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Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 37

Textus Latinus
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ARTICULUS II.

Utrum actio defectiva sit Deo attribuenda.

Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum articulum de actione defectiva, utrum sit Deo attribuenda. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit actio iniusta, secundum quod iniusta.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa.

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QUAESTIO I.

Utrum actio iniusta, secundum quod iniusta, sit a Deo.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum actio iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Tertio Regum ultimo1: Quis decipiet Achab, regem Israel? et post subiungitur, quod Dominus dixit spiritui mendaci: Egredere et fac; sed quod fit Deo praecipiente fit a Deo volente et auctore: si ergo spiritus ille malignus mentitus est et Achab decepit, Deo mandante sibi mentiri et decipere; videtur, quod tam mendacium quam deceptio, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo. Et si hoc verum est, ergo actio iniusta, secundum quod iniusta, a Deo est.

2. Item, sicut vult Philosophus2: « Si aliquid per sui praesentiam est causa alicuius, per sui absentiam est causa oppositi »; sed Deus per sui praesentiam est causa operationis iustae, secundum quod iusta est: ergo ab oppositis, per sui absentiam causa erit iniustitiae in actione.

3. Item, qui adiuvat aliquem scienter ad actionem furti, sive velit ipsum iuvare ad furtum, sive non, nihilominus dicitur currere cum fure3, et culpa furis ei attribuitur. Si ergo Deus adiuvat hominem ad actionem substratam malitiae et iniustitiae, videtur, quod talis deformitas tanquam auctori attribuenda sit Deo.

4. Item, dare eleemosynam propter vanam gloriam est peccatum; et hoc ipso est peccatum et iniustitia, quo actio ista refertur ad talem finem; sed sicut datio eleemosynae nonnihil est, sic relatio ad talem finem nonnihil est: si ergo talis relatio fuit ratio, quare illa actio est mala, et talis relatio est a Deo, cum non sit omnino nihil, videtur, quod talis actio sit a Deo.

5. Item, iste qui peccat in amando creaturam, hoc ipso peccat, quo quiescit in creatura; sed quiescere in creatura non omnino nihil est, immo hoc ipso, quod quiescere est, aliquid est: ergo cum omne quod est aliquid, sit a Deo, talis quies est a Deo, et talis erat ratio culpae: ergo etc.

6. Item, nobilior est potentia voluntatis, ut est deliberativa, quam ut est natura quaedam4; sed omne quod est a voluntate, ut est natura, est a Deo: ergo omne quod est a voluntate deliberativa, est a Deo. Sed actio iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi, est a voluntate deliberativa: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Ioannis primo5: Sine ipso factum est nihil; Glossa: « id est peccatum »: ergo videtur, quod peccatum non sit a Deo.

2. Item, ad Romanos primo6: Tradidit eos, ut contumeliis afficiant corpora sua in semetipsis; Glossa: « Immundas actiones et contumeliosas, quibus afficiunt et inficiunt corpora sua, habent in semetipsis, mali scilicet, id est non aliunde, sed a semetipsis; non enim habet homo hoc a Deo »; sed hoc non potest dici de actionibus, secundum quod actiones sunt: ergo dicitur de actionibus, secundum quod iniustae sunt.

3. Item, quicumque facit iniustitiam iniustus est; sed Deus non potest esse iniustus: ergo non potest facere iniustitiam: ergo iniustitia actionis vel actio, secundum quod iniusta, non est a Deo.

4. Item, quicumque facit iniustitiam offendit Deum, qui est summa iustitia; sed Deus non potest se ipsum offendere neque se ipsum negare, sicut dicit Apostolus7: ergo Deus non potest iniustitiam facere: ergo nec actionem iniustam, in quantum huiusmodi.

5. Item, iniustitia defectus est; ergo facere iniustitiam est deficere; sed divinum posse non potest deficere8: ergo nec iniustitiam facere: ergo actio, secundum quod iniusta est, non est a Deo.

