Dist. 11, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 11
Quaestio III. Utrum haec sit concedenda: homo incipit esse Deus.
Tertio quaeritur de hac: homo incipit esse Deus, utrum sit concedenda. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Ista est vera: Deus coepit esse homo: ergo a simplici conversa1: homo coepit esse Deus.
2. Item, haec est vera: Deus incipit esse homo, propter unionem; sed unio est reciproca et mutua, quia, sicut homo unitur Deo, et Deus homini2: ergo si unio reciprocatur, et inceptio, quae super unionem fundatur: ergo sicut haec est vera: Deus coepit esse homo, ita et haec: homo coepit esse Deus.
3. Item, simus in instanti, in quo Filius Dei incarnatus est, haec est vera: homo est Deus, et ante hoc: homo non fuit Deus: ergo homo coepit esse Deus3. Praemissae sunt verae: ergo conclusio, quoniam praemissae exponunt conclusionem4.
4. Item, antequam homo esset, nec homo erat homo nec aliud; sed homo coepit esse homo, et homo non potuit ante esse Deus, quam esset homo: ergo si homo coepit esse homo, homo coepit esse Deus.
Sed contra: 1. Haec est vera: iste homo fuit ab aeterno Deus5; et ad istum hominem sequitur homo: ergo homo fuit Deus ab aeterno: ergo haec est falsa: homo coepit esse Deus.
2. Item, si homo coepit esse Deus, aut ergo iste, aut ille, et sic de aliis; sed non est dare nisi
de isto, et iste homo semper fuit Deus: ergo non coepit esse Deus: ergo haec est falsa: homo coepit esse Deus.
3. Item, communicatio est in idiomatibus: ergo si homo incepit esse Deus, videtur, quod haec sit concedenda: Dei Filius incepit esse Deus. Sed haec est falsa simpliciter: ergo et prima.
4. Item, esto quod Filius Dei deponeret hominem, quem assumsit, per impossibile; tunc quaero de hac: iste homo desinit esse Deus; haec est falsa, ergo pari ratione et haec est falsa: homo coepit esse Deus, cum assumsit. Probatio minoris: nunc est unio: ergo communicatio est in idiomatibus: ergo si Filius Dei semper erit Filius Dei, et homo semper erit Deus; sequitur necessario, quod haec sit vera: iste homo erit semper Deus, et haec similiter: Filius Dei semper erit homo: ergo et haec est falsa: homo desinit esse Deus, et haec: Deus desinit esse homo; pari ratione6 et hae sunt falsae: iste homo incepit esse Deus, et Deus incepit esse homo.
### Conclusio Locutio: homo incepit esse Deus, bene intellecta, recipi potest tanquam simpliciter vera.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio haec conceditur: Deus coepit esse homo; sed de hac: homo coepit esse Deus, dubium est, utrum simpliciter sit concedenda.
Quidam namque voluerunt eam distinguere ex eo, quod hoc verbum incipit potest attribui huic termino homo ratione suppositi, vel ratione formae. Si attribuatur ratione formae, tunc iste terminus homo habet suppositionem simplicem7, et tunc est sensus, quod Deus incipit praedicari de homine, quia modo praedicatur et prius non praedicabatur; et sic locutio habet veritatem. Si vero respiciat ipsum ratione suppositi, sic dixerunt, quod haec est falsa locutio, quia supposito8 semper convenit esse Deum. — Huius autem simile assignant, sicut si dicatur: album incipit esse scutum, eo quod scutum primum fuit, et post dealbetur. Si enim inceptio attribuatur huic termino album ratione formae, vera est locutio; si ratione suppositi, falsa est, quia quod est album prius fuit scutum. — Si autem quaeratur ratio huius multiplicitatis, dicunt, eam ex hoc provenire, quia verbum incipiendi claudit in se negationem9, et illa potest intelligi praecedere terminum, et sic faciet ipsum habere simplicem suppositionem; vel sequi, et sic respicit ipsum gratia suppositi. Unde quamvis respectu aliquorum actuum vel verborum terminus subiectus determinare10 habeat suppositionem simplicem, aut personalem; tamen respectu huius verbi incipit utroque modo potest supponere; et hoc non ponit multiplicitatem in termino supponente, sed in tota locutione ex varia negationis comparatione.
