Dist. 34, Part 2, Dubia
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 34
# DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur super hoc quod dicit in principio: Et quia de timore tractandi occurrit nobis locus, sciendum est, quatuor esse timores. Videtur, quod inordinate procedat in tractando, quoniam via definitiva praecedit divisivam1: ergo prius est timorem definire quam dividere. Si tu dicas, quod non est unam communem definitionem ipsius timoris assignare; in contrarium huius opponitur: quia, cum timor habeat ortum ex amore, et unum sit assignare definitionem amoris, sicut Dionysius2 definit amorem per vim unitivam; videtur, quod similiter sit ex parte timoris. — Sed in contrarium huius opponitur: quia, quando aliquid in una sui acceptione est passio, in altera vero est habitus, aequivoce dicitur; sed timor, qui est donum, est habitus; timor vero naturalis est passio3: ergo de timore non potest assignari una communis ratio. — Item, Augustinus et Damascenus timorem definiunt; Augustinus super decimum Ioannis sic: « Timor est fuga animi, ne amittat quod habet »; Damascenus sic: « Timor est exspectatio futuri mali »: sed neutrum convenit timori in statu patriae, sicut patet: ergo non videtur, quod sit generalem rationem ipsius timoris invenire.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur de istis duabus definitionibus praetactis, quoniam videntur sibi contrariari. Si enim fuga et exspectatio opponuntur; et timor est fuga, secundum Augustinum: non ergo est exspectatio, ut dicit Damascenus.
Ulterius quaeritur iuxta hoc, utrum timor secundum generalem sui acceptionem habeat unum obiectum commune. Quod sic, videtur: quia naturalis timor conformis est gratuito, et gratuitus glorioso; alioquin nec timor naturalis perficeretur a gratuito, nec gratuitus a glorioso4; hoc autem esse non posset, nisi haberent unum obiectum commune: ergo etc. — Item, tantae generalitatis est amor, quantae generalitatis est timor; sed omnis amor est respectu obiecti sub una ratione, videlicet sub ra-
tione boni: ergo videtur similiter de timore. — Sed contra est, quod timor viae est respectu mali, timor autem patriae non potest esse respectu mali, cum ibi nullum sit malum: ergo non videtur, quod timoris viae et timoris patriae possit esse5 unum obiectum commune, ac per hoc nec una communis ratio assignari. — Item, timor viae est respectu futuri, timor autem patriae respectu futuri non potest esse: ergo non possunt communicare in ratione unius obiecti.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod timor, cum multas habeat differentias, de illis nec dicitur omnino univoce nec aequivoce, sed secundum quandam analogiam. Ubi autem est analogia, ibi est comparatio ad aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, maxime ubi est dicere proprie analogia6; et ideo timor secundum omnes suas differentias habet aliquod obiectum unum sive unam rationem obiecti, circa quod consistit eius actus secundum prius et posterius. Obiectum autem timoris sub ratione sua generali est arduum; actus vero communis est resilitio ab illo arduo; et hoc est in omni timore reperire. Unde una communis ratio potest de omni timore assignari, ut dicatur, quod timor est resilitio ab aliquo arduo sive excellente, sive illud arduum sit in genere boni, sive sit in genere mali. Sed cum est in genere boni, est resilitio cum reverentia; cum vero est in genere mali, est resilitio cum fuga.
Sed quia iuxta analogiam frequenter latet aequivocatio quaedam, secundum Philosophum7: propter tollendam ambiguitatem Magister primo maluit dividere quam definire; quia in multiplicibus primo est dividendum et postea definiendum. — Et hinc est, quod Augustinus et Damascenus timorem definiunt non quidem in sua generalitate, sed respectu mali. Et quia timor respectu mali duplicem actum habet, unum antecedentem, qui est aestimatio sive suspicio, qua quis credit malum sibi superventurum; alium consequentem8, qui est fuga illius mali aestimati: hinc est, quod unus illorum definit per exspectationem, alter vero per fugam, ita quod nulla est ibi controversia. Accipitur enim ibi exspectatio large pro quacumque aestimatione sive credulitate de adventu mali. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum, quod quaerebatur de timoris notificatione.