6. Item, quidquid est a Deo, laudat Deum9; sed iniustitia nullo modo laudat Deum, nec operatio iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi: nullo igitur modo actio, secundum quod iniusta vel mala, est Deo attribuenda.

Conclusio.

Actio mala et iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi, non est a Deo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum iniustitia sive malitia circa actionem dicat defectum et privationem, et defectum deordinatum de se et defectum carentem debito fine; facere actionem iniustam, hoc repugnat potentiae, sapientiae et bonitati. Est enim ibi pri-

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vatio utilitatis et ordinis et entitatis; et quia nihil est attribuendum Deo, nisi quod decet suam potentiam, sapientiam et bonitatem: ideo actionem malam Deo tribuere non solum est falsitatis, sed etiam blasphemiae et impietatis. — Concedendum est igitur, quod actio mala et iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi, non est a Deo. Et ideo rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de tertii Regum ultimo, dicendum, quod egredere et fac non intelligitur ibi imperative, sed intelligitur ibi permissive. Unde verbum imperativi modi multipliciter accipitur in Scriptura: aliquando praeceptorie, aliquando consultorie, aliquando insinuatorie et aliquando permissive, quorum exempla sumi possunt ex diversis locis Scripturae10.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eadem causa, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam est causa oppositorum; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de causa, quae voluntarie se absentat, ita quod eius absentatio principaliter est ab ipsa. Hoc autem non est in proposito; Deus enim nemini se absentat, immo paratus est omnes adiuvare et omnibus dare gratiam11.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ille qui iuvat furem in actione, dicitur currere cum fure, si scienter hoc facit; dicendum, quod hoc non est simile: quia decens et conveniens est, quod homo proximum non iuvet in ea actione, in qua quis ambulat non recte12, immo potius debet impedire; cum ipse nec sciat nec possit inde bonum elicere, nec ad illud adiutorium aliqua lege astringatur, sed potius prohibeatur. Non sic autem est in proposito, tum quia decet divinam liberalitatem, ut solem suum oriri faciat super bonos et malos13; nec debet influentiam virtutis suae subtrahere nec bonis nec malis, maxime secundum illam influentiam, quae respicit primum esse. Secundo vero, quia decet divinam providentiam « sic res, quas condidit, administrare, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »14. Tertio vero, quia ipse novit et scit inde bonum elicere; et ideo, cum cooperatur peccatori in actione, facit laudabiliter; et ideo nullo modo malitia, quae reddit suum actorem culpabilem, est ei attribuenda.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod relatio actionis ad inanem gloriam tanquam ad finem a Deo est; dicendum, quod relatio duo dicit; videlicet actum voluntatis et rationis protendentis se ad illum finem mediante illa actione; et hoc quidem bonum est et a Deo est. Praeter hoc importat deordinationem. Tali enim actioni coniuncta15 est inordinatio, quia talis finis tali operi non congruit; et quantum ad hoc, est ibi malitia; et ideo iniustitia est ibi ratione defectus, qui est in tali relatione. Propter hoc non oportet, quod sit a Deo. Et est simile in claudicatione, in qua est ambulatio cum defectu; sic et in proposito intelligendum est.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de quiete, similiter respondendum est, quod quies dicit positionem aliquam in hoc, quod dicit dilectionem creaturae; et dicit privationem rectitudinis in hoc, quod dicit privationem finis ultimi. In hoc enim, quod ibi quiescit et ultra non tendit, cum deberet ultra tendere, non tantum est positio, sed etiam privatio, quae quidem non est a Deo.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid est a voluntate naturali, est a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod est voluntas naturalis; et similiter illud quod est a voluntate deliberativa16 praecise, concedendum est esse a Deo. Sed malitia non est a voluntate proprie, ut est deliberativa, sed potius, ut est defectiva, quamvis defectus ille non incidat nisi circa actum deliberativum; et ideo, quamvis sit a voluntate deliberativa, non sequitur, quod sit a Deo, quia non est secundum quod deliberativa, sed secundum quod defectiva. Et propterea, sicut dictum fuit supra17, si fiat tale argumentum: voluntas deliberativa est a Deo; et malitia est a voluntate deliberativa: ergo est a Deo; peccat secundum accidens, quia peccat contra illam regulam: « Quidquid est causa causae, est causa causati ». Ita enim potest esse sophisma secundum accidens in causando, sicut in inhaerendo.

