Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 28, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 28

Textus Latinus

p. 690

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit, redarguens verbum Pelagii: Gratiam libero arbitrio infideli calliditate supponebat dicens, ad hoc eam dari hominibus etc. Videtur enim, quod verum diceret Pelagius. Si enim gratia habitus est, et omnis habitus reddit potentiam facilem; videtur, quod ad hoc detur gratia libero arbitrio, ut facilius possit exire in bona opera. Si tu dicas, quod in hoc non repellit eum¹, sed in hoc quod negabat², quod nullum posse libero arbitrio conferebat; videtur, quod in hoc etiam verum dicebat, quoniam, si solius potentiae est posse, et gratia non est potentia: ergo non dat novum posse. — Item, nullus alius habitus affert novam³ potentiam ei in quo est: ergo videtur, quod nec gratia; aut si in gratia hoc est, quaero: quare magis in ipsa quam in aliis?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quidam est habitus, qui ortum habet a potentia, sicut ille qui per assuefactionem acquiritur ab eo in quo est; et de tali habitu verum est, quod non dat novam potentiam, sed priorem potentiam habilitat. Est et alius habitus, qui desursum descendit et non solum dependet ab eo in quo, sed magis ab eo a quo; et talis habitus habet potentiam nobilitare⁴, et potest etiam illud, in quo est, p. 691 movere et supra se elevare, ratione illius a quo procedit; et talis habitus est ipsa gratia⁵. Et quoniam Pelagius non attribuebat plus habitui gratiae quam aliis habitibus, hinc est, quod Augustinus et Magister arguunt eum tanquam haereticum. — Et per hoc patent ea quae obiecta sunt.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod reprehendit Pelagium in littera, in hoc scilicet quod dicebat, gratiam Dei, qua liberantur homines ab impietate, secundum merita dari. Videtur enim, quod verum diceret, per illud quod dicit Hieronymus de filio prodigo⁶: « Nulla maior iustitia est quam ignoscere poenitenti et ad misericordiam revertenti misericordiae sinum aperire ». Si ergo iustitia retribuit unicuique secundum merita⁷, videtur, quod homo revertendo ad divinam misericordiam mereatur sibi gratiam Dei. — Item, nos videmus, quod homo potest mereri gratiam hominis per obsequia sibi impensa: ergo pari ratione videtur, et multo fortius, quod mereri possit gratiam Dei.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod gratiam primam non contingit mereri, tum quia⁸ est fundamentum omnis meriti et principium, tum etiam, quia est donum pure gratuitum. Nisi enim quis habeat gratiam Dei, nihil apud Deum mereri potest merito condigni, quia sine illa nihil acceptat Deus in operibus nostris. Rursus, ipsa est ita donum gratuitum, quod non redditur meritis. Sicut enim dicit Apostolus ad Romanos undecimo⁹: Si gratia est ex meritis, iam gratia non est gratia. — Et ex hoc patet, quantum Pelagius adversabatur divinae gratiae, qui dicebat, aliquem eam posse mereri. Auferebat enim ipsi gratiae suam dignitatem et excellentiam, dum eam meritis liberi arbitrii supponebat. Auferebat etiam suam efficaciam, dum potestatem merendi alii quam gratiae attribuebat.

Ad illud verbum Hieronymi dicendum, quod iustitia ibi dicitur divinae bonitatis condecentia, non prout respicit meritorum exigentiam¹⁰.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de gratia hominis, dicendum, quod non est simile: tum quia acceptatio hominis non est ita mere gratuita, sicut divina; tum etiam, quia non est ita aequa ponderatrix, sicut illa.

Si autem quaeratur, utrum aliquis in statu gratiae existens possit sibi mereri primam gratiam post recidivum, et hoc orando et petendo, ut si caderet, Deus illum¹¹ relevaret; dicendum, quod non potest ex merito condigni, sed solum ex merito congrui. Nam meritum condigni implicat perseverantiam, pro eo quod peccatum subsequens mortificat et in oblivionem ducit bona opera prius facta¹².

