Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 14, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus

p. 318

Articulus III. De scientia, quam anima Christi habuit a Verbo.

Consequenter quaeritur de scientia, quam anima Christi habuit a Verbo, et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum aliquam scientiam habuerit anima Christi a Verbo praeter illam quam habuit in Verbo. Secundo quaeritur, utrum secundum illam profecerit, aut ab initio habuerit eam perfectam. Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus debuerit communicare animae Christi omnipotentiam, sicut communicavit omniscientiam.

Quaestio I. Utrum Christus habuerit aliam scientiam praeter illam quam habuit in Verbo.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus habuerit aliam scientiam a Verbo praeter illam quam habuit in Verbo. Et quod non fuerit aliqua necessitas habendi aliam, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicit Damascenus^p318-1: « Quemadmodum caro hominis secundum propriam naturam non est vivificativa, Domini autem caro unita secundum hypostasim ipsi Deo Verbo vivifi- p. 319 cativa facta est propter eam quae est secundum hypostasim unionem; ita et humana natura quidem substantialiter non possidet futurorum cognitionem, Domini autem anima propter eam quae est ad Deum Verbum unionem ditata est futurorum cognitione »: ergo sicut caro Christi non potest vivificare nisi propter unionem sui ad Verbum, ita anima eius non cognoscet aliquid nisi in ipso Verbo.

2. Item, unius secundum unam naturam est una perfectio^p319-1; sed intellectus animae Christi perfectus fuit scientia, cognoscendo omnia in ipso Verbo: ergo cum scientia sit perfectio ipsius intellectus, non habuit aliam scientiam praeter illam.

3. Item, superfluum est facere per plura quod potest sufficienter fieri per pauciora^p319-2; sed anima Christi sufficientissime cognoscit omne cognoscibile cognitione, quae est in ipso Verbo: ergo videtur, quod superfluum sit ei attribuere aliam cognitionem.

4. Item, maioris luminis est absorbere minus: si ergo cognitio, quam anima Christi habet in ipso Verbo, fuit perfectae luminositatis, quia fuit in ipso fonte luminis; videtur, quod non^p319-3 potuerit simul cum ea stare aliud genus cognitionis in anima Christi.

5. Item, quando advenit quod perfectum est, evacuatur quod ex parte est^p319-4; sed cognitio ipsius animae Christi in Verbo est cognitio perfectissima, cognitio rerum in proprio genere est cognitio minus perfecta: ergo si Christus ab initio habuit cognitionem perfectissimam, quae est in Verbo; videtur, quod alia non habuit locum in ipso.

Sed contra: 1. Sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram, tractans illa tria verba, Genesis primo^p319-5: Fiat, fecit, et factum est, Angelus tripliciter cognovit res: in Verbo, in se et in proprio genere; sed intellectus animae Christi non fuit minus perfectus quam intellectus angelicus: ergo non tantum habuit cognitionem rerum in Verbo, verum etiam in se ipso.

2. Item, Christus assumsit quod dignitatis erat de omni statu, scilicet de statu gloriae, de statu innocentiae et de statu naturae lapsae^p319-6: ergo non tantum habuit cognitionem convenientem statui gloriae, verum etiam convenientem statui innocentiae: si ergo Adam habuit cognitionem omnium rerum creatarum divinitus sibi datam in se ipso, videtur, quod praeter cognitionem gloriosam Christus habuit illam scientiam.

3. Item, anima Christi in omni dono gratiarum debuit excedere omnes alias animas, et non tantum in dono gratiae gratum facientis, verum etiam in dono gratiae gratis datae: si ergo habere notitiam ipsarum rerum in se ipso, hoc est donum gratiae gratis datae; videtur, quod Christus habuit hanc cognitionem praeter eam cognitionem, quae est in Verbo^p319-7.

4. Item, sicut ratio superior debet habere suam perfectionem, ita etiam ratio inferior in Christo; sed ratio superior nata est nosse res in ipso Verbo aeterno, inferior vero nata est eas considerare in proprio genere^p319-8: ergo sicut habuit cognitionem superioris, ita etiam inferioris, et sic etc.

5. Item, Christus simul erat perfectus viator et comprehensor; sed utrique statui necessaria est cognitio: ergo sicut habuit scientiam debitam statui comprehensoris, cognoscendo res in ipso Verbo, ita videtur, quod habuit scientiam convenientem statui viatoris, cognoscendo res in se ipsis.