Ad illud vero quod quaerebatur ulterius de timoris obiecto; dicendum, quod obiectum eius est arduum sub ratione ardui et excellentis et quodam modo superexcellentis9. — Unde quod obiicit de malo et de futuro, non valet, quia illa ratio non respicit timorem nisi quantum ad statum viae, nec adhuc generaliter; in statu enim viae est timor reverentiae, sicut ex praecedentibus10 habitum est.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sciendum est, quatuor timores esse, scilicet mundanum et humanum etc. Et obiicitur contra hoc primo, quia videtur Magister esse insufficiens; omittit enim timorem naturalem11. — Item, obiicitur, quia videtur sibi contradicere: primo enim dicit, quatuor esse timores, et postmodum subiungit quinque. Quodsi tu dicas, quod ipse enumerat pro uno mundanum et humanum; contra: timor mundanus surgit ex concupiscentia oculorum, timor humanus ex concupiscentia carnis12; sed istae concupiscentiae sunt diversae: ergo et illi timores.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum sex differentiae assignantur, videlicet naturalis, mundanus et humanus, servilis, initialis et filialis, penes quid sumantur et quomodo distinguantur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sex differentiae timoris habent distingui secundum differentiam suarum originum. Timor enim aut est ex natura, aut ex libidine sive concupiscentia, aut ex gratia. — Si est ex natura, tunc est timor naturalis13. — Si est ex concupiscentia, hoc dupliciter: aut est ex nimio amore sui, aut ex nimio amore suorum. Si ex nimio amore sui, sic est humanus; si ex nimio amore suorum, sic est mundanus. — Si autem ex gratia: aut ex gratia gratis data, et sic est servilis; aut ex gratia gratum faciente, sed inchoata, et sic est initialis; aut est ex gratia perfecta, et sic est filialis14. — Et sic patet, quod sex sunt differentiae timoris secundum suam generalem divisionem ex parte suae originis.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Magister est insufficiens, quia non ponit nisi quatuor; dicendum, quod Magister, cum intendat hic agere de timore-dono15, non dividit timorem nisi eatenus, quatenus ad propositum suum spectat. Timor autem donum quadrupliciter habet considerari: aut per comparationem ad suum oppositum, quod expellit; et hic est timor malus, qui opponitur dono Spiritus sancti, ut mundanus et humanus, quos Magister non dividit, licet sint timores diversi, quia sub una ratione eos considerat, videlicet in quantum oppositionem habent ad donum timoris. — Aut per comparationem ad obiectum minus principale, et hoc quidem est malum poenae; et sic est timor servilis. — Aut per comparationem ad obiectum magis principale, quod quidem est malum culpae sive offensae; et sic est timor initialis. — Aut per comparationem ad obiectum maxime principale, quod quidem est excellentia16 Maiestatis divinae; et quantum ad hoc est timor filialis. — Et sic patet, quod secundum quadruplicem comparationem ipsius timoris-doni assignantur quatuor timoris differentiae; et Magister sufficienter dividit timorem, quantum spectat ad propositum.
Aliter potest dici, quod timor sub ratione doni potest secundum aliam considerationem quadrupliciter dividi: quia timor aut est simpliciter oppositum17 dono, et sic est una differentia, videlicet mundanus et humanus; aut est donum, tamen cum opposito doni, et sic est timor servilis; aut est donum non cum opposito, tamen cum quadam approximatione ad oppositum, et sic est timor initialis; aut est perfectum donum, et sic est timor filialis. — Et sic patet sufficientia horum membrorum et dissolutio obiectorum18.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Attende, quod hic quatuor distinguuntur timores, cum supra Beda dixerit, duos esse; ex hoc enim videtur, quod vel Magister sit superfluus, vel Beda diminutus. — Item, iuxta hoc quaeritur de divisione, quam ponit Damascenus19, ubi dividit timorem in sex differentias, quarum nullam ponit nec Magister nec Beda; dicit enim, quod « sex sunt genera timorum, videlicet segnities, erubescentia, verecundia, admiratio, stupor et agonia ». Videtur enim secundum hoc, quod aut ipse Damascenus, aut Magister in dividendo non recte procedit20. — Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur de sufficientia membrorum, quae ponit Damascenus.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de timore21, secundum quod est donum praecise; aut secundum quod est donum et oppositum dono; aut secundum quod comprehendit donum et oppositum dono et passionem naturae; aut specialiter de ipso, secundum quod timor est passio. — Si secundum quod est donum; sic dividitur in duo membra, et sic accipit Beda, dividens timorem in servilem et castum, quia potest esse donum gratuitum, aut gratis datum. — Si secundum quod comprehendit donum et oppositum dono; sic est divisio Magistri in quatuor membra, secundum quod dictum fuit supra22; et quia Magister largius accipit, ideo plura membra ponit. — Si autem accipitur, prout comprehendit donum et oppositum dono et etiam passionem naturae; sic dividitur in sex membra prius23 posita. — Si vero, prout accipitur specialiter pro passione naturae; sic est divisio Damasceni, quae est quasi subdivisio respectu praecedentis.