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Pelagii, quod ponit Magister in littera: Si non potest homo facere ea quae iubentur, non est imputandum ei ad mortem. Videtur enim, quod verum dicat Pelagius, quamvis Magister contradicat. Nam Hieronymus¹³ dicit: « Anathema sit qui dicit, Deum praecepisse impossibile »: ergo si praecepit homini habenti liberum arbitrium, videtur, quod Pelagius verum dicat. Item, Augustinus in quodam Sermone¹⁴: « Servum pigrum non damnaret, si ea quae fieri non poterant, imperaret »: ergo redit idem quod prius.

Quaeritur ergo, pro quanto verbum illud habeat veritatem, quod « nullus peccat in eo quod non potest facere, vel vitare¹⁵ ».

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod posse aliquid facere, vel vitare dupliciter alicui potest attribui. Uno modo dicitur aliquis aliquid posse, quia per se ipsum sine aliquo alieno suffragio potest illud, sicut aliquis potest comedere, cum est sanus et habet cibum. Alio modo dicitur aliquis aliquid posse, non solum quia potest illud per se et in se, sed quia potest cum alio, quod sibi praesto est; et hoc modo accipiendo posse, omne quod Deus praecipit, in nostra potestate est, quia ipse qui praecipit, praesto est praebere gratiam adiuvantem, per quam possumus perficere; alio¹⁶ modo accipiendo posse, non omne quod praecipit est in nostra potestate. Nec tamen ex hoc excusatur aliquis: sicut si praeciperet dominus servo, quod daret sibi ad bibendum, et ipse non haberet aquam, si posset eam acquirere, non excusaretur; sic et in proposito intelligendum est. — Secundo modo accipiendo posse, sive aliquis possit in se, sive per divinum auxilium, intelligit Augustinus¹⁷, et hoc insinuat eius verbum: p. 692 « Quis, inquit, peccat in eo, quod nullo modo evitari potest »? Et sic intellexit etiam Hieronymus, cum dixit, illum « esse anathema, qui dicit, Deum praecepisse impossibile ». Pelagius autem accepit primo modo, et ideo erravit et plus attribuit libero arbitrio, quam posset. — Aliter etiam consuevit responderi, quod praedicta verba intelliguntur de impotentia naturali, non de illa impotentia, in quam homo ex culpa sua se ipsum intrusit: sicut Anselmus¹⁸ ponit exemplum de servo, qui debuit ire ad nundinas et praecipitavit se ipsum in foveam. Sed primus modus exponendi errorem Pelagii magis excludit.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod Augustinus dicit in littera: Nihil tam est in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas. Hoc enim videtur esse falsum per experientiam. Facilius enim est homini ieiunare et magnos labores sustinere quam inimicum suum diligere; facilius est etiam omnia bona sua dispergere quam voluntatem suam subiugare. Item, si hoc verum esset, ergo videtur, quod cum bonitas hominis consistat in voluntate, quod homo posset se facere talem, qualem vellet.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dici potest, quod illud intelligitur cum¹⁹ auxilio gratiae Dei, pro eo quod bona voluntas quantum ad actum volendi non recipit impedimentum, si habeat auxilium gratiae, sed quantum ad opus exterius impedimentum recipit. Unde omnia bona possumus velle, non tamen omnia facere. Et sic videtur Augustinus intelligere, includendo auxilium gratiae, non excludendo, sicut excludebat Pelagius²⁰.

