Dist. 15, Dubia
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 15
## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Simplam accepit ille vetustatem, ut nostram duplam consumeret. Videtur enim hoc inconvenienter esse dictum, quia simile non consumitur per suum simile, immo augeturp340-10: ergo vetustas nostra non consumitur per vetustatem Christi assumtam. — Praeterea, quod consumit aliud est illo potentius: ergo si vetustas Christi consumsit nostram, potius debuit esse dupla respectu nostrae, quam nostra dupla respectu suae.
— Praeterea, vetustas Christi non consumsit nostram nisi per modum meriti; sed meritum debet commensurarip341-1 praemio: ergo nec simpla nec dupla debuit esse respectu nostrae, sed aequalis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tam poena quam culpa ad veterem hominem pertinet, quia in primaria conditione homo fuit creatus absque culpa et poena, et secundum haec duo in nobis est duplex vetustas; in Christo autem fuit poena sine culpa, et ideo vetustas simpla; fuit enim poena cum gratia. Et propterea per poenam Christi cum gratia nos merebamur liberari a culpa et a poena, ita quod vetustas poenae, iuncta novitati gratiae, consumit duplicem vetustatem, salvatap341-2 oppositione, salvata nihilominus debita proportione. Ideo verbum Augustini in littera verum est et rationabile.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod vetustas non opponitur vetustati; dicendum, quod verum est ratione sui, opponitur tamen ratione novitatis gratiae coniunctae. — Et per hoc patet sequens, quia ratione gratiae coniunctae illa vetustas simplex excedit nostram duplicem. Propter hoc enim, quod Christus gratiam habuit non ad mensuram, perfecte nobis meruit liberationem a poena et a culpap341-3.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Hos defectus assumsit ad ostensionem verae humanitatis, quia, si isti defectus non sunt de veritate humanae naturae, non faciunt ad verae humanitatis ostensionem. Quod autem non sint de veritate humanae naturae, ostendit Anselmusp341-4 tali ratione: humana natura uno modo est vera secundum statum corruptionis et incorruptionis; sed isti defectus non competunt ei secundum statum incorruptionis: ergo non sunt de veritate humanae naturae. — Item, Christus post resurrectionem veram humanitatem ostendit, et tamen ipsis Apostolis defectus et poenalitates non ostenditp341-5: ergo non videtur, quod huiusmodi defectus facerent ad veritatis humanae naturae ostensionem.
Respondeo: Dicendum est, quod est ostendere veritatem humanae naturae simpliciter, vel secundum statum; dico igitur, quod huiusmodi defectus assumti fecerunt ad ostensionem verae humanitatis secundum statum corporis animalis, et sic Christus volebat ostendere; voluit enim se nobis conformare: in similitudinem enim hominum factus est, ut dicit Apostolusp341-6, et habitu inventus est ut homo.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod illud non facit ad ostensionem verae humanitatis, quod non est de veritate humanae naturae; dicendum, quod falsum est. Aliquid enim annexum alicui statui humanae naturae potest esse ostensivum veritatis. «Accidentia enim partem magnam conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid estp341-7», quamvis non sint de essentia rei. — Ad ultimum patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de intellectu veritatis istarum auctoritatum, quas adducit in illo capitulop341-8: Quaedam tamen reperiuntur in Sanctorum tractatibus etc. Videtur enim, quod illae auctoritates verum dicant, quae dicunt, Christum non timuisse. Scribitur enim primae Ioannis quartop341-9: Perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem; sed Christus perfectissimam habuit caritatem: ergo nullus in eo videtur timor fuisse. — Item, Augustinus, libro Octoginta trium Quaestionump341-10: «Signum perfectionis est nullus timor»; sed in Christo fuit summa perfectio: ergo nullus in eo fuit omnino timor. — Item, nullus timet quod potest effugere; sed Christus certus erat, omnem poenam se posse effugere: ergo videtur, quod nihil timebat.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod timor est in triplici differentia: quidam enim est gratuitus, quidam libidinosus, quidam naturalis quasi inter utrumque medius. — Timor autem gratuitus est in triplici differentia: quidam enim est timor poenae, quidam est timor offensae, quidam reverentiae. Prima et secundap341-11 non fuit in Christo, pro eo quod perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem utrumque; sed secundum tertiam differentiam fuit in Christo, quia sic a perfecta caritate non expellitur, sed potius consummatur, secundum illud Isaiae undecimop341-12: Replebit eum spiritus timoris Domini; et secundum illud Psalmi: Timor Domini sanctus permanet in saeculum saeculi. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum.