Sufficientia autem et numerus horum membrorum sic patet: quia timor-passio aut est respectu mali, aut respectu ardui. Si respectu mali, hoc est dupliciter: aut respectu mali poenae, aut respectu mali culpae. — Si respectu mali poenae, hoc est dupliciter24: quia aut respectu mali poenae in se, aut respectu mali poenae in ordine ad culpam. — Si respectu mali poenae in se, hoc est dupliciter: aut prout timetur difficultas in opere superexcedens vires nostras; et sic est segnities, de qua dicit ipse Damascenus25, quod « segnities est timor futurae operationis ». — Aut prout timetur malum poenae, nec tamen est a nobis, sed potius a fortuna et per accidens; et sic est ipsa agonia, de qua dicit ipse Damascenus, quod « agonia timor est per casum sive infortunium ». — Si autem est timor respectu mali poenae26 in comparatione ad culpam, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut respectu culpae, quae iam est; et sic est verecundia, de qua dicit Damascenus, quod « verecundia est timor in turpi actu »; aut respectu culpae, quae iam non est, sed potest esse; et sic est erubescentia, de qua dicit Damascenus, quod « erubescentia est timor in ex-
spectatione convitii27 ». — Si autem est respectu ardui sive magni, aut est magnum, in quod non possumus cognoscendo et operando propter defectum cognitionis; tunc est admiratio, de qua dicit Damascenus, quod « admiratio est timor in magna imaginatione phantasiae28 »; aut est arduum, ad quod inassueti sumus; et sic est stupor, de quo dicit, quod « stupor est timor ex inassueta imaginatione ».
Vel aliter: timore-passione aut timetur quod est vere timendum, aut timetur quod de se timendum non est, sed propter defectum a parte timentis29. Si timetur quod est timendum de se, hoc potest esse tripliciter: quoniam aut est praesens, et sic est verecundia; aut futurum certum, et sic est erubescentia; aut futurum dubium, et sic est agonia. Si autem timetur aliquid propter defectum a parte timentis, hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut propter defectum virtutis, et sic est segnities; aut propter defectum cognitionis, et sic est admiratio; aut propter defectum consuetudinis, et sic est stupor. — Et sic patet praedictorum numerus et sufficientia; et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad obiecta30.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod Beda vocat amicabilem timorem castum. Videtur enim, quod alius sit timor castus, et alius timor amicabilis31, et alius timor filialis. Aliud enim timet sponsa, et aliud amicus, et aliud filius. Filius enim timet patris indignationem, amicus voluntatum dissensionem, sponsa complexuum separationem: ergo videtur, quod illi sunt diversi timores. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur: propter quid timor perfectus sortitur illa tria vocabula; et quare magis vocatur amicabilis quam socialis?
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod licet isti timores in his sensibilibus32 habeant differentiam, tamen respectu Dei unus et idem timor censetur hoc triplici nomine. Sicut enim una est gratia, quae facit esse filium Dei per adoptionem, facit etiam amicum et desponsat animam in coniugium33; sic etiam in proposito est intelligendum, quoniam unus et idem timor est, quo quis timet amittere Deum sive separari a Deo sub hac triplici ratione. — Et ex hoc patet, quare iste timor hoc triplici nomine nominetur34; patet etiam responsio ad obiecta.
Dub. V.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod uterque timor, scilicet initialis et servilis, dicitur initium sapientiae. Si enim timor initialis dicitur, quia in eo inchoatur sapientia et gratia; timor autem servilis est huiusmodi: videtur ergo, quod timor servilis sit initialis; quod falsum est. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur: propter quid timor in sacra Scriptura potius dicitur initium sapientiae quam aliud donum; et quare magis dicitur initium sapientiae quam alicuius alterius doni, aut virtutis, aut gratiae?
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum duplex sit initium, videlicet intra, vel extra35; initialis denominatur a principio intra, quod est naturae principium intrinsecum; servilis autem habet rationem principii extra, et propterea nec est nec debet dici initialis.
Ad illud quod quaeritur: quare magis dicitur principium sapientiae quam aliud donum, et quare magis sapientiae36 quam alterius doni? dicendum, quod in proficiendo in bonum donum timoris est primum inter omnia dona, et donum sapientiae est supremum. Quia ergo ratio initii et principii debet attribui primo; hinc est, quod ratio initii debet attribui timori. — Quia vero in summo est status37; hinc est, quod timor magis dicitur principium sapientiae quam alicuius alterius doni. — Alia vero, quae dicuntur in littera, sunt satis plana.
