Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 10

Textus Latinus

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Articulus I. De comparatione Christi hominis ad conditionem personalitatis.

Quaestio I. Utrum haec sit admittenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum haec sit admittenda: Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. (Ad oppositum.) Ad Philippenses secundo^p225-1: Dedit illi nomen etc.; Glossa: « In quantum homo assumsit nomen Dei non usurpative, sed vere »; sed quod vere assumsit vere habet: ergo si, secundum quod homo, assumsit nomen Dei, secundum quod homo, est vere Deus.

2. Item, Christus fuit praedestinatus esse filius Dei in virtute, sicut dicitur ad Romanos primo^p225-2; sed Christus est illud, secundum quod homo, ad quod praedestinatus fuit, secundum quod homo: si ergo praedestinatus fuit esse filius Dei, secundum quod homo; Christus est Deus et Dei filius, secundum quod homo.

3. Item, Christus secundum gratiam unionis est Deus et homo; sed gratia unionis et quaelibet gratia competit ipsi Christo secundum humanam naturam: ergo si secundum gratiam unionis est Deus, et secundum quod homo^p225-3, habet gratiam unionis, ergo secundum quod homo, est Deus.

4. Item, Christus, secundum quod peccata dimittebat, est Deus: sed secundum quod homo, peccata dimittebat: ergo secundum quod homo, est Deus. Maior manifesta est; minor probatur per illud quod dicitur Matthaei nono^p225-4: Ut autem sciatis, quia filius hominis habet potestatem in terra dimittendi peccata etc.

Sed contra: 1. (Fundamenta.) Omne illud quod convenit alicui, secundum quod ipsum, aut est per se accidens, aut definitio, sive pars definitionis; sed Deus non se habet hoc modo ad hominem sive ad humanam naturam: ergo etc. Prima manifesta est per doctrinam demonstrativam^p225-5; secunda vero manifesta est per se ipsam.

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2. Item, quae sunt disparata non praedicantur de eodem et secundum idem^p226-1; sed esse animal et esse Deum sunt praedicata disparata: si ergo esse animal convenit ipsi Christo, secundum quod homo, ergo esse Deum non convenit eidem secundum humanitatem.

3. Item, Christus, secundum quod Deus, caret principio: si ergo est Deus, secundum quod homo; sequitur, quod Deus, secundum quod homo, careat principio. Sed secundum quod homo, habet principium: ergo secundum quod habet principium, caret principio: ergo oppositum est ratio sui oppositi; quod est absurdum^p226-2.

4. Item, si aliquod praedicatum convenit alicui subiecto secundum aliquid, illo remoto, non convenit ei: ergo si Christus est Deus, secundum quod homo, si Christus non esset homo, non esset Deus. Sed non fuit homo nisi ex tempore: ergo Christus est Deus solum ex tempore^p226-3. Sed constat, quod hoc est falsum: ergo falsum est, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus.

Conclusio.

Christum esse Deum, secundum quod homo, non debet admitti, nisi improprie accipiatur, scilicet secundum indivisionem concomitantiae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quemadmodum Magister dicit in littera^p226-4, haec dictio secundum multiplicem facit intelligentiam. (Secundum dupliciter intelligitur.) Potest enim importare habitudinem causae, vel indivisionem sive unitatem concomitantiae. Si dicat habitudinem causae, (conclusio 1.) sic absque dubio falsa est locutio, pro eo quod conditio apposita nullo modo est causa praedicati, nec ratio, secundum quam nec per quam tale praedicatum insit illi subiecto. — Si autem dicat indivisionem concomitantiae, (conclusio 2.) sic potest habere veritatem. Tunc enim dicere, quod Christus sit Deus, secundum quod homo, non est aliud quam dicere, quod esse Deum competit personae Christi existenti in humana natura, ita quod divinitas et humanitas concomitantur se inseparabiliter circa eandem personam.

