Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24
Articulus II. De divisione potentiarum animae.
Quaestio III. Utrum divisio voluntatis per naturalem et deliberativam sit per diversas potentias.
Tertio quaeritur de illa divisione potentiarum animae, quae quidem est per naturale et deliberativum; et quaeritur, utrum divisio voluntatis per naturalem et deliberativam sit per diversas potentias. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Damascenus1, cum dividit potentias animae, primo dividit in thelesin et bulesin, id est in naturalem et deliberativam, et postea subdividit per alias potentias: ergo si maior differentia est inter prima membra, videtur, quod naturalis voluntas et deliberativa sit potentia alia et alia.
2. Item, divisio substantiae per rationale et non-rationale variat ipsam per essentiam, ergo divisio potentiae per huiusmodi differentias facit potentias essentialiter differre; sed talis est divisio potentiarum animae per naturalem et deliberativam: ergo etc. Minor probatur per hoc, quod, sicut dicit Philosophus2, « rationales potentiae sunt ad opposita »; sed quando aliqua potentia naturaliter movetur ad aliquid, non movetur ad oppositum: ergo potentia, ut est naturalis, non est rationalis.
3. Item, cum dividimus creaturam per corruptibilem et incorruptibilem, diversificamus eam essentialiter: ergo pari ratione, cum dividimus potentiam per mutabilem et immutabilem, eam essentialiter variamus; sed potentia, quae movetur naturaliter ad suum obiectum, movetur uniformiter, deliberativa vero vertibiliter: ergo etc.
4. Item, potentia, in qua communicamus cum brutis, non potest esse eadem cum potentia, in qua differimus; sed in naturali appetitu cum brutis convenimus, et in rationali differimus: ergo etc. Sicut enim bruta naturaliter appetunt sui esse conservationem, sic et nos appetimus.
Sed contra: 1. Potentiae, quae habent idem obiectum et sub eadem ratione, non habent diversitatem3; sed naturalis voluntas et deliberativa idem habent pro obiecto, videlicet bonum — naturaliter enim bonum appetimus, et ex deliberatione etiam, cum bene ordinati sumus — ergo etc.
2. Item, potentia, quae ordinat in finem et in id quod est ad finem4, non est alia et alia; p. 566 sed voluntas nostra, ut est in finem, est naturalis, quia naturaliter unusquisque appetit beatitudinem; ut est in rem ordinatam ad finem, est deliberativa: ergo etc.
3. Item, eadem potentia cognitiva est, qua cognoscimus aliquid naturaliter, et per acquisitionem: ergo pari ratione eadem est voluntas, qua aliquid appetimus per naturalem instinctum, et per deliberationis arbitrium.
4. Item, omne quod est aliqua natura, habet operationem naturalem5; sed voluntas deliberativa est aliqua natura: ergo habet operationem naturalem. Sed voluntatis actus est velle, ergo voluntas deliberativa aliquid vult naturaliter; sed voluntas, quae vult aliquid naturaliter, est naturalis: ergo voluntas deliberativa est voluntas naturalis.
Conclusio
Conclusio. Voluntas naturalis et deliberativa, quatenus differunt in modo appetendi, non sunt diversae potentiae, sed una, diversimode tamen movens.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dividimus appetitum in naturalem et deliberativum, sive6 quamcumque aliam potentiam; hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod appetitus naturalis et deliberativus diversitatem habeant in obiectis, utpote cum unum est appetibile solum a substantia rationali, aliud autem est appetibile a brutali. Et hoc modo bene contingit, naturalem potentiam et deliberativam esse diversas potentias8. — Alio modo potest dividi appetitus sive potentia in naturalem et deliberativam, ita tamen, quod non sit differentia in obiectis, sed in modo appetendi; ut cum appetimus synderesim esse voluntatem naturalem, quae quidem naturaliter inclinat et instigat ad bonum honestum et murmurat contra malum7; et voluntatem deliberativam appetitum, quo post deliberationem aliquando adhaeremus bono, aliquando malo. Et sic divisio potentiae per naturalem et deliberativam non variat eam secundum essentiam potentiae, sed secundum modum movendi. Et hoc modo dividit Damascenus, non quia naturalis et deliberativa sint diversae potentiae, sed quia una est potentia, diversimode tamen movens; et hoc sufficit ad divisionem potentiarum.