Ex his autem, quae in littera dicta sunt, possent formari sex problemata de timore, ut primum sit de timoris definitione; secundum de obiecto; tertium de divisione Magistri; quartum de divisione Damasceni38; quintum de doni gratuiti nominatione; sextum et ultimum de eius comparatione ad donum sapientiae.
# DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about that which he says at the beginning: And because the place for treating of fear now occurs to us, it must be known that there are four fears. It seems that he proceeds inordinately in his treatment, since the way of definition precedes that of division1: therefore one ought first to define fear rather than to divide it. If you say that one cannot assign a single common definition of fear itself; against this it is objected: that, since fear has its origin from love, and one can assign a definition of love — as Dionysius2 defines love by the uniting power — it seems that it is likewise on the side of fear. — But against this it is objected: that, when something in one of its acceptations is a passion, and in another is a habit, it is said equivocally; but the fear which is a gift is a habit; whereas natural fear is a passion3: therefore one cannot assign a single common account of fear. — Likewise, Augustine and Damascene define fear; Augustine on the tenth [chapter] of John thus: « Fear is a flight of the soul, lest it lose what it has »; Damascene thus: « Fear is the expectation of a future evil »: but neither of these is fitting to fear in the state of the heavenly fatherland, as is clear: therefore it does not seem that one can find a general account of fear itself.
In connection with this it is asked about those two definitions just touched upon, since they seem to be contrary to one another. For if flight and expectation are opposed; and fear is flight, according to Augustine: then it is not expectation, as Damascene says.
Further, in connection with this it is asked whether fear according to its general acceptation has one common object. That it does, seems clear: because natural fear is conformed to gratuitous [fear], and gratuitous to glorious [fear]; otherwise neither would natural fear be perfected by the gratuitous, nor the gratuitous by the glorious4; but this could not be, unless they had one common object: therefore etc. — Likewise, love is of as great a generality as fear is; but all love is with respect to its object under one account, namely under the ac-
count of the good: therefore it seems likewise concerning fear. — But on the contrary: the fear of the way is with respect to evil, but the fear of the fatherland cannot be with respect to evil, since there is no evil there: therefore it does not seem that there can be5 one common object of the fear of the way and the fear of the fatherland, and through this neither one common account assigned. — Likewise, the fear of the way is with respect to the future, but the fear of the fatherland cannot be with respect to the future: therefore they cannot share in the account of one object.
I respond: It must be said that fear, since it has many differences, is said of them neither altogether univocally nor equivocally, but according to a certain analogy. But where there is analogy, there is a comparison to some one thing according to prior and posterior, especially where one may speak of analogy in the proper sense6; and therefore fear according to all its differences has some one object or one account of an object, about which its act consists according to prior and posterior. Now the object of fear under its general account is the arduous; and the common act is recoiling from that arduous thing; and this is to be found in every fear. Hence one common account can be assigned of every fear, so that it be said that fear is a recoiling from something arduous or excellent, whether that arduous thing be in the genus of good, or be in the genus of evil. But when it is in the genus of good, it is a recoiling with reverence; but when it is in the genus of evil, it is a recoiling with flight.
But because along with analogy a certain equivocation frequently lies hidden, according to the Philosopher7: in order to remove the ambiguity, the Master preferred first to divide rather than to define; because in things manifold one must first divide and afterwards define. — And hence it is that Augustine and Damascene define fear not indeed in its generality, but with respect to evil. And because fear with respect to evil has a twofold act — one antecedent, which is an estimation or suspicion, by which one believes that an evil will come upon him; another consequent8, which is the flight from that estimated evil — hence it is that one of them defines [it] by expectation, the other by flight, so that there is no controversy there. For expectation is taken there broadly for any estimation or belief concerning the coming of evil. — And through this is clear the response to the first [question], which was asked concerning the notification of fear.
But to that which was further asked concerning the object of fear; it must be said that its object is the arduous under the account of the arduous and the excellent and in a certain way the superexcellent9. — Hence what is objected concerning evil and concerning the future is of no force, because that account regards fear only as to the state of the way, and not even then generally; for in the state of the way there is the fear of reverence, as has been established from what precedes10.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: It must be known that there are four fears, namely the worldly and the human etc. And it is objected against this, first, that the Master seems to be insufficient; for he omits natural fear11. — Likewise, it is objected that he seems to contradict himself: for first he says that there are four fears, and afterwards subjoins five. But if you say that he reckons the worldly and the human as one; on the contrary: worldly fear arises from the concupiscence of the eyes, human fear from the concupiscence of the flesh12; but these concupiscences are diverse: therefore also those fears.
