Bonaventure

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illo verbo Augustini: Liquido apparet, non esse factum, per quem facta sunt omnia. Videtur enim ista auctoritas esse falsa in se et ad propositum non valere: quoniam dicimus, quod ex ipso et per ipsum sunt omnia¹: ergo si omnia sunt per ipsum, ipse nihil est; constat, quod hoc non sequitur: ergo pari ratione non sequitur: omnia facta sunt per ipsum, ergo ipse non est factus. — Item, videtur, quod non valeat ad propositum: quia Augustinus loquitur de Filio Dei secundum divinam naturam; cum autem quaeritur, utrum Christus sit creatura, hoc est secundum naturam assumtam: videtur ergo, quod auctoritas illa et aliae sequentes sint adductae valde improprie.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod auctoritas et vera est in se et ad propositum valet. In se quidem vera est, quia causa praedicati clauditur in subiecto. Si enim ipse est principium omnium creatorum, impossibile est, ipsum esse aliquid creatorum, tum ratione potentiae creandi, quae non potest competere creaturae; tum ratione generalitatis principiandi, quae non potest competere rei creatae. Nec valet ista instantia: Ex ipso sunt omnia etc., omnia scilicet facta; quia omnia pro universitate rerum distribuit, et Deus non est de universo, sed supra universum. Et ideo non sequitur, quod sit nihil².

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non valet ad propositum; dicendum, quod Christus nominat personam Verbi ut in duabus naturis; et quia nomen impositum est personae Filii Dei, quia³ Filio Dei repugnat, repugnat etiam Christo. Et ideo auctoritas inducta et aliae sequentes ad propositum quidem faciunt, sed hoc est per accidens. — Alio etiam modo faciunt ad propositum, quia auctoritates inductae sunt in littera⁴, quae sunt contra errorem Arianum; et quoniam praedictus sermo, simpliciter et sine determinatione prolatus, sermoni Arii est propinquus; ideo quasi ex consequenti auctoritates inductae obviant praedicto sermoni. Et propterea valent tam in se quam ad propositum⁵.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Etsi Christus secundum hominem est creatura, non tamen simpliciter est praedicandus etc. Contra: quod vere de altero praedicatur cum determinatione non diminuente vere praedicatur de ipso simpliciter⁶; sed homo non diminuit de ratione Christi: ergo si aliquid dicitur de Christo secundum hominem, videtur, quod simpliciter dicatur de ipso. — Item, quando aliquid natum est inesse solum secundum corpus, vere dicitur de toto simpliciter, si quantum ad corpus dicatur⁷: ergo pari ratione, si aliquid natum est inesse Christo secundum humanam naturam; videtur, quod necessaria sit consequentia, quod ei simpliciter et absolute convenit.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum aliquid dicitur de aliquo simpliciter et cum determinatione⁸, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut ita, quod simpliciter dictum non ponat latius rem suam, quam cum ponitur cum determinatione, et tunc licet inferre; aut ita, quod latius ponat rem suam, quantum est de sensu, quem verba praetendunt, et tunc consequentia potest negari: sicut non sequitur, si inferatur: iste est albus secundum pedem, ergo iste est albus; per hunc modum non sequitur: quia esse creatura⁹ secundum hominem attribuitur Christo ratione naturae assumtae, prolatum autem simpliciter videtur ei omnino convenire; consuetum enim est, nomine creaturae ea intelligi, quae omnino inducta sunt de non-esse in esse. Et sic patet responsio ad utramque rationem. — Vel dicatur, sicut supra dictum fuit distinctione septima¹⁰ de praedestinatione Christi, quod non sequitur: est praedestinatus secundum hominem, ergo est praedestinatus simpliciter; non quia homo diminuit, sed quia variatur attributio praedicati, ut cum prius attribuitur humanae naturae, postmodum attribuitur divinae personae. Et ideo talis modus procedendi inducit accidens in aliquibus praedicatis, quae per suam extraneitatem nec communicantur nec inferri possunt.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nitens probare, Christum esse aliquid non divinum. Videtur enim, quod Magister habeat illud pro inconvenienti; sed hoc nullum videtur inconveniens, quia cum Christus sit dominus, haec non recipitur: Christus est homo dominicus¹¹: ergo pari ratione, cum Christus sit Deus, haec non videtur admittenda: Christus est aliquid divinum: ergo eius opposita est vera, scilicet Christus est aliquid non divinum. — Item, videtur, quod argumentatio illa sit necessaria: si Christus est aliqua substantia non divina, quod Christus sit aliquid non divinum: ad esse enim substantiam necessario sequitur esse aliquid¹². Sicut ergo sequitur: est homo albus, ergo animal album; ita necessario sequi videtur: est substantia non divina, ergo aliquid non divinum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod haec est vera: Christus est aliquid divinum; et haec est falsa: Christus est aliquid non divinum. Nec est simile de hoc nomine divinus et de hoc nomine dominicus. Nam etsi utrumque sit possessorium, tamen dominicus importat circa illud, de quo dicitur, possessionem per modum passionis — dicitur enim dominicus a domino habitus vel possessus¹³ — sed divinum non solum per modum passionis, sed etiam per modum actionis; quia divinum dicitur quod habet divinitatem, per quem modum consuevit dici persona divina. Et propter hoc conceditur ista tanquam vera: Christus est aliquid divinum, quia est persona divina. Et ideo Magister¹⁴ hanc negat: Christus est aliquid non divinum; et dicit, quod haec consequentia non tenet: Christus, secundum quod creatura, est aliquid non divinum, ergo Christus est aliquid non divinum; quia in prima removet negatio divinitatem a natura creata, sed in conclusione removet a persona aeterna.

