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Dist. 23, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus
p. 501

# Dubia circa litteram Magistri

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illa notificatione, quam Magister ponit: Fides est virtus, qua creduntur quae non videntur. Videtur enim ista definitio minus recte assignari, quia Ioannis vigesimop501-1 dictum est Thomae: Quia vidisti me, credidisti; constat, quod Thomas credidit vera fide: ergo ista definitio non convenit omni fidei universaliter. — Item, quaeritur iuxta hoc de diversitate notificationum ipsius fidei, quae a diversis doctoribus assignantur. Videtur enim, quod minus recte, quia, cum « unius rei unum sit esse » ; et « definitio est ratio indicans quid est esse » ; videtur, quod fidei unica tantum debet assignari definitiop501-2. Quaeritur ergo, penes quid, et quomodo differenter assignantur?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod virtus fidei, secundum quod multipliciter habet considerari, habet diversimode notificari. Consideratur enim fides quantum ad genus proprium; et sic definitur ab Augustinop501-3: « Fides est virtus, qua creduntur quae non videntur ».

Consideratur secundo quantum ad finem ultimum; et sic definitur ab Apostolop501-4: « Fides est substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium » ; et haec definitio explanatur a Damasceno in libro suo: « Fides est eorum quae sperantur hypostasis, rerum redargutio, quae non videntur ».

Consideratur tertio quantum ad obiectum et principium motivum; et sic definitur ab Augustino ad Consentiump501-5: « Fides est illuminatio mentis ad summam Veritatem » .

Consideratur nihilominus quantum ad actum proprium; et sic definitur a Damascenop501-6: « Fides est non inquisitus consensus » circa primam Veritatem; vel secundum alios affirmative: « inquisitus consensus », quia in diversis translationibus utrumque reperitur; et utrumque potest intelligi vere, quia, quamvis videantur dicere oppositum, una tamen explanat alteram. Cum enim dicitur fides consensus inquisitus, hoc est dicere, id est consensus non quaesitus; et tunc in tenetur privative et tantum valet quantum consensus non inquisitus, hoc est assensus, quo quis libere assentit Veritati, non innitens alicui rationi.

Consideratur etiam in ordine ad subiectum; et sic definitur a Dionysio in libro de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo septimop501-7: « Fides est unicum credentium fundamentum, eos collocans Veritati ».

Consideratur etiam in comparatione ad habitus alios quantum ad assentiendi modum; et sic definitur ab Hugone in libro de Sacramentisp501-8: « Fides est certitudo quaedam de rebus absentibus, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta » .

Ex his patet, quod fides habet diversimode notificari, secundum quod habet diversimode considerari, videlicet in comparatione ad genus proprium, ad finem ultimum, ad obiectum, ad actum proprium, ad subiectum et ad habitum disparatum.

Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de Thoma, quod et vidit et credidit; dicendum, quod aliud credidit,

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scilicet Divinitatem, et aliud vidit, videlicet humanitatem. Sed hoc melius infrap502-1 determinabitur, cum agetur de obiecto fidei.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod fides accipitur tribus modis. Videtur enim, quod insufficienter distinguat ipsam fidem; videmus enim, fidem aliquando accipi pro ipsa conscientia, secundum quod dicitur ad Romanos decimo quartop502-2: Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est; quod non continetur sub aliquo praedictorum. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur, de quot modis fides dicatur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod fides invenitur accipi decem modis. — Aliquando enim accipitur pro sponsione; prima ad Timotheum quintop502-3: Primam fidem irritam fecerunt. — Aliquando pro fidelitate; Ieremiae septimo: Periit fides et Sanctus de terra. — Aliquando pro conscientia; ad Romanos decimo quarto: Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est. — Aliquando pro Sacramento fidei, secundum quod dicit Augustinus ad Bonifaciump502-4, quod non est aliud parvulos habere fidem quam habere fidei Sacramentum. — Aliquando pro acceptatione conclusionis per rationem probatae, secundum quod dicit Boethiusp502-5: « Argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem ». — Aliquando pro cognitione comprehensionis, secundum quod dicitur ad Romanos primop502-6: Iustitia Dei revelatur ex fide in fidem; Glossa: « in fidem speciei », quae dicitur fides, quia fidentissima et certissima est. — Aliquando pro habitu fidei informis; Iacobi secundop502-7: Fides sine operibus mortua est. — Aliquando pro habitu fidei formatae; ad Romanos primo: Iustus ex fide vivit. — Aliquando pro actu fidei, secundum quod dicit Augustinusp502-8: « Fides est credere quod non vides ». — Aliquando pro ipso obiecto fidei, secundum quod dicitur in Symbolo Athanasii: « Haec est fides catholica » etc.

