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Dist. 14, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus
p. 321

Quaestio II. Utrum Christus profecerit secundum illud genus cognitionis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Christus profecerit secundum illud genus cognitionis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Hebraeos quintop321-1: Didicit ex his quae passus est, obedientiam; sed discere est proficere in scientia: ergo etc.

2. Item, super illud Lucae secundop321-2: Proficiebat Iesus aetate et sapientia; Glossa: «Sicut carnis est aetate proficere, sic animae gratia et sapientia»: ergo sicut Christus profecit secundum carnem crescendo in aetate, ita videtur, quod secundum animam profecerit crescendo in cognitione.

3. Item, «Christus assumsit quae plantavit in nostra naturap321-3»; sed Christus plantavit in nostra natura, ut «ex multis sensibilibus fiat una memoria, ex multis memoriis una experientia, ex multis experimentis unum universale, quod est principium artis et scientiae»: ergo si iste modus procedendi facit animam proficere in cognitione; videtur, quod anima Christi in cognitione profecerit.

4. Item, aut intellectus agens in Christo potuit abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus materialibus, aut nonp321-4. Si non potuit: ergo fuit impotens; si potuit, cum talis modus abstrahendi sit via in cognitionem, videtur, quod Christus in cognitione profecerit.

5. Item, qui aliquid apprehendit et retinet quod prius non apprehenderat, aliquid addiscit et in cognitione proficit; sed sensus communis in Christo aliquid apprehendit et aliqua sensibilia retinebat quae prius non apprehenderat nec composuerat, et imaginativa potentia in Christo totum illud retinebatp321-5: ergo videtur, quod anima Christi proficiebat et addiscebat.

Sed contra: 1. Gregorius super illud Lucaep321-6: Proficiebat Iesus etc.: «Proficiebat, non quod ipse sapientior fieret ex tempore, sed eandem qua plenus erat sapientiam ceteris ex tempore paulatim demonstrabat».

2. Item, Damascenusp321-7: «Qui dicunt, eum proficere sapientia, non eam quae est secundum hypostasim unionem venerantur»: ergo si quis dicat, Christum profecisse in scientia, videtur facere iniuriam Sapientiae increatae sibi unitae.

3. Item, Christus habuit plenitudinem non solum gratiae gratum facientis, sed etiam gratiae gratis dataep321-8: si ergo cognitio, quam habuit a Verbo in se ipso, fuit cognitio gratiae gratis datae, ergo plena fuit in Christo a suae conditionis primordio: non ergo crescebat in eo.

4. Item, anima Christi habuit species rerum cognoscibilium; sed qua ratione habuit species unius cognoscibilis, eadem ratione et omnium; sed impossibile est, duas formas eiusdem speciei esse et in eodem et secundum idemp321-9: ergo impossibile fuit, quod anima Christi novas formas sive novas species reciperet: ergo non potuit in cognitione proficere.

5. Item, materia non est possibilis ad formam p. 322 quam habet in actu, pro eo quod «omne recipiens debet esse denudatum a forma receptip322-1»: ergo si anima Christi a principio habuit in se omnium rerum creatarum speciem et notitiam, videtur, quod amplius non potuerit cognitionem novam recipere, ergo nec in cognitione proficere.

Conclusio.