Est et alius timor libidinosus, et iste similiter in multiplici differentia est: quia est timor mundanus, et est timor humanus; et nullus istorum fuit
in Christo nec etiam in viro perfecto; et sic intelligitur verbum Augustini, quod «signum perfectionis est nullus timor». — Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum.
Est iterum timor in tertia differentia, timor scilicet naturalis, et iste est in triplici differentia: quidamp342-1 est sensualitatis praevenientis rationem, quidam sensualitatis subiacentis rationi, quidam vero est ipsius partis rationalis. Primus timor est naturae corruptae et quodam modo inordinatae, similiter et tertius; secundus vero est naturae corruptae, sed tamen ordinatae. Quoniam ergo in Christo, quamvis esset defectus passibilitatis, non tamen fuit defectus inordinationis et vitiositatis; hinc est, quod fuit in eo timor medio modo, non primop342-2 vel tertio. — Et per hoc patet tertio obiectum. Patent etiam auctoritates, quae in littera dicuntur. Nam omnes illae auctoritates, quae dicunt, Christum non timuisse, hoc dicunt, non quia velint a Christo omnem timorem removere, cum auctoritas Isaiae dicat contrarium; sed quia non fuit in eo timor, qui rationem eius praeveniret, vel rationem eius perturbaret; securissima enim fuit et bene noverat, quod nihil poterat sibi evenire vel inferri, quod ipsa prius non desideraret et velletp342-3.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Vere contristatus est, sed non passio eius dominatur animo, verum propassio est. Ex hoc enim vult dicere, quod in Christo fuerit propassio. Sed contra; super quintop342-4 Matthaei dicit Glossa, quod «propassio est subitus motus, cui ex ratione non consentitur»; sed talis motus est veniale peccatum, secundum quod ibi innuitur, et iste non fuit in Christo: ergo propassio non fuit in eo. — Item, subitum est illud quod praevenit iudicium rationis et quod est ex surreptione; sed Christus nihil per surreptionem egit: ergo non habuit in se motum subitum, ergo nec propassionem. — Item, Christus timuit mortem non ob aliud, nisi quia praevidit eam; sed non praevidit eam nisi secundum rationem: ergo timuit eo timore, qui est secundum rationem; et iste timor est passio, non propassio: ergo nulla est responsio Magistri.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod propassio secundum generalem nominis sui acceptionem dicitur esse passio diminuta; haec autem est illa quae sistit infra rationem, ut ratio est, et ita propassio dicit passionem partis sensualis, vel virtutis naturalis; et hoc modo vult dicere Magisterp342-5 et Hieronymus, huiusmodi passiones fuisse in Christo. Erant enim ex horrore sensualitatis, non rationis partis in quantum rationalis.
Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod definitur propassio, quod est motus subitus; dicendum, quod ibi definitur propassio, secundum quod est in nobis, in quibus sensualitas movetur praeter iudicium rationis; in Christo autem non fuit hoc. Et ideo patet responsio ad illa duo, quae primo obiiciuntur.
Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod timor mortis non potuit esse nisi in ratione; dicendum, quod ratio praevidens mortem instantem fecit imaginationem mortis in ipsa parte sensuali; qua quidem facta, sensualitas mota fuit et horrore mortis concussa. — Et si tu dicas, quod hic non est ordo cognitionis, ut deveniatur a ratione in sensualitatem; dicendum, quod hoc est verum in nobis, in quibus est scientia per acquisitionem ab inferiori. In Christo autem aliter esse potuit, qui fuit plenus scientiap342-6, et in quo fuit obedientia perfecta virium inferiorum respectu superiorum. Praeterea, nos ipsi imaginari possumus quod volumus, quamvis non possimus, quando volumus, sentire exteriusp342-7. Et ita timor in Christo de morte futura potuit esse in parte sensuali, ut merito secundum Hieronymum et Magistrum possit et debeat dici propassiop342-8.