In connection with this it is asked, since six differences are assigned — namely natural, worldly and human, servile, initial and filial — on what basis they are taken and how they are distinguished.
I respond: It must be said that the six differences of fear are to be distinguished according to the difference of their origins. For fear is either from nature, or from lust or concupiscence, or from grace. — If it is from nature, then it is natural fear13. — If it is from concupiscence, this is twofold: either it is from excessive love of self, or from excessive love of one's own. If from excessive love of self, thus it is human; if from excessive love of one's own, thus it is worldly. — But if from grace: either from grace freely given, and thus it is servile; or from grace making pleasing, but inchoate, and thus it is initial; or it is from perfect grace, and thus it is filial14. — And thus it is clear that there are six differences of fear according to its general division on the side of its origin.
To that, therefore, which is objected, that the Master is insufficient, because he posits only four; it must be said that the Master, since he intends here to treat of fear-as-gift15, does not divide fear except in so far as it pertains to his purpose. Now fear-as-gift may be considered in fourfold manner: either by comparison to its opposite, which it expels; and this is evil fear, which is opposed to the gift of the Holy Spirit, as the worldly and the human, which the Master does not divide, although they are diverse fears, because he considers them under one account, namely inasmuch as they have opposition to the gift of fear. — Or by comparison to a less principal object, and this indeed is the evil of punishment; and thus it is servile fear. — Or by comparison to a more principal object, which indeed is the evil of fault or of offense; and thus it is initial fear. — Or by comparison to the most principal object, which indeed is the excellence16 of the divine Majesty; and as to this it is filial fear. — And thus it is clear that according to a fourfold comparison of fear-as-gift four differences of fear are assigned; and the Master divides fear sufficiently, as far as pertains to his purpose.
Otherwise it can be said that fear under the account of a gift can, according to another consideration, be divided fourfold: because fear is either simply opposed17 to a gift, and thus it is one difference, namely the worldly and the human; or it is a gift, yet with the opposite of a gift, and thus it is servile fear; or it is a gift not with [its] opposite, yet with a certain approximation to the opposite, and thus it is initial fear; or it is a perfect gift, and thus it is filial fear. — And thus is clear the sufficiency of these members and the resolution of the objections18.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: Note that here four fears are distinguished, whereas above Beda had said that there are two; for from this it seems that either the Master is superfluous, or Beda deficient. — Likewise, in connection with this it is asked about the division which Damascene posits19, where he divides fear into six differences, of which neither the Master nor Beda posits any; for he says that « there are six kinds of fears, namely sluggishness, bashfulness, shame, wonder, astonishment and agony ». For it seems, according to this, that either Damascene himself, or the Master, does not proceed rightly in dividing20. — In connection with this it is also asked about the sufficiency of the members which Damascene posits.
I respond: It must be said that one may speak of fear21 according as it is a gift precisely; or according as it is a gift and an opposite of a gift; or according as it comprehends a gift and an opposite of a gift and the passion of nature; or specially of it, according as fear is a passion. — If according as it is a gift; thus it is divided into two members, and thus Beda takes it, dividing fear into servile and chaste, because it can be a gratuitous gift, or [a gift] freely given. — If according as it comprehends a gift and an opposite of a gift; thus it is the Master's division into four members, according to what was said above22; and because the Master takes [it] more broadly, therefore he posits more members. — But if it is taken as comprehending a gift and an opposite of a gift and also the passion of nature; thus it is divided into the six members posited before23. — But if it is taken specially for the passion of nature; thus it is Damascene's division, which is as it were a subdivision with respect to the preceding.
Now the sufficiency and number of these members is thus clear: because fear-as-passion is either with respect to evil, or with respect to the arduous. If with respect to evil, this is twofold: either with respect to the evil of punishment, or with respect to the evil of fault. — If with respect to the evil of punishment, this is twofold24: because it is either with respect to the evil of punishment in itself, or with respect to the evil of punishment in its order to fault. — If with respect to the evil of punishment in itself, this is twofold: either inasmuch as one fears a difficulty in a work exceeding our powers; and thus it is sluggishness, of which Damascene himself says25 that « sluggishness is fear of a future operation ». — Or inasmuch as one fears the evil of punishment, yet [one] not from ourselves, but rather from fortune and by accident; and thus it is agony itself, of which Damascene himself says that « agony is fear by chance or misfortune ». — But if it is fear with respect to the evil of punishment26 in comparison to fault, this can be twofold: either with respect to fault which already is; and thus it is shame, of which Damascene says that « shame is fear in a base act »; or with respect to fault which is not yet, but can be; and thus it is bashfulness, of which Damascene says that « bashfulness is fear in the ex-
pectation of reproach27 ». — But if it is with respect to the arduous or great, either it is something great, into which we cannot [enter] by knowing and operating on account of a defect of knowledge; then it is wonder, of which Damascene says that « wonder is fear in a great imagining of the fancy28 »; or it is something arduous, to which we are unaccustomed; and thus it is astonishment, of which he says that « astonishment is fear from an unaccustomed imagining ».
