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Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 10

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum haec sit vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum.

Tertio quaeritur de hac: Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum. Et quod vera sit, videtur.

(Argg. pro parte affirmativa.)

1. Christus est aliquid, secundum quod homo, sicut habitum est in praecedentibusp229-8, aut ergo quid universale, aut quid singulare; sed non universale, quia Damascenus dicit, quod «Filius Dei assumsit humanam naturam in atomo», hoc est in singulari, et hoc est individuum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Christus, secundum quod homo, habet proprietates, quarum collectionem impossibile est in alio reperire; hoc autem est esse individuum, sicut patet per notificationem individui, quam dat Porphyriusp229-9: «Individuum est quod constat ex proprietatibus, quarum collectionem impossibile est in alio reperire»; sed hoc convenit Christo, secundum quod homo: ergo etc.

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3. Item, Christus, secundum quod homo, praedicatur de uno solo; sed «singulare et individuum est illud quod de uno solo praedicaturp230-1»: ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum.

4. Item, haec est vera: Christus est homo; aut ergo praedicatur ibi praedicatum accidentale, aut substantiale. Non accidentale, hoc constat, cum homo vere dicatur de Christo, sicut et de aliis hominibus; si essentiale: ergo vel est genus, vel species, vel differentia. Non genus, vel differentia: ergo species; sed species specialissima praedicatur de individuis solum sub ipsa contentisp230-2: ergo Christus est individuum hominis.

5. Item, haec est vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est substantia; sed substantia dividitur sufficienti divisione a Philosophop230-3 per primam et secundam: aut igitur Christus est substantia prima, aut secunda; non secunda, cum non sit genus, vel species: ergo prima. Sed prima substantia idem est quod individuum: ergo etc.

6. Item, haec est vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est albus, et albedo inest Christo, secundum quod homo; sed accidentia primo et per se sunt in individuisp230-4: ergo albedo inest Christo, secundum quod est hominis individuum.

Sed contra:

(Pro parte negativa.)

1. Idem est esse individuum substantiae et hypostasim; sed in Christo una sola est hypostasis, quoniam in hypostasi fit unio, ut dicit Damascenusp230-5, et illa hypostasis est divina, non humana nisi per unionem: ergo si haec est falsa: Christus, secundum quod homo, est hypostasis; haec similiter est falsa: Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum.

2. Item, Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum, et secundum quod Deus, est substantia individua — hoc constat — et secundum rationem individuationis est numeratio: ergo Christus est duo. Sed hoc est falsum, sicut ostensum est suprap230-6: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne individuum est per se unum et unum numerop230-7; sed nihil tale est unitum alii substantiae antecedenti secundum esse: ergo cum humana natura in Christo sit unita Verbo aeterno, videtur, quod rationem individuationis non teneat in ipso.

4. Item, quidquid dicitur de filio hominis, dicitur de Filio Dei: ergo cum individuum dicat «collectionem proprietatum, quam impossibile est in alio reperiri et de alio individuo dicip230-8»; impossibile est, quod Christus sit aliud et aliud individuum, secundum quod homo, et secundum quod Deus: ergo sicut in Christo est unitas personalitatis, ita est unitas individuationis: ergo sicut haec est falsa: Christus est persona, secundum quod homo; ita, ut videtur, haec erit falsa: Christus est individuum, secundum quod homo.

(Quaestio generalis.) Quaeritur igitur de hac et de consimilibus, videlicet utrum sint concedendae: Christus est individuum, secundum quod homo; Christus est suppositum, secundum quod homo; Christus est hypostasis, secundum quod homo; et de aliis consimilibus, quid veritatis habeant et quid proprietatis.

### Conclusio. (De duplici locutione, conclusio.) Locutio: Christus, secundum quod est homo, est individuum, conceditur, quatenus individuum accipitur largiori modo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod accipiendo proprie hanc dictionem secundum, prout dicit habitudinem causaep230-9, quaedam ex huiusmodi locutionibus simpliciter sunt falsae et impropriae, quaedam sunt distinguendae, pro eo quod habent aliquid proprietatis, aliquid improprietatis. (Conclusio generalis ad quaestiones.)