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says: He took up a single oldness, that he might consume our double oldness. For this seems to be said unfittingly, since like is not consumed by its like, but rather is increasedp340-10: therefore our oldness is not consumed by the oldness assumed by Christ. — Furthermore, that which consumes another thing is more powerful than it: therefore if Christ's oldness consumed ours, it ought rather to have been double with respect to ours, than ours double with respect to his.
— Furthermore, Christ's oldness did not consume ours except by way of merit; but merit ought to be commensuratep341-1 with the reward: therefore it ought to have been neither single nor double with respect to ours, but equal.
I respond: It must be said that both punishment and fault pertain to the old man, because in his primary condition man was created without fault and punishment, and according to these two there is in us a double oldness; but in Christ there was punishment without fault, and therefore a single oldness; for it was punishment together with grace. And therefore through Christ's punishment together with grace we merited to be freed from fault and from punishment, so that the oldness of punishment, joined to the newness of grace, consumes the double oldness, the opposition being preservedp341-2, and the due proportion being nonetheless preserved. Therefore the saying of Augustine in the text is true and reasonable.
To that, then, which is objected, that oldness is not opposed to oldness; it must be said that this is true by reason of itself, yet it is opposed by reason of the newness of grace joined to it. — And by this what follows is plain, that by reason of the joined grace that single oldness exceeds our double one. For on account of this, that Christ had grace not by measure, he perfectly merited for us liberation from punishment and from faultp341-3.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about what he says: He assumed these defects for the showing forth of true humanity, because, if these defects are not of the truth of human nature, they do not make for the showing forth of true humanity. But that they are not of the truth of human nature, Anselm showsp341-4 by such a reasoning: human nature is true in one way according to the state of corruption and of incorruption; but these defects do not belong to it according to the state of incorruption: therefore they are not of the truth of human nature. — Likewise, after the resurrection Christ showed forth true humanity, and yet to the Apostles themselves he did not show forth defects and penaltiesp341-5: therefore it does not seem that defects of this kind would make for the showing forth of the truth of human nature.
I respond: It must be said that there is a showing forth of the truth of human nature simply, or according to a state; I say therefore that defects of this kind, assumed, made for the showing forth of true humanity according to the state of the animal body, and this Christ wished to show; for he wished to conform himself to us: for he was made in the likeness of men, as the Apostle saysp341-6, and in habit was found as a man.
To that, then, which is objected, that what is not of the truth of human nature does not make for the showing forth of true humanity; it must be said that this is false. For something annexed to some state of human nature can be a manifestation of the truth. «For accidents contribute a great part toward knowing what a thing isp341-7», although they are not of the essence of the thing. — To the last point the response is plain through the things that have been said.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about the understanding of the truth of those authorities which he adduces in that chapterp341-8: Yet certain things are found in the treatises of the Saints etc. For it seems that those authorities speak the truth which say that Christ did not fear. For it is written in the first [Epistle] of John, chapter fourp341-9: Perfect charity casts fear out of doors; but Christ had the most perfect charity: therefore no fear seems to have been in him. — Likewise, Augustine, in the book of the Eighty-three Questionsp341-10: «The sign of perfection is no fear»; but in Christ there was the highest perfection: therefore there was in him no fear at all. — Likewise, no one fears what he can escape; but Christ was certain that he could escape every punishment: therefore it seems that he feared nothing.
I respond: It must be said that fear is of a threefold difference: for one is gratuitous, one libidinous, one natural, as it were a mean between the two. — Now gratuitous fear is of a threefold difference: for one is the fear of punishment, one is the fear of offense, one of reverence. The first and the secondp341-11 were not in Christ, because perfect charity casts both out of doors; but according to the third difference it was in Christ, because thus it is not expelled by perfect charity, but rather is consummated, according to that of Isaiah, chapter elevenp341-12: The spirit of the fear of the Lord shall fill him; and according to that of the Psalm: The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever. — And by this the response to the first objection is plain.
There is also another fear, the libidinous, and this likewise is of a manifold difference: for there is a worldly fear, and there is a human fear; and none of these was
in Christ nor even in the perfect man; and thus is understood the saying of Augustine, that «the sign of perfection is no fear». — And by this the response to the second is plain.
