it must be explained that this is understood according as the merits are compared merely to our will, not according as they have their rise from grace.
3. To that which is objected, that all that a man does he owes to God; it must be said that although that work is owed, insofar as it is the creature's; yet it is gratuitous, insofar as it is done from grace and charity. And therefore, just as the account of debt does not take away the account of the gratuitous, so neither does it take away the account of merit. — And if one objects that neither a gratuitous work nor a debt can obligate God; it must be said that although God cannot be obligated to us in the account of giving and receiving, as the last reason also shows; yet he is said to be obligated in a certain way from his mere benignity, by which he willed to promise himself to those who love him17. Moreover, the merit of condignity does not necessarily posit an obligation in the one who rewards, but it posits a sufficient ordination of him who is rewarded toward the reward itself, through the mediation of some praiseworthy operation. But grace posits a sufficient ordination in the wayfarer toward obtaining glory, both by reason of its dignity, by which it renders the whole man both acceptable and dear to God, and also by reason of the divine covenant, and by reason of the arduous operation, as was touched on before.
4. 5. And thus appears the response to the two following reasons. For as to what is objected: that what is done gratuitously does not obligate; it must be said that, granted that it does not obligate, on account of this it is not taken from merit, so that it cannot be condign. Moreover, although it does not obligate him whose [office] it is to repay and reward a service done to him, his own utility being weighed; yet it obligates in a certain way the one who rewards, the faithfulness of the service being weighed. Hence he merits more before God who serves him out of filial and liberal love than he who serves out of mercenary love, awaiting wages and recompense18. — But if anyone objects that there cannot be merit of condignity there, since there is no commensuration there; it must be said that although there is no commensuration through every kind of equality, yet there is commensuration through a certain fitting proportionability19, just as fruit is rightly said to be commensurated to the seed, when it exceeds it by as much as befitted the fecundity of the seed and the germinating earth. Hence just as someone would not be content if he did not receive tenfold from the seed, so no one could be content from the meritorious works done, unless for them he received the perfect reward, which completes and terminates the whole desire.
I. Durandus (here, q. 2), following the first opinion (in the body [of the article]), did not admit « merit of condignity taken strictly and properly, namely for a voluntary action on account of which a wage is owed from justice in such a way that, if it be not rendered, the one to whom it pertains to render it acts unjustly ». This opinion is commonly, especially after the Council of Trent, reproved. But since between God and man there cannot be an account of justice according to absolute equality, but only according to a certain equality of proportion and a certain analogy; theologians dissent to some extent in explaining the account of debt and justice which is implied in merit of condignity; in particular it is disputed whether there is there commutative justice, or distributive, or both. But concerning that debt which arises from a promise, by which God is as it were a debtor to himself, there is no difficulty, but [the difficulty is] concerning the other root of debt, which is posited in the proportion of the meritorious work to the reward. St. Bonaventure, to explain the matter, besides the truth of the one promising, adduces the dignity of grace and the arduousness of the work (cf. below, d. 29, a. 3, q. 2, d. 40, a. 2, q. 1-3). — That distinction between the substance of the work, insofar as it is from free choice and has only a certain congruity, and the meritorious work, insofar as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, is also brought forward by St. Thomas (S. I-II, q. 114, a. 3).
Concerning the various species of merit, especially the threefold species, namely of the merit of condignity, of dignity, and of congruity, cf. I Sent., d. 41, a. 1, q. 1; III Sent., d. 4, a. 2, q. 2, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2. — That our merits do not derogate from the divine liberality is explained in III Sent., d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, ad ult. — Many other things concerning merit you will find in III Sent., d. 18, throughout. — Concerning acceptation on the part of God, cf. below, d. 29, a. 1, q. 1.
Scotus, I Sent., d. 17, q. 3, n. 22. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 3; S. I-II, q. 14, a. 3; I, q. 21, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.
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- Vers. 8: In reliquo etc. Circa finem arg. pro gloriae praemium ed. 1 gratiae praemium.[2 Tim. 4,] v. 8: For the rest etc. Near the end of the argument, for the reward of glory edition 1 reads the reward of grace.
- Vers. 7: Et exaequabit etc. — Ad hunc locum explicandum Haymo, Enarrat. in Zach. Proph., recurrit ad Ioan. 1, 16, dicens: « Quod vero sequitur: exaequabit gratiam gratiae eius, illud est quod Apostolus ait: Nos omnes de plenitudine eius accepimus gratiam pro gratia ». Sed hunc locum Apostoli August., in Ioan. Evang. tract. 3. n. 9. seq. exponit, ut in arg. dicitur. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 6. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 2.[Zach. 4,] v. 7: And he shall make equal etc. — To explain this passage Haymo, Commentary on the Prophet Zachariah, has recourse to John 1:16, saying: « What in fact follows, he shall make grace equal to his grace, is that which the Apostle says: We all have received of his fullness, grace for grace ». But Augustine expounds this Apostolic passage in Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 3, n. 9 f., as is said in the argument. Cf. IV Sent., d. 49, p. I, q. 6. — The following text is loc. cit., v. 2.
- Vers. 18.[Rom. 8,] v. 18.