Haec enim est falsa et impropria: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona; et haec similiter: Christus, secundum quod homo, est hypostasis. Sed prima est falsa ex duplici causa: tum quia persona importat proprietatem dignitatis, tum etiam, quia importat fundamentum totius existentiae naturalis. (Notandum.) Neutrum autem horum inest Christo ratione naturae assumtae, sed assumentisp230-10. — Secunda vero est falsa altera illarum causarum, quoniam, etsi

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hypostasis non dicat proprietatem excellentiae, dicit tamen fundamentum existentiae; hoc autem in Christo non est anima nec caro nec ex utroque compositum, sed Verbum increatum. Et propterea praedictae duae locutiones impropriae sunt et falsae; et si legantur alicubi, sunt exponendae et secundum aliam acceptionem illius determinationis, secundum quod est homop231-1, sunt intelligendae.

(De duabus aliis.) Haec autem, de qua nunc est sermo, scilicet Christus est individuum, secundum quod homo; et haec: Christus est suppositum, secundum quod homo, possunt habere proprietatem et improprietatem secundum diversam intentionem istorum vocabulorum. — (De individuo distinctio.) Dicitur enim aliquid individuum dupliciter: uno modo, quia dicitur de uno solo; et hoc modo albedo Petri est individuum, et hoc modo individuum dicitur quod est indivisum in se. Et sic (Conclusio 1.) absque dubio Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum. Alio modo dicitur individuum quod est ab aliis divisum et subsistit in se et per se; et (Conclusio 2.) hoc modo accipiendo individuum, humana natura in Christo non est individuum. Est enim unita Verbo increato, sicut suo supposito.

(Conclusio 3.) Per hunc etiam modum distinguendum est, cum dicitur: Christus, secundum quod homo, est suppositum. (De supposito distinctio.) Est enim suppositum in quo et suppositum de quop231-2. Si dicatur suppositum illud, de quo alterum praedicatur et quod subiicitur superiori; (Conclusio 4.) Christus, secundum quod homo, est suppositum. Si vero dicatur illud suppositum, in quo totum esse rei stabilitur et fundatur; sic non est concedendum, (Conclusio 5.) Christum esse suppositum, secundum quod homo, nisi arctetur ratio suppositi, ut dicatur suppositum accidentium et proprietatum accidentalium.

(Epilogus.) Unde quia in unica sui acceptione tam nomen individui quam nomen suppositi aequipollet hypostasi, falsae sunt praedictae locutiones ex eadem causa, ex qua et locutio praedicta, scilicet: Christus est hypostasis, secundum quod homo. Sequeretur enim, quod in Christo essent duo supposita et duae hypostases; et ita non esset unum, nec esset in eo vera unio. — Secundum autem aliam acceptionem possunt concedi; et per hoc possunt dissolvi rationes, quae inducuntur ad utramque partem. (Ad argg. pro utraque parte.) Rationes enim, quae inducuntur ad primam partem, procedunt de individuo, secundum quod individuum dicitur quod de uno solo dicitur. Rationes vero ad partem sequentem procedunt de individuo, secundum quod non solum non dividitur in aliap231-3, sed etiam in quantum dividitur ab alio supposito, et hoc quidem non habet in Christo. Et hoc totum patet pertractanti singulas rationes.