Again there is fear in the third difference, namely natural fear, and this is of a threefold difference: onep342-1 is of the sensuality going before reason, one of the sensuality lying subject to reason, and one indeed is of the rational part itself. The first fear is of corrupted and in some way disordered nature, and likewise the third; but the second is of corrupted, yet ordered, nature. Since therefore in Christ, although there was a defect of passibility, yet there was no defect of disorder and viciousness; hence it is that there was in him fear in the middle way, not the firstp342-2 nor the third. — And by this the third objection is plain. The authorities also which are said in the text are plain. For all those authorities which say that Christ did not fear, say this, not because they wish to remove all fear from Christ, since the authority of Isaiah says the contrary; but because there was not in him a fear that would go before his reason, or that would disturb his reason; for it was most secure and knew well that nothing could happen or be inflicted upon it which it did not first desire and willp342-3.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked about what he says: He was truly made sorrowful, but his passion does not dominate the soul; it is rather a propassion. For by this he wishes to say that in Christ there was a propassion. On the contrary; upon the fifth [chapter]p342-4 of Matthew the Gloss says that «a propassion is a sudden motion, to which it is not consented from reason»; but such a motion is a venial sin, according to what is there intimated, and this was not in Christ: therefore there was no propassion in him. — Likewise, the sudden is that which goes before the judgment of reason and which is from a stealthy seizure; but Christ did nothing through stealthy seizure: therefore he had in himself no sudden motion, therefore neither a propassion. — Likewise, Christ feared death for no other reason than because he foresaw it; but he did not foresee it except according to reason: therefore he feared with that fear which is according to reason; and this fear is a passion, not a propassion: therefore the Master's response is null.
I respond: It must be said that a propassion, according to the general acceptation of its name, is said to be a diminished passion; and this is that which stops short of reason, insofar as it is reason, and so a propassion means a passion of the sensual part, or of the natural power; and in this way the Masterp342-5 and Jerome wish to say that passions of this kind were in Christ. For they were from the horror of the sensuality, not of the rational part insofar as it is rational.
To that, then, which is objected, that a propassion is defined as a sudden motion; it must be said that there a propassion is defined according to what it is in us, in whom the sensuality is moved apart from the judgment of reason; but in Christ this was not so. And therefore the response to the two points which are first objected is plain.
To that, then, which is objected, that the fear of death could not be except in reason; it must be said that reason, foreseeing imminent death, made an imagination of death in the sensual part itself; and this being made, the sensuality was moved and struck with the horror of death. — And if you say that here there is no order of cognition, such that one might come from reason into the sensuality; it must be said that this is true in us, in whom there is knowledge through acquisition from what is lower. But in Christ it could be otherwise, who was full of knowledgep342-6, and in whom there was perfect obedience of the lower powers with respect to the higher. Furthermore, we ourselves can imagine what we will, although we cannot, when we will, sense outwardlyp342-7. And so the fear of future death could be in Christ in the sensual part, so that deservedly, according to Jerome and the Master, it can and ought to be called a propassionp342-8.
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- Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 44. seqq. (c. 4.).Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 44 and following (c. 4).
- Ita codd. A bb, non pauci alii codd. consummari, nonnulli et edd. conformari.So codices A, bb, and not a few other codices read consummari; some, and the editions, read conformari.
- Edd. salea, codd. F T salca tamen.The editions read salea; codices F, T read salca tamen.
- Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.Cf. on this doubt St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here, concerning the text.
- Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 11: Si pertineret ad veritatem humanae naturae mortalitas, nequaquam posset esse homo, qui esset immortalis; non ergo pertinet ad sinceritatem humanae naturae corruptibilitas sive incorruptibilitas, quoniam neutra facit, aut destruit hominem etc.Book II of Why God Became Man, c. 11: If mortality pertained to the truth of human nature, there could in no way be a man who was immortal; therefore corruptibility or incorruptibility does not pertain to the integrity of human nature, since neither makes, nor destroys, a man, etc.
- Cfr. Luc. 24, 39; Ioan. 20, 20. seqq. — Mox pro huiusmodi defectus cod. K huiusmodi poenalitates.Cf. Luke 24:39; John 20:20 and following. — Shortly after, for defects of this kind codex K reads penalties of this kind.
- Phil. 2, 7. — Paulo superius pro fecerunt edd. fuerunt et deinde corruptionis pro corporis animalis.Phil. 2:7. — A little earlier, for made (fecerunt) the editions read were (fuerunt), and then of corruption for of the animal body.