De omnibus autem his modis contingit dicere fidem secundum quandam analogiam, pro eo quod in omnibus reperitur quaedam ratio assensus et credulitatisp502-9 cuiusdam, licet non uniformiter. De his autem decem modis Magister solum tres assumit, quia illi sunt, qui faciunt ad suum propositum principale, videlicet ad praemissae definitionis explanationemp502-10.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Aliud est credere in Deum, aliud credere Deo, aliud credere Deum. Si enim habitus distinguuntur per actusp502-11, videtur, quod non sit unius fidei omnia ista facere, sed diversarum; quod falsum est, quia una fide omnia haec tria facimus. — Item, videtur, quod male definiat credere in Deum, cum dicit, quod credere in Deum est credendo amare etc. Si enim credere et amare sunt actus disparatip502-12, videtur, quod unus per alterum non habeat definiri. — Item, videtur esse inculcatio verborum, cum dicit: credendo amare, credendo in eum irep502-13, credendo incorporari; idem enim videtur per verba illa dici.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Magister, aliud et aliud est sive alius et alius modus credendi: credere Deo et Deum et in Deum. Et isti quidem actus possunt ad diversos habitus pertinere, possunt etiam pertinere ad eundem, quoniam non sunt sic diversi, quin habeant ad invicem ordinem. Nam credere Deum respicit divinam Veritatem ut obiectum; credere Deo, ut motivum; credere in Deum, ut finem ultimum. Et istae tres comparationes circa eundem habitum reperiri habent. Et quoniam fides non perfecte tendit in Deum tanquam in finemp502-14, nisi prout est iuncta caritati; ideo actus cre-

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dendi in Deum definitur per actum amandi, non tanquam per actum proprium, sed tanquam per actum annexum. — Et iterum, quia quadruplex genus actus annexum est ipsi fidei, secundum quod iungitur caritati, secundum quadruplicem comparationem; ideo quatuor ponit in eius notificatione. Fides enim, prout iuncta est caritati, ordinat ad amandum Deum, ad faciendum bonum, ad sustinendump503-1 malum, ad diligendum proximum. Et iuxta haec quatuor, quatuor ponit actus in illa notificatione, videlicet credendo amare quantum ad affectum, credendo ire quantum ad bonum opus, credendo ei adhaerere quantum ad tolerantiam mali, credendo incorporari membris quantum ad dilectionem proximi. — Et sic patet responsio ad illa quae quaerebanturp503-2.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus: Fidem ipsam videt quisque in corde suo esse. Si enim virtutes ad invicem connexae sunt, et aliquis scit, se habere fidem; videtur per consequens, quod sciat, se habere caritatem; cuius contrarium in primo libro ostensum fuit distinctione decima septimap503-3. — Item, si fides videtur et certissime cognoscitur, eo quod essentialiter sit in anima, cum caritas et gratia essentialiter sint in anima; est quaestio, quare non cognoscatur certissime ab his, a quibus habentur.

Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur de modis visionis, quos assignat Augustinus in litterap503-4; videtur enim eadem illa divisio esse superflua, cum super Genesim ad litteram in libro duodecimo et in Glossa secundae ad Corinthios duodecimo non distinguantur nisi tria genera visionum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum verbum Augustinip503-5, fides essentialiter existens in anima cognoscitur per sui essentiam; et hoc communiter omnes tenent.