Si autem quaeratur, utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus est homo divinus; dicendum, quod non. Nam cum sic dicitur, divinus non potest dicere divinitatem per modum informantis, nec possessionem per modum actionis, sed solum per modum passionis, per quem modum dicit Dionysius¹⁵: divinissimus Paulus, vel divinissimus Ioannes. Unde impropriae sunt tales locutiones de Christo. Et propterea Magister concedit earum oppositas, cum dicit: « Christus secundum hominem est aliqua substantia non divina », id est non informata divinitate, quia est substantia creata. Ideo sane concedit praemissas et negat conclusionem dicens, peccatum esse in tali illatione¹⁶.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod ex tropicis locutionibus non est recta argumentationis processio. Primo enim videtur, quod verbum illud nihil faciat ad propositum, quia nulla praedictarum locutionum est tropica; nulla enim ibi est transumtio, immo secundum proprietatem sermonis dicuntur. — Item, videtur esse falsum, quod ex tropicis locutionibus non est recta argumentationis processio, quia aut sunt verae, aut falsae; si verae, ex veris contingit inferre verum: ergo recta potest ex talibus locutionibus argumentatio fieri; si falsae; sed ex falsis potest recte inferri falsum, potest etiam et verum¹⁷: videtur igitur, quod nihil sit dictum hoc quod Magister dicit. — Hic etiam modus solvendi videtur inauditus, quia non est per interemptionem nec per divisionem; nullus enim locus sophisticus est, nec in dictione nec extra, cuius dissolutio currat secundum hanc viam¹⁸.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tropicus sermo dupliciter potest dici: uno namque modo tropicus dicitur sermo, in quo est aliquod vitium aliquo tropo excusatum. Est enim tropus figura, et figura est vitium ratione excusatum¹⁹. Alio modo dicitur sermo tropicus quilibet sermo, qui habet aliquam improprietatem, sed tamen excusatur per aliquam determinationem. Cum ergo dicit Magister, quod iste sermo: Christus est creatura secundum hominem, est tropicus; hoc dicit, quia aliquam habet improprietatem consurgentem ex repugnantia intellectuum, quae removetur per determinationem adiunctam. Et pro tanto vocat Magister praedictas locutiones tropicas. — Posset etiam dici, quod vocat eas tropicas accipiendo tropum pro figura. Possunt enim dici tales locutiones synecdochicae²⁰, quia quod est partis attribuitur toti, et accipitur largo modo pars et totum, ut dicatur humana natura quodam modo esse pars respectu Christi, licet non proprie. Et sic potest dici, quod tales locutiones tropicae sunt et quod figurativae sunt per synecdochen, secundum quod synecdoche est figura locutionis. Sicut enim dicunt periti in grammatica, synecdoche²¹ aliquando est figura locutionis, aliquando figura constructionis.