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Scholion

I. Conclusiones trium huius articuli quaestionum nullam controversiam recipiunt. — Pro solutionibus obiectorum in 1. quaest. intelligendis supponendum est, quod quamvis malitia, quae erat in aliqua actione, non potuisset fieri sine illa actione, tamen eadem actio potuisset fieri sine malitia, si relata esset ad debitum obiectum et finem. Hoc principium applicat Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 1. ad 2.) ad actum pessimum odii Dei, his verbis: « Velle malum potest esse sine malitia, sicut cum homo vult malum illi qui est dignus malo. Odire autem Deum dicit ipsam actionem cum sua deformitate, et ideo a malitia separari non potest ». Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 2. — Scot., hic q. 4. et q. 2. n. 14. seqq.; Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. 1. II. q. 79. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 162; de Malo, q. 3. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 134. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., art. cit. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

II. Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem de casu cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 4. Fuse disputat de hac re Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. 2, et etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 26. m. 4. a. 2. Eandem tangunt S. Thom., S. I. q. 19. a. 6, q. 22. a. 2. ad 1.; de Malo, q. 2. a. 5. ad 6, et alibi.

III. De 3. quaest. cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. a. 4; et quoad principia Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 15. m. 9, et q. 16. passim. Explicite de eadem quaest. tractant Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aliqua ex S. Bonav. excerpsit Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation

ARTICLE II.

Whether a defective action is to be attributed to God.

Consequently it is asked concerning the second article, about a defective action, whether it is to be attributed to God. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked whether an unjust action, insofar as it is unjust, is from God.

Secondly it is asked whether a fortuitous operation, insofar as it is fortuitous, is from God.

Thirdly it is asked whether a false statement, insofar as it is false, is from God.

QUESTION I.

Whether an unjust action, insofar as it is unjust, is from God.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether an unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is from God. And that it is, it seems:

1. Third [book] of Kings, last [chapter]1: Who shall deceive Achab, king of Israel? and afterward it is added that the Lord said to the lying spirit: Go forth and do [it]; but what comes to be by God's commanding comes to be by God willing and authoring [it]: if therefore that malign spirit lied and deceived Achab, with God commanding him to lie and to deceive; it seems that both the lie and the deception, insofar as they are of this kind, are from God. And if this is true, then an unjust action, insofar as it is unjust, is from God.

2. Likewise, as the Philosopher holds2: « If something by its presence is the cause of something, by its absence it is the cause of the opposite »; but God by his presence is the cause of a just operation, insofar as it is just: therefore from the opposite, by his absence he will be the cause of injustice in an action.

3. Likewise, he who knowingly helps someone toward an action of theft, whether he wills to help him toward the theft or not, is nonetheless said to run with the thief3, and the fault of the thief is attributed to him. If therefore God helps a human toward an action underlying malice and injustice, it seems that such deformity is to be attributed to God as to its author.

4. Likewise, to give alms for the sake of vainglory is sin; and by this very fact it is sin and injustice, by which that action is referred to such an end; but just as the giving of alms is not nothing, so the relation to such an end is not nothing: if therefore such a relation was the reason why that action is evil, and such a relation is from God, since it is not altogether nothing, it seems that such an action is from God.