Iste autem modus accipiendi hanc dictionem secundum non est ita communis et^p226-5 proprius, sicut (conclusio 3.) praecedens, licet inveniatur quandoque. — Et sic patet, quod sermo praedictus, scilicet Christus, secundum quod homo, est Deus, secundum diversam intelligentiam huius praepositionis secundum quodam modo potest concedi, quodam modo negari. Negari enim debet, secundum quod dicit causam sive rationem formalem; et secundum istam viam procedunt rationes ad secundam partem; et quia verum concludunt secundum illam viam, ideo concedendae sunt.

(Solutio oppositorum.) 1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod assumsit nomen Dei, secundum quod homo; responderi potest, quod secundum dicit ibi concomitantiam per indivisionem unionis; quia enim unio illa fecit hominem Deum, ideo dicitur assumsisse nomen supremum, secundum quod homo. — (Alia solutio.) Aliter potest dici, quod cum dico assumere nomen Dei, duo dico, scilicet nominis ipsius celsitudinem et ipsius nominis acquisitionem. Cum ergo dicit^p226-6, quod assumsit nomen Dei, secundum quod homo, illa reduplicatio non dicit rationem nominis, sed acquisitionis. Nam Christus secundum divinam naturam habet nomen, quod est super omne nomen, per generationem, non per acquisitionem sive assumtionem; et ideo ex hoc non licet inferre: ergo est Deus, secundum quod homo, accipiendo secundum quod secundum eandem acceptionem; immo est accidens^p226-7 in illo processu.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedestinatus fuit esse filius Dei, secundum quod homo; iam patet responsio per idem, quod nunc dictum est, quia haec dictio secundum potius dicit concomitantiam secundum expressionem conditionis naturae, quam dicat habitudinem causae. — (Alia solutio.) Vel potest dici, quod ille sermo dicit rationem antecessionis, quae importatur in vocabulo praedestinationis, quae, inquam, non est respectu Christi secundum divinam naturam, sed solum secundum humanam^p226-8. Non sic autem est de eo quod est esse Deum; et ideo consimilis defectus est in hac ratione, sicut in praecedente.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de gratia unionis, dicendum, quod Christus significat personam in duabus naturis; et illa persona Deus est per naturam, non per gratiam unionis; dicitur attamen^p226-9 simul,

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quod sit Deus et homo per gratiam unionis. (Notandum.) Esto tamen, quod ista sit concedenda: iste homo est Deus secundum gratiam unionis; ex hoc non habetur, quod sit Deus, secundum quod homo; quia gratia unionis non convenit illi homini, secundum quod homo simpliciter, sed secundum quod homo unitus, sive secundum assumtionem ipsius a Verbo.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod dimittebat peccata, secundum quod homo^p227-1; si proprie loquamur de dimissione peccati, falsum est, nisi accipiatur haec dictio secundum, prout importat concomitantiam. (Notandum.) Nec potest inferri ex illa auctoritate: filius hominis habet potestatem dimittendi peccata; hanc enim potestatem, etsi in se haberet in forma hominis, non tamen habebat secundum hominis formam et in quantum homo, sed in quantum habebat formam Dei. Si vero dimissio peccatorum attribueretur alicui quantum ad meritum, tunc posset concedi, quod conveniret Christo, secundum quod homo; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod sit Deus in quantum homo, quia hoc non est Dei proprium^p227-2.

Scholion

I. In tribus huius articuli quaestionibus continuantur subtiles inquisitiones, iam in dist. 7. inchoatae, de proprietate plurium de Christo homine propositionum, utrum scilicet secundum proprietatem verborum sane dicantur. Hae disceptationes dialecticae in scholas introductae esse videntur ab eo tempore, quo exortae sunt famosae illae tres opiniones, quae relatae sunt in dist. 6. 7. post divisionem textus, cum patroni harum opinionum nec in his propositionibus explicandis possint convenire. Insuper notandum cum Magistro et S. Bonaventura, quod terminus secundum intelligi potest dupliciter, ut explicatur in corp. Vel cum S. Thoma dici potest, quod aliud est dicere: secundum quod homo (quo significatur substantia rationalis naturae), et dicere: secundum quod iste homo (quo significatur suppositum humanae naturae; cfr. tamen infra q. 2. ad 1.) — Quoad I. quaestionem antiqui Scholastici propositionem cum sua reduplicatione distinguunt eamque intellectam uno modo concedunt, alio modo negant. Adiiciunt autem, quod prior sensus verus minus usui verborum respondeat; unde ista propositio magis sit neganda quam concedenda. At Richard. a Med. vult, eam simpliciter esse negandam. Agitur autem potius de nomine quam de re.