- Ut ait Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 11. (c. 1.). Verbis quod quid est (τὸ τί ἐστιν) significatur quidditas sive essentia. — De solut. huius dubii vide Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 5. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic circa lit.As Aristotle says, On the Soul I, text 11 (c. 1). By the words what a thing is (τὸ τί ἐστιν) the quiddity or essence is signified. — On the solution of this doubt see Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 5, m. 3; Bl. Albert, here, a. 6; St. Thomas, here, concerning the text.
- Cap. 1. circa finem.Chapter 1, near the end.
- Vers. 18.Verse 18.
- Quaest. 36. n. 1.Question 36, n. 1.
- Edd. cum nonnullis codd. supplent differentia.The editions, with some codices, supply difference.
- Vers. 3. Pro spiritus codd. G I K L T Z aa bb spiritu. — Seq. textus est Ps. 18, 10.Verse 3. For spiritus codices G, I, K, L, T, Z, aa, bb read spiritu. — The following text is Ps. 18:10.
- Codd. A I K. adiiciunt enim.Codices A, I, K add enim (for).
- Non pauci codd. perperam secundo.Not a few codices wrongly read secundo (the second).
- Cfr. infra d. 34. p. II. dub. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 5. m. 2. a. 1. § 3; B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3.Cf. below, d. 34, p. II, dub. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 5, m. 2, a. 1, § 3; Bl. Albert, here, a. 8; St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 3, a. 1, quaestiuncula 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 3, q. 3.
- Vers. 28. Glossa apud Strabum et Lyranum sonat sic: Passio dicitur quae est mors in domo. Propassio est animi subitus affectus vel irae vel amoris, passio quaedam animi forma vel deliberatio ex consensu; unde dicitur aliquis iracundus vel amator. — Hieronymus in hunc Matth. loc. ait: Inter passionem et propassionem hoc interest, quod passio reputatur in vitium; propassio, licet initii culpam habeat, tamen non tenetur in crimine... Si vero consenserit... de propassione transivit ad passionem. — Codd. allegant c. 7, edd. c. 26, ad quem ulteriorem loc. spectat expositio Hieron., quae hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. affertur.Verse 28. The Gloss in Strabo and Lyra reads thus: That is called a passion which is a death in the house. A propassion is a sudden affection of the soul, whether of anger or of love; a passion is a certain settled form of the soul, or a deliberation from consent; whence someone is called wrathful or a lover. — Jerome on this place of Matthew says: Between a passion and a propassion there is this difference, that a passion is reckoned a vice; a propassion, though it has the fault of a beginning, is nonetheless not held as a crime... But if it has consented... it has passed from propassion to passion. — The codices cite c. 7, the editions c. 26, to which latter place pertains the exposition of Jerome that is here brought forward in the text of the Master, c. 2.
- Hic. c. 2, ubi et Hieronymi verba inveniuntur. — Paulo superius pro sistit codd. A H N W consistit, edd. sistitur. Paulo inferius pro non rationis [codd. A K Q bb rationalis] partis in quantum rationalis edd. non ratione partis rationalis.Here, c. 2, where also the words of Jerome are found. — A little earlier, for sistit (stops) codices A, H, N, W read consistit, the editions sistitur. A little below, for non rationis [codices A, K, Q, bb rationalis] partis in quantum rationalis the editions read non ratione partis rationalis.
- Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 1. seq.Cf. above, d. 14, a. 3, q. 1 and following.
- Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 60. (c. 5.): Intelligere in ipso est [i. e. in hominis potestate est], cum vult; sentire autem non est in ipso; necessarium est enim esse [adesse] sensibile. — Edd. quod volumus sentire pro quando volumus, sentire. Mox pro in parte cod. V ex parte.Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 60 (c. 5): To understand is in his own power [i.e. it is in man's power], when he wills; but to sense is not in his power; for it is necessary that the sensible thing be [be present]. — The editions read quod volumus sentire for quando volumus, sentire (when we will, to sense). Shortly after, for in parte codex V reads ex parte.
- Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 4. et circa lit.Cf. on this doubt Bl. Albert, here, a. 9; St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here, concerning the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 4, q. 4, and concerning the text.