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Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 10

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum haec sit vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona.

Secundo quaeritur de hac: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona; et accipiatur illa determinatio secundum quod homo proprie. Nam in aliis acceptionibus non est dubium quin habeat veritatem, secundum quod dicit Magister in litterap227-3. Et quod sit vera, videtur.

1. Christus non est homo, nisi quia est iste; sed Christus, secundum quod est iste homo, est persona, quia proprium est pronominis pro proprio nomine poni et certam designare personam (Ad oppositum): ergo haec est vera et concedenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona.

2. Item, Christus, secundum quod homo, est res completa omni completione, quae potest reperiri in rationali creatura; sed personalitas est dignitas et proprietas nobilitatis reperta in creatura rationali completap227-4: ergo reperitur in Christo, secundum quod Christus est homo.

3. Item, nobilior et perfectior est unio, secundum quam Verbum unitur naturae assumtae, quam unio, secundum quam tota Trinitas per gratiam unitur cuilibet animae iustaep227-5; sed unio per gratiam inhabitantem nulli tollit personae dignitatem, immo quilibet homo iustus, secundum quod homo, est persona: ergo multo fortius Christus.

4. Item, unio divinae naturae ad humanam nihil tollit divinitati, quae tamen dicitur humiliata,

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et multo fortius nihil tollit humanitati, cum humanitas dicatur per illam unionem exaltatap228-1; sed haec est vera: Christus, secundum quod Deus, est persona: ergo multo fortius haec erit vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, cum homo nihil perdat dignitatis, sed acquirat per unionem illam.

5. Item, esto per impossibile, quod Verbum dimitteret naturam humanamp228-2, tunc ille homo, qui dicitur Iesus, secundum quod homo, esset persona; sed constat, quod nihil sibi accresceret propter illam separationem: ergo verum est nunc, quod Iesus, secundum quod homo, est persona.

Sed contra: 1. Nihil convenit Christo, secundum quod homo (Fundamenta), quod non sit assumtum, vel coassumtum; sed Filium Dei assumsisse personam est falsum et haereticum, sicut supra distinctione quintap228-3 dicit Magister, et Augustinus, et multipliciter fuit probatum: ergo falsum est, Christum esse personam, secundum quod homo.

2. Item, si Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona; et humanitas coepit in Christo: ergo et personalitas: igitur Christus incepit esse persona: ergo non est persona aeterna: igitur non est unigenitus Filius Patris, cum Filius sit coaeternus Patri. Sed hoc est impium: ergo restat, quod illud, ex quo hoc sequitur, est falsump228-4.

3. Item, impossibile est, idem praedicatum inesse eidem secundum naturas differentes: cum ergo Christus sit persona, secundum quod Deus; aut non conveniret ei esse personam, secundum quod homo, aut alia persona erit, secundum quod homo; et si alia persona est, secundum quod homo, et alia, secundum quod Deus: ergo Christus est duae personae: ergo non est unus, et ita non estp228-5. Sed hoc est falsum: restat igitur, quod aliud membrum est verum, scilicet quod Christo non convenit esse personam, secundum quod homo.

4. Item, personalitas cuilibet rei inest ratione eius quod est in ipsa dignissimum — pertinet enim nomen personae ad notabilemp228-6 dignitatem — sed constat, quod dignissimum in Christo non est humana natura, sed divina; ergo falsum est, Christum secundum hominem sive secundum humanam naturam esse personam.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per nominis etymologiam. Sic enim arguit Magister in litterap228-7: Persona dicitur quasi per se sonans, vel per se unum; nihil autem tale est alii coniunctum, saltem digniori: ergo si humana natura in Christo unita est digniori, scilicet divinae, videtur etc.