Haec autem distinctio satis est rationabilis, si sane intelligatur simplex suppositio, ut dicatur terminus habere simplicem suppositionem, sub quo non licet descendere11, sicut cum dicitur: solus homo currit; vel simplicem suppositionem habere, quando praedicatum, vel aliquid in praedicato respicit ipsum12 gratia formae. Licet autem non sit praedicta distinctio reprobanda, attamen non dissolvit plene ambiguitatem locutionis propositae, quoniam, si respicit ipsum ratione suppositi, adhuc habet locutio veritatem. Si enim haec est vera: iste homo incipit esse, in aliquo sensu, ut prius13 probatum est, absque dubio verum est, quod incipit esse Deus.
Et propter hoc intelligendum, quod adhuc praedicta locutio habet veritatem, secundum quod verbum incipiendi respicit tantum subiectum gratia suppositi. Unde attendendum est, quod iste terminus homo respectu Christi partim habet naturam termini accidentalis, partim naturam termini substantialis: naturam, inquam, termini accidentalis respectu personae, quae praeexistit; naturam termini substantialis respectu singularis hominis, quod simul cum ipso incipit; per quod iste terminus homo habet supponere pro singulari hominis per se, pro persona Verbi non nisi gratia unionis14. Et quoniam pro supposito singularis hominis, quod quidem est Iesus, habet locutio veritatem, quamvis non habeat pro supposito, quod est persona Christi; hinc est, quod praedicta locutio recipi potest tanquam simpliciter vera. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec est vera: iste homo ab aeterno fuit Deus; dicendum, quod si iste demonstret personam, vera est; et in illo sensu falsa est: iste homo incepit esse Deus; si vero suppositum hominis respiciat, adhuc potest esse vera per unionem sive idiomatum communicationem. Sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod ista sit falsa: iste homo incepit esse Deus, per proprietatem suae naturae. Contingit enim, sicut prius15 dictum fuit, hunc hominem dicere mortalem et immortalem sine contradictione.
2. Et per hoc patet sequens obiectum, quod si homo incipit esse Deus, aut iste, aut ille. Dici potest, quod iste; sed iste ibi non demonstrat personam, sed singulare hominis, sicut prius16 dictum fuit. Unde non est simile, si dicatur: album incipit esse scutum, quia album non habet nisi naturam termini accidentalis nec habet suppositum, pro quo possit reddere locutionem veram nisi ipsum scutum; non sic autem est in homine respectu Christi.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de communicatione idiomatum, dicendum, quod in idiomatum communicatione haec regula est attendenda, quia omnia communicantur, his dumtaxat exceptis, quae exprimunt ipsam unionem, vel quae claudunt intellectuum repugnantiam, ratione cuius errori appropinquant17. — Ratio autem huius est, quia communicatio idiomatum fundatur super ipsam unionem et ordinatur ad fidei catholicam expressionem. Et ideo non communicantur illa quae important unionem; unde quamvis haec sit vera: Filius Dei est incarnatus, haec est falsa: homo est incarnatus. Similiter intelligendum est de his quae repugnantiam intellectuum important, sicut sunt esse creaturam et esse praedestinatum et similia. Et quoniam, cum dicitur: homo incepit esse Deus, importatur unio; ideo talis idiomatis non est communicatio.
4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, si per impossibile homo dimitteretur a Deo, utrum haec esset vera: homo desinit esse Deus; dicendum, quod sic; nec valet: homo semper erit Deus, ergo non desinit esse Deus. Sicut enim prius18 tactum fuit, istae duae simul sunt verae: homo desinit esse Deus, et homo semper erit Deus, quia per idiomatum communicationem haec est vera: homo semper erit Deus; et tamdiu erit vera, quamdiu durabit unio. Si vero cras solvatur unio, tunc nec per idiomatum communicationem nec alio modo est verum dicere, quod homo sit Deus. Et si tu obiicias, quod desinere implicat non esse; et istae non possunt concedi simul de Christo erit et non erit; dicendum, quod sicut dictum fuit19, plus negat negatio explicita quam implicita; propter hoc ista conceditur tanquam vera: iste homo est immortalis, demonstrato Christo in statu possibilitatis, quamvis non concedatur: iste homo non est mortalis. — Et sic patent ea quae in hac parte quaeruntur, et qualiter idiomata communicantur20.