Aliter potest responderi, quod velle in nobis dupliciter accipitur: uno modo, ut nominat actum potentiae affectivae, ut est quaedam potentia naturalis; alio modo, ut nominat actum liberi arbitrii. Primo modo velle aliquid idem est quod affici circa illud; alio modo velle idem est quod eligere²¹. Unde secundum hos duos actus distinguitur in nobis voluntas appetitus et voluntas eligentiae; non quia sint in nobis istae duae voluntates essentialiter differentes, sed quia modus volendi est aliter et aliter. Dico ergo, quod verbum Augustini non intelligitur de voluntate appetitus, quae aliquando adeo adhaeret alicui rei, ut vix vel nunquam possit ab ea separari; sed hoc intelligitur de voluntate eligentiae, qua aliquis vult, se velle quod vult, vel nolle²². Et hoc semper in nostra potestate est; non tamen sequitur ex hoc, quod iustitia sit in nostra voluntate, quia non est efficax, nisi in quantum praevalet voluntati appetitus; et illi non praevalet nisi per gratiam. Unde multi sunt peccatores, qui vellent esse iusti, et vellent, quod nunquam affectarent mala: nihilominus tamen in sua remanent iniustitia, quia non adiuvantur a gratia divina²³.

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English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what he says, refuting the word of Pelagius: He cunningly substituted grace for the unbelieving free choice, saying that it is given to men for this purpose, etc. For it seems that Pelagius spoke truly. For if grace is a habit, and every habit renders a power facile, it seems that grace is given to free choice for this, that it may more easily go forth into good works. But if you say that he does not rebuke him in this¹, but in that he denied² that he conferred any power upon free choice, it seems that in this too he spoke truly, since, if "to be able" belongs to power alone, and grace is not a power, then it gives no new power. — Likewise, no other habit brings a new³ power to that in which it is: therefore it seems that neither does grace; or if this is the case with grace, I ask: why rather in it than in others?

I respond: It must be said that there is a certain habit which has its origin from a power, like that which is acquired by habituation in the one in whom it is; and concerning such a habit it is true that it does not give a new power, but renders the prior power apt. And there is another habit which descends from above and depends not only on that in which it is, but more on that from which it is; and such a habit has the property of ennobling⁴ a power, and can also p. 691 move and elevate above itself that in which it is, by reason of that from which it proceeds; and such a habit is grace itself⁵. And because Pelagius did not attribute more to the habit of grace than to other habits, hence it is that Augustine and the Master argue against him as a heretic. — And through this what was objected is clear.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he reproves in Pelagius in the text, namely in this, that he said that the grace of God, by which men are freed from impiety, is given according to merits. For it seems that he spoke truly, by that which Jerome says concerning the prodigal son⁶: « There is no greater justice than to pardon the penitent and to open the bosom of mercy to one returning to mercy ». If therefore justice renders to each one according to merits⁷, it seems that a man, by returning to the divine mercy, merits for himself the grace of God. — Likewise, we see that a man can merit the favor of a man by services rendered to him: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems, and much more strongly, that he can merit the grace of God.

I respond: It must be said that first grace cannot be merited, both because⁸ it is the foundation and principle of all merit, and also because it is a purely gratuitous gift. For unless one has the grace of God, he can merit nothing before God by condign merit, since without it God accepts nothing in our works. Again, it is so a gratuitous gift that it is not given in return for merits. For as the Apostle says to the Romans, in the eleventh chapter⁹: If grace is from merits, then grace is no longer grace. — And from this it is clear how greatly Pelagius opposed the divine grace, who said that someone could merit it. For he took away from grace itself its dignity and excellence, when he made it depend on the merits of free choice. He took away also its efficacy, when he attributed the power of meriting to another than to grace.

To that word of Jerome it must be said that justice is there called a befittingness of the divine goodness, not insofar as it regards the requirement of merits¹⁰.

To that which is objected concerning the favor of a man, it must be said that it is not similar: both because the acceptance of a man is not so purely gratuitous as the divine, and also because it is not so equal a weigher as that.

But if it be asked whether one existing in the state of grace can merit for himself first grace after a relapse, and this by praying and asking that, if he should fall, God would¹¹ raise him up; it must be said that he cannot by merit of condignity, but only by merit of congruity. For merit of condignity implies perseverance, since a subsequent sin mortifies and leads into oblivion the good works previously done¹².