Unde notandum est, quod multis modis consueverunt auctores divisionem potentiarum animae accipere. Aliquando secundum naturam ipsarum potentiarum, ut cum dividuntur potentiae animae in vegetabilem, sensibilem et rationalem, vel ipsa rationalis in intellectivam et affectivam. — Aliquando vero secundum officia, ut cum dividitur ratio in superiorem et inferiorem. — Aliquando secundum status, ut cum dividitur intellectus in speculativum et practicum; intellectus enim speculativus secundum alium statum efficitur practicus, videlicet dum coniungitur voluntati et operi in dictando et regendo. — Aliquando vero fit divisio potentiarum secundum aspectus, sicut dividitur potentia cognitiva in rationem, intellectum et intelligentiam, secundum quod aspicit ad inferius, ad par et ad superius9. — Aliquando vero secundum actus, sicut fit divisio in inventivam et iudicativam; invenire enim et iudicare sunt actus potentiae cognitivae ad invicem ordinati. — Aliquando vero fit divisio potentiarum animae secundum modos movendi; et sic est illa, quae est per naturalem et deliberativam.
Omnibus his modis diversitatis10 utuntur auctores in divisione potentiarum animae, et in solo primo modo dividendi attenditur proprie potentiarum diversificatio. — Concedendum est igitur, quod naturalis voluntas et deliberativa potest esse eadem potentia, quae quidem secundum alium et alium modum movendi sic et sic appellatur. Eadem enim est potentia, qua appeto beatitudinem, et qua appeto virtutem, sive facere hoc bonum vel illud ad beatitudinem ordinatum; quae, ut appetit beatitudinem, dicitur naturalis, quia immutabiliter appetitus eius ad beatitudinem inclinatur; ut vero appetit hoc vel illud bonum facere, deliberativa dicitur, et secundum iudicium rationis potest ad contrarium inclinari.
Ad argumenta: Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de divisione potentiarum facta a Damasceno, iam patet responsio. Ipse enim, ut ibidem patet in sua exemplificatione11, potius in hac divisione diversitatem modorum movendi attendit quam diversitatem potentiarum moventium.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas naturalis est irrationalis, quia non est ad opposita; dicendum, quod cum dicitur, quod potestates rationales12 sunt ad opposita, hoc non intelligitur de omnibus oppositis, sed de aliquibus. Rationalis enim voluntas ita ordinatur ad aliquid, quod nullo modo appetit suum oppositum, ut patet in ordine voluntatis nostrae ad beatitudinem et felicitatem. Licet autem determinate inclinetur ad beatitudinem, ad multa tamen genera appetibilium illa et eadem voluntatis potentia est indeterminata, ita quod nata est moveri in opposita; et propterea sic est naturalis, ut tamen non desinat esse rationalis et deliberativa. Si autem sic esset determinata ad unum, p. 567 quod nullo modo posset in opposita, sicut est potentia calefaciendi et illuminandi in igne, tunc esset pure naturalis, et non esset deliberativa sive rationalis.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de incorruptibilitate, dicendum, quod non est simile de incorruptibilitate substantiae et immutabilitate potentiae. Incorruptibilitas enim in substantia dicitur absolute; et ideo esse corruptibile et incorruptibile directe opponuntur et sunt incompossibilia circa idem. Mutabile vero et immutabile in potentia accipi possunt respectu diversorum obiectorum, ut patet, cum aliqua voluntas est immutabilis respectu finis, et mutabilis respectu eius quod est ad finem; et ideo non oportet, potentias per haec membra essentialiter diversificari.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de naturali appetitu in brutis, iam patet responsio; quia cum dicitur, nos communicare cum brutis in potentia naturali et appetitu, ibi distinguitur naturalis potentia a rationali non solum quantum ad modum appetendi, sed etiam quantum ad appetibile; et penes hoc contingit diversas differentias potentiarum accipere.