Anima Christi non secundum cognitionem simplicis notitiae, sed secundum cognitionem experientiae profecit.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod praeter scientiam, quam anima Christi habuit in Verbo, duplicem habuit cognoscendi modum, sicut praedictum fuitp322-2: habuit enim cognitionem simplicis notitiae in intellectu, et cognitionem experientiae in sensu. Cognitio simplicis notitiae consistebat in habitibus et speciebus ipsi animae Christi inditis a primordio suae conditionis ex beneficio Conditoris; cognitio vero experientiae consistebat in usibus sensuum exteriorum. — Quoniam ergo habitus et species impressae fuerunt ipsi animae Christi in omnimoda plenitudine; hinc est, quod Christus proficere non potuit cognitione simplicis notitiae. Quia vero sensus exterior ad aliquid convertebatur de novo, ad quod prius conversus non fuerat; hinc est, quod cognitione experientiae proficiebat. — Iuxta quod dicit Ambrosiusp322-3, quod «in eo sensus proficiebat humanus»; et Apostolus dicit, quod didicit ex his quae passus est, obedientiam; et Glossa super illud Psalmi: Qui tribuit mihi intellectum: «Usque ad mortem erudivit me inferior pars mea, scilicet carnis assumtio, ut experirer tenebras mortalitatis». — Et sic anima Christi quamvis non proficeret secundum cognitionem simplicis notitiae, proficiebat tamen secundum cognitionem experimentalem. Ille autem profectus scientiae experimentalis in Christo in duobus differebat a profectu cognitionis nostrae, in uno videlicet, quod Christus non proficiebat veniendo in notitiam rei prius incognitae, sed quod prius cognoscebatp322-4 uno modo, scilicet per simplicem notitiam, cognoscebat alio modo, scilicet per experientiam. In alio etiam differebat, quia profectus noster est secundum existentiam, profectus vero Christi erat solum secundum apparentiam.

Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet etiam responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem pro magna parte. Nam rationes, quae ostendunt, quod Christus non proficiebat in cognitione sive scientia, procedunt de profectu non solum secundum apparentiam, sed etiam secundum existentiam, non solum secundum cognitionem experientiae, verum etiam secundum cognitionem simplicis notitiae. Et ideo rationes illae sunt concedendae, quia verum concludunt.

1. 2. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Apostoli et de auctoritate Bedae in Glossa, dicendum, quod utraque auctoritas intelligitur de cognitione experientiae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod hoc est naturale, videlicet quod ex multis sensibilibus fiat una memoria; dicendum, quod duplex est modus cognoscendi per experientiam: unus, qui est via in acquisitionem scientiae; alius vero, qui est via in exercitium scientiae, ut quod prius sciebatur theoretice postmodum sciatur practicep322-5. Et primus modus experientiae reperitur in scientiae inventione, secundus vero consistit in usu scientiae iam adeptae; et in primo est motus ab incognito ad cognitum, in secundo vero est via sive processus a cognito uno modo, ut cognoscatur alio modo. — Et primus modus respicit imperfectionem naturae lapsae propter ignorantiam annexam, secundus vero respicit statum innocentiae, in quo habitus scientiae praecessisset usum, et cognitio simplicis notitiae praecessisset cognitionem experientiae; et iste modus fuit in Christo et non alius, quia, sicut infrap322-6 patebit de statu naturae lapsae, Christus non debuit assumere defectum ignorantiae. Philosophus autem in praedicto progressu cognitionis procedit secundum statum naturae lapsae, quod in Christo non oportet reperiri.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus agens in Christo potuit abstrahere; dicendum, quod abstractio speciei a conditionibus materialibus quaedam ordinaturp322-7 ad generandum habitum, quaedam vero consistit in iudicio eius quod apprehensum est per sensum, iudicio, inquam, facto ab intellectu. Et prima non fuit in Christo, cum intellectus eius haberet habitus et species rerum, illa autem abstractio ordinaretur ad acquisitionem habitus et scientiae nondum adeptae, et ita haberet annexum defectum ignorantiae. Secunda vero in Christo fuit, sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod aliquid didicerit de novo, vel in scientia profecerit, sed solum quod aliquid consideravit intellectu excitato a potentia inferiori. p. 323 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sensus eius poterat componere et tenere; dicendum, quod illud non facit profectum in cognitione speculationis, sed in cognitione experimentali, quoniam illa quae sensus componebat, aut dividebat, apud intellectum erant magis cognita, non solum quantum ad essentias, sed etiam quantum ad comparationesp323-1, secundum quas compositiones et divisiones possunt formaliter variari. Unde secus est de cognitione rerum in Christo et in quocumque Angelo. Angeli enim potuerunt proficere in cognitione rerum componendo et dividendo et conferendo, etiam cognitione simplicis notitiae, quamvis non reciperent novas species; Christus vero minime, propter cognitionis plenitudinem et perfectionem, quam decuit animam eius habere a principio suae conditionis.