### Conclusio. Locutio: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, neganda est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio, si haec dictio secundum accipiatur, prout importat rationem formae, vel causaep228-8, neganda est simpliciter (Conclusio 1); pro eo quod personalitas Christo secundum humanam naturam convenire non potest. Ipsa enim coniuncta est rei digniori, et ideo non potest habere rationem personae, quae attenditur secundum excellentiam dignitatis in eo, de quo dicitur; nec tantum coniuncta est rei digniori quacumque coniunctione, sed coniunctione sive unione personalip228-9. Et ideo necesse est, esse in Christo respectu duarum naturarum unam personam; sed illa non potest attendi penes naturam creatam et penes naturam assumtam: necesse est igitur, ipsam attendi (Conclusio 2) secundum naturam assumentem et increatam. Et propterea haec admittitur: Christus, secundum quod Deus, est persona; haec respuitur: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, sicut probant rationes ad secundam partem inductae; et ideo sunt concedendae.

Ad obiecta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de hac: Christus, secundum quod iste homo, est persona (Solutio oppositorum): dicendum, quod haec est distinguenda, ergo etc.; quia iste (Notanda distinctio)

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potest demonstrare naturam humanam in atomop228-10, scilicet compositum ex illa anima et illo corpore; et hoc modo falsum est, Christum, secundum quod est iste homo, esse personam. Nec valet quod obiicit, quod pronomen demonstrat certam personam; persona enim ibi tantum valet quantum suppositum, unde convenienter dicitur: ista albedo. Si autem hoc quod est iste demonstrat personam, tunc est vera, et est sensus: Christus, secundum quod est iste, qui est homo, est persona. Sed tunc non sequitur: ergo secundum quod homo, immo est sophisma secundum accidensp228-11. — (Aliter.) Generaliter autem posset resisti illi modo arguendi. Non enim sequitur: Petrus est individuum, secundum quod hic homo: ergo est individuum, secundum quod homo.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est res completa omni completione; dicendum, quod verum est de completione absoluta (Notandum), de completione autem respectiva, quae est dignitas superexcellentiae, veritatem non habet; nam humana natura in Christo non est nobilissimum eius, sicut in aliis hominibus. Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod minor sit dignitas in Christo, secundum quod homo, quam in aliis hominibus, propter hoc, quia illa dignitas recompensatur per dignitatem improportionabiliter nobiliorem. Multo enim nobilius est esse personam personalitate aeterna quam personalitate creatap229-1.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unio per gratiam non tollit dignitatem personae; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, quamvis anima per gratiam uniatur rei digniori, scilicet Deo, non tamen unitur unione naturali, sed magis voluntaria; nec unitur in unitatem hypostasis, sed in conformitatem voluntatis. Et ideo non est necesse, Spiritum esse unius personae cum anima, quam inhabitat, sed conformis voluntatis. Non sic autem est in Christo, in quo personalis unio estp229-2.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quamvis natura divina sit unita humanae, tamen Christus est persona, secundum quod Deus; dicendum, quod non est simile, duplici ex causa: persona quidem duo dicit (Persona dicit duo), scilicet hypostasim, in qua est substantiap229-3 totius esse rei, et proprietatem supereminentis dignitatis; et in illa beata unione utrumque horum (Notandum) reperitur in Christo, secundum quod Deus. Nam hypostasis divina est illa, in qua substantificatur totum esse Christi, non humana; proprietas etiam dignitatis inest illi secundum illam naturam, quae non potest uniri digniori; utrumque autem horum deficit humanae naturae, quoniam ipsa substantificatur in hypostasi alterius naturae, propter quod quodam modo dicitur vergere in accidensp229-4; unitur etiam digniori naturae. Et ideo ex ipsa sui unione et nobilitate caret proprietate personae secundum se, quamvis non careat, immo habeat in assumente.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi Verbum dimitteret humanam naturam, quod Iesus, secundum quod homo, esset persona; dicendum, quod verum est, quia tunc illa natura haberet alium modum existendi (Notandum); non enim esset unita alii digniori nec haberet suppositum alterius naturae. Nunc autem est e contrario; etp229-5 in illo processu nulla est necessitas inferendi, quia non servatur convenientia similitudinis. Et si tu obiicias, quod nulla dignitas accrescit; dicendum, quod ille homo sit persona, secundum quod homo, hoc non est propter dignitatis incrementum, sed propter minorationem ex illa separatione, quia tunc natura illa prius haberet pro supposito personam aeternam, nunc autem post separationem habetp229-6 personam temporalem. Multo autem dignius est habere personam aeternam alterius naturae quam personam temporalem sibi omnino connaturalem. Nam primo modo persona faciebat, ipsum vere dici et esse Deum, secundo modo hominem purump229-7.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether this is true: Christ, as man, is a person.