Conclusio.

Anima Christi praeter cognitionem, quam habuit in Verbo, habuit etiam cognitionem rerum a Verbo, non tantum cognitionem simplicis intelligentiae, verum etiam experientiae.

Respondeo: Absque dubio concedendum est, quod praeter cognitionem, quam habuit anima Christi in ipso Verbo, quae est cognitio gloriosa, habuit cognitionem a Verbo, quae est cognitio gratiae gratis datae, qua etiam cognitione cognoscit Christus res in se ipsis per species ei inditas ab ipso conditionis primordio, sicut fuit in intellectu Adae, vel etiam in intellectu angelico^p319-9.

Ratio autem huius est perfectio ipsius animae Christi, quae non tantum debuit esse perfecta secundum superiorem portionem, verum etiam secundum inferiorem et secundum partem sensibilem, non tantum quantum ad statum patriae, verum etiam quantum ad statum viae, qui duplex est, videlicet innocentiae et naturae lapsae. Et secundum hoc Christus habuit triplicem cognitionem isti triplici statui convenientem, videlicet cognitionem gloriae, cognitionem naturae integrae et cognitionem poenalis experientiae, ut de quolibet statu aliquid in se haberet. — Rursus, quia perfecta fuit anima Christi quantum ad cognitionem non solum respectu cognoscibilium, sed etiam respectu modorum cognoscendi; ideo cum res tripliciter sint cognoscibiles, se- p. 320 cundum quod tripliciter^p320-1 habent esse — habent enim esse in Verbo, habent esse in intellectu creato, habent nihilominus esse in proprio genere — ideo ad hoc, quod intellectus animae Christi plenam de rebus cognitionem haberet, res cognovit ista triplici cognitione.

Et sic patet, quod anima Christi non tantum habuit cognitionem rerum in Verbo, sed etiam rerum a Verbo, cognitionem, inquam, non tantum simplicis notitiae, verum etiam experientiae^p320-2. — Patet etiam harum trium cognitionum sufficientia, necessitas et distinctio, quae potest sumi vel ex parte virium, scilicet superioris rationis, inferioris et sensualitatis; vel ex parte statuum, videlicet gloriae, innocentiae et naturae lapsae; vel ex parte modorum cognoscendi, scilicet in Verbo, in se et in genere proprio. Et sic patet, quod anima Christi praeter cognitionem, quam habuit in Verbo, habuit aliam cognitionem a Verbo^p320-3. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de auctoritate Damasceni, dicendum, quod Damascenus non vult assignare similitudinem quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad hoc, quod sicut caro Christi non esset vivificativa, nisi fuisset ipsi Verbo unita, sic anima Christi ignorans esset et imperfecta, nisi fuisset unita cum sapientia perfecta; sed propter illam unionem habet omnis cognitionis perfectionem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod unius rei una est perfectio; dicendum, quod verum est secundum unum modum et statum et potentiam; sed quia in anima Christi est considerare diversitatem potentiarum et statuum et modorum cognoscendi, ideo nihil impedit, quin secundum diversitatem horum diversas habeat cognitiones perficientes.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod superfluum est facere per plura quod potest etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, si fiat aeque bene et aeque sufficienter; sic autem non esset in proposito, quia non ita haberet anima Christi completionem scientiae secundum omnem modum et^p320-4 omnem statum, sed solum alteram istarum cognitionum haberet.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris luminis est absorbere minus; dicendum, quod illud alicubi habet veritatem, hoc est de luminibus, quae sunt eiusdem rationis, et eodem modo irradiant et secundum eandem partem; non sic autem est in proposito reperire, sicut in distinctione harum cognitionum ostensum est. Praeterea, quod dicitur, quod maius lumen absorbet minus, hoc non dicitur quantum ad existentiam, sed quantum ad apparentiam; et licet hoc sit verum in lumine corporali, non tamen est verum in lumine spirituali, propter maiorem impermixtionem, quae reperitur in lumine spirituali quam in corporali^p320-5.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitio ex parte non manet cum cognitione perfecta; dicendum, quod verum est, quando cognitio ex parte habet imperfectionem annexam, sicut est cognitio aenigmatica; et de hac verum est, quod non fuit in anima Christi. Si autem dicatur cognitio ex parte, quia minus perfecta est quam cognitio gloriae, non oportet, eam evacuari, in eo potissimum, in quo est simul status viae cum statu patriae^p320-6.