Verum igitur dicit Magister in dicendo, praedictas locutiones esse tropicas; verum etiam dicit, quod ex tropicis non est recta argumentationis processio. Et ratio huius est, quoniam aliquando negatur aliqua locutio propter improprietatem; et cum aliquis sermo excusatur sub una forma, si fiat processio ad sermonem sub alia forma, in qua non invenit excusationem, proceditur a locutione, quae excusatur, ad eam quae non habet excusationem; et sic talis processus impeditur, sicut si procederetur a vero ad falsum. Unde illud argumentum non valet: iste est albus secundum pedem, ergo est coloratus secundum pedem²². Quamvis enim ad esse album sequatur esse coloratum, tamen processus praedictus non valet, quia color non est natus inesse corpori secundum partem, sicut albedo.

Et hoc est quod vult dicere Magister in proposito; et hoc est quod alias consuevit dici, quod locutiones impropriae non sunt extendendae nec ad consequentiam trahendae, sed magis sunt sustinendae et exponendae et arctandae, ne de minori improprietate veniatur ad maiorem²³.

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that word of Augustine: It plainly appears that he, through whom all things were made, was not himself made. For this authority seems to be false in itself and to be of no avail for the purpose [at hand]: since we say that from him and through him are all things¹: therefore if all things are through him, he himself is nothing; it is established that this does not follow: therefore by parity of reasoning it does not follow: all things were made through him, therefore he himself was not made. — Likewise, it seems that it is of no avail for the purpose: for Augustine is speaking of the Son of God according to the divine nature; but when it is asked whether Christ is a creature, this is according to the assumed nature: therefore it seems that that authority and the others following are adduced very improperly.

I respond: It must be said that the authority is both true in itself and avails for the purpose. It is indeed true in itself, because the cause of the predicate is enclosed in the subject. For if he himself is the principle of all created things, it is impossible that he himself be anything of the created things, both by reason of the power of creating, which cannot belong to a creature; and by reason of the generality of being a principle, which cannot belong to a created thing. Nor does this objection avail: From him are all things etc., that is, all things made; because all things is distributed for the totality of things, and God is not part of the universe, but above the universe. And therefore it does not follow that he is nothing².

To that which is objected, that it does not avail for the purpose; it must be said that Christ names the person of the Word as in two natures; and since the name is imposed on the person of the Son of God, [therefore] what is repugnant to the Son of God is repugnant also to Christ³. And therefore the authority adduced and the others following do indeed make for the purpose, but this is per accidens. — In yet another way they make for the purpose, because the authorities adduced are in the text⁴, which are against the Arian error; and since the aforesaid utterance, set forth absolutely and without qualification, is close to the utterance of Arius; therefore as it were by consequence the authorities adduced go against the aforesaid utterance. And on that account they avail both in themselves and for the purpose⁵.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: Although Christ according to the man is a creature, nevertheless he is not to be predicated absolutely etc. On the contrary: what is truly predicated of another with a non-diminishing qualification is truly predicated of it absolutely⁶; but man does not diminish from the account of Christ: therefore if anything is said of Christ according to the man, it seems that it is said of him absolutely. — Likewise, when something is apt to be present only according to the body, it is truly said of the whole absolutely, if it is said as to the body⁷: therefore by parity of reasoning, if something is apt to be present in Christ according to the human nature; it seems that the consequence is necessary, that it belongs to him absolutely and unqualifiedly.

I respond: It must be said that when something is said of something absolutely and with a qualification⁸, this can be twofold: either in such a way that the term said absolutely does not posit its meaning more widely than when it is posited with the qualification, and then it is permitted to infer; or in such a way that it posits its meaning more widely, so far as concerns the sense which the words present, and then the consequence can be denied: just as it does not follow, if one infers: this man is white according to his foot, therefore this man is white; in this way it does not follow: because to be a creature⁹ according to the man is attributed to Christ by reason of the assumed nature, but when set forth absolutely it seems to belong to him altogether; for it is customary that by the name of creature there be understood those things which have been brought altogether from non-being into being. And thus the response to both arguments is clear. — Or let it be said, as was said above in the seventh¹⁰ distinction concerning the predestination of Christ, that it does not follow: he is predestined according to the man, therefore he is predestined absolutely; not because man diminishes, but because the attribution of the predicate is varied, as when it is first attributed to the human nature, afterwards attributed to the divine person. And therefore such a manner of proceeding introduces the accident [fallacy] in certain predicates, which by their extraneousness are neither communicated nor able to be inferred.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: Striving to prove that Christ is something not divine. For it seems that the Master holds that as something unfitting; but this seems no unfitting thing, because since Christ is lord, this is not admitted: Christ is a lordly man¹¹: therefore by parity of reasoning, since Christ is God, this does not seem to be admitted: Christ is something divine: therefore its opposite is true, namely Christ is something not divine. — Likewise, it seems that that argumentation is necessary: if Christ is some substance not divine, that Christ is something not divine: for to being a substance there necessarily follows being something¹². As therefore it follows: he is a white man, therefore a white animal; so it seems necessarily to follow: he is a substance not divine, therefore something not divine.