Secondly it is asked concerning this: Christ, as man, is a person; and let that qualification as man be taken properly. For in its other acceptations there is no doubt that it has truth, as the Master says in the textp227-3. And that it is true seems so.

1. Christ is not man except because he is this one; but Christ, insofar as he is this man, is a person, because it is proper to a pronoun to be put in place of a proper name and to designate a definite person (To the contrary): therefore this is true and to be conceded: Christ, as man, is a person.

2. Likewise, Christ, as man, is a thing complete with every completion that can be found in a rational creature; but personality is the dignity and property of nobility found in a complete rational creaturep227-4: therefore it is found in Christ, insofar as Christ is man.

3. Likewise, more noble and more perfect is the union by which the Word is united to the assumed nature than the union by which the whole Trinity is united through grace to any just soulp227-5; but the union through indwelling grace takes away from no one the dignity of person, indeed every just man, as man, is a person: therefore much more so Christ.

4. Likewise, the union of the divine nature to the human takes away nothing from the divinity, which nevertheless is said to be humbled,

and much more it takes away nothing from the humanity, since the humanity is said to be exalted through that unionp228-1; but this is true: Christ, as God, is a person: therefore much more will this be true: Christ, as man, is a person, since the man loses nothing of dignity, but acquires it through that union.

5. Likewise, suppose by the impossible that the Word should release the human naturep228-2, then that man who is called Jesus, as man, would be a person; but it is established that nothing would accrue to him on account of that separation: therefore it is true now that Jesus, as man, is a person.

On the contrary: 1. Nothing belongs to Christ, as man (The foundations), that is not assumed or co-assumed; but that the Son of God assumed a person is false and heretical, as the Master says above in the fifth distinctionp228-3, and Augustine, and it has been proved in many ways: therefore it is false that Christ is a person, as man.

2. Likewise, if Christ, as man, is a person; and the humanity began in Christ: therefore also the personality: therefore Christ began to be a person: therefore he is not an eternal person: therefore he is not the only-begotten Son of the Father, since the Son is co-eternal with the Father. But this is impious: therefore it remains that that from which this follows is falsep228-4.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that the same predicate be in the same thing according to differing natures: since therefore Christ is a person, as God; either it would not belong to him to be a person, as man, or another person will be, as man; and if there is another person, as man, and another, as God: therefore Christ is two persons: therefore he is not one, and so he is notp228-5. But this is false: therefore it remains that the other member is true, namely that it does not belong to Christ to be a person, as man.

4. Likewise, personality is in any thing by reason of that which is most worthy in it — for the name of person pertains to a notablep228-6 dignity — but it is established that the most worthy thing in Christ is not the human nature, but the divine; therefore it is false that Christ, as man, or according to his human nature, is a person.

5. Likewise, this same thing is shown through the etymology of the name. For thus the Master argues in the textp228-7: Persona is so called as it were per se sonans (sounding by itself), or per se unum (one by itself); but nothing of this kind is joined to another, at least to something more worthy: therefore if the human nature in Christ is united to something more worthy, namely the divine, it seems etc.