Scholion

I. Scientia infusa « per species Christo inditas ab ipso conditionis primordio », vocatur a S. Bonav. cognitio simplicis notitiae et a S. Thoma in Sum. etiam scientia indita. Nonnulli tamen posteriores theologi scientiam inditam distinguunt ab infusa, ut inditam vocent eam quae naturam, in qua est, concomitatur ut proprietas naturalis, sicut est ea quam Angeli habent per species impressas; infusam vero, quae naturam non concomitatur, sed, Deo infundente, advenit subiecto. — Insuper, communiter posteriores theologi infusam scientiam iterum distinguunt in infusam per se et per accidens; illa respicit obiectum, quod excedit virtutem naturalem, ut est cognitio rerum supernaturalium, unde a solo Deo communicari potest; ast infusa per accidens naturali quidem virtute successive posset comparari, de facto tamen impressa est a Deo.

II. Fuerunt qui generatim negaverint, in Christo fuisse scientiam infusam, et quod mirum est, non defuerunt qui S. Bonaventuram, non obstantibus perspicuis ipsius verbis, his annumeraverint. Alii vero plures, ut Suarez (in III. p. Sum. disp. 25. sect. 3.) contendunt, S. Doctorem non admittere nisi scientiam infusam per accidens; pro qua assertione probanda afferri posset, quod ipse hanc scientiam attribuit rationi inferiori eamque comparat cum scientia Adamo infusa (hic fundam. 2.). Nihilominus hanc limitationem a mente nostri Doctoris alienam esse putamus. Praefata enim distinctio ab eodem nullibi memoratur, asseritur autem (hic q. 2.) de hac infusa scientia: « Habitus et species impressae fuerunt ipsi animae Christi in omnimoda plenitudine; hinc est, quod proficere non potuit cognitione simplicis notitiae ». Item, pluries ab eodem docetur, animam Christi omnibus donis Spiritus S. repletam fuisse, pro quo allegat locum Isaiae 11, 3. (cfr. supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. fundam. 1.). Denique est locus peremptorius in Breviloq. p. IV. c. 6, ubi, postquam quinque modos cognoscendi in Christo distinxit, duos tribuit scientiae infusae his verbis: « Tertius per gratiam, et hoc modo cognovit omnia spectantia ad humani generis redemptionem [quod manifeste pertinet ad scientiam infusam per se]. Quartus est secundum naturam integram, cuiusmodi fuit in Adam, et hoc modo cognovit omnia quae spectant ad universi constitutionem ». — De obiecto, actu et extensione scientiae infusae est quaedam opinionum differentia inter S. Thom. et Scotum. — Quoad scientiam experimentalem, cuius actus certissime Christo competit, non conveniunt sententiae quoad habitum acquisitum, de quo agitur in seq. quaestione.

III. Alex. Hal., p. III. q. 13. m. 5. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 1-5; S. III. q. 11. a. 1-6; de Verit. q. 20. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. quaest. hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Article III. On the knowledge which Christ's soul had from the Word.

Next there is inquiry concerning the knowledge which Christ's soul had from the Word, and concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether Christ's soul had any knowledge from the Word besides that which it had in the Word. Second it is asked whether it advanced according to that knowledge, or had it perfect from the beginning. Third it is asked whether God ought to have communicated omnipotence to Christ's soul, just as he communicated omniscience.

Question I. Whether Christ had any other knowledge besides that which he had in the Word.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether Christ had any other knowledge from the Word besides that which he had in the Word. And that there was no necessity of having another, it seems:

1. First, by that which Damascene says^p318-1: « Just as the flesh of a man according to its own nature is not life-giving, but the Lord's flesh, united according to the hypostasis to God the Word himself, was made life-giving on account of the union which is according to the hypostasis; so also human nature indeed does not substantially possess the knowledge of future things, but the Lord's soul, on account of the union which is toward God the Word, was enriched with the knowledge of future things »: therefore just as Christ's flesh cannot give life except on account of its union with the Word, so his soul will not know anything except in the Word itself.

2. Likewise, of one thing according to one nature there is one perfection^p319-1; but the intellect of Christ's soul was perfect in knowledge, knowing all things in the Word itself: therefore, since knowledge is a perfection of the intellect itself, it did not have another knowledge besides that one.