De hac I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 2. — Scotus hanc et seq. quaest. tangit III. Sent. d. 11. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. III. q. 16. a. 9. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1–3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

II. Ad seq. (2.) quaestionem S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal., B. Alberto, Richardo et Aegid. R. respondet negative, sed S. Thom. in Sum. (loc. cit. a. 12.) propositionem admittit intellectam in duplici sensu, in tertio vero sensu eam respuit. In ipsa re omnes consentiunt.

Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 1. — B. Albert., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Article I. On the comparison of Christ as man to the condition of personality.

Question I. Whether this is to be admitted: that Christ, as man, is God.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether this is to be admitted: that Christ, as man, is God. And that it is so, seems to be the case.

1. (On the affirmative side.) In Philippians 2^p225-1: He gave him a name etc.; the Gloss: « Inasmuch as a man he assumed the name of God not by usurpation, but truly »; but what one truly assumed one truly has: therefore if, as man, he assumed the name of God, then, as man, he is truly God.

2. Likewise, Christ was predestined to be Son of God in power, as is said in Romans 1^p225-2; but Christ is, as man, that to which he was predestined, as man: if therefore he was predestined to be Son of God, as man, then Christ is God and Son of God, as man.

3. Likewise, Christ according to the grace of union is God and man; but the grace of union and any grace whatever belongs to Christ himself according to his human nature: therefore if according to the grace of union he is God, and as man^p225-3 he has the grace of union, then as man he is God.

4. Likewise, Christ, insofar as he was forgiving sins, is God: but as man he was forgiving sins: therefore as man he is God. The major is manifest; the minor is proved through that which is said in Matthew 9^p225-4: But that you may know that the Son of man has power on earth to forgive sins etc.

On the contrary: 1. (The foundations.) Everything that belongs to anything, insofar as it is that thing, is either a per se accident, or a definition, or part of a definition; but God is not related in this way to man or to human nature: therefore etc. The first is manifest through demonstrative doctrine^p225-5; the second is manifest through itself.

2. Likewise, things that are disparate are not predicated of the same thing and according to the same respect^p226-1; but to be an animal and to be God are disparate predicates: if therefore to be an animal belongs to Christ himself, as man, then to be God does not belong to the same according to his humanity.

3. Likewise, Christ, as God, lacks a beginning: if therefore he is God, as man; it follows that God, as man, lacks a beginning. But as man he has a beginning: therefore insofar as he has a beginning, he lacks a beginning: therefore the opposite is the ground of its opposite; which is absurd^p226-2.

4. Likewise, if some predicate belongs to a subject according to something, then with that removed, it does not belong to it: therefore if Christ is God, as man, then if Christ were not man, he would not be God. But he was not man except in time: therefore Christ is God only in time^p226-3. But it is established that this is false: therefore it is false that Christ, as man, is God.

Conclusion.

That Christ is God, as man, ought not to be admitted, unless it be taken improperly, namely according to the indivision of concomitance.

I respond: It must be said that, just as the Master says in the text^p226-4, this word secundum (insofar as) admits of multiple understandings. (The word "secundum" is understood in two ways.) For it can import the relation of a cause, or the indivision or unity of concomitance. If it states the relation of a cause, (first conclusion) then without doubt the locution is false, because the condition appended is in no way the cause of the predicate, nor the ground according to which nor through which such a predicate is in that subject. — But if it states the indivision of concomitance, (second conclusion) then it can hold truth. For then to say that Christ is God, as man, is nothing other than to say that to be God belongs to the person of Christ existing in a human nature, in such a way that divinity and humanity accompany one another inseparably about the same person.

