Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 14, Art. 3, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus

p. 323

Quaestio III. Utrum Deus communicaverit animae Christi omnipotentiam, sicut communicavit omniscientiam.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus communicaverit animae Christi omnipotentiam, sicut communicavit ei omniscientiam. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Philippenses secundo^p323-2: Dedit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen: ergo si non dedit ei nomen sine re, dedit igitur illi virtutem super omnem virtutem et potentiam super omnem potentiam: ergo dedit ei omnipotentiam.

2. Item, cum tria sint in anima, potentia, scientia et voluntas, ut vult Richardus^p323-3, voluntas praesupponit scientiam, et scientia praesupponit potentiam: ergo natura, quae est capax scientiae, est capax potentiae: ergo quae est capax omniscientiae est capax omnipotentiae; sed anima Christi fuit capax omniscientiae, sicut supra^p323-4 ostensum fuit: ergo fuit capax omnipotentiae.

3. Item, amplioris extensionis est scientia quam potentia — omne enim quod Deus potest, scit, sed non convertitur — sed quod capax est rei maioris est capax rei minoris^p323-5: ergo si anima Christi fuit capax omniscientiae, fuit etiam capax omnipotentiae: ergo debuit Deus ei communicare omnipotentiam.

4. Item, posse scire unum scibile est potentiae, ergo posse scire duo scibilia est maioris potentiae, et sic procedendo: ergo posse scire infinita scibilia est summae et infinitae potentiae; sed anima Christi potuit scire infinita scibilia^p323-6: ergo Deus communicavit ei omnipotentiam.

5. Item, artifex materialis non solum communicat filio suo scientiam simplicis notitiae, sed etiam scientiam practicam: ergo multo fortius hoc^p323-7 Deus communicavit animae Christi; sed scientia practica habet operationem coniunctam, et operatio habet potentiam praeviam: ergo si Deus communicavit animae Christi scientiam practicam omnium rerum, communicavit ergo ei omnipotentiam.

6. Item, sicut intellectus animae Christi coniunctus est divinae sapientiae, ita etiam et virtus illius animae iuncta est divinae potentiae — dicimus enim Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam^p323-8 — ergo sicut intellectus animae Christi propter coniunctionem eius ad summam sapientiam est factus omnisciens, ita et virtus propter coniunctionem cum summa potentia debuit fieri omnipotens.

p. 324

Sed contra: 1. Omnis potentia creaturae sequitur ipsam substantiam creaturae; sed omnipotentia praecedit substantiam omnis creaturae, quia potest producere omne ens^p324-1: ergo nulli creaturae communicari potuit omnipotentia.

2. Item, nihil habens omnipotentiam potest ab aliquo excedi vel superari, quia nihil est maius omnipotente; sed necesse est, omnem creaturam a Deo excedi et superari: ergo impossibile est, alicui creaturae omnipotentiam communicari.

3. Item, « nullius substantiae finitae potest esse virtus infinita », sicut dicit Philosophus^p324-2, et ratio manifestat; sed omnipotentia est virtus infinita: ergo nulli substantiae finitae potest communicari omnipotentia. Sed omnis creatura est substantiae finitae, cum sit creata in numero, pondere et mensura: ergo etc.

4. Item, nulla virtus entis creati transcendit ens^p324-3; sed omnipotentia transcendit ens, quia potest de non-ente facere ens: ergo impossibile est, alicui virtuti creatae dari omnipotentiam.

Conclusio. Nec animae Christi nec alicui creaturae potest omnipotentia communicari ut proprietas ei inhaerens.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nec animae Christi nec alicui creaturae potest omnipotentia communicari, nisi eatenus, qua communicatur ei nomen et excellentia divinitatis, hoc est per communicationem idiomatum, quae ortum habet ex personali unione — sicut enim possumus dicere, quod homo est Deus, ita possumus dicere, quod homo est omnipotens — et sicut excellentia divinitatis nulli communicari potest sicut forma et proprietas eidem inhaerens substantialiter, vel accidentaliter; sic etiam nec omnipotentia.