I. Magni momenti est haec distinctio voluntatis in naturalem, quae immobiliter inhaeret bono universali ut fini, ita ut ne malum quidem velle possit nisi sub ratione boni, et in deliberativam, quae libere eligit ea quae sunt ad finem, sive bona particularia (cfr. infra d. 28. dub. 1, d. 39. dub. 2; III. Sent. d. 17. a. 4. q. 2; et praecipue IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1.). — Concordat omnino S. Thom., qui saepe, praesertim S. I. q. 82. a. 1. 2, affirmat, « quod sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo » (loc. cit. a. 1.); et quod libere eligit « particularia bona, quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem » (a. 2; cfr. etiam S. I. q. 105. a. 4.). — De ipsa quaestione consule infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 2, sive quaestionem, utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia distincta contra rationem et voluntatem. Alii commentatores non nisi hanc alteram quaestionem tractant, ubi in scholio auctores videri possunt. Tamen Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 71, m. I. 2. plura habet de divisione in hac quaestione tractata.
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Article II. On the division of the powers of the soul.
Question III. Whether the division of the will into natural and deliberative is a division into diverse powers.
Thirdly, inquiry is made about that division of the powers of the soul which is according to the natural and the deliberative; and it is asked whether the division of the will into natural and deliberative is a division into diverse powers. And it seems that it is.
1. Damascene1, when he divides the powers of the soul, first divides them into thelesis and boulesis, that is, into the natural and the deliberative, and afterwards subdivides them through the other powers: therefore if the greater difference is between the first members, it seems that the natural will and the deliberative are one power and another.
2. Likewise, the division of substance into rational and non-rational varies it according to essence; therefore the division of a power by differences of this kind makes the powers differ essentially; but such is the division of the powers of the soul into natural and deliberative: therefore, etc. The minor is proved by this, that, as the Philosopher says2, « rational powers are toward opposites »; but when some power is naturally moved toward something, it is not moved toward the opposite: therefore a power, insofar as it is natural, is not rational.
3. Likewise, when we divide a creature into corruptible and incorruptible, we diversify it essentially: therefore by parity of reasoning, when we divide a power into mutable and immutable, we vary it essentially; but a power that is moved naturally toward its object is moved uniformly, whereas the deliberative is moved changeably: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, a power in which we share with brutes cannot be the same as a power in which we differ; but in natural appetite we agree with brutes, and in rational appetite we differ: therefore, etc. For just as brutes naturally desire the preservation of their being, so do we also desire it.
On the contrary: 1. Powers that have the same object and under the same formal account do not have diversity3; but the natural will and the deliberative have the same thing for their object, namely the good — for we desire the good naturally, and also from deliberation, when we are well ordered — therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, a power that orders toward the end and toward that which is for the end4 is not one and another; sed voluntas nostra — but our will, insofar as it is toward the end, is natural, because everyone naturally desires beatitude; insofar as it is toward the thing ordered to the end, it is deliberative: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, the same cognitive power is that by which we know something naturally, and by acquisition: therefore by parity of reasoning the same will is that by which we desire something by natural instinct, and by the judgment of deliberation.
4. Likewise, everything that is some nature has a natural operation5; but the deliberative will is some nature: therefore it has a natural operation. But the act of the will is to will, therefore the deliberative will wills something naturally; but a will that wills something naturally is natural: therefore the deliberative will is a natural will.
Conclusio
Conclusion. The natural will and the deliberative, insofar as they differ in the mode of desiring, are not diverse powers, but one, moving nevertheless in diverse modes.
I respond: It must be said that when we divide appetite into natural and deliberative, or6 any other power, this can be understood in two ways: either thus, that the natural appetite and the deliberative have diversity in their objects, as when one thing is desirable only by a rational substance, and another is desirable by a brute substance. And in this way it well happens that the natural power and the deliberative are diverse powers8. — In another way appetite or power can be divided into natural and deliberative, yet such that there is no difference in the objects, but in the mode of desiring; as when we hold synderesis to be the natural will, which indeed naturally inclines and incites toward the honorable good and murmurs against evil7; and the deliberative will to be the appetite by which, after deliberation, we sometimes cleave to the good, sometimes to the evil. And thus the division of power into natural and deliberative does not vary it according to the essence of the power, but according to the mode of moving. And in this way Damascene divides, not because the natural and the deliberative are diverse powers, but because there is one power, moving nevertheless in diverse modes; and this suffices for a division of powers.