(Ad quaestionem generalem.) Ex his patet quod ultimo quaerebatur, quae scilicet locutiones in hac materia sint admittendae, et quae non. Illae enim concedendae sunt, quae sic veritatem et proprietatem naturarum important, quod illi summae unioni non praeiudicant, in qua quidem facta est unio in persona Verbi, non solum in quantum dicit dignitatem proprietatis, sedp231-4 in quantum dicit suppositum incommunicabile, scilicet ipsam hypostasim, ratione cuius est mutua praedicatio et idiomatum communicatio. — (Directivum principium.) Et hoc tanquam pro directivo principio est habendum, quia in illa unione beata persona Verbi fecit se suppositum humanae naturae, sicut pluries in praecedentibusp231-5 dictum est. Et pro tanto humana natura in Christo dicitur vergere in accidens: et ideo aliquod praedicatum, quod dicit modum existendi, vere attribuitur nobis secundum humanam naturam, quod tamen non vere attribuitur Christo secundum humanam, sed secundum divinam, scilicet esse personam, et esse hypostasim, esse suppositum, esse individuum, secundum quod vocabulo hypostasis aequipollent; licet secundum largiorem modum accipiendi duo ultima possint attribui, ut praetactum est.

(Obiectio de individuo.) Sed contra praedicta videtur posse obiici, quoniam videtur, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, vere et proprie sit individuum. Sicut enim in secundo librop231-6 ostensum fuit, individuatio est ex communicatione materiae cum forma, et innotescere habet per accidentium collectionem; Christus autem, secundum quod homo, ex anima et carne componitur, sicut et alii homines: ergo ita vere et proprie habet individuationem, sicut et alii homines: non videtur igitur, quod praedictum est sufficere. — (Quaestio incidens.) Propter hoc est quaestio, quantum sit de proprietate individuationis in Christo, secundum quod homo. Si enim non est amplior, nisi quia dicitur de uno solo; tunc non habet magis de ratione individuationis quam accidentia; quod absurdum est penitus, cum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit vera substantiap231-7.

(Solutio.) Et dicendum, quod circumscriptis accidentibus et proprietatibus, quae individuationem non faciunt, sed ostendunt, individuatio est a principiis intrinsecis, secundum quod unum constituunt suppositum, in quo totum esse rei stabilitur. Et quia ex concursu

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illorum principiorum constituitur individuum, et resultat forma totius, quae est forma specifica; hinc est, quemadmodum dicit Boethiusp232-1, quod «species est totum esse individui». In Christo autem anima et caro, sive materia et forma, uniuntur non solum in eo quod constituunt, sed etiam in hypostasi Verbi aeterni. (Notandum.) Et ideo forma specifica non dicit totum esse Christi, ac per hoc Christus, secundum quod homo, non habet omnino plenam rationem individui; unde quasi medium tenet inter individuum, proprie dictum, et individuum, secundum quod accidens dicitur aliquid individuum. Nam in individuo proprie dicto est principiorum substantialium unio et primi suppositi constitutio in se ipso, non in altero. Utrumque autem horum deest in accidentibus, quae nec in se nec per se subsistuntp232-2. Medio modo est in Christo, ubi principia conveniunt secundum humanam naturam; tamen primum suppositum est alterius naturae, non ab eis constitutum. — Et sic patet, quod veritatem habent quae praedicta sunt. Ad haec autem valent praedeterminata libro secundo, distinctione tertiap232-3.

Scholion

I. Communiter antiqui Scholastici non concedunt simpliciter locutionem, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, sit individuum. Nam, ut dicit Ægid. R. (hic q. 2. dub. lat. 1.) ad mentem S. Thomae, «illa humana natura (in Christo), licet sit quoddam individuum, non tamen praedicatur de Christo in abstracto, et ut est quoddam individuum, quia Christus non est humanitas». — Aliis verbis ac S. Bonav., sed in re idem dicentibus, rem explicat Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.) sic: «Uno modo individuum accipitur communiter, secundum quod est in quolibet genere; altero modo specialiter, secundum quod est in genere substantiae solius. Primo modo individuum dicitur quod de uno solo praedicatur; secundo, quod per se subsistit, ab aliis divisum. Primo modo pes vel albedo Socratis potest dici individuum; secundo modo non. Primo modo plura sunt in Christo individua, sed ipse non est nisi unum solum individuum; secundo modo unum solum in Christo est individuum, specialiter dictum, et ipse est illud, scilicet persona divina». Deinde resolvit, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est individuum, primo modo intellectum, nec tamen aliud a persona; non autem in altero sensu acceptum. — Quoad terminum suppositum S. Bonav. praeter sensum vulgarem alium sensum cum antiquis Scholasticis distinguit, scilicet ut aliquid sub communi natura positum, ad quam habet respectum, et quae de illo praedicatur. Si ita intelligitur, «Christus, secundum quod homo, supponitur humanae naturae, vel est aliquod suppositum humanae naturae»; ita S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3.). — In fine quaestionis notanda sunt quae dicuntur ad quaestionem generalem et incidentem de ratione individui in Christo.

II. Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 6. m. 2. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. 3.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether this is true: Christ, as man, is an individual.

Thirdly it is asked about this: Christ, as man, is an individual. And that it is true seems so.

(Arguments for the affirmative side.)

1. Christ is something, as man, as was held in the foregoingp229-8; therefore he is either something universal or something singular; but not universal, because Damascene says that "the Son of God assumed human nature in an atom," that is, in a singular, and this is an individual: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Christ, as man, has properties whose collection it is impossible to find in another; but this is to be an individual, as is clear from the description of an individual which Porphyryp229-9 gives: "An individual is what consists of properties whose collection it is impossible to find in another"; but this belongs to Christ, as man: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Christ, as man, is predicated of one alone; but "the singular and the individual is that which is predicated of one alonep230-1": therefore Christ, as man, is an individual.

4. Likewise, this is true: Christ is man; therefore either an accidental predicate is predicated there, or a substantial one. Not accidental, this is clear, since man is truly said of Christ, as also of other men; if essential: therefore it is either a genus, or a species, or a difference. Not a genus or a difference: therefore a species; but the most specific species is predicated only of the individuals contained under itp230-2: therefore Christ is an individual of man.

5. Likewise, this is true: Christ, as man, is a substance; but substance is divided by a sufficient division by the Philosopherp230-3 into first and second: therefore either Christ is a first substance or a second; not a second, since he is neither a genus nor a species: therefore a first. But first substance is the same as individual: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, this is true: Christ, as man, is white, and whiteness is in Christ, as man; but accidents are primarily and per se in individualsp230-4: therefore whiteness is in Christ insofar as he is an individual of man.

On the contrary:

(For the negative side.)

1. To be the individual of a substance and to be a hypostasis are the same; but in Christ there is only one hypostasis, since the union takes place in the hypostasis, as Damascene saysp230-5, and that hypostasis is divine, not human except through the union: therefore if this is false: Christ, as man, is a hypostasis; this likewise is false: Christ, as man, is an individual.

2. Likewise, Christ, as man, is an individual, and as God is an individual substance — this is clear — and according to the account of individuation there is numbering: therefore Christ is two. But this is false, as was shown abovep230-6: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every individual is one per se and one in numberp230-7; but nothing of this kind is united to another substance prior to it according to being: therefore since human nature in Christ is united to the eternal Word, it seems that it does not hold the account of individuation in him.

4. Likewise, whatever is said of the son of man is said of the Son of God: therefore, since "individual" denotes "a collection of properties which it is impossible to find in another and to be said of another individualp230-8"; it is impossible that Christ should be a different and different individual as man and as God: therefore just as in Christ there is a unity of personality, so there is a unity of individuation: therefore just as this is false: Christ is a person as man; so, as it seems, this will be false: Christ is an individual as man.

(General question.) It is asked therefore concerning this and similar matters, namely whether these are to be conceded: Christ is an individual as man; Christ is a suppositum as man; Christ is a hypostasis as man; and concerning other similar ones, what they have of truth and what of propriety.

### Conclusion. (On the twofold mode of speech, conclusion.) The locution: Christ, as he is man, is an individual, is conceded, insofar as "individual" is taken in the broader mode.