Ratio autem, quare omnipotentia communicari non potest alicui creaturae, est, quia omnis creatura eo ipso, quod ex nihilo est, deficit a summa stabilitate, unde non existit per se ipsam; deficit a summa simplicitate, unde non agit per se totam; deficit a summa immensitate, unde distare potest in ipsa virtus a substantia^p324-4. Et quoniam a se non subsistit nec in se, nisi sustentetur a divina potentia; ideo impossibile est, ipsam esse omnipotentem; non enim potest se ipsam sustinere. — Rursus, quoniam ex se tota non agit, non potest in totam rei substantiam; et ideo non potest esse omnipotens, cum non possit totum producere. — Postremo, quia virtus eius distat a substantia, tantum potest elongari, quod omnino deficiet, unde non potest in omnia. — Sicut igitur soli Deo convenit summa stabilitas, summa simplicitas, summa etiam immensitas; sic etiam omnipotentia, quae necessario requirit ista tria. Et ideo omnipotentia communicari non potest alicui creaturae, nec animae Christi nec alii. — Et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod dedit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen; dicendum, quod datio illius nominis fuit per communicationem idiomatum, ut homo ille diceretur esse Deus et Dei Filius. De hac autem communicatione non intelligitur ad praesens; ideo auctoritas illa nihil facit ad propositum.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod potentia antecedit scientiam; dicendum, quod potentia dicitur dupliciter: respectu actus interioris et respectu actus exterioris. Dicimus enim, aliquem posse scire et velle; dicimus etiam, posse operari. Cum ergo dicimus, quod in creatura potentia antecedit scientiam, hoc verum est respectu actus interioris, sed non exterioris^p324-5, quia potentia operativa consequitur scientiam. Cum autem dicitur omnipotentia esse in aliquo, hoc non intelligitur respectu actus interioris tantum, sed etiam respectu exterioris; ideo non sequitur, quodsi in aliquo sit omniscientia, quod in eo sit omnipotentia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amplioris extensionis est scientia quam potentia; dicendum, quod esse maioris extensionis est dupliciter: vel respectu obiecti, vel respectu subiecti. Si loquamur de extensione respectu obiecti, maioris extensionis est omniscientia quam omnipotentia, quia respectu plurium est. Si autem loquamur de extensione respectu subiecti, maioris amplitudinis est omnipotentia quam omniscientia, quantum est de propria ratione utriusque. Nam omnipotentia ponit subiectum suum omnino immensum et infinitum, omniscientia vero non, sicut in praecedentibus^p324-6 fuit ostensum. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi alicui subiecto naturae creatae possit communicari omniscientia, quod propter hoc possit ei communicari omnipotentia. Communicatio enim omnipotentiae plus respicit amplitudinem subiecti quam obiecti.

p. 325

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod posse scire omne scibile est posse; dicendum, quod cum anima cognoscat in Verbo, cognoscere ipsius animae plus est in recipiendo ab ipso Verbo quam in agendo in ipsum Verbum; et ideo posse scire aliquid scibile in ipso Verbo est potentiae utique activae et passivae, sed activae ex parte Verbi illuminantis, passivae vero ex parte animae suscipientis. Cum ergo infertur, quod posse scire infinita sit potentiae infinitae; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod in creatura sit infinitas potentiae activae, sed in ipsa est infinitas potentiae passivae; et hoc quidem non repugnat creaturae, licet ei repugnaret infinitas potentiae activae. Quoniam ergo posse facere infinita dicit infinitatem potentiae activae, posse vero scire omnia dicit infinitatem potentiae passivae; hinc est, quod quamvis alicui creaturae conveniat, ut possit omnia scire, non tamen convenit, ut possit omnia facere. Et si tu obiicias, quod scire non tantum est pati, verum etiam agere; dicendum, quod hoc est verum de scientia actuali, quae quidem consistit in actu iudicandi, et illa quidem proprium est solius Dei nec potuit alicui creaturae communicari. Sed non est verum de cognitione habituali, sicut in praecedentibus^p325-1 fuit ostensum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus communicare debuit Christo non tantum scientiam speculativam, verum etiam practicam; dicendum, quod scientia practica dicitur duobus modis: uno modo dicitur scientia practica, quae est de opere; sicut moralis philosophia dicitur de opere, quae est de operibus procedentibus^p325-2 a libera voluntate. Alio modo dicitur scientia practica, quae est de opere et in opere; sicut faber, quando fabricat, dicitur habere cognitionem practicam fabricandi. Primo modo communicavit Deus scientiam practicam animae Christi, quia Christus cognitionem habuit omnium operum divinorum; secundo modo non communicavit ei, pro eo quod anima Christi in cunctis suis operibus non potuit ei cooperari. Ideo non est simile de artifice et eius filio, quia filius artificis potest aequari in scientia et virtute, non sic autem anima Christi Verbo; simile autem erit, si loquamur de Christo secundum divinam naturam. Pater enim omnia demonstrat Filio, et quaecumque Pater facit, haec omnia et Filius facit, sicut dicitur in Ioannis quinto^p325-3.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod ita unitur virtus virtuti, sicut intellectus sapientiae; dicendum, quod non est simile, sicut iam praedictum est, eo quod operatio intellectus est in suscipiendo, operatio vero potentiae activae magis consistit in agendo. Et huius signum est, quia^p325-4 multo excellentioris virtutis est aliquid posse facere, quam posse nosse; multo enim difficilius est facere unam formicam, quam cognoscere caelum et terram. Cognoscens enim, eo ipso quod cognoscens, non influit in ipsum cognitum; potens vero, in eo ipso quod potens est, comparatur ad ipsum possibile sicut ad effectum. Et hinc est, quod virtus operativa in Christo non est facta omnipotens, sicut intellectus eius factus est omnisciens^p325-5.