But this way of taking this word secundum is not so common and^p226-5 proper, as (third conclusion) the preceding one, although it is found sometimes. — And thus it is clear that the aforesaid statement, namely that Christ, as man, is God, according to the diverse understanding of this preposition secundum, can in one way be conceded, in another way denied. For it ought to be denied, insofar as it states a cause or formal ground; and along this path proceed the reasons for the second part; and because they conclude truly along that path, therefore they are to be conceded.

(The resolution of the opposed arguments.) 1. To that which is first objected on the contrary, that he assumed the name of God, as man; it can be answered that secundum there states a concomitance through the indivision of the union; for because that union made the man God, therefore he is said to have assumed the supreme name, as man. — (Another solution.) Otherwise it can be said that when I say "to assume the name of God," I say two things, namely the loftiness of the name itself and the acquisition of that name. When therefore he says^p226-6 that he assumed the name of God, as man, that reduplication does not state the ground of the name, but of the acquisition. For Christ according to his divine nature has the name which is above every name, by generation, not by acquisition or assumption; and therefore from this it is not licit to infer: therefore he is God, as man, taking the secundum quod (insofar as) according to the same acceptation; rather it is an accident^p226-7 in that process.

2. To that which is objected, that he was predestined to be Son of God, as man; the response is now clear by the same point that has just been said, because this word secundum states rather a concomitance according to the expression of the condition of the nature, than that it states the relation of a cause. — (Another solution.) Or it can be said that that statement states the ground of antecedence, which is imported in the word "predestination," which, I say, is not with respect to Christ according to his divine nature, but only according to his human^p226-8. But it is not so concerning that which is to be God; and therefore there is a like defect in this reason, as in the preceding.

3. To that which is objected concerning the grace of union, it must be said that "Christ" signifies the person in two natures; and that person is God by nature, not by the grace of union; nevertheless it is said^p226-9 at the same time that he is God and man by the grace of union. (Note.) Yet granted that this is to be conceded: that this man is God according to the grace of union; from this it is not had that he is God, as man; because the grace of union does not belong to that man, as man simply, but as man united, or according to his assumption by the Word.

4. To that which is objected last, that he was forgiving sins, as man^p227-1; if we speak properly of the forgiveness of sin, it is false, unless this word secundum be taken as it imports concomitance. (Note.) Nor can it be inferred from that authority: the Son of man has the power of forgiving sins; for this power, even if he had it in himself in the form of a man, he nevertheless did not have according to the form of a man and inasmuch as man, but inasmuch as he had the form of God. But if the forgiveness of sins were attributed to someone as regards merit, then it could be conceded that it would belong to Christ, as man; but from this it does not follow that he is God inasmuch as man, because this is not proper to God^p227-2.

Scholion

I. In the three questions of this article there are continued the subtle inquiries, already begun in distinction 7, concerning the propriety of several propositions about Christ as man, namely whether they are rightly said according to the propriety of the words. These dialectical disputations seem to have been introduced into the schools from the time at which those famous three opinions arose, which were related in distinctions 6 and 7 after the division of the text, since the patrons of these opinions could not agree even in explaining these propositions. It is moreover to be noted, with the Master and St. Bonaventure, that the term secundum can be understood in two ways, as is explained in the body of the question. Or, with St. Thomas, it can be said that it is one thing to say as man (by which is signified the rational substance of a nature), and another to say as this man (by which is signified the supposit of the human nature; cf. however below, q. 2, ad 1). — As regards the first question, the ancient Scholastics distinguish the proposition with its reduplication and, taken in one way, concede it, in another way deny it. They add, however, that the prior true sense corresponds less to the use of the words; whence this proposition is rather to be denied than conceded. But Richard of Middleton holds that it is to be denied simply. It is, however, a matter rather of the name than of the thing.

On this first question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III, q. 6, m. 2, a. 2. — Scotus touches this and the following question, III Sent., d. 11, q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. III, q. 16, a. 9. — B. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 1–3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here under a single question.

II. To the following (second) question St. Bonaventure, with Alexander of Hales, B. Albert, Richard, and Giles of Rome, responds negatively, but St. Thomas in the Summa (loc. cit., a. 12) admits the proposition as understood in a twofold sense, while in a third sense he rejects it. In the matter itself all agree.

Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., a. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit., a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit., q. 1. — B. Albert, here q. 2, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 9. — Glossa hic allegata neque apud Strabum neque apud Petrum Lombardum neque apud Lyranum habetur. Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. similem affert Glossam, sumtam ex August., II. contra Maximin. Arian. c. 2, quae sic sonat: Hoc [nomen] illi ergo donatum est ut homini, secundum quem Filius factus est obediens usque ad mortem crucis, quod iam habebat idem ipse Dei Filius, Deus de Deo natus aequalis. Cfr. II. Qq. in nov. Testam. q. 64. (inter opera August.) et Comment. in Epist. ad Phil. 2, 9, olim Ambrosio adscriptum. — In fine arg. pro vere Deus codd. K bb exhibent verus Deus.
Verse 9. — The Gloss here cited is found neither in Strabo nor in Peter Lombard nor in Lyra. Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2, cites a similar Gloss, taken from Augustine, Against Maximinus the Arian II, c. 2, which runs thus: This [name] was therefore granted to him as to a man, according to which the Son was made obedient unto the death of the cross, which the same Son of God, God born of God, equal, already had. Cf. Questions on the New Testament q. 64 (among the works of Augustine) and the Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians 2, 9, formerly ascribed to Ambrose. — At the end of the argument, for vere Deus (truly God) codices K bb give verus Deus (true God).
Vers. 4. Cfr. supra d. 7. a. 2. q. 3.
Verse 4. Cf. above, d. 7, a. 2, q. 3.
Vox homo desideratur in non paucis codd. et edd. 1, 2, pro qua Vat. cum nonnullis codd. mox post gratiam unionis addit est homo. In cod. C legitur: et secundum quod habet humanitatem, habet gratiam unionis.
The word homo (man) is lacking in not a few codices and in editions 1, 2; in its place the Vatican edition, with some codices, adds soon after gratiam unionis (the grace of union) the words est homo (he is man). In codex C is read: and insofar as he has humanity, he has the grace of union.
Vers. 6.
Verse 6.
De qua agit Aristot. in libris Posteriorum. Ibid. I. c. 4–7. tractatur de ipsa sententia, quae proponitur hic in maiori. De locutione secundum quod ipsum (i. e. quatenus tale est) cfr. Aristot. V. Metaph. text. 23. (IV. c. 18.). Locutio per se accidens, cui opponitur non per se accidens sive accidens communiter acceptum (quod scil. et adesse et abesse potest, ac de quo non est demonstratio sive scientia), intelligit proprietatem sive passionem, quae resultat ex principiis speciei, ut est risibilitas respectu hominis. Ad rem est illud Aristot., I. Poster. c. 7: Tertium autem genus [eorum quae ad demonstrationem requiruntur] subiectum, cuius passiones et per se accidentia [τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα] ostendit demonstratio. — In maiori codd. M O S perperam aut est per se, aut per accidens. Deinde pro sive pars codd. M O aut pars.
Of which Aristotle treats in the books of the Posterior [Analytics]. There, I, c. 4–7, the very thesis is treated which is proposed here in the major. On the locution secundum quod ipsum (insofar as it is itself, i.e. inasmuch as it is such) cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 23 (IV, c. 18). The locution per se accidens (per se accident), to which is opposed non per se accidens (a non-per-se accident) or an accident taken commonly (which, namely, can both be present and be absent, and of which there is no demonstration or science), he understands as a property or attribute which results from the principles of the species, as risibility is with respect to man. To the point is that saying of Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 7: The third class, however, [of those things which are required for a demonstration] is the subject, whose attributes and per se accidents [τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα] the demonstration shows. — In the major, codices M O S wrongly aut est per se, aut per accidens (either is per se, or per accident). Then for sive pars (or part) codices M O aut pars (or part).