- Vers. 23. — Glossa, quae hic affertur et habetur apud Petrum Lombardum et Lyranum (in hunc loc.), sumta est ex August., de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 9. n. 21. Cfr. eius Epist. 194. (alias 105.) c. 5. n. 19. seqq.[Rom. 6,] v. 23. — The Gloss which is here adduced and is found in Peter Lombard and Lyranus (on this passage) is taken from Augustine, On Grace and Free Choice, c. 9, n. 21. Cf. his Letter 194 (otherwise 105), c. 5, n. 19 ff.
- Vers. 7. seqq., super quem locum (v. 10.) Glossa ordinaria: Ne quis de suis operibus glorietur, sed quanto fides est foris virtutibus excellentior, tanto conscientia intus sit humilior, quia Domino iure debemus obsequium.[Luke 17,] v. 7 ff., on which passage (v. 10) the Ordinary Gloss [reads]: Lest anyone glory in his own works; but the more faith is outwardly more excellent than virtues, the more the conscience within should be humbler, since by right we owe obedience to the Lord.
- Codd. I V interiiciunt redit.Codices I, V insert he returns [redit].
- Psalm. 15, 2: Quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. — Beda, V. Expos. in Luc. 17, 10. ait: Servi inutiles sumus: servi quidem, quia pretio empti estis; inutiles vero, quia Dominus bonorum vestrorum non indiget. Deinde addit: Aliter: Servi inutiles sumus, quia non sunt condignae passiones etc. Et alibi: Qui coronat me in miseratione et misericordia (Ps. 102, 4.). — Mox pro praemium gloriae codd. F K T Y ee et nonnulli alii cum primis edd. praemium gratiae.Psalm 15:2: For thou hast no need of my goods. — Bede, Exposition on Luke 17:10, says: We are unprofitable servants: servants indeed, because you are bought with a price; unprofitable truly, because the Lord has no need of your goods. Then he adds: Otherwise: We are unprofitable servants, because the sufferings are not condign etc. And elsewhere: Who crowns me in compassion and mercy (Ps. 102:4). — Further, for the reward of glory codices F, K, T, Y, ee and some others, with the first editions, read the reward of grace.
- Plures codd., inter quos sunt H K T bb, cum edd. 2, 3, 4 gratiae.Several codices, among which are H, K, T, bb, with editions 2, 3, 4, read of grace.
- Matth. 16, 27: Et tunc reddet unicuique secundum opera eius. Rom. 2, 6. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 14.Matthew 16:27: And then he will render to each one according to his works. Rom. 2:6. — The following text is loc. cit., v. 14.
- Gen. 15, 1: Noli timere, Abram, ego protector tuus sum et merces tua magna nimis. — Paulo superius pro firmare plures codd., ut F I W Z, confirmare; deinde dedd., excepta 1, diligunt pro diligerent, et codd. I K Y aa cum ed. 1 tribueret pro retribueret.Gen. 15:1: Fear not, Abram, I am thy protector and thy reward exceeding great. — A little above, for to confirm [firmare] several codices, such as F, I, W, Z, read confirmare; then the editions, except 1, read they love [diligunt] for they would love [diligerent], and codices I, K, Y, aa with ed. 1 read he would bestow [tribueret] for he would render [retribueret].
- Anselm., Proslog. c. 10: Ita iustus es, non quia nobis reddas debitum, sed quia facis quod te decet, summe bonum.Anselm, Proslogion c. 10: Thus thou art just, not because thou renderest a debt to us, but because thou doest what befits thee, O highest good.
- Codd. H T Y bb et ed. 2 reddet.Codices H, T, Y, bb and ed. 2 read he will render [reddet].
- Epist. II. Cor. 9, 6; Gal. 6, 8. — De seqq. vide Matth. 13, 18. seqq.; Marc. 4, 26. seqq.; Luc. 8, 11. seqq.2 Cor. 9:6; Gal. 6:8. — On what follows see Matthew 13:18 ff.; Mark 4:26 ff.; Luke 8:11 ff.
- Matth. 19, 29.Matthew 19:29.
- Codd. K W Y aa bb etc. cum ed. 1 considerationem.Codices K, W, Y, aa, bb etc., with ed. 1, read consideration [singular].
- Isai. 64, 6: Et quasi pannus menstruatae universae iustitiae nostrae.Isaiah 64:6: And all our justices [are] as the rag of a menstruous woman.
- Iac. 1, 12: Beatus vir... accipiet coronam vitae, quam repromisit Deus diligentibus se.James 1:12: Blessed is the man... he shall receive the crown of life, which God has promised to those who love him.
- Cfr. Bernard., Epist. 11. n. 3. seq.Cf. Bernard, Letter 11, n. 3 f.
- In multis codd. lectio est dubia, siquidem propter abbreviationem pro proportionabilitatem etiam legi potest proportionalitatem. Mox pro quando tantum codd. C H L O R S T V quando enim.In many codices the reading is doubtful, since on account of the abbreviation, for proportionability one can also read proportionality. Further, for when [it exceeds] by as much codices C, H, L, O, R, S, T, V read when in fact. ---