Scholion

I. Quod Christus non potuerit proficere in scientia infusa, saltem quoad habitum, inter omnes constat; item, quod proficere potuerit secundum scientiam experimentalem, quatenus per usum sensuum multa nova expertus sit et intuitive cognoverit. Cum autem intellectus humanus usu sensuum acquirat species intelligibiles, et inde habitum demonstrativum sive cognitionem abstractivam habitualem; restat quaestio, utrum Christus talem habitum scientiae naturali modo acquisiverit, et sic profecerit. Negative respondent cum S. Bonav. Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. m. 2. circa finem), Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5, Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2, a. 4. q. 3, Scot., hic q. 3. n. 6, Durand., hic q. 4, quorum ratio principalis est, quod duo habitus scientiae per accidens infusae et acquisitae sint eiusdem rationis (quod discipuli S. Thomae negant); porro dicunt, etiam adversarios statuere, quod duae formae eiusdem rationis non possint simul esse in eodem subiecto (cfr. 4. fundam.), et quod Christus iam habuerit habitum scientiae omnium rerum per accidens infusum. Huic negativae sententiae etiam S. Thom. prius adhaesit in Comment. (hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 5.); sed postea in Sum. (III. q. 9. a. 4.) quaestionem affirmative solvit.

II. Seq. (3.) quaestio, de qua iam egit Magister (hic c. 2.), ab omnibus concorditer solvitur et a nostro Doctore gravibus argumentis probatur. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 14. m. 2. — Scot., III. Sent. d. 16. q. 2. n. 9. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. III. q. 13. a. 1-4. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether Christ advanced according to that kind of knowledge.

Secondly it is asked whether Christ advanced according to that kind of knowledge. And that he did, it seems.

1. To the Hebrews, chapter fivep321-1: He learned obedience from the things which he suffered; but to learn is to advance in knowledge: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, on that passage of Luke, chapter twop321-2: Jesus advanced in age and wisdom; the Gloss: «As it belongs to the flesh to advance in age, so to the soul to advance in grace and wisdom»: therefore, just as Christ advanced according to the flesh by growing in age, so it seems that he advanced according to the soul by growing in knowledge.

3. Likewise, «Christ assumed the things which he had planted in our naturep321-3»; but Christ planted in our nature that «from many sensibles there comes to be one memory, from many memories one experience, from many experiments one universal, which is the principle of art and of knowledge»: therefore, if this manner of proceeding makes the soul advance in knowledge, it seems that Christ's soul advanced in knowledge.

4. Likewise, either the agent intellect in Christ was able to abstract universal forms from material conditions, or it was notp321-4. If it was not able: then it was impotent; if it was able, since such a mode of abstracting is a way into knowledge, it seems that Christ advanced in knowledge.

5. Likewise, he who apprehends and retains something which he had not previously apprehended learns something and advances in knowledge; but the common sense in Christ apprehended something and retained some sensibles which it had not previously apprehended nor composed, and the imaginative power in Christ retained all of itp321-5: therefore it seems that Christ's soul was advancing and learning.

On the contrary: 1. Gregory, on that passage of Lukep321-6: Jesus advanced etc.: «He advanced, not that he himself became wiser with time, but that he gradually displayed to others, in time, the same wisdom of which he was full».

2. Likewise, Damascenep321-7: «Those who say that he advanced in wisdom do not venerate the union which is according to the hypostasis»: therefore, if anyone should say that Christ advanced in knowledge, he seems to do injury to the uncreated Wisdom united to him.

3. Likewise, Christ had the fullness not only of the grace that makes pleasing, but also of the grace freely givenp321-8: if therefore the knowledge which he had from the Word in himself was a knowledge of the grace freely given, then it was full in Christ from the first beginning of his condition: therefore it was not increasing in him.

4. Likewise, Christ's soul had the species of knowable things; but by the same account by which it had the species of one knowable thing, by the same account it had those of all; but it is impossible that two forms of the same species be both in the same thing and according to the same respectp321-9: therefore it was impossible that Christ's soul should receive new forms or new species: therefore it could not advance in knowledge.