I respond: It must be said that this is true: Christ is something divine; and this is false: Christ is something not divine. Nor is it alike with this name divine and with this name lordly. For although each is possessive, nevertheless lordly imports, concerning that of which it is said, possession by way of passion — for one is called lordly as held or possessed by a lord¹³ — but divine [imports it] not only by way of passion, but also by way of action; because divine is said of that which has divinity, in which way a divine person is wont to be called. And on account of this, this is conceded as true: Christ is something divine, because he is a divine person. And therefore the Master¹⁴ denies this: Christ is something not divine; and he says that this consequence does not hold: Christ, insofar as a creature, is something not divine, therefore Christ is something not divine; because in the first [proposition] the negation removes divinity from the created nature, but in the conclusion it removes it from the eternal person.

But if it be asked whether this is to be conceded: Christ is a divine man; it must be said that [it is] not. For when it is so said, divine cannot signify divinity by way of informing, nor possession by way of action, but only by way of passion, in which way Dionysius¹⁵ says: most divine Paul, or most divine John. Whence such expressions about Christ are improper. And on that account the Master concedes their opposites, when he says: « Christ according to the man is some substance not divine », that is, not informed by divinity, because it is a created substance. Therefore he soundly concedes the premises and denies the conclusion, saying that there is a fault in such an inference¹⁶.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that from tropical expressions there is no correct procedure of argumentation. For first it seems that that word does nothing for the purpose, because none of the aforesaid expressions is tropical; for there is no transference there, but rather they are said according to the propriety of speech. — Likewise, it seems to be false that from tropical expressions there is no correct procedure of argumentation, because [the expressions] are either true or false; if true, from true things it is possible to infer the true: therefore a correct argumentation can be made from such expressions; if false; but from false things the false can be correctly inferred, and even the true¹⁷: therefore it seems that what the Master says is nothing said. — This manner of solving also seems unheard-of, because it is neither by destruction nor by division; for there is no sophistical place, neither in speech nor outside it, whose dissolution runs according to this way¹⁸.

I respond: It must be said that tropical speech can be said in two ways: for in one way that speech is called tropical in which there is some fault excused by some trope. For a trope is a figure, and a figure is a fault excused by reason¹⁹. In another way any speech is called tropical speech which has some impropriety, but is nevertheless excused by some qualification. When therefore the Master says that this utterance: Christ is a creature according to the man, is tropical; he says this because it has some impropriety arising from the repugnance of the understandings, which is removed by the qualification adjoined. And to this extent the Master calls the aforesaid expressions tropical. — It could also be said that he calls them tropical by taking trope for figure. For such expressions can be called synecdochic²⁰, because what belongs to the part is attributed to the whole, and part and whole are taken in a broad sense, so that the human nature may be said in a certain way to be a part with respect to Christ, although not properly. And thus it can be said that such expressions are tropical and that they are figurative by synecdoche, according as synecdoche is a figure of speech. For as those skilled in grammar say, synecdoche²¹ is sometimes a figure of speech, sometimes a figure of construction.

Truly therefore the Master says, in saying that the aforesaid expressions are tropical; truly also he says that from tropical [expressions] there is no correct procedure of argumentation. And the reason for this is that sometimes some expression is denied on account of impropriety; and when some utterance is excused under one form, if a procedure be made to an utterance under another form, in which it does not find excuse, one proceeds from an expression which is excused to one which has no excuse; and thus such a procedure is impeded, just as if one were to proceed from the true to the false. Whence that argument does not avail: this man is white according to his foot, therefore he is colored according to his foot²². For although to being white there follows being colored, nevertheless the aforesaid procedure does not avail, because color is not apt to be present in the body according to a part, as whiteness [is].

And this is what the Master means to say in the matter at hand; and this is what is otherwise wont to be said, that improper expressions are not to be extended nor drawn into consequence, but rather are to be upheld and expounded and restricted, lest from a lesser impropriety one come to a greater²³.