Hence it must be noted that the authors have been accustomed to take the division of the powers of the soul in many modes. Sometimes according to the nature of the powers themselves, as when the powers of the soul are divided into vegetative, sensible, and rational, or the rational itself into intellective and affective. — Sometimes, however, according to offices, as when reason is divided into superior and inferior. — Sometimes according to states, as when the intellect is divided into speculative and practical; for the speculative intellect according to another state becomes practical, namely when it is joined to the will and to operation in directing and ruling. — Sometimes, however, a division of powers is made according to aspects, as the cognitive power is divided into reason, intellect, and intelligence, according as it looks toward the inferior, toward the equal, and toward the superior9. — Sometimes, however, according to acts, as the division is made into inventive and judicative; for to invent and to judge are acts of the cognitive power ordered to one another. — Sometimes, however, a division of the powers of the soul is made according to modes of moving; and such is that which is according to the natural and the deliberative.
In all these modes of diversity10 the authors make use of a division of the powers of the soul, and in the first mode of dividing alone is the diversification of powers properly regarded. — It must therefore be conceded that the natural will and the deliberative can be the same power, which indeed according to one and another mode of moving is so and so named. For the same is the power by which I desire beatitude, and by which I desire virtue, or to do this or that good ordered to beatitude; which, insofar as it desires beatitude, is called natural, because its appetite is immutably inclined toward beatitude; but insofar as it desires to do this or that good, it is called deliberative, and according to the judgment of reason it can be inclined toward the contrary.
To the arguments: To 1. To that which is first objected concerning the division of powers made by Damascene, the response is now clear. For he himself, as is evident there in his exemplification11, regards in this division rather a diversity of modes of moving than a diversity of moving powers.
To 2. To that which is objected, that the natural will is irrational, because it is not toward opposites; it must be said that when it is said that rational powers12 are toward opposites, this is not understood of all opposites, but of some. For the rational will is so ordered toward something that it in no way desires its opposite, as is evident in the ordering of our will toward beatitude and felicity. But although it is determinately inclined toward beatitude, yet toward many kinds of desirable things that one and the same power of the will is indeterminate, so that it is apt to be moved toward opposites; and on that account it is natural in such a way that nevertheless it does not cease to be rational and deliberative. But if it were so determined to one thing, that it could in no way be moved toward opposites, as is the power of heating and illuminating in fire, then it would be purely natural, and would not be deliberative or rational.
To 3. To that which is objected concerning incorruptibility, it must be said that the case is not the same with the incorruptibility of substance and the immutability of a power. For incorruptibility in substance is said absolutely; and therefore to be corruptible and incorruptible are directly opposed and are incompossible with respect to the same thing. But the mutable and the immutable in a power can be taken with respect to diverse objects, as is evident, since some will is immutable with respect to the end, and mutable with respect to that which is for the end; and therefore it is not necessary that powers be essentially diversified by these members.
To 4. To that which is objected concerning natural appetite in brutes, the response is now clear; for when it is said that we share with brutes in natural power and appetite, there the natural power is distinguished from the rational not only as to the mode of desiring, but also as to the desirable object; and according to this it happens that diverse differences of powers are taken.
I. Of great moment is this distinction of the will into the natural, which immovably adheres to the universal good as to its end, in such a way that it cannot even will evil except under the account of good, and into the deliberative, which freely chooses the things that are for the end, or particular goods (cf. below d. 28, dub. 1, d. 39, dub. 2; III Sent. d. 17, a. 4, q. 2; and especially IV Sent. d. 49, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1). — St. Thomas agrees entirely, who often, especially in S. I, q. 82, a. 1, 2, affirms « that just as the intellect of necessity adheres to first principles, so the will of necessity adheres to the ultimate end, which is beatitude » (loc. cit. a. 1); and that it freely chooses « particular goods, which do not have a necessary connection to beatitude » (a. 2; cf. also S. I, q. 105, a. 4). — On the question itself, consult below d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, that is, the question whether free choice is a power distinct against reason and will. Other commentators treat only this latter question, where the authors may be seen in the scholion. Nevertheless Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 71, m. I, 2, has much concerning the division treated in this question.