De caritate autem quidam dicunt, quod videtur essentialiter, et scit homo, se habere caritatem, qui habet; sed nescit, utrum in ea perseveretp503-6. Dicunt enim, hoc esse generaliter verum, quod de omnibus, quae sunt essentialiter in anima, habet anima certam scientiam, quia cognoscit ea per eorum essentiam, sive sit habitus gratiae, sive caritatis, sive alterius virtutis. — Sed haec responsio contrariatur ipsi cognitioni experimentali. Multa enim sunt in nobis, quae nos latent; et multae animae sunt deformes, quae suas deformitates nullo modo noverunt; et multa sunt in nobis, quae patentp503-7. Et propterea non est dicendum, quod omnia quae sunt in anima essentialiter, teneantur visione et cognitione certa. Et de caritate et gratia satis est planum, quia pauci vel nulli sunt, qui sciant certitudinaliter, se esse in gratia; et hoc melius scitur, si inquiratur a viris sanctis et bonis.

Ideo aliter dicunt alii, quod dupliciter scitur aliquid, videlicet scientia notitiae et scientia discretionis, secundum quod traditur ab Augustino in libro de Trinitatep503-8, quod aliud est rem nosse, aliud co-

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gitare et distinguere. Dicunt ergo, quod omnia quae essentialiter sunt in anima, certissime sciuntur scientia notitiae; qua quidem scientia dicit Augustinusp504-1, quod anima non potest se ipsam ignorare; et sic cognoscuntur tam fides quam caritas quam etiam alia. Sed si de scientia discretionis loquamur, sic non habet veritatem, pro eo quod ea quae essentialiter sunt in anima, etsi scientia notitiae cognoscantur, tamen ab aliis non semper discernuntur, sicut dicit Augustinusp504-2 de ipsa anima, quod etsi non possit se ipsam non nosse, nescit tamen aliquando se ab aliis discernere; sicut patet de illis qui posuerunt, animam esse corpus, vel aquam, vel ignem. Et hoc modo non habet quis notitiam de caritate, quae est in se, nec de gratia gratum faciente, quia nescit eam discernere a dono gratiae gratis datae, propter ipsius mentis obnubilationem ex phantasmatum involutionep504-3. — Sed nec adhuc istud sufficit, quia non solum cognoscit quis habens fidem ipsum habitum scientia notitiae, sed etiam discretionis et cognitionis; discernit enim ipsum ab aliis habitibus virtutum.

Et propterea aliter dicendum, quod cognitio, qua anima cognoscit illud quod habet in se, est cognitio cuiusdam experientiae; per hoc enim cognoscit aliquis, se habere fidem, dum ad se ipsum introrsus ingrediens experitur, utrum sit promptus ad credendum; sic de aliis habitibus virtutum et aliis omnibus, quae latent introrsus. Quoniam igitur anima non potest habere experientiam, nisi de eo quod est in potestate sua, et de eo quod respicit actum animae, cum experientia dicat usum alicuius potentiaep504-4; hinc est, quod quando aliqua sic sunt in anima, quod reddunt eius potentiam habilem ad aliquod opus, vel circumstant alicui operi interiori, talia possunt cognosci ab ipsa anima certitudinaliter. Unde si aliquis est habilis ad aliquod opus, certissime se novit habere illum habitum, sicut fidelis habitum credendi, et amans habitum amandi, et sic de ceteris. Quando vero aliqua sic sunt in anima, quod ipsa principaliter non respiciunt usum alicuius potentiae, sicut character, vel sicut deformitas culpae praeteritae, vel quae sunt supra potestatem ipsius animae, sicut gratia, in quantum reddit acceptum Deo, et caritas similiter; quia de talibus non potest habere anima experientiam, non potest habere certam notitiam. Ideo cum dicitur, quod illa quae sunt essentialiter in anima, certitudinaliter cognoscuntur; hoc intelligitur de illis, de quibus potest sumere anima certum experimentum; de his autem, de quibus non potest sumere experimentump504-5 nisi per coniecturam, non cognoscit nisi coniecturando. Et quoniam de fide, secundum quod reddit habilem ad credendum, certissima potest haberi experientia; secundum autem quod suum credere est Deo acceptum, certa experientia haberi non potest, sed solum coniectura: hinc est, quod fides quantum ad habitum substratum certissime videtur ab anima; in quantum autem est formata, non cognoscitur nisi per coniecturam; et sic est aliis connexa. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur de caritate et gratia.