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of Pelagius, which the Master sets down in the text: If a man cannot do those things which are commanded, it is not to be imputed to him unto death. For it seems that Pelagius speaks truly, although the Master contradicts. For Jerome¹³ says: « Let him be anathema who says that God commanded the impossible »: therefore if He commanded a man having free choice, it seems that Pelagius speaks truly. Likewise, Augustine in a certain Sermon¹⁴: « He would not condemn the lazy servant, if He commanded things that could not be done »: therefore the same returns as before.

It is asked therefore, to what extent that word has truth, namely that « no one sins in that which he cannot do, or avoid¹⁵ ».

I respond: It must be said that to be able to do, or avoid something can be attributed to someone in two ways. In one way someone is said to be able to do something, because by himself, without any external help, he can do it, as someone can eat when he is healthy and has food. In another way someone is said to be able to do something, not only because he can do it by himself and in himself, but because he can do it together with another which is at hand to him; and taking posse in this way, everything which God commands is in our power, because He who commands is at hand to furnish the helping grace through which we are able to accomplish it; taking posse in another¹⁶ way, not everything which He commands is in our power. Nor yet is anyone thereby excused: just as if a master should command a servant to give him something to drink, and the servant had no water, if he could acquire it he would not be excused; so it must be understood in the case at hand. — Taking posse in the second way, whether one can do it in himself or through divine help, Augustine understands¹⁷, and his word suggests this: p. 692 « Who, he says, sins in that which can in no way be evaded »? And so Jerome too understood, when he said that he is « anathema who says that God commanded the impossible ». But Pelagius took it in the first way, and therefore he erred and attributed more to free choice than it could do. — In another way also it has been customary to respond, that the aforesaid words are understood of natural incapacity, not of that incapacity into which a man has thrust himself by his own fault: as Anselm¹⁸ gives the example of the servant who had to go to the market and threw himself headlong into a pit. But the first manner of explaining excludes the error of Pelagius more.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says in the text: Nothing is so much in our power as the will itself. For this seems to be false by experience. For it is easier for a man to fast and to bear great labors than to love his enemy; it is easier also to scatter all his goods than to subdue his own will. Likewise, if this were true, then it seems that, since the goodness of a man consists in the will, a man could make himself such as he would will.

I respond: To this it can be said that this is understood with¹⁹ the help of the grace of God, for this reason, that a good will, as to the act of willing, does not receive an impediment, if it has the help of grace, but as to the exterior work it does receive an impediment. Hence we can will all good things, but not do them all. And thus Augustine seems to understand it, by including the help of grace, not excluding it, as Pelagius excluded it²⁰.