3. Likewise, it is superfluous to do through more what can sufficiently be done through fewer^p319-2; but Christ's soul most sufficiently knows every knowable thing by the knowledge which is in the Word itself: therefore it seems that it is superfluous to attribute another knowledge to it.

4. Likewise, it belongs to the greater light to absorb the lesser: if therefore the knowledge which Christ's soul has in the Word itself was of perfect luminosity, because it was in the very fount of light; it seems that there could not^p319-3 coexist with it another kind of knowledge in Christ's soul.

5. Likewise, when that which is perfect comes, that which is in part is done away with^p319-4; but the knowledge of Christ's soul in the Word is the most perfect knowledge, while the knowledge of things in their proper genus is a less perfect knowledge: therefore if Christ from the beginning had the most perfect knowledge, which is in the Word; it seems that the other had no place in him.

On the contrary: 1. As Augustine says On Genesis according to the Letter, treating those three words, in Genesis chapter one^p319-5: Let it be made, he made it, and it was made, the Angel knew things in a threefold way: in the Word, in itself, and in its proper genus; but the intellect of Christ's soul was not less perfect than the angelic intellect: therefore it not only had the knowledge of things in the Word, but also in itself.

2. Likewise, Christ assumed what was of dignity from every state, namely from the state of glory, from the state of innocence, and from the state of fallen nature^p319-6: therefore he not only had the knowledge befitting the state of glory, but also that befitting the state of innocence: if therefore Adam had the knowledge of all created things divinely given to him in himself, it seems that besides the glorious knowledge Christ had that knowledge.

3. Likewise, Christ's soul in every gift of graces ought to exceed all other souls, and not only in the gift of grace that makes pleasing, but also in the gift of grace freely given: if therefore to have the knowledge of those things in oneself is a gift of grace freely given; it seems that Christ had this knowledge besides that knowledge which is in the Word^p319-7.

4. Likewise, just as the higher reason ought to have its perfection, so also the lower reason in Christ; but the higher reason is fitted to know things in the eternal Word itself, while the lower is fitted to consider them in their proper genus^p319-8: therefore as he had the knowledge of the higher, so also of the lower, and so on.

5. Likewise, Christ was at once a perfect wayfarer and comprehensor; but knowledge is necessary for each state: therefore just as he had the knowledge due to the state of the comprehensor, knowing things in the Word itself, so it seems that he had the knowledge befitting the state of the wayfarer, knowing things in themselves.

Conclusion.

Christ's soul, besides the knowledge which it had in the Word, also had the knowledge of things from the Word, not only the knowledge of simple intelligence, but also of experience.

I respond: Without doubt it must be conceded that, besides the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word itself, which is the glorious knowledge, it had a knowledge from the Word, which is the knowledge of grace freely given, by which knowledge Christ also knows things in themselves through the species imparted to him from the very beginning of his condition, just as was the case in the intellect of Adam, or also in the angelic intellect^p319-9.

Now the ground of this is the perfection of Christ's soul itself, which ought to have been perfect not only according to the higher portion, but also according to the lower and according to the sensible part, not only as to the state of the homeland, but also as to the state of the way, which is twofold, namely of innocence and of fallen nature. And according to this Christ had a threefold knowledge befitting that threefold state, namely the knowledge of glory, the knowledge of integral nature, and the knowledge of penal experience, that he might have in himself something of each state. — Again, because Christ's soul was perfect as to knowledge not only with respect to the knowables, but also with respect to the modes of knowing; therefore, since things are knowable in a threefold way, ac- cording as they have being in a threefold way^p320-1 — for they have being in the Word, they have being in the created intellect, and they have being nonetheless in their proper genus — therefore, in order that the intellect of Christ's soul might have full knowledge of things, it knew things by this threefold knowledge.

And thus it is clear that Christ's soul not only had the knowledge of things in the Word, but also of things from the Word, knowledge, I say, not only of simple acquaintance, but also of experience^p320-2. — Clear too is the sufficiency, necessity, and distinction of these three kinds of knowledge, which can be taken either on the part of the powers, namely the higher reason, the lower, and sensuality; or on the part of the states, namely of glory, of innocence, and of fallen nature; or on the part of the modes of knowing, namely in the Word, in itself, and in its proper genus. And thus it is clear that Christ's soul, besides the knowledge which it had in the Word, had another knowledge from the Word^p320-3. — And the reasons for this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the authority of Damascene, it must be said that Damascene does not intend to assign a likeness as to all things, but as to this, that just as Christ's flesh would not be life-giving unless it had been united to the Word itself, so Christ's soul would be ignorant and imperfect unless it had been united with perfect wisdom; but on account of that union it has the perfection of all knowledge.