---

English Translation

Question III. Whether God communicated omnipotence to Christ's soul, as He communicated omniscience.

Thirdly it is asked whether God communicated omnipotence to Christ's soul, as He communicated to it omniscience. And that He did, it seems.

1. To the Philippians, chapter two^p323-2: He gave Him a name which is above every name: therefore if He did not give Him the name without the reality, He gave Him therefore a power above every power and a potency above every potency: therefore He gave Him omnipotence.

2. Likewise, since there are three things in the soul, potency, knowledge, and will, as Richard holds^p323-3, will presupposes knowledge, and knowledge presupposes potency: therefore a nature which is capable of knowledge is capable of potency: therefore that which is capable of omniscience is capable of omnipotence; but Christ's soul was capable of omniscience, as was shown above^p323-4: therefore it was capable of omnipotence.

3. Likewise, knowledge is of wider extension than potency — for everything that God can do, He knows, but it is not converse — but that which is capable of the greater thing is capable of the lesser^p323-5: therefore if Christ's soul was capable of omniscience, it was also capable of omnipotence: therefore God ought to have communicated omnipotence to it.

4. Likewise, to be able to know one knowable belongs to a potency, therefore to be able to know two knowables belongs to a greater potency, and proceeding thus: therefore to be able to know infinite knowables belongs to a supreme and infinite potency; but Christ's soul was able to know infinite knowables^p323-6: therefore God communicated omnipotence to it.

5. Likewise, a material craftsman communicates to his son not only the knowledge of simple acquaintance, but also practical knowledge: therefore much more strongly did God communicate this^p323-7 to Christ's soul; but practical knowledge has an operation joined to it, and the operation has a potency prior to it: therefore if God communicated to Christ's soul the practical knowledge of all things, He communicated therefore to it omnipotence.

6. Likewise, just as the intellect of Christ's soul is conjoined to the divine wisdom, so too the power of that soul is joined to the divine potency — for we call Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God^p323-8 — therefore just as the intellect of Christ's soul, on account of its conjunction with supreme wisdom, became all-knowing, so too the power, on account of its conjunction with supreme potency, ought to have become omnipotent.

On the contrary: 1. Every potency of a creature follows the very substance of the creature; but omnipotence precedes the substance of every creature, since it can produce every being^p324-1: therefore omnipotence could be communicated to no creature.

2. Likewise, nothing having omnipotence can be exceeded or surpassed by anything, since nothing is greater than the omnipotent; but it is necessary that every creature be exceeded and surpassed by God: therefore it is impossible that omnipotence be communicated to any creature.

3. Likewise, « of no finite substance can there be an infinite power », as the Philosopher says^p324-2, and reason makes manifest; but omnipotence is an infinite power: therefore to no finite substance can omnipotence be communicated. But every creature is of a finite substance, since it is created in number, weight, and measure: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no power of a created being transcends being^p324-3; but omnipotence transcends being, since it can make being out of non-being: therefore it is impossible that omnipotence be given to any created power.

Conclusion. Neither to Christ's soul nor to any creature can omnipotence be communicated as a property inhering in it.

I respond: It must be said that neither to Christ's soul nor to any creature can omnipotence be communicated, except to the extent that the name and excellence of divinity is communicated to it, that is, through the communication of idioms, which has its origin from the personal union — for just as we can say that the man is God, so we can say that the man is omnipotent — and just as the excellence of divinity can be communicated to none as a form and property inhering in it substantially or accidentally; so neither can omnipotence.