Ad illud quod obiicit de sufficientia illorum modorum, dicendum, quod modi videndi possunt dupliciter distingui: vel a parte virtutis cognoscentis, vel a parte medii. Si a parte virtutis cognitivaep504-6, cum illa sit triplex, scilicet sensitiva exterior, imaginativa et intellectiva; sic triplex distinguitur visio, videlicet corporalis, imaginativa et intellectualis. — Si autem a parte medii, tunc sex sunt differentiae, quarum sufficientia patet sic. Omne enim, quod videtur ab anima, aut videtur per sui essentiam, aut videtur per sui speciem, aut videtur per rem aliam, ab ipsa simpliciter differentem. Si per sui essentiam videtur, sic est unus modus, qui ponitur sexto locop504-7. Si per sui speciem, hoc potest esse tripliciter: nam illa species aut est omnino concreta materiae, aut abstracta, aut partim concreta, partim abstracta. Concreta est, prout apprehenditur a sensu exteriori, licet sit ibi aliqua abstractiop504-8; simpliciter abstracta, prout apprehenditur ab intellectu; medio modo, prout apprehenditur ab imaginatione; et sic

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sunt tres primi modi. — Si autem res habet cognosci per rem ab ipsa differentem, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut quia comparatur ad ipsam sub ratione similis, aut in ratione effectus. Et sic duo sunt modi, videlicet quartus et quintus. Et si tu obiicias, quod aliquid potest comparari ad alterum in ratione disparati, vel in ratione contrarii; dicendum, quod nec disparatum nec contrarium facit cognoscere aliquid, nisi in quantum innuit aliquem modum in ratione similis. Unde qui cognoscit, quod « album disgregat », per consequens cognoscit, quod « nigrum congregat », quia « similiter se habet oppositum ad oppositum, sicut propositum ad propositump505-1 ».

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Probatur futura resurrectio, quia ita crediderunt Patriarchae et alii Sancti, et propter hoc vult dicere, quod fides dicatur argumentum. Hoc enim videtur potius ad oppositum quam ad propositum. Si enim probatur istud quod creditur per auctoritatem Patrum, tunc videtur, quod fides non sit argumentum, immo potius conclusio: ergo si fides est argumentum, videtur, quod non recte dicat, quod resurrectio probatur per fidem Patrum. — Item, si locus ab auctoritate est incertissimusp505-2, et fides trahit fundamentum a loco ab auctoritate: ergo videtur, quod fides sit incertissima.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum aliquosp505-3 verbum Magistri intelligitur hic de fide, quae est acquisita ex inspectione Scripturarum, non autem de illa, quae est inspirata et quae numeratur inter spiritualia charismata. — Sed illud non satisfacit, quia Magister hoc dicit ad exponendam illam definitionem, quam Apostolusp505-4 assignat; et constat, quod Apostolus loquitur de fide formata.

Et propterea dicendum est aliter, quod secundum quod Magisterp505-5 dicit, illud quod creditur per fidem, « per ipsam fidem probatur ». Ipsum enim, quod creditur, probatur per auctoritatem; auctoritas autem nullius est efficaciae in probando nisi per fidem: et ita tota firmitas argumenti ad fidem redit. Unde si aliquis quaerat, utrum resurrectio sit futura, probatur eip505-6 per auctoritates sacrae Scripturae et per verba Prophetarum, qui ita dixerunt. Sed si quaerat ulterius, ut probem ei, quod ipsi verum dixerunt; respondebitur ei, quod scimus, ipsos verum dixisse, quia a Spiritu sancto illuminati fueruntp505-7, et ita certificati fuerunt per fidem, quam a Deo acceperunt; et nos certificamur de eorum certificatione per fidem, quam ab ipso Deo accipimus. — Et sic patet, quod expositio Magistri bona est, quia per hoc non vult dicere, quod fides probetur, sed magis, quod fides probet, ita quod vere et proprie dicatur ab Apostolo « argumentump505-8 ».