I respond: It must be said that, taking this word secundum (insofar as) properly, as it expresses the relation of a causep230-9, some of such locutions are simply false and improper, and some are to be distinguished, in that they have something of propriety and something of impropriety. (General conclusion to the questions.)

For this is false and improper: Christ, as man, is a person; and this likewise: Christ, as man, is a hypostasis. But the first is false from a twofold cause: both because person imports a property of dignity, and also because it imports the foundation of the whole of natural existence. (Note.) But neither of these is in Christ by reason of the assumed nature, but of the assumingp230-10. — But the second is false by the other of those causes, since, although

a hypostasis does not express a property of excellence, it nevertheless expresses the foundation of existence; but this in Christ is not soul nor flesh nor that composed of both, but the uncreated Word. And therefore the aforesaid two locutions are improper and false; and if they are read anywhere, they are to be expounded and to be understood according to another acceptation of that determination "insofar as he is manp231-1."

(On the two others.) But this, of which there is now discourse, namely Christ is an individual, as man; and this: Christ is a suppositum, as man, can have propriety and impropriety according to the diverse intention of these words. — (Distinction concerning "individual.") For "individual" is said of something in two ways: in one way, because it is said of one alone; and in this way the whiteness of Peter is an individual, and in this way an individual is said to be what is undivided in itself. And so (Conclusion 1.) without doubt Christ, as man, is an individual. In another way an individual is said to be what is divided from others and subsists in itself and per se; and (Conclusion 2.) taking "individual" in this way, human nature in Christ is not an individual. For it is united to the uncreated Word, as to its suppositum.

(Conclusion 3.) In this same way too a distinction must be made, when it is said: Christ, as man, is a suppositum. (Distinction concerning "suppositum.") For there is a suppositum in which and a suppositum of whichp231-2. If by "suppositum" is meant that of which another is predicated and which is subjected to a higher term; (Conclusion 4.) Christ, as man, is a suppositum. But if by it is meant that suppositum in which the whole being of the thing is established and founded; thus it is not to be conceded (Conclusion 5.) that Christ is a suppositum as man, unless the account of suppositum is narrowed, so that it be called a suppositum of accidents and of accidental properties.

(Epilogue.) Hence, since in its single acceptation both the name "individual" and the name "suppositum" are equivalent to "hypostasis," the aforesaid locutions are false from the same cause from which the aforesaid locution is also false, namely: Christ is a hypostasis as man. For it would follow that in Christ there would be two supposita and two hypostases; and so he would not be one, nor would there be in him a true union. — But according to another acceptation they can be conceded; and through this the reasons that are brought forward for both sides can be resolved. (To the arguments for both sides.) For the reasons that are brought forward for the first side proceed concerning the individual insofar as individual is said to be what is said of one alone. But the reasons for the following side proceed concerning the individual insofar as it not only is not divided into othersp231-3, but also insofar as it is divided from another suppositum, and this indeed it does not have in Christ. And all this is clear to one who treats the individual reasons thoroughly.

(To the general question.) From these things it is clear what was asked last, namely which locutions in this matter are to be admitted, and which not. For those are to be conceded which so import the truth and propriety of the natures that they do not prejudice that supreme union, in which indeed the union was made in the person of the Word, not only insofar as it expresses the dignity of a property, butp231-4 insofar as it expresses an incommunicable suppositum, namely the hypostasis itself, by reason of which there is mutual predication and communication of idioms. — (The directive principle.) And this is to be held as a directive principle, because in that union the blessed person of the Word made itself the suppositum of human nature, as was said many times in the foregoingp231-5. And to that extent human nature in Christ is said to incline toward an accident: and therefore some predicate which expresses a mode of existing is truly attributed to us according to human nature, which nevertheless is not truly attributed to Christ according to the human nature, but according to the divine, namely to be a person, and to be a hypostasis, to be a suppositum, to be an individual, insofar as they are equivalent to the word "hypostasis"; although, according to the broader mode of taking them, the last two can be attributed, as has been touched upon.