### Conclusion. The locution: Christ, as man, is a person, is to be denied.

I respond: It must be said that, beyond doubt, if this word secundum (according to) is taken insofar as it imports the account of form or of causep228-8, it is to be denied without qualification (First conclusion); because personality cannot belong to Christ according to the human nature. For it itself is joined to something more worthy, and therefore it cannot have the account of person, which is regarded according to the excellence of dignity in that of which it is said; nor is it merely joined to something more worthy by any kind of conjunction whatever, but by a conjunction or union that is personalp228-9. And therefore it is necessary that in Christ, with respect to the two natures, there be one person; but that person cannot be regarded on the side of the created nature and of the assumed nature: it is necessary therefore that it be regarded (Second conclusion) according to the assuming and uncreated nature. And for that reason this is admitted: Christ, as God, is a person; this is rejected: Christ, as man, is a person, as the reasons adduced for the second part prove; and therefore they are to be conceded.

To the objections for the affirmative part:

To 1. To that which is objected concerning this: Christ, insofar as he is this man, is a person (Solution of the objections): it must be said that this is to be distinguished, therefore etc.; because this (A distinction to be noted)

can demonstrate the human nature in atomo (in the individual)p228-10, namely the composite of that soul and that body; and in this way it is false that Christ, insofar as he is this man, is a person. Nor is what he objects valid, that the pronoun demonstrates a definite person; for persona there has only as much force as suppositum, whence it is fittingly said: this whiteness. But if that which is this demonstrates a person, then it is true, and the sense is: Christ, insofar as he is this one who is man, is a person. But then it does not follow: therefore as man — rather it is a fallacy secundum accidens (of accident)p228-11. — (Otherwise.) Generally, however, this manner of arguing could be resisted. For it does not follow: Peter is an individual, as this man: therefore he is an individual, as man.

To 2. To that which is objected, that Christ, as man, is a thing complete with every completion; it must be said that it is true of absolute completion (To be noted), but of relative completion, which is the dignity of supereminence, it does not have truth; for the human nature in Christ is not the most noble thing in him, as it is in other men. Nor from this does it follow that the dignity in Christ, as man, is less than in other men, on this account, because that dignity is compensated by a dignity disproportionately more noble. For it is much more noble to be a person by an eternal personality than by a created personalityp229-1.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the union through grace does not take away the dignity of person; it must be said that it is not similar, because, although the soul through grace is united to something more worthy, namely God, nevertheless it is not united by a natural union, but rather by a voluntary one; nor is it united into the unity of hypostasis, but into a conformity of will. And therefore it is not necessary that the Spirit be of one person with the soul which it inhabits, but of conformed will. It is not so, however, in Christ, in whom the union is personalp229-2.

To 4. To that which is objected, that although the divine nature is united to the human, nevertheless Christ is a person, as God; it must be said that it is not similar, for a twofold cause: for person indeed says two things (Person says two things), namely the hypostasis, in which is the substancep229-3 of the whole being of the thing, and the property of supereminent dignity; and in that blessed union each of these (To be noted) is found in Christ, as God. For the divine hypostasis is that in which the whole being of Christ is substantiated, not the human; the property also of dignity is in him according to that nature which cannot be united to something more worthy; but each of these is lacking to the human nature, since it itself is substantiated in the hypostasis of another nature, on account of which it is in a certain way said to verge into an accidentp229-4; it is also united to a more worthy nature. And therefore from its very union and nobility it lacks the property of person in itself, although it does not lack it, indeed has it, in the assuming one.