5. Likewise, matter is not in potency to a form p. 322 which it has in act, for the reason that «every recipient must be stripped of the form of what is receivedp322-1»: therefore, if Christ's soul from the beginning had in itself the species and notion of all created things, it seems that it could no longer receive new knowledge, and therefore could not advance in knowledge.

Conclusion.

Christ's soul advanced, not according to the knowledge of simple notion, but according to the knowledge of experience.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, besides the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word, it had a twofold mode of knowing, as has been said beforep322-2: for it had the knowledge of simple notion in the intellect, and the knowledge of experience in the sense. The knowledge of simple notion consisted in the habits and species bestowed upon Christ's soul itself from the first beginning of its condition by the benefit of the Creator; but the knowledge of experience consisted in the uses of the exterior senses. — Since therefore the impressed habits and species were in Christ's soul in every kind of fullness, hence it is that Christ could not advance by the knowledge of simple notion. But because the exterior sense was being turned anew to something to which it had not previously been turned, hence it is that he was advancing by the knowledge of experience. — In accordance with which Ambrose saysp322-3 that «in him the human sense advanced»; and the Apostle says that he learned obedience from the things which he suffered; and the Gloss on that passage of the Psalm: Who bestows understanding on me: «Even unto death my lower part instructed me, namely the assumption of flesh, that I might experience the darkness of mortality». — And thus Christ's soul, although it did not advance according to the knowledge of simple notion, nevertheless advanced according to experiential knowledge. But that advance of experiential knowledge in Christ differed in two respects from the advance of our knowledge: namely in one, that Christ was not advancing by coming into the knowledge of a thing previously unknown, but that what he previously knewp322-4 in one mode, namely by simple notion, he knew in another mode, namely by experience. In another it also differed, because our advance is according to existence, but Christ's advance was only according to appearance.

And according to this the response to the proposed question is clear; the response to the reasons on either side is also for the most part clear. For the reasons which show that Christ was not advancing in cognition or knowledge proceed from an advance not only according to appearance, but also according to existence, not only according to the knowledge of experience, but also according to the knowledge of simple notion. And therefore those reasons are to be conceded, because they conclude what is true.

1. 2. To that which is first objected to the contrary from the authority of the Apostle and from the authority of Bede in the Gloss, it must be said that each authority is understood of the knowledge of experience.

3. To that which is objected, that this is natural, namely that from many sensibles there comes to be one memory; it must be said that there is a twofold mode of knowing through experience: one, which is a way into the acquisition of knowledge; the other, which is a way into the exercise of knowledge, so that what was previously known theoretically may afterwards be known practicallyp322-5. And the first mode of experience is found in the discovery of knowledge, the second consists in the use of knowledge already acquired; and in the first there is a motion from the unknown to the known, but in the second there is a way or process from what is known in one mode, so that it may be known in another mode. — And the first mode regards the imperfection of fallen nature on account of the attached ignorance, but the second regards the state of innocence, in which the habit of knowledge would have preceded its use, and the knowledge of simple notion would have preceded the knowledge of experience; and this mode was in Christ and not the other, because, as will be shown belowp322-6 concerning the state of fallen nature, Christ ought not to assume the defect of ignorance. But the Philosopher, in the aforesaid progress of knowledge, proceeds according to the state of fallen nature, which need not be found in Christ.