Or otherwise: by fear-as-passion either one fears what is truly to be feared, or one fears what of itself is not to be feared, but on account of a defect on the part of the one fearing29. If one fears what is to be feared of itself, this can be threefold: since it is either present, and thus it is shame; or certainly future, and thus it is bashfulness; or doubtfully future, and thus it is agony. But if one fears something on account of a defect on the part of the one fearing, this can be threefold: either on account of a defect of virtue, and thus it is sluggishness; or on account of a defect of knowledge, and thus it is wonder; or on account of a defect of custom, and thus it is astonishment. — And thus is clear the number and sufficiency of the aforesaid; and through this also is clear the response to the objections30.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked about that which Beda calls chaste fear amicable. For it seems that chaste fear is one thing, and amicable31 fear another, and filial fear another. For the bride fears one thing, the friend another, and the son another. For the son fears the father's indignation, the friend the dissension of wills, the bride the separation of embraces: therefore it seems that those are diverse fears. — In connection with this it is asked: on what account does perfect fear obtain those three appellations; and why is it called amicable rather than social?
I respond: It must be said that, although these fears have a difference in these sensible things32, nevertheless with respect to God one and the same fear is reckoned under this threefold name. For just as there is one grace, which makes [one] to be a son of God by adoption, makes [one] also a friend and espouses the soul into matrimony33; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood, since it is one and the same fear by which one fears to lose God or to be separated from God under this threefold account. — And from this it is clear why this fear is named by this threefold name34; the response to the objections is also clear.
Doubt V.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that each fear, namely the initial and the servile, is called the beginning of wisdom. For if initial fear is so called because in it wisdom and grace are begun; and servile fear is of this kind: it seems therefore that servile fear is initial; which is false. — In connection with this it is asked: on what account is fear in sacred Scripture called the beginning of wisdom rather than another gift; and why is it called the beginning of wisdom rather than of any other gift, or virtue, or grace?
I respond: It must be said that, since the beginning is twofold, namely within, or without35; the initial is denominated from a beginning within, which is the intrinsic beginning of nature; whereas the servile has the account of a beginning without, and therefore neither is nor ought to be called initial.
To that which is asked: why is it called the beginning of wisdom rather than another gift, and why rather of wisdom36 than of another gift? it must be said that, in progressing toward the good, the gift of fear is first among all the gifts, and the gift of wisdom is supreme. Since therefore the account of beginning and of principle ought to be attributed to the first; hence it is that the account of beginning ought to be attributed to fear. — But because the [final] state is in the highest37; hence it is that fear is rather called the beginning of wisdom than of any other gift. — But the other things which are said in the letter are sufficiently plain.
Now from these things which have been said in the letter, six problems concerning fear could be formed: the first being concerning the definition of fear; the second concerning its object; the third concerning the division of the Master; the fourth concerning the division of Damascene38; the fifth concerning the naming of the gratuitous gift; the sixth and last concerning its comparison to the gift of wisdom.
- Cicero, l. de Offic. c. 3: Omnis enim quae a ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio debet a definitione proficisci, ut intelligatur, quid sit id, de quo disputetur. Cfr. Boeth., de Definitione.Cicero, On Duties, bk. 1, ch. 3: For every systematic treatment undertaken by reason concerning any matter ought to begin from a definition, so that it may be understood what that is which is under discussion. Cf. Boethius, On Definition.
- De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 15. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6. in fine. — Quomodo timor ex amore oriatur, insinuatur ab August., de quo vide supra pag. 338, nota 3. Pro unam sit cod. K unum continuum.[Dionysius,] On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 15. Cf. above, d. 27, art. 1, q. 2, reply to 6, at the end. — How fear arises from love is suggested by Augustine, on which see above, p. 338, note 3. For unam codex K reads unum continuum.