(Objection concerning the individual.) But against the aforesaid it seems possible to object, since it seems that Christ, as man, is truly and properly an individual. For as was shown in the second bookp231-6, individuation is from the communication of matter with form, and comes to be known through the collection of accidents; but Christ, as man, is composed of soul and flesh, just as other men are: therefore he truly and properly has individuation, just as other men do: it does not seem therefore that what was said suffices. — (Incidental question.) On account of this there is a question, how much there is of the propriety of individuation in Christ, as man. For if it is not greater, except because it is said of one alone; then it has no more of the account of individuation than accidents do; which is utterly absurd, since Christ, as man, is a true substancep231-7.

(Solution.) And it must be said that, the accidents and properties being set aside, which do not make individuation but show it, individuation is from intrinsic principles, insofar as they constitute one suppositum, in which the whole being of the thing is established. And because from the concurrence

of those principles the individual is constituted, and there results the form of the whole, which is the specific form; hence it is, as Boethius saysp232-1, that "the species is the whole being of the individual." But in Christ soul and flesh, or matter and form, are united not only in that which they constitute, but also in the hypostasis of the eternal Word. (Note.) And therefore the specific form does not express the whole being of Christ, and through this Christ, as man, does not altogether have the full account of an individual; whence he holds as it were a middle between the individual properly said and the individual according to which an accident is said to be something individual. For in an individual properly said there is the union of substantial principles and the constitution of a first suppositum in itself, not in another. But both of these are lacking in accidents, which subsist neither in themselves nor per sep232-2. In a middle way it is in Christ, where the principles come together according to human nature; yet the first suppositum is of another nature, not constituted from them. — And so it is clear that the things said above hold truth. And for these things the matters predetermined in the second book, distinction threep232-3, are of value.

Scholion

I. Commonly the older Scholastics do not simply concede the locution that Christ, as man, is an individual. For, as Giles of Rome (here q. 2, Latin dub. 1) says according to the mind of St. Thomas, "that human nature (in Christ), although it is a certain individual, is nevertheless not predicated of Christ in the abstract, and as it is a certain individual, because Christ is not humanity." — In other words than St. Bonaventure, but saying in substance the same thing, Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1, a. 1, subquestion 2) explains the matter thus: "In one way 'individual' is taken commonly, insofar as it is in any genus whatever; in another way specially, insofar as it is in the genus of substance alone. In the first way an individual is said to be what is predicated of one alone; in the second, what subsists per se, divided from others. In the first way the foot or whiteness of Socrates can be called an individual; in the second way not. In the first way there are several individuals in Christ, but he is only one single individual; in the second way only one in Christ is an individual, specially so called, and he is that one, namely the divine person." Then he resolves that Christ, as man, is an individual understood in the first way, yet not other than the person; but not taken in the other sense. — As to the term suppositum, St. Bonaventure, besides the common sense, distinguishes another sense together with the older Scholastics, namely as something placed under a common nature, to which it has reference, and which is predicated of it. If it is understood thus, "Christ, as man, is placed under human nature, or is some suppositum of human nature"; so St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2, subquestion 3). — At the end of the question, what is said in reply to the general and incidental question concerning the account of the individual in Christ is to be noted.

II. Besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 6, m. 2, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1, subquestions 2, 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Dist. 6. a. 1. q. 3. — De dicto Damasceni (III. de Fide orthod. c. 11.) vide supra pag. 15, nota 5.
    Distinction 6, a. 1, q. 3. — On the saying of Damascene (On the Orthodox Faith, bk. III, c. 11), see above p. 15, note 5.
  2. De Praedicab. c. de Specie, in fine. In maiori Vat. inepte omittit homo.
    On the Predicables, chapter "On Species," at the end. In the major [premise] the Vatican edition ineptly omits homo (man).
  3. Quod Aristot. docet I. Periherm. c. 5. (c. 7.). Cfr. supra pag. 133, nota 5. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Genere, ait: «Eorum enim quae praedicantur, alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo, sicut individua, ut Socrates et hic et hoc; alia vero de pluribus, quemadmodum genera et species et differentia et propria et accidentia» etc.
    Which Aristotle teaches in On Interpretation I, c. 5 (c. 7). Cf. above p. 133, note 5. Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter "On Genus," says: "For of the things which are predicated, some are said of one alone, like individuals, as Socrates and 'this' and 'this'; but others of many, as genera and species and differences and propria and accidents," etc.
  4. Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie. Vide supra pag. 49, nota 4. — Paulo superius pro si essentiale codd. F U si substantiale. Subinde in initio seq. enuntiati pro vel differentia cod. U nec differentia.
    Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter "On Species." See above p. 49, note 4. — A little above, for si essentiale (if essential) codices F U read si substantiale (if substantial). Then at the beginning of the next clause, for vel differentia (or difference) codex U reads nec differentia (nor difference).
  5. De Praedicam. c. de Substantia, ubi et illustrantur quae hic in arg. amplius proponuntur.
    On the Categories, chapter "On Substance," where the things proposed more fully here in the argument are also illustrated.
  6. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia: Color in corpore est, ergo et in quodam corpore; nam si non in aliquo esset singulorum, nec omnino in corpore. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 105, nota 8, ubi Boethii expositio in hunc loc. allegatur.
    Aristotle, On the Categories, chapter "On Substance": Color is in body, therefore also in some body; for if it were in none of the singulars, it would not be in body at all. Cf. vol. II, p. 105, note 8, where Boethius's exposition on this passage is cited.
  7. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 5, ubi statuit, quod in incarnatione duas naturas «secundum hypostasim unitas esse confitemur». Cfr. ibid. c. 3. et 11. nec non supra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 1. in fine et d. VI. c. 3. — Quod in maiori proponitur Damasc. loc. cit. c. 4. insinuat dicens, quod «persona ac hypostasis individuum denotet». Et in Dialect. c. 11. ait: De isto [individuo] philosophi loquuntur, quod quidem in substantia hypostasim significat.
    On the Orthodox Faith, bk. III, c. 5, where he lays down that in the incarnation "we confess two natures united according to the hypostasis." Cf. ibid. c. 3 and 11, as well as above the Master's text, d. V, c. 1 at the end, and d. VI, c. 3. — What is proposed in the major Damascene insinuates in the cited passage, c. 4, saying that "person and hypostasis denote an individual." And in the Dialectica, c. 11, he says: The philosophers speak of this [individual] which in substance signifies a hypostasis.
  8. Dist. 6. a. 1. q. 1. — Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto, ait: «Numerus quidem discretorum est». Et V. Metaph. text. 11. seq. (IV. c. 6.) docet, numerum sequi divisionem (quae includitur in notione individui i. e. divisi ab aliis). Cfr. Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 8.
    Distinction 6, a. 1, q. 1. — Aristotle, On the Categories, chapter "On Quantity," says: "Number indeed belongs to the discrete." And in Metaphysics V, text 11f. (IV, c. 6) he teaches that number follows division (which is included in the notion of an individual, i.e. of what is divided from others). Cf. Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. III, c. 8.
  9. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 1. (IX. c. 1.): Numero igitur indivisibile est singulare.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 1 (IX, c. 1): What is indivisible in number, therefore, is the singular.