4. To that which is objected, that the agent intellect in Christ was able to abstract; it must be said that the abstraction of a species from material conditions is ordered, in one way, top322-7 generating a habit, but in another way it consists in the judgment of that which is apprehended through the sense, a judgment, I say, made by the intellect. And the first was not in Christ, since his intellect had the habits and species of things, whereas that abstraction would be ordered to the acquisition of a habit and of a knowledge not yet acquired, and so would have attached to it the defect of ignorance. But the second was in Christ, yet from this it does not follow that he learned anything anew, or advanced in knowledge, but only that he considered something with the intellect roused by the lower power. p. 323 5. To that which is objected, that his sense was able to compose and to retain; it must be said that that does not make an advance in speculative cognition, but in experimental cognition, since the things which the sense composed or divided were more known in the intellect, not only as to their essences, but also as to their comparisonsp323-1, according to which compositions and divisions can be formally varied. Hence it is otherwise concerning the cognition of things in Christ and in any Angel. For the Angels were able to advance in the cognition of things by composing and dividing and comparing, even by the knowledge of simple notion, although they did not receive new species; but Christ not at all, on account of the fullness and perfection of cognition which it was fitting that his soul should have from the first beginning of its condition.

Scholion

I. That Christ could not advance in infused knowledge, at least as to the habit, is agreed among all; likewise, that he could advance according to experimental knowledge, inasmuch as through the use of the senses he experienced many new things and knew them intuitively. But since the human intellect acquires intelligible species through the use of the senses, and thence a demonstrative habit or habitual abstractive cognition, there remains the question whether Christ acquired such a habit of knowledge in the natural mode, and thus advanced. Together with St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales (Summa, part III, member 2, near the end), Peter of Tarentaise (here, art. 5), Richard of Mediavilla (here, art. 3, q. 2, and art. 4, q. 3), Scotus (here, q. 3, n. 6), Durandus (here, q. 4) answer negatively; their principal reason is that two habits of knowledge — per accidens infused and acquired — are of the same account (which the disciples of St. Thomas deny); moreover they say that the adversaries too lay it down that two forms of the same account cannot be at once in the same subject (cf. the 4th fundamentum), and that Christ already had the habit of the knowledge of all things infused per accidens. To this negative opinion St. Thomas too at first adhered in his Commentary (here, art. 3, quaestiuncula 5); but afterwards in the Summa (III, q. 9, art. 4) he resolved the question affirmatively.