- Cfr. supra pag. 555, nota 7. et pag. 556, nota 5. — Aequivoca, ut Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1. exponit, dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa.Cf. above, p. 555, note 7, and p. 556, note 5. — Equivocals, as Aristotle expounds in the Categories, ch. 1, are said [to be] those whose name alone is common, but according to the name the account of substance is diverse.
- Vide infra dub. 1. — Edd. summi boni ardui.See below, doubt 1. — The editions read summi boni ardui [of the arduous highest good].
- Cod. Z assignari. Paulo superius pro non potest esse edd. non est.Codex Z reads assignari [assigned]. A little above, for non potest esse the editions read non est.
- Cfr. Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 24. seqq. (c. 4.), et IV. Metaph. text. 4. (III. c. 2.). — Mox post aliquod obiectum auctoritate cod. K supplevimus unum.Cf. Aristotle, Physics VII, text 24 and following (ch. 4), and Metaphysics IV, text 4 (bk. III, ch. 2). — Soon after, following aliquod obiectum, on the authority of codex K we have supplied unum.
- Libr. VII. Phys. text. 31. (c. 4.). Cfr. II. Poster. c. 15. (c. 12.), et I. Topic. c. 13. Ibid. c. 14. (c. 16.) dicitur (quae verba proposit. seq. tangunt): Si enim immanifestum sit, quotupliciter dicitur, contingit non ad idem etiam qui respondet et qui interrogat ferre intellectum etc. — Paulo inferius post Et hinc [cod. G hoc] est, quod codd. G I L T aa et edd. 1, 2 inserunt dicit, et dein post timorem subiiciunt vero, edd. 1, 2 enim.Physics bk. VII, text 31 (ch. 4). Cf. Posterior [Analytics] II, ch. 15 (ch. 12), and Topics I, ch. 13. Ibid., ch. 14 (ch. 16) it is said (which words touch on the following proposition): For if it be unmanifest in how many ways [a thing] is said, it happens that the one who answers and the one who asks do not bring their understanding to the same thing, etc. — A little below, after Et hinc est, quod (cod. G hoc) codices G I L T aa and editions 1, 2 insert dicit, and then after timorem subjoin vero, editions 1, 2 enim.
- Sic Vat., cuius lectio procul dubio aptior praestantiorque est quam scriptura codicum, quorum alii (etiam edd. 1, 2) exhibent et consequenter [cod. A consequentem] est fuga, alii et consignificat consequenter [cod. F consequentem, codd. G I L N O quantum]. Paulo ante pro qua quis codd. F G H I L N T V et quia quis, cod. K quando quis.Thus the Vatican [edition], whose reading is without doubt more apt and superior to the writing of the codices, of which some (also editions 1, 2) exhibit et consequenter (cod. A consequentem) est fuga, others et consignificat consequenter (cod. F consequentem, codd. G I L N O quantum). A little before, for qua quis codices F G H I L N T V [read] et quia quis, cod. K quando quis.
- Cod. A superexcedentis.Codex A reads superexcedentis.
- Art. 2. q. 1. seq. — Pro ex praecedentibus codd. A K Z in praecedentibus. — Quoad hoc dubium cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1.Art. 2, q. 1 and following. — For ex praecedentibus codices A K Z [read] in praecedentibus. — As to this doubt cf. Blessed Albert, here, art. 6; St. Thomas, here, q. 2, art. 1, little-question 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, art. 1.
- Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 9.See the Master's letter here, ch. 9.
- Respicitur I. Ioan. 2, 16. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. — Post pauca pro assignantur cod. Z distinguuntur, edd. assignentur.Reference is made to 1 John 2:16. Cf. the Master's letter here, ch. 4. — A little after, for assignantur codex Z reads distinguuntur, the editions assignentur.
- Cfr. Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 23, et supra d. 15. dub. 3.Cf. Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith III, ch. 23, and above, d. 15, doubt 3.
- Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. et a. 2. q. 2.Cf. above, art. 1, q. 2, reply to 4, and art. 2, q. 2.
- Codd. A F G I L N T V de timore divino. Mox pro quatenus plurimi codd. qua, cod. aa quantum. Subinde pro Timor autem [cod. T enim] donum codd. F N Timor autem Domini.Codices A F G I L N T V read de timore divino [of divine fear]. Soon, for quatenus most codices [read] qua, cod. aa quantum. Then, for Timor autem (cod. T enim) donum codices F N [read] Timor autem Domini.
- Ita cod. U, in aliis excellentiae. Paulo inferius pro ipsius timoris doni cod. K in ipsius timoris dono.Thus codex U; in the others excellentiae. A little below, for ipsius timoris doni codex K reads in ipsius timoris dono.