But the reason why omnipotence cannot be communicated to any creature is that every creature, by the very fact that it is from nothing, falls short of supreme stability, whence it does not exist through itself; it falls short of supreme simplicity, whence it does not act through its whole self; it falls short of supreme immensity, whence the power in it can stand apart from the substance^p324-4. And since it does not subsist of itself nor in itself, unless it be sustained by the divine potency; therefore it is impossible that it be omnipotent; for it cannot sustain itself. — Again, since it does not act of its whole self, it cannot reach the whole substance of a thing; and therefore it cannot be omnipotent, since it cannot produce the whole. — Lastly, because its power stands apart from the substance, it can be so far removed that it altogether fails, whence it cannot reach all things. — As therefore to God alone belong supreme stability, supreme simplicity, and supreme immensity also; so too omnipotence, which necessarily requires these three. And therefore omnipotence cannot be communicated to any creature, neither to Christ's soul nor to another. — And the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that He gave Him a name which is above every name; it must be said that the giving of that name was through the communication of idioms, so that that man might be called God and the Son of God. But of this communication there is no question at present; therefore that authority does nothing for the point at issue.

2. To that which is objected, that potency precedes knowledge; it must be said that potency is spoken of in two ways: with respect to the interior act and with respect to the exterior act. For we say that someone can know and will; we also say that he can operate. When therefore we say that in a creature potency precedes knowledge, this is true with respect to the interior act, but not the exterior^p324-5, since operative potency follows knowledge. But when omnipotence is said to be in something, this is not understood with respect to the interior act only, but also with respect to the exterior; therefore it does not follow that, if omniscience be in something, omnipotence be in it.

3. To that which is objected, that knowledge is of wider extension than potency; it must be said that to be of greater extension is twofold: either with respect to the object, or with respect to the subject. If we speak of extension with respect to the object, omniscience is of wider extension than omnipotence, since it is with respect to more things. But if we speak of extension with respect to the subject, omnipotence is of greater amplitude than omniscience, as regards the proper account of each. For omnipotence posits its subject as altogether immense and infinite, but omniscience does not, as was shown in what precedes^p324-6. And therefore it does not follow that, if omniscience can be communicated to some subject of a created nature, omnipotence can on this account be communicated to it. For the communication of omnipotence regards the amplitude of the subject more than of the object.

4. To that which is objected, that to be able to know every knowable is to be able [to do all]; it must be said that, since the soul knows in the Word, the knowing of the soul itself is more in receiving from the Word than in acting upon the Word; and therefore to be able to know some knowable in the Word belongs indeed to a potency active and passive, but active on the part of the illuminating Word, passive on the part of the receiving soul. When therefore it is inferred that to be able to know infinite things belongs to an infinite potency; it must be said that from this it does not follow that there be in the creature an infinity of active potency, but in it there is an infinity of passive potency; and this indeed is not repugnant to the creature, although an infinity of active potency would be repugnant to it. Since therefore to be able to do infinite things states an infinity of active potency, but to be able to know all things states an infinity of passive potency; hence it is that, although it befits some creature that it be able to know all things, yet it does not befit it that it be able to do all things. And if you object that to know is not only to suffer, but also to act; it must be said that this is true of actual knowledge, which indeed consists in the act of judging, and that is the property of God alone and could not be communicated to any creature. But it is not true of habitual cognition, as was shown in what precedes^p325-1.

5. To that which is objected, that God ought to have communicated to Christ not only speculative knowledge, but also practical; it must be said that practical knowledge is spoken of in two ways: in one way that is called practical knowledge which is concerning the work; as moral philosophy is said to be concerning the work, which is concerning works proceeding^p325-2 from a free will. In another way that is called practical knowledge which is concerning the work and in the work; as a smith, when he forges, is said to have practical knowledge of forging. In the first way God communicated practical knowledge to Christ's soul, since Christ had cognition of all the divine works; in the second way He did not communicate it to Him, for the reason that Christ's soul in all His works could not cooperate with Him. Therefore the case is not similar regarding the craftsman and his son, since the son of a craftsman can be made equal in knowledge and power, but not so Christ's soul to the Word; but it will be similar, if we speak of Christ according to the divine nature. For the Father shows all things to the Son, and whatever the Father does, all these the Son also does, as is said in John, chapter five^p325-3.

6. To that which is objected last, that power is united to power just as the intellect to wisdom; it must be said that the case is not similar, as has already been said, for the reason that the operation of the intellect is in receiving, but the operation of the active potency consists rather in acting. And a sign of this is that^p325-4 it is of much more excellent power to be able to do something than to be able to know it; for it is much more difficult to make one ant than to know heaven and earth. For the knower, by the very fact that he is a knower, does not flow into the thing known; but the one who has power, in the very fact that he has power, is related to the possible as to an effect. And hence it is that the operative power in Christ was not made omnipotent, just as His intellect was made all-knowing^p325-5.