2. To that which is objected second, that of one thing there is one perfection; it must be said that this is true according to one mode and state and power; but because in Christ's soul there is a diversity of powers and states and modes of knowing to consider, therefore nothing prevents that, according to the diversity of these, it should have diverse perfecting kinds of knowledge.

3. To that which is objected, that it is superfluous to do through more what can [be done through fewer] etc.; it must be said that this is true if it be done equally well and equally sufficiently; but this would not be so in the case at hand, because Christ's soul would not thus have the completion of knowledge according to every mode and^p320-4 every state, but would have only one of these kinds of knowledge.

4. To that which is objected, that it belongs to the greater light to absorb the lesser; it must be said that this has truth somewhere, that is, of lights which are of the same nature, and which irradiate in the same way and according to the same part; but it is not so to be found in the case at hand, as was shown in the distinguishing of these kinds of knowledge. Moreover, what is said, that the greater light absorbs the lesser, is not said as to existence, but as to appearance; and although this is true in corporeal light, it is nevertheless not true in spiritual light, on account of the greater unmixedness which is found in spiritual light than in corporeal^p320-5.

5. To that which is objected, that knowledge in part does not remain together with perfect knowledge; it must be said that this is true when knowledge in part has imperfection annexed to it, such as is enigmatic knowledge; and of this it is true that it was not in Christ's soul. But if it be called knowledge in part because it is less perfect than the knowledge of glory, it is not necessary that it be done away with, especially in that case in which the state of the way is together with the state of the homeland^p320-6.

Scholion

I. The infused knowledge « through species imparted to Christ from the very beginning of his condition » is called by St. Bonaventure the knowledge of simple acquaintance, and by St. Thomas in the Summa also imparted knowledge. Some later theologians, however, distinguish imparted knowledge from infused, so that they call imparted that which accompanies the nature in which it is as a natural property, such as is that which the Angels have through impressed species; but infused that which does not accompany the nature, but, with God infusing it, comes upon the subject. — Furthermore, later theologians commonly distinguish infused knowledge again into infused per se and per accidens; the former regards an object which exceeds natural power, such as is the knowledge of supernatural things, whence it can be communicated by God alone; but knowledge infused per accidens could indeed be acquired successively by natural power, though in fact it is impressed by God.

II. There have been those who in general denied that there was infused knowledge in Christ, and, what is astonishing, there have not been wanting those who, notwithstanding his own clear words, have numbered St. Bonaventure among these. But others, many of them, such as Suarez (in III. p. Sum. disp. 25. sect. 3.), contend that the holy Doctor admits only knowledge infused per accidens; for proving which assertion it could be alleged that he himself attributes this knowledge to the lower reason and compares it with the knowledge infused into Adam (here, fundamentum 2). Nevertheless we think this limitation alien to the mind of our Doctor. For the aforesaid distinction is nowhere mentioned by him, but it is asserted (here, q. 2) of this infused knowledge: « The habits and the impressed species were in Christ's soul in all-around fullness; hence it is that he could not advance by the knowledge of simple acquaintance ». Likewise, it is taught by him many times that Christ's soul was filled with all the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for which he alleges the passage of Isaiah 11, 3 (cfr. above d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. fundam. 1). Finally there is a more decisive passage in the Breviloquium p. IV. c. 6, where, after he has distinguished five modes of knowing in Christ, he assigns two to infused knowledge in these words: « The third is through grace, and in this mode he knew all things pertaining to the redemption of the human race [which manifestly belongs to knowledge infused per se]. The fourth is according to integral nature, of which kind there was in Adam, and in this mode he knew all things which pertain to the constitution of the universe ». — Concerning the object, act, and extension of infused knowledge there is a certain difference of opinions between St. Thomas and Scotus. — As for experimental knowledge, whose act most certainly belongs to Christ, the opinions do not agree concerning the acquired habit, which is treated in the following question.