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Question III. Whether this is to be conceded: a man begins to be God.
Third, it is asked concerning this proposition: a man begins to be God, whether it is to be conceded. And that it is so, it seems.
1. This is true: God began to be man: therefore, by simple conversion1: man began to be God.
2. Likewise, this is true: God begins to be man, on account of the union; but the union is reciprocal and mutual, because, just as man is united to God, so also God to man2: therefore, if the union is reciprocal, the inception too, which is founded upon the union [is reciprocal]: therefore, just as this is true: God began to be man, so also this: man began to be God.
3. Likewise, let us be at the instant in which the Son of God was incarnate: this is true: man is God, and before this: man was not God: therefore man began to be God3. The premises are true: therefore the conclusion [is true], since the premises set forth the conclusion4.
4. Likewise, before man existed, man was neither man nor anything else; but man began to be man, and man could not be God before he was man: therefore, if man began to be man, man began to be God.
On the contrary: 1. This is true: this man was from eternity God5; and from this man "man" follows: therefore man was God from eternity: therefore this is false: man began to be God.
2. Likewise, if man began to be God, then either this one, or that one, and so on of the others; but there is none to be given except concerning this one, and this man was always God: therefore he did not begin to be God: therefore this is false: man began to be God.
3. Likewise, there is a communication in the idioms: therefore, if man began to be God, it seems that this is to be conceded: the Son of God began to be God. But this is false absolutely: therefore the first [proposition] also [is false].
4. Likewise, suppose that the Son of God were to lay aside the man whom he assumed, per impossibile; then I ask concerning this: this man ceases to be God; this is false, therefore by parity of reasoning this also is false: man began to be God, when he assumed [the man]. Proof of the minor: now there is a union: therefore there is a communication in the idioms: therefore, if the Son of God will always be the Son of God, the man too will always be God; it follows necessarily that this is true: this man will always be God, and this likewise: the Son of God will always be man: therefore this also is false: man ceases to be God, and this: God ceases to be man; by parity of reasoning6 these too are false: this man began to be God, and God began to be man.
### Conclusion The expression "man began to be God," well understood, can be received as absolutely true.
I respond: It must be said that without doubt this is conceded: God began to be man; but concerning this: man began to be God, it is doubtful whether it is to be conceded absolutely.
For some have wished to distinguish it on the ground that this verb "begins" can be attributed to this term "man" by reason of the supposit, or by reason of the form. If it is attributed by reason of the form, then this term "man" has simple supposition7, and then the sense is that God begins to be predicated of man, because now it is predicated and before it was not predicated; and thus the expression has truth. But if it regards [the man] by reason of the supposit, then they said that this is a false expression, because to the supposit8 it always belongs to be God. — And they assign a similar case to this, as if it were said: a white thing begins to be a shield, because the shield existed first, and afterward is whitened. For if the inception is attributed to this term "white" by reason of the form, the expression is true; if by reason of the supposit, it is false, because that which is white was previously a shield. — And if the ground of this manifold sense be asked, they say that it arises from this, that the verb of beginning includes within itself a negation9, and that [negation] can be understood to precede the term, and thus it will make it have simple supposition; or to follow [it], and thus it regards it by reason of the supposit. Hence, although with respect to certain acts or words the subject term may have10 simple or personal supposition; nevertheless with respect to this verb "begins" it can supposit in either way; and this does not place a manifold sense in the suppositing term, but in the whole expression, by reason of the varied relation of the negation.
Now this distinction is reasonable enough, provided that simple supposition be soundly understood, namely, so that a term is said to have simple supposition under which one may not descend11, as when it is said: only man runs; or to have simple supposition when the predicate, or something in the predicate, regards it12 by reason of the form. But although the aforesaid distinction is not to be rejected, nevertheless it does not fully dissolve the ambiguity of the proposed expression, since, if it regards [the man] by reason of the supposit, the expression still has truth. For if this is true: this man begins to be, in some sense, as was proved before13, without doubt it is true that he begins to be God.