---

Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 9.
Verse 9. [Philippians 2:9.]
Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 15, ubi de tribus appropriatis, scil. potentia, sapientia et bonitate, agens ostendit, quod multiplex potentia esse potest, ubi nulla potest esse sapientia, ex. gr. in rebus insensatis et brutis; « econtra autem, ubi nulla potentia est, nulla sapientia inesse potest. Nam posse sapere absque dubio est aliquid posse. Dat igitur esse posse non sapientia potentiae, sed potentia sapientiae… nulla bonitas inesse poterit, ubi sapientia vel potentia omnino defuerit » etc. Cfr. eius opusc. de Tribus appropriatis Personis in Trinitate.
Book VI, On the Trinity, c. 15, where, treating of the three appropriated [attributes], namely potency, wisdom, and goodness, he shows that there can be manifold potency where there can be no wisdom, e.g. in things without sense and in brutes; « but, on the contrary, where there is no potency, no wisdom can be present. For to be able to be wise is without doubt to be able to do something. Therefore being able to be gives being able, not [the] wisdom of potency, but [the] potency of wisdom… no goodness can be present where wisdom or potency is altogether lacking » etc. Cf. his opusculum On the Three [Attributes] Appropriated to the Persons in the Trinity.
Art. 2. q. 3.
Article 2, q. 3.
Regula iuris 35. (V. Sext. Decret. in fine): Plus semper in se continet quod est minus.
Rule of law 35 (in the Sext of the Decretals, at the end): That which is greater always contains within itself what is less.
Vide supra a. 2. q. 3.
See above, article 2, q. 3.
Edd. hanc.
The editions [read] hanc [this].
Epist. I. Cor. 1, 24.
First Epistle to the Corinthians 1:24.
Cfr. supra d. 11. dub. 1. — De maiori vide tom. I. pag. 84, nota 6.
Cf. above, d. 11, doubt 1. — On the major [premise] see vol. I, p. 84, note 6.
Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 78. seqq. (c. 10.). — Testimon. Scripturae est Sap. 11, 21. — Infra pro est substantiae finitae cod. K est substantia finita.
Book VIII of the Physics, text 78ff. (c. 10). — The scriptural testimony is Wisdom 11:21. — Below, for est substantiae finitae codex K [reads] est substantia finita.
Quia esse habet rationem effectus communissimi et transcendentis omne esse particulare et participatum et per consequens etiam virtutem entis particularis, ut docent Scot. de Rerum principiis, S. Thom. de Potent. q. 3. a. 7, et Bonav. I. Sent. d. 43. q. 1, et II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 2. Cfr. etiam tom. II. p. 14, nota 7.
Because being has the character of a most common effect transcending every particular and participated being, and consequently also [transcending] the power of a particular being, as Scotus teaches in On the Principles of Things, St. Thomas On Potency q. 3, a. 7, and Bonaventure I Sent. d. 43, q. 1, and II Sent. d. 1, p. I, a. 2. Cf. also vol. II, p. 14, note 7.
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2, d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, d. 43. q. 1, et II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. — Subinde pro a se non subsistit nec in se, quae est scriptura cod. N (nec in se habent etiam multi alii codd.), edd. in se non subsistit nec a se. Pro nec in se codd. A D U Y Z bb nec per se.
Cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 2; d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1; d. 43, q. 1; and II Sent. d. 37, a. 1, q. 2. — Thereupon, for a se non subsistit nec in se, which is the reading of codex N (nec in se is also had by many other codices), the editions [read] in se non subsistit nec a se. For nec in se codices A D U Y Z bb [read] nec per se.
Codd. F G I K L T U V Z aa omittunt sed non exterioris, pro quo cod. A exhibet non respectu exterioris.
Codices F G I K L T U V Z aa omit sed non exterioris, in place of which codex A presents non respectu exterioris.
Art. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro maioris amplitudinis cod. bb extensionis amplioris. Versus finem solut. pro quod propter hoc codd. E F G I K L T V aa et propter hoc.
Article 2, q. 3. — A little above, for maioris amplitudinis codex bb [reads] extensionis amplioris. Toward the end of the solution, for quod propter hoc codices E F G I K L T V aa [read] et propter hoc.
Art. 1. q. 3. ad 6. et a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro proprium cod. A propria.
Article 1, q. 3, reply 6, and a. 2, q. 3. — A little above, for proprium codex A [reads] propria.
Cod. F, omisso quae est de operibus, substituit procedente.
Codex F, having omitted quae est de operibus, substitutes procedente.
Vers. 19. seq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Paulo superius post potest aequari [cod. N adaequari] cod. A supplet artifici.
Verse 19f. [John 5:19f.] Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — A little above, after potest aequari [codex N adaequari] codex A supplies artifici.
Cod. G quod.
Codex G [reads] quod.
Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
See the scholion to the preceding question.

← Dist. 14, Art. 3, Q. 2 Dist. 14, Dubia→