- Codd. I L oppositus; alii ut opponitur.Codices I L read oppositus; the others ut opponitur.
- Ita codd. H L aa bb; in aliis et edd. perperam deest non.Thus codices H L aa bb; in the others and the editions non is wrongly absent.
- Vide de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic n. 7; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; qui tres auctores ibi etiam de seq. dubio tractant.See on this doubt Blessed Albert, here, n. 7; St. Thomas, here, q. 2, art. 1, little-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, art. 1, little-question 3; which three authors there also treat of the following doubt.
- Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 15. — Paulo superius post videtur, quod cod. W inserit in illis, plures alii codd. nullus.On the Orthodox Faith bk. II, ch. 15. — A little above, after videtur, quod codex W inserts in illis, several other codices nullus.
- Edd. loqui quadrupliciter de timore: aut secundum etc., in fine enuntiati est passio naturae.The editions read loqui quadrupliciter de timore: aut secundum etc., [and] at the end of the statement est passio naturae.
- In principio solut. dubii praeced.At the beginning of the solution of the preceding doubt.
- Dub. praeced.The preceding doubt.
- Exhibemus lectionem cod. U, quae completior est aliis, in quibus praecedens in se mali omittitur.We exhibit the reading of codex U, which is more complete than the others, in which the preceding in se mali is omitted.
- Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 15, unde et seqq. definitiones sumtae sunt. Cfr. Ioan. de Rupella, Sum. de anima, p. II. c. 31.On the Orthodox Faith bk. II, ch. 15, whence also the following definitions are taken. Cf. John of La Rochelle, Summa on the Soul, part II, ch. 31.
- Ita codd. A P S U Z bb in aliis et edd. Si autem est timor mali respectu poenae.Thus codices A P S U Z bb; in the others and the editions Si autem est timor mali respectu poenae.
- Pro convitii (ψόγου) edd. falso cogniti.For convitii (ψόγου, reproach) the editions falsely [read] cogniti.
- Pro phantasiae (in textu Graeco legitur φόβος ἐκ μεγάλης φαντασίας) edd. perperam finita.For phantasiae (in the Greek text is read φόβος ἐκ μεγάλης φαντασίας, fear from a great imagining) the editions wrongly [read] finita.
- Edd. omittunt sed propter defectum a parte timentis et paulo inferius pro iisdem verbis substituunt quod de se timendum non est. Paulo superius pro est vere timendum edd. est de se timendum.The editions omit sed propter defectum a parte timentis and a little below, for the same words, substitute quod de se timendum non est. A little above, for est vere timendum the editions read est de se timendum.
- De hoc dubio praeter supra cit. locos cfr. S. Thom., hic circa lit.On this doubt, besides the places cited above, cf. St. Thomas, here, on the letter.
- Plurimi codd. hic et inferius amicalis.Most codices here and below read amicalis.
- Edd. cum multis codd. sensibus.The editions, with many codices, read sensibus.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1.Cf. Sentences II, d. 27, art. 1, q. 1 and following, and d. 29, art. 1, q. 1.
- Cod. A nominatur, cod. U censetur. — Cfr. solut. huius dubii apud B. Albert., hic a. 9. quaestiunc. 5, et apud Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.Codex A reads nominatur, codex U censetur. — Cf. the solution of this doubt in Blessed Albert, here, art. 9, little-question 5, and in Peter of Tarentaise, here, on the letter.
- Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1, voluntarium docet esse quod ex principio intrinseco efficiatur, involuntarium (ad quod quodam modo reducitur factum ex timore), quod ex principio extrinseco.Aristotle, Ethics III, ch. 1, teaches that the voluntary is what is brought about from an intrinsic principle, the involuntary (to which the deed done from fear is in a certain way reduced) that [which is] from an extrinsic principle.
- Edd. omittunt quam aliud… sapientiae. Paulo ante pro principium sapientiae codd. N Z initium sapientiae, cod. O initium vel principium sapientiae.The editions omit quam aliud… sapientiae. A little before, for principium sapientiae codices N Z read initium sapientiae, codex O initium vel principium sapientiae.
- Edd. cum paucis codd. quia non in summo status [Vat. statu] est. — Cfr. supra p. I. dub. 2, et de hoc 5. dubio S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.The editions, with a few codices, read quia non in summo status (Vat. statu) est. — Cf. above, part I, doubt 2, and on this fifth doubt St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here, on the letter.
- Edd. 1, 2 cum plurimis codd. doni.Editions 1, 2, with most codices, read doni.