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod fides caritatem praecedit. Hoc enim videtur esse falsum, quia, sicut dicit Ambrosiusp505-9, « caritas est mater virtutum » et caput; et mater praecedit illud cuius est mater. — Item, Glossa super illud Psalmip505-10: Noli aemulari, dicit, quod « spes est introitus ad fidem »: ergo videtur, quod fides non sit prima inter virtutes theologicas, secundum quod dicitur in littera. — Item, omnes virtutes simul infundunturp505-11: ergo non videtur, quod reperiatur in illis aliquis ordo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de fide et aliis virtutibus dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad ha-

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bitum et quantum ad actum. Si quantum ad habitum, sic est ibi simultas; si quantum ad actum, sic est ibi naturalis ordo, pro eo quod actus fidei praeambulus est ad actum spei et caritatis. Nemo enim aliquid sperat, vel amat, nisi illud cognoscat et aliquo modo credatp506-1.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod caritas est mater; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur quantum ad rationem merendi. Praeterea, caritas dicitur esse mater virtutum, non quia illas generet, sed quia illas fovet et nutrit, ut perveniant ad statum perfectionisp506-2.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de Glossa, dicendum, quod fides non accipitur ibi pro fide-virtute, vel eius actu, sed pro illo quod fidei succedit, videlicet pro ipsa beatissima visionep506-3.

English Translation
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# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that notification which the Master sets down: Faith is a virtue by which things that are not seen are believed. For this definition seems to be assigned less correctly, because in the twentieth chapter of Johnp501-1 it was said to Thomas: Because you have seen me, you have believed; it is established that Thomas believed by true faith: therefore this definition does not fit faith universally. — Likewise, in connection with this it is asked about the diversity of the notifications of faith itself, which are assigned by various teachers. For it seems that this is less correct, because, since « of one thing there is one being » ; and « a definition is the account indicating what the being is » ; it seems that only a single definition ought to be assigned to faithp501-2. It is asked, therefore, in regard to what, and how they are differently assigned?

I respond: It must be said that the virtue of faith, according as it can be considered in many ways, can be notified in diverse ways. For faith is considered with respect to its proper genus; and thus it is defined by Augustinep501-3: « Faith is a virtue by which things that are not seen are believed ».

It is considered, secondly, with respect to its ultimate end; and thus it is defined by the Apostlep501-4: « Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing » ; and this definition is explained by the Damascene in his book: « Faith is the hypostasis of those things which are hoped for, the refutation of things which are not seen ».

It is considered, thirdly, with respect to its object and its motive principle; and thus it is defined by Augustine, to Consentiusp501-5: « Faith is the illumination of the mind toward the highest Truth » .

It is considered, nevertheless, with respect to its proper act; and thus it is defined by the Damascenep501-6: « Faith is an unsought consent » concerning the first Truth; or, according to others, affirmatively: « a sought consent », because in different translations both are found; and both can be understood truly, because, although they seem to say the opposite, the one explains the other. For when faith is called a sought consent, this is to say, that is, a consent not investigated; and then the in- is taken privatively and is worth just as much as unsought consent, that is, the assent by which someone freely assents to the Truth, not relying on any reasoning.

It is considered also in relation to its subject; and thus it is defined by Dionysius in the book on the Divine Names, chapter sevenp501-7: « Faith is the single foundation of believers, establishing them in the Truth ».

It is considered also in comparison with other habits with respect to the mode of assenting; and thus it is defined by Hugh in the book on the Sacramentsp501-8: « Faith is a certain certitude about absent things, established above opinion and below knowledge » .

From these things it is clear that faith can be notified in diverse ways, according as it can be considered in diverse ways, namely in comparison with its proper genus, with its ultimate end, with its object, with its proper act, with its subject, and with a disparate habit.