And on account of this it is to be understood that the aforesaid expression still has truth insofar as the verb of beginning regards only the subject by reason of the supposit. Hence it is to be attended to that this term "man," with respect to Christ, partly has the nature of an accidental term, partly the nature of a substantial term: the nature, I say, of an accidental term with respect to the person, which preexists; the nature of a substantial term with respect to the singular of the man, which begins together with him; whereby this term "man" supposits for the singular of the man by itself, but for the person of the Word only by reason of the union14. And since the expression has truth for the supposit of the singular man, which indeed is Jesus, although it does not have [truth] for the supposit which is the person of Christ; hence it is that the aforesaid expression can be received as absolutely true. — And the reasons in favor of this are to be conceded.
1. To that which is objected, that this is true: this man was from eternity God; it must be said that if "this one" points out the person, it is true; and in that sense it is false: this man began to be God; but if it regards the supposit of the man, it can still be true through the union or the communication of idioms. But nevertheless from this it does not follow that this is false: this man began to be God, by the property of his nature. For it happens, as was said before15, that one may call this man mortal and immortal without contradiction.
2. And through this the following objection is made clear, that if man begins to be God, [it is] either this one, or that one. It can be said: this one; but "this one" there does not point out the person, but the singular of the man, as was said before16. Hence it is not similar, if it be said: a white thing begins to be a shield, because "white" has only the nature of an accidental term and has no supposit for which it could render the expression true except the shield itself; but it is not so in man with respect to Christ.
3. To that which is objected concerning the communication of idioms, it must be said that in the communication of idioms this rule is to be attended to, namely, that all things are communicated, with these alone excepted, which express the union itself, or which include a repugnance of understandings, by reason of which they approach error17. — And the ground of this is that the communication of idioms is founded upon the union itself and is ordered to the expression of the catholic faith. And therefore those things are not communicated which imply the union; whence, although this is true: the Son of God is incarnate, this is false: man is incarnate. Similarly it is to be understood concerning those things which imply a repugnance of understandings, such as to be a creature and to be predestined and the like. And since, when it is said: man began to be God, the union is implied; therefore there is no communication of such an idiom.
4. To that which is asked, if per impossibile man were released by God, whether this would be true: man ceases to be God; it must be said that yes; nor does this hold: man will always be God, therefore he does not cease to be God. For just as was touched on before18, these two are simultaneously true: man ceases to be God, and man will always be God, because through the communication of idioms this is true: man will always be God; and it will be true as long as the union will last. But if tomorrow the union be dissolved, then neither through the communication of idioms nor in any other way is it true to say that man is God. And if you object that to cease implies not-being, and these cannot be conceded together concerning Christ — that he will be and will not be — it must be said that, as was said19, an explicit negation negates more than an implicit one; on account of this the following is conceded as true: this man is immortal, Christ being pointed out in the state of possibility, although it not be conceded: this man is not mortal. — And thus those things which are asked in this part are made clear, and how the idioms are communicated20.
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- Cfr. supra pag. 175, nota 10. — De maiori cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. VII. c. I. seqq. et Comment. a. I. q. 2. nec non a. 2. q. 2. — Hic et per totam hanc quaest. edd. constanter exhibent incepit pro coepit.Cf. above, page 175, note 10. — On the major [premise] cf. above, the Master's text, d. VII, c. I and following, and the Commentary, a. I, q. 2, as also a. 2, q. 2. — Here and throughout this whole question the editions constantly exhibit began (incepit) for began (coepit).
- Scil. in Logica. Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.) quaestionem tractat, quaenam propositiones magis contrariae sibi invicem dicantur, e. gr. utrum Kallias sit iustus, et Kallias non sit iustus; an Kallias sit iustus, et Kallias sit iniustus. Probat autem multis rationibus, duas priores propositiones magis esse sibi contrarias quam sequentes.That is, in Logic. Aristotle, On Interpretation II, c. 4 (c. 14), treats the question, which propositions are said to be more contrary to one another, e.g. whether [the propositions] "Callias is just" and "Callias is not just," or "Callias is just" and "Callias is unjust." And he proves by many arguments that the two former propositions are more contrary to one another than the latter ones.