5. Likewise, he who sins in loving a creature, by this very fact sins, by which he rests in the creature; but to rest in a creature is not altogether nothing, indeed by this very fact, that it is a resting, it is something: therefore since everything that is something is from God, such a rest is from God, and such was the reason of the fault: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the power of the will is nobler as it is deliberative than as it is a certain nature4; but everything that is from the will, as it is nature, is from God: therefore everything that is from the deliberative will is from God. But an unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is from the deliberative will: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. John, first [chapter]5: Without him was made nothing; the Gloss: « that is, sin »: therefore it seems that sin is not from God.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, first [chapter]6: He delivered them up, that they should afflict their own bodies with contumelies in themselves; the Gloss: « The unclean and contumelious actions, by which they afflict and infect their own bodies, they have in themselves, namely the wicked, that is not from elsewhere, but from themselves; for the human does not have this from God »; but this cannot be said of actions insofar as they are actions: therefore it is said of actions insofar as they are unjust.

3. Likewise, whoever does injustice is unjust; but God cannot be unjust: therefore he cannot do injustice: therefore the injustice of an action, or an action insofar as it is unjust, is not from God.

4. Likewise, whoever does injustice offends God, who is the highest justice; but God cannot offend himself nor deny himself, as the Apostle says7: therefore God cannot do injustice: therefore neither [can he do] an unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind.

5. Likewise, injustice is a defect; therefore to do injustice is to be deficient; but the divine power cannot be deficient8: therefore neither [can it] do injustice: therefore an action, insofar as it is unjust, is not from God.

6. Likewise, whatever is from God praises God9; but injustice in no way praises God, nor [does] an unjust operation, insofar as it is of this kind: in no way therefore is an action, insofar as it is unjust or evil, to be attributed to God.

Conclusion.

An evil and unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is not from God.

I respond: It must be said that, since injustice or malice concerning an action states a defect and a privation, and a defect disordered of itself and a defect lacking the due end; to do an unjust action is repugnant to [God's] power, wisdom, and goodness. For there is there a pri-

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vation of utility and of order and of entity; and because nothing is to be attributed to God except what befits his power, wisdom, and goodness: therefore to attribute an evil action to God is not only [a matter] of falsity, but also of blasphemy and impiety. — It is to be granted therefore that an evil and unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is not from God. And therefore the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that therefore which is objected from the last [chapter] of the third [book] of Kings, it must be said that go forth and do [it] is not understood there imperatively, but is understood there permissively. Whence a verb of the imperative mood is taken in many ways in Scripture: sometimes preceptively, sometimes consultively, sometimes insinuatively, and sometimes permissively, of which examples can be taken from diverse places of Scripture10.

2. To that which is objected concerning the same cause, that by its presence and absence it is the cause of opposites; it must be said that that holds true of a cause which voluntarily absents itself, such that its absenting is principally from itself. But this is not so in the case at hand; for God absents himself from no one, indeed he is ready to help all and to give grace to all11.

3. To that which is objected, that he who helps a thief in [his] action is said to run with the thief, if he does this knowingly; it must be said that this is not similar: because it is becoming and fitting that a human not help his neighbor in that action in which one walks not rightly12, indeed he ought rather to hinder [it]; since he himself neither knows nor is able to draw out a good thereby, nor is he bound by any law to that assistance, but is rather forbidden [it]. But it is not so in the case at hand, both because it befits the divine liberality that he make his sun to rise upon the good and the evil13; nor ought he to withdraw the influence of his power either from the good or from the evil, especially according to that influence which regards the first being. Secondly indeed, because it befits the divine providence « so to administer the things which it founded, as to let them act their own proper motions »14. Thirdly indeed, because he himself knows and understands how to draw out a good thereby; and therefore, when he cooperates with the sinner in the action, he acts praiseworthily; and therefore in no way is the malice, which renders its actor culpable, to be attributed to him.

4. To that which is objected, that the relation of the action to vainglory as to an end is from God; it must be said that the relation states two things; namely the act of the will and of the reason extending itself to that end by means of that action; and this indeed is good and is from God. Besides this it imports a disordering. For to such an action is conjoined15 a disorder, because such an end does not befit such a work; and as to this, there is there malice; and therefore the injustice is there by reason of the defect which is in such a relation. On account of this it is not necessary that it be from God. And it is similar in limping, in which there is a walking with a defect; so also in the case at hand it is to be understood.