To 5. To that which is objected, that if the Word should release the human nature, then Jesus, as man, would be a person; it must be said that it is true, because then that nature would have another mode of existing (To be noted); for it would not be united to something else more worthy, nor would it have the suppositum of another nature. But now it is the contrary; andp229-5 in that process there is no necessity of inferring, because the fittingness of the likeness is not preserved. And if you object that no dignity accrues; it must be said that, that the man would be a person, as man, this is not on account of an increment of dignity, but on account of the lessening from that separation, because then that nature would previously have for its suppositum an eternal person, but now after the separation it hasp229-6 a temporal person. But it is much more worthy to have an eternal person of another nature than a temporal person wholly connatural to oneself. For in the first way the person made him to be truly called and to be God, in the second way a mere manp229-7.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic c. 1. — Superius pro et accipiatur (codd. WX accipitur) Vat. et hoc si accipiatur, edd. 1, 2 et si accipiatur. Paulo inferius pro nisi quia cod. K nisi secundum quod, et subinde post est iste edd. repetunt homo. — Rationem minori additam Priscian., XI. Grammat. c. 2. sic exprimit: » Pronomen enim dicitur quod pro nomine ponitur «. Et ibid. XVII. c. 2. idem dicit: Substantiam enim significat loco nominis positum pronomen et personam verbo sibi adiuncto congruam indicat.
    Here c. 1. — Above, for et accipiatur (codd. WX accipitur) the Vatican edition reads et hoc si accipiatur, edd. 1, 2 et si accipiatur. A little below, for nisi quia cod. K has nisi secundum quod, and thereupon after est iste the editions repeat homo. — The added ground for the minor Priscian, Grammar XI, c. 2, expresses thus: "For a pronoun is so called because it is put in place of a name." And ibid. XVII, c. 2, he says the same: For a pronoun put in place of a name signifies substance, and indicates the person congruent with the verb joined to it.
  2. Cfr. supra d. 3. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Pro nobilitatis cod. U rationabilitatis, cod. F voci nobilitatis addit i. e. rationabilitatis.
    Cf. above d. 3, a. 2, q. 2 and following. — For nobilitatis cod. U has rationabilitatis, cod. F adds to the word nobilitatis "i.e. rationabilitatis."
  3. Vide supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. — In codd. III (K primitus) L T Z aa deest tota ante Trinitas.
    See above d. 2, a. 3, q. 2. — In codd. III (K originally) L T Z aa the word tota before Trinitas is missing.
  4. Cfr. August., Epist. 137. (alias 3.) c. 3. n. 9; Epist. 169. (alias 102.) c. 2. n. 7. seq., et, de Praedest. Sanctor. c. 15. n. 31.
    Cf. Augustine, Letter 137 (otherwise 3) c. 3, n. 9; Letter 169 (otherwise 102) c. 2, n. 7 and following, and On the Predestination of the Saints c. 15, n. 31.
  5. In codd. AG (K a prima manu) LTUVZaa desideratur humanam, pro quo cod. bb substituit illam. Codd. N W X naturam humanam mutaverunt in hominem.
    In codd. AG (K by the first hand) LTUVZaa humanam is lacking, for which cod. bb substitutes illam. Codd. N W X changed naturam humanam into hominem.
  6. Cap. 1. et 3, nec non Comment. ibid. a. 2. q. 2, ubi et Augustini testimonia habentur, quae hic respiciuntur. — De maiori cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 5. ad 1. — Voci Magister cod. G annectit in littera.
    Chapters 1 and 3, and also the Commentary on the same, a. 2, q. 2, where the testimonies of Augustine are also found, which are here regarded. — On the major, cf. above d. 5, a. 2, q. 5, to 1. — To the word Magister cod. G annexes in littera.
  7. Cfr. infra d. XI. lit. Magistri, c. 3, et Comment. a. 2. q. 2. seq.
    Cf. below d. XI, text of the Master, c. 3, and the Commentary, a. 2, q. 2 and following.