II. The following (third) question, of which the Master has already treated (here, ch. 2), is concordantly resolved by all and is proved by our Doctor with weighty arguments. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., q. 14, m. 2. — Scotus, III Sent., d. 16, q. 2, nn. 9 ff. — St. Thomas, here, art. 4; Summa III, q. 13, arts. 1–4. — Bl. Albert, here, art. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, art. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, art. 5, qq. 1–3. — Durandus, here, q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 8.
    Verse 8 [Hebrews 5:8].
  2. Vers. 52. — Glossa, quae ut ordinaria invenitur apud Strabum et Lyranum, sumta est ex Beda, in hunc locum, et est secundum Ambros., de Incarn. domin. sacram. c. 7. n. 72. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XIII. circa med., et pag. 282, nota 3, ubi verba Fulgentii.
    Verse 52 [Luke 2:52]. — The Gloss, which is found as the ordinary gloss in Strabo and Lyra, is taken from Bede, on this passage, and is according to Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation, c. 7, n. 72. Cf. above, the littera of the Master, d. XIII, near the middle, and p. 282, note 3, where the words of Fulgentius are given.
  3. Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. 1. in fine. — Seq. testimon. est Aristot., II. Poster. c. 18. (c. 15.), et I. Metaph. c. 1. — Pro una experientia (ἐμπειρία μία) cod. K unum experimentum, et pro experimentis codd. H Z aa experientiis.
    Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. III, c. 6. Cf. above, the littera of the Master, d. II, c. 1, at the end. — The following testimony is from Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, c. 18 (c. 15), and Metaphysics I, c. 1. — For one experience (ἐμπειρία μία) codex K reads one experiment, and for experiments codices H, Z, aa read experiences.
  4. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4.
    Cf. II Sent., d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 4.
  5. Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. 2. sensum communem describit his verbis: Est autem quaedam et communis potentia sequens omnes [sensus exteriores], qua [animal] et quod videt et audit sentit. Non enim visu quidem videt quod videt, et iudicat utique et potest discernere, quod alia quidem dulcia sunt ab albis, nec gustu, nec visu, nec ambobus, sed quadam communi particula omnium sensoriorum; nam est quidem sensus unus et principale sensorium unum etc. Cfr. II. de Anima, text. 136. seqq. (III. c. 2.). Cfr. etiam ibid. text. 153. seqq. (III. c. 3.), ubi de potentia imaginativa.
    Aristotle, On Sleep and Waking, c. 2, describes the common sense in these words: But there is also a certain common power following upon all [the exterior senses], by which [the animal] perceives both what it sees and what it hears. For it is not by sight that it sees what it sees, and yet it judges and is able to discern that sweet things are other than white things — neither by taste, nor by sight, nor by both, but by a certain common portion of all the sensories; for there is indeed one sense and one principal sensory, etc. Cf. On the Soul II, text 136 ff. (III, c. 2). Cf. also ibid., text 153 ff. (III, c. 3), where he treats of the imaginative power.
  6. Cap. 2, 52. — Pro Gregorius edd. substituerunt Beda; cfr. supra pag. 274, nota 4. Gregor. Nazian., homil. 20. n. 65. sic ait: Proficiebat enim, inquit, ut aetate, ita etiam sapientia, non quod haec in illo incrementum caperent; quid enim eo quod a principio perfectum erat, perfectius esse possit? sed quod haec paulatim detegerentur et elucerent.
    Chapter 2, 52. — For Gregory the editions substituted Bede; cf. above, p. 274, note 4. Gregory Nazianzen, Homily 20, n. 65, speaks thus: «He advanced,» he says, «as in age, so also in wisdom, not that these took any increase in him; for what could be more perfect than what was perfect from the beginning? but that these were gradually uncovered and shone forth.»
  7. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 22, ubi in textu origin. post sapientia plura adiuncta reperiuntur.
    On the Orthodox Faith, bk. III, c. 22, where in the original text several additions are found after wisdom.
  8. Ioan. 1, 14: Plenum gratiae et veritatis.
    John 1:14: Full of grace and truth.
  9. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 119, nota 8. — De maiori vide quaest. praeced.
    Cf. tome II, p. 119, note 8. — Concerning the major [premise] see the preceding question.
  10. Averroes, III. de Caelo et mundo, text. 67; II. de Anima, text. 67. et III. text. 4.
    Averroes, On the Heavens and the Earth III, text 67; On the Soul II, text 67, and III, text 4.
  11. Quaest. praeced. Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 9. — Paulo inferius ante Cognitio simplicis multi codd. ponunt et. Deinde pro conditionis cod. W substituit creationis.
    The preceding question. Cf. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, bk. I, c. 9. — A little below, before The knowledge of simple [notion], many codices put and. Then for condition codex W substitutes creation.
  12. De Incarn. domin. sacram. c. 7. n. 72. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XIII. circa medium. — Seq. Script. loc. est Hebr. 5. 8. — Glossa subinde allata est ordinaria in Ps. 15, 7; sumta est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc loc. et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. — Post pauca pro proficeret edd. profecerit.
    On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation, c. 7, n. 72. Cf. above, the littera of the Master, d. XIII, near the middle. — The following scriptural passage is Hebrews 5:8. — The Gloss thereupon adduced is the ordinary gloss on Ps. 15:7; it is taken from Augustine, Enarration on this passage, and is found in Strabo and Lyra. — A little after, for would advance the editions read advanced.
  13. Cod. L sciebat; edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd., omisso prius (quod etiam in codd. A H desideratur), proficiebat; perperam.
    Codex L reads knew [sciebat]; editions 1, 2 with several codices, having omitted previously, read was advancing [proficiebat]; wrongly.
  14. Cfr. Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1.
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 1.
  15. Dist. 15. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro progressu cod. X processu.
    Distinction 15, a. 2, q. 1. — A little below, for progress codex X reads process.
  16. Non pauci codd. falso ordinantur.
    Not a few codices wrongly read are ordered [ordinantur].
  17. Edd. cum multis codd. vitiose compositiones. — De naturali cognitione Angelorum vide II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.
    The editions, with many codices, faultily read compositions [compositiones]. — Concerning the natural cognition of the Angels, see II Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1. ---
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