5. To that which is objected concerning rest, it must similarly be responded that rest states a certain position in this, that it states a love of the creature; and it states a privation of rectitude in this, that it states the privation of the ultimate end. For in this, that it there rests and does not tend beyond, when it ought to tend beyond, there is not only position, but also privation, which indeed is not from God.

6. To that which is objected, that whatever is from the natural will is from God; it must be said that it is true, insofar as it is the natural will; and similarly that which is from the deliberative will16 precisely, must be granted to be from God. But malice is not from the will properly, as it is deliberative, but rather as it is defective, although that defect does not occur except concerning a deliberative act; and therefore, although it be from the deliberative will, it does not follow that it is from God, because it is not insofar as it is deliberative, but insofar as it is defective. And for this reason, as was said above17, if such an argument be made: the deliberative will is from God; and malice is from the deliberative will: therefore it is from God; it errs by accident, because it errs against that rule: « Whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the caused ». For there can thus be a sophism by accident in causing, just as in inhering.

Scholion

I. The conclusions of the three questions of this article admit no controversy. — For understanding the solutions of the objections in the first question, it is to be supposed that, although the malice which was in some action could not have come to be without that action, nevertheless the same action could have come to be without the malice, if it had been referred to the due object and end. Richard of Middleton (here a. 3. q. 1. ad 2.) applies this principle to the worst act of hatred of God, in these words: « To will evil can be without malice, as when a human wills evil to him who is worthy of evil. But to hate God states the very action with its deformity, and therefore cannot be separated from malice ». Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 2. — Scotus, here q. 4. and q. 2. n. 14. seqq.; Reportata here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; S. 1. II. q. 79. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 162; de Malo, q. 3. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 134. m. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, in the cited article. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

II. As to the following (second) question on chance, cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 4. Richard of Middleton disputes copiously on this matter, here a. 4. q. 1. 2, and also Alexander of Hales, S. p. I. q. 26. m. 4. a. 2. The same matter is touched by St. Thomas, S. I. q. 19. a. 6, q. 22. a. 2. ad 1.; de Malo, q. 2. a. 5. ad 6, and elsewhere.