Boeth., I. de Syllogismo hypothet., ait: « Disparata autem ea voco, quae tantum a se diversa sunt, nulla contrarietate pugnantia, veluti terra, vestis, ignis » etc. Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Locis topic. c. de Locis extrinsecis, sic docet: De quocumque dicitur unum disparatorum abstractive, ab illo eodem removetur reliquum. Dicitur notanter abstractive, quia, si concretive sumeretur, tunc non sequeretur, quia non sequitur: hoc est album, ergo non est quantum; sed bene sequitur: hoc est albedo, ergo non est quantitas.
Boethius, On the Hypothetical Syllogism I, says: « I call disparate those things which are merely diverse from one another, conflicting by no contrariety, such as earth, garment, fire » etc. Peter of Spain, Summulae, treatise on Topical Loci, ch. on the Extrinsic Loci, teaches thus: Of whatever one of disparate things is said abstractly, from that same thing the other is removed. It is said pointedly abstractly, because, if it were taken concretely, then it would not follow, since it does not follow: this is white, therefore it is not quantified; but it does well follow: this is whiteness, therefore it is not quantity.
Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 36. (c. 10.) et IV. Meteor. text. 41. (c. 7.): Contrariorum [ἐναντίων] enim contrariae causae.
Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 36 (c. 10) and Meteorology IV, text 41 (c. 7): For of contraries [ἐναντίων] the causes are contrary.
Cod. G ergo Christus non fuit Deus nisi ex tempore.
Codex G: therefore Christ was not God except in time.
Hic c. 1. Quod ad duplicem intelligentiam dictionis secundum attinet, de quo in seqq. disseritur, Logici vulgo docent, particulas reduplicativas secundum quod, in quantum, quatenus etc. sumi posse vel reduplicative (quod fit, quando terminus reduplicatus est praedicati propria causa formalis, aut efficiens), vel specificative (quod locum habet, quando terminus reduplicatus non est propria ratio praedicati, attamen aliquo modo eam includit, cum sit quaedam eius species aut proprium subiectum).
Here c. 1. As regards the twofold understanding of the word secundum, which is discussed in what follows, the Logicians commonly teach that the reduplicative particles secundum quod, in quantum, quatenus (insofar as, inasmuch as, to the extent that) etc. can be taken either reduplicatively (which occurs when the reduplicated term is the proper formal or efficient cause of the predicate), or specificatively (which has place when the reduplicated term is not the proper ground of the predicate, yet in some way includes it, since it is a certain species of it or its proper subject).
Cod. U nec.
Codex U: nor.
Codd. A F G N U bb dicitur. Mox pro reduplicatio cod. bb implicatio. Subinde idem cod. bb voci nominis praefigit celsitudinis, et pro acquisitionis codd. S U aa exhibent acquisitionem.
Codices A F G N U bb: it is said. Soon for reduplicatio (reduplication) codex bb implicatio (implication). Then the same codex bb prefixes to the word nominis (of the name) the word celsitudinis (of the loftiness), and for acquisitionis (of the acquisition) codices S U aa give acquisitionem (the acquisition).
De hac fallacia vide supra pag. 179, nota 1.
On this fallacy see above, page 179, note 1.
Cfr. supra d. 7. a. 2. q. 3.
Cf. above, d. 7, a. 2, q. 3.
Codd. A G N V Z tamen, cod. E autem. Paulo inferius post ex hoc edd. subiiciunt tamen. In fine solut. pro unitus non pauci codd. substituunt mutatus.
Codices A G N V Z tamen (however), codex E autem (but). A little below, after ex hoc (from this) the editions subjoin tamen (nevertheless). At the end of the solution, for unitus (united) not a few codices substitute mutatus (changed).
In cod. K a secunda manu adiectum est dicendum, quod. Circa finem solut. pro quantum ad meritum in codd. G N U scriptum est secundum meritum. Cfr. infra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. Deinde pro conveniret cod. aa convenit.
In codex K, by a second hand, there has been added it must be said, that. Near the end of the solution, for quantum ad meritum (as regards merit) in codices G N U is written secundum meritum (according to merit). Cf. below, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1. Then for conveniret (it would belong) codex aa convenit (it belongs).
Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 5. a. 3. q. 2.
Cf. IV Sent., d. 5, a. 3, q. 2.

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