- Syllogismum Aristot., I. Prior. c. I, definit sic: Est oratio, in qua, quibusdam positis [i. e. praemissis], aliud quiddam ab his quae posita sunt, ex necessitate accidit [i. e. concluditur], eo quod haec sunt.Aristotle defines the syllogism, Prior Analytics I, c. I, thus: It is a discourse in which, certain things being posited [i.e. the premises], something else besides those which are posited follows of necessity [i.e. is concluded], on the ground that these are so.
- Cfr. quaest. praeced.Cf. the preceding question.
- Vide supra d. 5. a. I. q. I. — In maiori non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 pro Deus incipit falso homo incipit.See above, d. 5, a. I, q. I. — In the major [premise] not a few codices, with editions 1, 2, [read] for God begins falsely man begins.
- Cod. F ante pari ratione interserit ergo.Codex F before by parity of reasoning inserts therefore.
- Id est, terminus homo accipitur hic pro re universali per ipsum significata, sive pro natura speciei, scil. pro natura humana, et non pro quolibet inferiori sive supposito sub ipsa contento. Simplici suppositioni opponitur personalis, in qua terminus sumitur pro suis inferioribus sive suppositis e. gr. homo currit. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. scholion.That is, the term man is here taken for the universal thing signified by it, or for the nature of the species, namely for human nature, and not for any inferior or supposit contained under it. To simple supposition is opposed personal [supposition], in which the term is taken for its inferiors or supposits, e.g. man runs. Cf. I Sent. d. 4, q. 1, scholion.
- Scil. humanae naturae in Christo, quod est Verbum. — De exemplo mox adducto cfr. quaest. praeced.That is, of the human nature in Christ, which is the Word. — On the example soon adduced cf. the preceding question.
- Cfr. supra pag. 252, nota 3.Cf. above, page 252, note 3.
- Vat. determinate.The Vatican [edition reads] determinately.
- Sive applicare ad inferiora (supposita); sic in exemplo allato non licet inferre: ergo solus hic homo v. gr. Petrus currit.That is, to apply to the inferiors (supposits); thus in the example adduced it is not permitted to infer: therefore only this man, e.g. Peter, runs.
- Intellige: terminum.Understand: the term.
- Quaest. praeced. — Paulo superius pro si respicit cod. bb etsi respiciat.The preceding question. — A little above, for if it regards codex bb [reads] even if it should regard.
- Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 3. et d. 10. a. 1. q. 3. — Paulo ante pro per quod codd. A (K. a secunda manu) M O bb propter quod.Cf. above, d. 6, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 10, a. 1, q. 3. — A little before, for whereby codices A (K by a second hand) M O bb [read] on account of which.
- Quaest. praeced. ad 3. pro parte negativa.The preceding question, [reply] to the 3rd [argument] on the negative side.
- Quaest. praeced. in corp.The preceding question, in the body [of the article].
- Vide hic q. 1. et supra d. 7. a. 1. q. 3. in fine, a. 2. q. 1. ad 2. — Mox pro catholicam cod. A catholicae, sed cfr. supra pag. 250, nota 2. Deinde pro haec est falsa edd. haec tamen est falsa.See here q. 1 and above, d. 7, a. 1, q. 3, at the end, [and] a. 2, q. 1, [reply] to 2. — Soon, for catholic codex A [reads] of the catholic [faith], but cf. above, page 250, note 2. Then for this is false the editions [read] this nevertheless is false.
- Hic in hac obiect. et ad 1. et q. praeced. ad 3. seq. — Paulo superius pro semper erit Deus edd. 1, 2 cum non paucis codd. semper erat Deus, quam lectionem dictae edd. (non codd.) etiam paulo inferius bis exhibent.Here in this objection, and at [reply] to 1, and the preceding question [reply] to 3 and following. — A little above, for will always be God editions 1, 2 with not a few codices [read] was always God, which reading the said editions (not the codices) also exhibit twice a little below.
- Quaest. praeced. ad 3. — Cfr. Gul. Antissiodor. S. p. III. tr. 1. c. 1. q. 7. — Mox pro passibilitatis cod. N perperam impassibilitatis.The preceding question, [reply] to 3. — Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa part III, tr. 1, c. 1, q. 7. — Soon, for of passibility codex N erroneously [reads] of impassibility.
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question. ---