III. On the third question cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. a. 4; and as to the principles Alexander of Hales, S. p. I. q. 15. m. 9, and q. 16. passim. Explicitly on the same question treat Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 2. — Some things from S. Bonaventure were excerpted by Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 20. et deinde v. 22. — In primo s. Script. loco multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 post decipiet addunt nobis (ed. 1 ex nobis). — In minori respicitur illud August., 83 Qq. q. 3: Illo [Deo] autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente dicitur.
    Verse 20, and then v. 22. — In the first place of Sacred Scripture many codices and edd. 1, 2 after decipiet add nobis (ed. 1 from nobis). — In the minor there is regarded that [saying] of Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 3: But when it is said "with him [God] as author," it is said "with him willing."
  2. Libr. II. Phys. text. 30. (c. 3.).
    Book II. Physics text 30 (c. 3.).
  3. Psalm. 49, 18: Si videbas furem, currebas cum eo.
    Psalm 49, 18: If thou didst see a thief, thou didst run with him.
  4. Cfr. supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.
    Cfr. above d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. and d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. in the body.
  5. Vers. 3. — Glossam, quae deprompta est ex August. super hunc locum, vide supra pag. 640, nota 8.
    Verse 3. — The Gloss, which is drawn from Augustine on this place, see above p. 640, note 8.
  6. Vers. 24. — Glossam exhibet Petr. Lombardus in hunc locum.
    Verse 24. — Peter Lombard presents the Gloss on this place.
  7. Epist. II. Tim. 2, 13.
    Epistle II. Timothy 2, 13.
  8. Cfr. August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8.
    Cfr. Augustine, XII. On the City of God, c. 8.
  9. Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2, verba August. super Ps. 68, 3.
    See here in the text of the Master, c. 2, the words of Augustine on Ps. 68, 3.
  10. Matth. 5, 41; 19, 19. — Ps. 82, 14. — Ps. 50, 1. — Ps. 4, 5. — Expositionem loci ex tertio libro Reg. memorati vide apud August., V. contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 3. n. 13.
    Matthew 5, 41; 19, 19. — Ps. 82, 14. — Ps. 50, 1. — Ps. 4, 5. — For an exposition of the place from the third book of Kings mentioned, see in Augustine, V. Against Julian the Pelagian c. 3. n. 13.
  11. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 4. q. 2. ad 6. seqq.
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 4. q. 2. ad 6. seqq.
  12. Locutio ambulare non recte legitur II. Paral. 21, 20. et Gal. 2, 14.
    The expression to walk not rightly is read [in] II. Paralipomenon 21, 20, and Galatians 2, 14.
  13. Matth. 5, 45. — Pro tum Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 Primo.
    Matthew 5, 45. — For tum the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] Primo.
  14. Ut dicit August., VII. de Civ. Dei, c. 30. Vide supra pag. 772, nota 10. — De rationibus hic adductis cfr. supra d. 32. a. 3. q. 2, et I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3.
    As Augustine says, VII. On the City of God, c. 30. See above p. 772, note 10. — On the reasons here adduced cfr. above d. 32. a. 3. q. 2, and I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3.
  15. Plures codd., ut F H (T a prima manu) etc., iniuncta, cod. bb iuncta.
    Several codices, such as F H (T by the first hand) etc., [read] iniuncta, cod. bb iuncta.
  16. Cod. Y addit secundum quod est deliberativa. In propositione seq. respicitur definitio illa peccati, quae supra d. 33. dub. 6. in fine et hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. habetur: Peccatum est actus incidens ex defectu boni.
    Cod. Y adds secundum quod est deliberativa ("insofar as it is deliberative"). In the following proposition there is regarded that definition of sin which is had above d. 33. dub. 6. at the end and here in the text of the Master, c. 1: Sin is an act befalling from a defect of good.
  17. Dist. 34. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, ubi et regula exponitur, quae in seqq. affertur. — Paulo superius post quia non est Vat. supplet a voluntate. In fine solut. pro sicut in inhaerendo multi codd. cum primis edd. sicut inhaerendo, codd. D ee sicut in habendo, Vat. sicut in essendo. — De hoc sophismate, scil. secundum accidens, Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). ait: Propter igitur accidens captiones sunt, quando similiter quodcumque existimabitur rei, et accidenti inesse; nam quia multa eidem accidunt, non est necesse omnibus praedicatis et ei, de quo praedicantur, illa omnia inesse, nam omnia sic erunt eadem. Cfr. B. Albert., Comment. in II. Topic. tr. 2. c. 1. seq., ubi cum verbo inesse coniunguntur verba cohaerentia et inhaerentia.
    Dist. 34. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, where also the rule is expounded which is brought forward in what follows. — A little above, after quia non est the Vatican [edition] supplies a voluntate. At the end of the solution, for sicut in inhaerendo many codices with the first editions [read] sicut inhaerendo, codd. D ee sicut in habendo, the Vatican [edition] sicut in essendo. — On this sophism, namely by accident, Aristotle, I. Elenchi c. 4. (c. 5.), says: On account of accident, therefore, there are deceptions, when whatever is judged to be in a thing is judged similarly to be in the accident; for because many things befall the same [subject], it is not necessary that all those things be in all the predicates and in that of which they are predicated, for [otherwise] all would thus be the same. Cfr. B. Albert, Commentary on II. Topics tr. 2. c. 1. seq., where with the word inesse ("to be in") are conjoined the words cohaerentia ("cohering") and inhaerentia ("inhering").
← Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 2→