  10. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie, in fine. — In initio arg. post quidquid dicitur edd. cum paucis codd. adiungunt vere. De maiori cfr. supra d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.
    Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter "On Species," at the end. — At the beginning of the argument, after quidquid dicitur (whatever is said), the editions with a few codices add vere (truly). On the major premise cf. above d. 7, a. 1, q. 1ff.
  11. Cfr. supra q. 1. in corp.
    Cf. above, q. 1, in the body [of the response].
  12. Vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. et 4. nec non d. 6. a. 1. q. 1, ubi et plura invenies de iis quae in textu procedente proferuntur. — Inferius pro ex utroque cod. K (bb a prima manu) ex utraque.
    See above d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 and 4, as well as d. 6, a. 1, q. 1, where you will also find more on the things brought forward in the following text. — Below, for ex utroque (from both) codex K (and bb by the first hand) reads ex utraque (from each).
  13. Intellige: secundum unitatem concomitantiae, ut dictum est supra q. 1. in corp. — Aliquanto inferius pro intentionem Vat. acceptionem.
    Understand: according to the unity of concomitance, as was said above, q. 1, in the body. — Somewhat below, for intentionem (intention) the Vatican edition reads acceptionem (acceptation).
  14. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.
    Cf. above d. 6, a. 1, q. 1, in the body.
  15. Edd. 1, 2 cum multis codd. non solum dividitur in alia, perperam omissa vocula non ante dividitur; Vat. non solum dividitur ab alio; nostram lectionem tuentur codd. A F U bb. Mox post supposito Vat. cum cod. cc addit vel suppositaliter.
    Editions 1, 2 with many codices read non solum dividitur in alia (not only is divided into others), the particle non before dividitur being wrongly omitted; the Vatican edition non solum dividitur ab alio (not only is divided from another); our reading is supported by codices A F U bb. Shortly after supposito the Vatican edition with codex cc adds vel suppositaliter (or suppositally).
  16. Edd. sed etiam.
    The editions read sed etiam (but also).
  17. Dist. 1. a. 1. q. 1; d. 5. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.; d. 6. per totam. — Paulo superius pro directivo codd. C D E T X ductivo, Vat. ductivo vel directivo. Subinde post habendum cod. A quod pro quia. De enuntiato seq. cfr. supra pag. 155, nota 6.
    Distinction 1, a. 1, q. 1; d. 5, a. 2, q. 1ff.; d. 6 throughout. — A little above, for directivo (directive) codices C D E T X read ductivo (leading), the Vatican edition ductivo or directivo. Then after habendum codex A reads quod for quia. On the following statement cf. above p. 155, note 6.
  18. Dist. 3. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Mox pro ex communicatione cod. bb ex coniunctione, et pro materiae cum forma cod. K formae cum materia. Paulo inferius pro non videtur igitur cod. N et ita non videtur.
    Distinction 3, part 1, a. 2, q. 1ff. — Shortly, for ex communicatione (from the communication) codex bb reads ex coniunctione (from the conjunction), and for materiae cum forma (of matter with form) codex K formae cum materia (of form with matter). A little below, for non videtur igitur (it does not seem therefore) codex N reads et ita non videtur (and so it does not seem).
  19. Vide supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 3. — Codd. C N X sit una substantia, edd. sit una vera substantia.
    See above d. 6, a. 1, q. 3. — Codices C N X read sit una substantia (is one substance), the editions sit una vera substantia (is one true substance).
  20. Libr. III. Comment. in Porphyr. c. de Specie, et lib. de Divisione. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 441, nota 8. — Pro individui cod. K individuorum. Paulo inferius pro totum esse Christi codd. W X totum esse individui, cod. N totum esse individui Christi.
    [Boethius,] bk. III of the Commentary on Porphyry, chapter "On Species," and the book On Division. Cf. vol. II, p. 441, note 8. — For individui (of the individual) codex K reads individuorum (of individuals). A little below, for totum esse Christi (the whole being of Christ) codices W X read totum esse individui (the whole being of the individual), codex N totum esse individui Christi (the whole being of the individual of Christ).
  21. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 2 (VI, c. 1).
  22. Part. I. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Cfr. etiam supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 6. a. 1. q. 3.
    Part I, a. 2, q. 1ff. — Cf. also above d. 2, a. 2, q. 3, and d. 6, a. 1, q. 3.
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