  8. Sic argumentatur Boethius; vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 2. — In initio arg. codd. K N T vocabulo eidem adiungunt subiecto. Deinde pro conveniret Vat. substituit conveniet, et mox post aut alia persona erit, secundum quod homo cod. Q addit et alia, secundum quod Deus.
    Thus Boethius argues; see above d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, foundation 2. — At the beginning of the argument codd. K N T add to the word eidem the word subiecto. Then for conveniret the Vatican edition substitutes conveniet, and soon after aut alia persona erit, secundum quod homo cod. Q adds et alia, secundum quod Deus.
  9. Codd. M O rationabilem.
    Codd. M O read rationabilem.
  10. Hic c. 1. Cfr. supra d. V. c. 3. — Mox pro vel per se unum cod. bb vel per se una. In fine arg. post divinae cod. U repetit naturae.
    Here c. 1. Cf. above d. V, c. 3. — Soon, for vel per se unum cod. bb has vel per se una. At the end of the argument, after divinae cod. U repeats naturae.
  11. Vide corp. quaest. praeced.
    See the body of the preceding question.
  12. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro et penes cod. K nec penes, cod. U vel.
    Cf. above d. 6, a. 2, q. 1. — A little below, for et penes cod. K has nec penes, cod. U vel.
  13. Respiciuntur verba illa Damasc., quae supra pag. 15, nota 4. allegavimus. De hac solut. cfr. quaest. seq.
    Those words of Damascene are regarded which we cited above on page 15, note 4. On this solution cf. the following question.
  14. Cfr. supra pag. 179, nota 1. et tom. II. pag. 870, nota 8. — Paulo superius post demonstrat personam cod. K subiicit propriam.
    Cf. above page 179, note 1, and vol. II, page 870, note 8. — A little above, after demonstrat personam cod. K subjoins propriam.
  15. Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. et 2. — Aliquanto superius post sicut cod. A interserit est, et post pauca, scil. post secundum quod, cod. S subdit ille. Deinde pro quia illa dignitas codd. A G K N U bb exhibent quod illa dignitas, et demum pro nobiliorem in codd. GZ (bb a secunda manu) scriptum est nobilitantem, in codd. W X digniorem.
    Cf. above d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, to 1 and 2. — Somewhat above, after sicut cod. A inserts est, and after a little, namely after secundum quod, cod. S subjoins ille. Then for quia illa dignitas codd. A G K N U bb give quod illa dignitas, and finally for nobiliorem in codd. GZ (bb by the second hand) is written nobilitantem, in codd. W X digniorem.
  16. Vide supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro Spiritum (scil. sanctum) edd. 1, 2 cum paucis codd. ipsum, Vat. ipsum Deum.
    See above d. 2, a. 3, q. 2. — A little above, for Spiritum (namely the Holy Spirit) edd. 1, 2 with a few codices read ipsum, the Vatican edition ipsum Deum.
  17. Cod. A bene substantiatio [substantificatio?], cod. bb sustentatio, Vat. subsistentia. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 2. scholion. Mox pro beata edd. vera. Deinde post substantificatur edd. cum cod. cc inepte addunt in hypostasi alterius naturae.
    Cod. A well reads substantiatio [substantificatio?], cod. bb sustentatio, the Vatican edition subsistentia. Cf. above d. 6, a. 2, q. 2, scholion. Soon, for beata the editions read vera. Then after substantificatur the editions with cod. cc ineptly add in hypostasi alterius naturae.
  18. Vide supra pag. 155, nota 6. — Paulo inferius post caret Vat. inserit et.
    See above page 155, note 6. — A little below, after caret the Vatican edition inserts et.
  19. Vat. et ideo.
    The Vatican edition reads et ideo.
  20. Vat. haberet. Eadem Vat. paulo superius ante sit persona (codd. I L N T Z aa fit persona) interiicit cum; in cod. U legitur quod etsi homo ille etc. Circa finem solut. Vat. voculam sibi mutavit in sive.
    The Vatican edition reads haberet. The same Vatican edition, a little above, before sit persona (codd. I L N T Z aa fit persona) inserts cum; in cod. U is read quod etsi homo ille etc. Near the end of the solution the Vatican edition changed the word sibi into sive.
  21. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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