In another way it can be responded that to will is taken in us in two ways: in one way, as it names the act of the affective power, which is a certain natural power; in another way, as it names the act of free choice. In the first way to will something is the same as to be affected about it; in the other way to will is the same as to choose²¹. Hence according to these two acts the will of appetite and the will of choice are distinguished in us; not because these two wills are essentially different in us, but because the manner of willing is in one way and in another. I say therefore that the word of Augustine is not understood of the will of appetite, which sometimes adheres so much to some thing that it can scarcely or never be separated from it; but this is understood of the will of choice, by which one wills, to will what he wills, or to nill²². And this is always in our power; yet it does not follow from this that justice is in our will, because it is not efficacious except insofar as it prevails over the will of appetite; and it does not prevail over the latter except through grace. Hence there are many sinners who would wish to be just, and would wish that they might never crave evils: nevertheless they remain in their injustice, because they are not helped by the divine grace²³.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
See the scholion to the preceding question.
Supple cum cod. V gratia. Vat. sic: non reprehendit eum, sed in hoc quod asserebat, scilicet quod. Pro repellit cod. M refellit.
Supply with codex V gratia. The Vatican edition thus: non reprehendit eum, sed in hoc quod asserebat, scilicet quod. For repellit codex M reads refellit.
Edd., excepta I, omittunt novam, et pro affert ponunt aufert.
The editions, except the first, omit novam, and for affert put aufert.
Cod. F et nobiliorem facere.
Codex F: et nobiliorem facere.
Vide supra d. 26. q. 3. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 2.
See above, d. 26, q. 3. — Compare on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 2.
Epist. 21. ad Damasum de Duobus Filiis, n. 34: Porro, quae maior iustitia Dei, quam ignoscere poenitentibus, filium suscipere redeuntem?
Letter 21, to Damasus, On the Two Sons, n. 34: For what greater justice of God is there than to pardon the penitent, to receive back the returning son?
Cfr. Aristot., V. Ethic. c. 5.
Compare Aristotle, Ethics V, c. 5.
Codd. Y aa addunt ipsa.
Codices Y aa add ipsa.
Vers. 6: Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia. — Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.
Verse 6: But if by grace, then not now by works; otherwise grace is no more grace. — Compare above, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1.
Vide verbum Anselmi supra pag. 667, nota 4.
See the word of Anselm above, page 667, note 4.
Cod. cc et ed. 1. ipsum.
Codex cc and the first edition: ipsum.
Ezech. 18, 24: Si autem averterit se iustus a iustitia sua... omnes iustitiae eius, quas fecerat, non recordabuntur. — Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 2. § 2.
Ezekiel 18:24: But if the just man turn himself away from his justice... all his justices which he had done shall not be remembered. — Compare above, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 61, m. 3, a. 2, § 2.
In Explanat. Symboli ad Damasum: Exsecramur etiam eorum blasphemiam, qui dicunt, impossibile aliquid homini a Deo praeceptum esse.
In the Exposition of the Creed to Damasus: We also execrate the blasphemy of those who say that anything impossible has been commanded to man by God.
Serm. 54. (alias 2. de Verbis Domini) c. 2. n. 2.
Sermon 54 (otherwise 2, On the Words of the Lord), c. 2, n. 2.
August., 1. Retract. c. 9. n. 5, et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 50: Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest? Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
Augustine, Retractations I, c. 9, n. 5, and On Free Choice III, c. 18, n. 50: For who sins in that which can in no way be guarded against? Compare here the Master's text, c. 3.
Intellige cum Vat. primo.
Understand with the Vatican edition primo.
Qui in eodem sensu in libro de Natura et gratia, contra Pelagium, c. 43. n. 50. dicit: Non igitur Deus impossibilia iubet; sed iubendo admonet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis. Cfr. ibid. c. 15. n. 16. — Paulo ante plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 3, 4 Primo modo pro Secundo modo; non recte; Vat. nec unum nec alterum exhibet.
Who, in the same sense, in the book On Nature and Grace, against Pelagius, c. 43, n. 50, says: God therefore does not command impossible things; but by commanding He admonishes both to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot. Compare the same, c. 15, n. 16. — A little before, very many codices, with editions 1, 3, 4, read Primo modo for Secundo modo; not rightly; the Vatican edition exhibits neither one nor the other.
Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 24. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
[Anselm,] Cur Deus homo, Book I, c. 24. — Compare on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.
Edd., excepta I, de.
The editions, except the first, read de.
Vide August., I. Retract. c. 9. n. 4.
See Augustine, Retractations I, c. 9, n. 4.
Cfr. Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. qu. 3. c. 11, ubi voluntatem distinguit in voluntatem-affectionem et voluntatem-usum. Cfr. supra pag. 683, nota 3.
Compare Anselm, On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice, qu. 3, c. 11, where he distinguishes the will into will-as-affection and will-as-use. Compare above, page 683, note 3.
Cod. O bene adiungit quod non vult. Subinde pro Et hoc codd. C R S et alii Et haec, scil. voluntas eligentiae. Mox pro in nostra voluntate codd. E cc et ed. 1 in nostra potestate, cod. B in nostra potestate et voluntate.
Codex O well adds quod non vult. Then for Et hoc codices C R S and others read Et haec, namely the will of choice. Soon for in nostra voluntate codices E cc and the first edition read in nostra potestate, codex B in nostra potestate et voluntate.
Hoc dubium solvunt etiam Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 8.
This doubt is also resolved by Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 8.

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