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- Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22, ubi exponitur, quod naturaliter nobis insita est vis, qua appetimus id quod secundum naturam est, sicut et ea quae substantialiter naturae insunt, ut v. g. esse, vivere etc.; quae vis dicitur voluntas (θέλησις) et nihil aliud est quam ipse naturalis, vitalis et rationalis appetitus omnium eorum, quibus natura constituitur, simplex virtus (δύναμις). Est etiam insita animae hominis — sic docet Damasc. — vis appetendi secundum rationem, quae vis nuncupatur βούλησις i. e. voluntas consiliativa, et idem est ac rei cuiusdam appetitio rationalis. Haec βούλησις, voluntas, potest esse tum eorum quae sunt in nobis (in nostra potestate), v. g. sobrium esse, tum eorum quae non sunt in nobis. Voluntas eorum quae non sunt in nostra potestate, aliquando est possibilium, ut cum reges esse volumus; aliquando impossibilium, ut cum volumus nunquam mori. Voluntas deliberativa eorum quae in nostra potestate sunt, hos includit actus: voluntatem finis, consilium, iudicium, sententiam, electionem (quorum quatuor ultimi respiciunt media ad finem), impetum et usum (qui duo actus respiciunt ordinem exsecutionis).Bk. II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22, where it is set forth that there is naturally implanted in us a power by which we desire what is according to nature, as also those things which substantially belong to nature, e.g. to be, to live, etc.; which power is called will (θέλησις) and is nothing other than the natural, vital, and rational appetite itself for all those things by which nature is constituted, a simple power (δύναμις). There is also implanted in the soul of man — so Damascene teaches — a power of desiring according to reason, which power is named βούλησις, i.e. the deliberative will, and is the same as the rational desire of some thing. This βούλησις, will, can be of those things that are in us (in our power), e.g. to be sober, and also of those that are not in us. The will of things not in our power is sometimes of possible things, as when we will to be kings; sometimes of impossible things, as when we will never to die. The deliberative will of those things that are in our power includes these acts: willing of the end, counsel, judgment, decision, choice (the last four of which regard the means to the end), impulse and use (which two acts regard the order of execution).
- Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.). De minori cfr. supra pag. 153, nota 5.Bk. IX Metaphysics, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5). On the minor, cf. above p. 153, note 5.
- Vide supra pag. 561, nota 3.See above p. 561, note 3.
- Non pauci codd., ut H I T W V bb cc ec, cum edd. 1, 2 in finem. Paulo inferius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 textum simul cum interpunctione sic in peius mutarunt: appetit beatitudinem, ut est in rem ordinata; sed potentia, quae ordinatur ad finem etc.Not a few codices, such as H I T W V bb cc ec, together with editions 1, 2, read in finem ("toward the end"). A little below, the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 altered the text together with its punctuation for the worse thus: it desires beatitude, insofar as it is ordered to the thing; but a power that is ordered to the end, etc.
- Cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 5. et pag. 198, nota 3.Cf. above p. 197, note 5, and p. 198, note 3.
- Non pauci codd. cum primis edd. sive in, falso.Not a few codices, with the first editions, read sive in, wrongly.
- Sive appetitum sensitivum et voluntatem esse diversas potentias, de quo vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 47. seqq. (c. 9. seq.).That is, that the sensitive appetite and the will are diverse powers, on which see Aristotle, III On the Soul, text 47 ff. (c. 9 f.).
- Cfr. infra d. 39 a. 2. q. 1. seq.Cf. below d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 f.
- Libr. de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.), c. 6. et 11. seq.On the Spirit and the Soul (among the works of Augustine), c. 6 and 11 f.
- Plures codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 diversificatis.Several codices with the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 read diversificatis.
- Cfr. supra pag. 565, nota 1.Cf. above p. 565, note 1.
- Plurimi codd. cum edd. perperam naturales; ed. 1 insuper post naturales subiicit non. Nostra lectio est codd. O T bb.Very many codices with the editions wrongly read naturales ("natural"); edition 1 moreover adds non after naturales. Our reading is that of codices O T bb. ---