III. Alex. of Hales, p. III. q. 13. m. 5. — Scotus, in both Writings here q. 3. — St. Thomas, here a. 3. quaestiunculae 1-5; S. III. q. 11. a. 1-6; de Verit. q. 20. a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1. quaestiunculae 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus

Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 21. — In conclus. arg. pro non potest... non cognoscet edd. non posset... non cognosceret.
[John Damascene,] Book III On the Orthodox Faith c. 21. — In the conclusion of the argument, for cannot... will not know the editions read could not... would not know.
Cfr. tom. II. pag. 225, nota 6. — De minori vide hic a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Pro unius non pauci codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 perperam unio.
Cfr. tom. II. pag. 225, note 6. — On the minor [premise] see here a. 2. q. 1 ff. — For unius not a few codices, and likewise editions 1, 2, wrongly [read] unio.
Vide supra pag. 277, nota 1. — In fine arg. pro aliam cognitionem codd. G I L T U V Z illam cognitionem.
See above pag. 277, note 1. — At the end of the argument, for another knowledge codices G I L T U V Z [read] that knowledge.
Pro quod non complures codd. quod tunc, codd. K V Z quod tunc non.
For that... not several codices [read] that then, codices K V Z that then... not.
Epist. I. Cor. 13, 10: Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur etc. — Cod. U evacuabitur.
Epistle I Cor. 13, 10: But when that which is perfect comes, that [which is in part] shall be done away with etc. — Cod. U [reads] evacuabitur.
Vers. 3. et 7. — August. dictum habetur II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 8. n. 16. seqq. Cfr. supra pag. 306, nota 4.
Verses 3 and 7. — The saying of Augustine is found in II On Genesis according to the Letter c. 8. n. 16 ff. Cfr. above pag. 306, note 4.
Cfr. supra pag. 267, nota 7. — De cognitione in statu innocentiae vide II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Pro dignitatis cod. W dignius.
Cfr. above pag. 267, note 7. — On knowledge in the state of innocence see II Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1 ff. — For dignitatis cod. W [reads] dignius.
Cod. S praeter eam quam habuit in Verbo.
Cod. S [reads] besides that which he had in the Word.
Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 1. seq. et Comment. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.
Cfr. II Sent., the Master's text, d. XXIV. c. 1 f., and the Commentary p. I. a. 2. q. 2.
Vide II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 23. a. 2. q. 1.
See II Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, and d. 23. a. 2. q. 1.
Cod. K triplex.
Cod. K [reads] triplex (threefold).
Vide quaest. seq.
See the following question.
Vat., omisso aliam, subinde post cognitionem suo marte interserit rerum in se, et in genere proprio; et sic ulterius patet, quod anima Christi praeter cognitionem, quam habuit in Verbo, habuit aliam cognitionem. Pro aliam plures codd. aliquam.
The Vatican edition, having omitted aliam, thereupon after cognitionem on its own authority inserts of things in themselves, and in their proper genus; and so it is further clear that Christ's soul, besides the knowledge which it had in the Word, had another knowledge. For aliam several codices [read] aliquam.
Codd. 1 L N aa adiiciunt secundum.
Codices 1 L N aa add secundum (according to).
Ad obiectionem huic similem Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1, respondet sic: Quamvis stellae ita luceant de die sicut de nocte, tamen de die visui non apparent, quia vincitur [earum lumen] lumine fortiori; sed intellectus, cum intelligat aliquid valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit intima, sed etiam magis; cuius ratio est, quia excellentia intelligibilis intellectum non debilitat, sed confortat. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 13. m. 1. ad 4: Ratio huius [quod in corporalibus minus lumen obfuscatur a maiori] est, quoniam omnia lumina corporalia sunt ad unum actum, scil. manifestationis, qui quidem actus per se et perfectissime est a lumine maiori. Sed in spiritualibus non sic; non enim omnia lumina spiritualia sunt ad unum actum etc. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 3; ibid. ad 1. habetur etiam solut. obiect. seq.
To an objection similar to this Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1, responds thus: Although the stars shine as much by day as by night, yet by day they do not appear to sight, because [their light] is overcome by a stronger light; but the intellect, when it understands something highly intelligible, understands the lesser things no less, but even more; the ground of which is that the excellence of the intelligible does not weaken the intellect, but strengthens it. Cfr. I Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 13. m. 1. ad 4: The ground of this [that in corporeal things the lesser light is obscured by the greater] is that all corporeal lights are ordered to one act, namely of manifestation, which act indeed is per se and most perfectly from the greater light. But in spiritual things it is not so; for not all spiritual lights are ordered to one act etc. Cfr. II Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. ad 3; in the same place ad 1 there is also had the solution of the following objection.
Vide infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. et 3.
See below d. 31. a. 2. q. 1 and 3. ---

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