To that which is first objected concerning Thomas, that he both saw and believed; it must be said that he believed one thing,

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namely the Divinity, and saw another, namely the humanity. But this will be determined better belowp502-1, when the object of faith is treated.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that faith is taken in three modes. For it seems that he distinguishes faith itself insufficiently; for we see that faith is sometimes taken for conscience itself, according as it is said in the fourteenth chapter of Romansp502-2: Whatever is not from faith is sin; which is not contained under any of the aforesaid. — In connection with this it is asked, in how many modes faith is spoken of.

I respond: It must be said that faith is found to be taken in ten modes. — For sometimes it is taken for a pledge; in the fifth chapter of First Timothyp502-3: They have made void their first faith. — Sometimes for fidelity; in the seventh chapter of Jeremiah: Faith and the holy one have perished from the earth. — Sometimes for conscience; in the fourteenth chapter of Romans: Whatever is not from faith is sin. — Sometimes for the Sacrament of faith, according as Augustine says, to Bonifacep502-4, that for little ones to have faith is nothing other than to have the Sacrament of faith. — Sometimes for the acceptance of a conclusion proved by reason, according as Boethius saysp502-5: « An argument is the account producing belief in a doubtful matter ». — Sometimes for the cognition of comprehension, according as it is said in the first chapter of Romansp502-6: The justice of God is revealed from faith unto faith; the Gloss: « unto the faith of vision », which is called faith because it is most confident and most certain. — Sometimes for the habit of unformed faith; in the second chapter of Jamesp502-7: Faith without works is dead. — Sometimes for the habit of formed faith; in the first chapter of Romans: The just man lives from faith. — Sometimes for the act of faith, according as Augustine saysp502-8: « Faith is to believe what you do not see ». — Sometimes for the object of faith itself, according as it is said in the Symbol of Athanasius: « This is the catholic faith » etc.

But concerning all these modes it is fitting to speak of faith according to a certain analogy, for the reason that in all of them there is found a certain account of assent and of a certain credulityp502-9, although not uniformly. But of these ten modes the Master takes up only three, because they are the ones that serve his principal purpose, namely the explanation of the aforesaid definitionp502-10.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: To believe in God is one thing, to believe God another, to believe a God another. For if habits are distinguished by their actsp502-11, it seems that it does not belong to one faith to do all these things, but to diverse ones; which is false, because by one faith we do all these three things. — Likewise, it seems that he defines to believe in God badly, when he says that to believe in God is by believing to love etc. For if to believe and to love are disparate actsp502-12, it seems that the one ought not to be defined through the other. — Likewise, it seems to be a piling-up of words, when he says: by believing to love, by believing to go into himp502-13, by believing to be incorporated; for the same thing seems to be said through those words.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says, the mode of believing is one and another, or the manner is one and another: to believe God and a God and in God. And these acts can indeed pertain to diverse habits; they can also pertain to the same one, since they are not so diverse that they do not have an order to one another. For to believe a God regards the divine Truth as object; to believe God, as motive; to believe in God, as ultimate end. And these three comparisons can be found about the same habit. And since faith does not tend perfectly into God as into an endp502-14, except insofar as it is joined to charity; therefore the act of be-

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lieving in God is defined through the act of loving, not as through a proper act, but as through an annexed act. — And again, because a fourfold genus of act is annexed to faith itself, according as it is joined to charity, according to a fourfold comparison; therefore he sets down four things in its notification. For faith, insofar as it is joined to charity, orders one to love God, to do good, to bearp503-1 evil, to love one's neighbor. And according to these four, he sets down four acts in that notification, namely by believing to love with respect to the affection, by believing to go with respect to the good work, by believing to cleave to him with respect to the toleration of evil, by believing to be incorporated into the members with respect to the love of neighbor. — And thus the response to the things that were asked is clearp503-2.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what Augustine says: Each one sees that faith itself is in his heart. For if the virtues are connected to one another, and someone knows that he has faith; it seems consequently that he knows that he has charity; the contrary of which was shown in the first book, in the seventeenth distinctionp503-3. — Likewise, if faith is seen and is most certainly known, because it is essentially in the soul, since charity and grace are essentially in the soul; the question is why it is not most certainly known by those by whom it is had.

In connection with this it is also asked about the modes of vision which Augustine assigns in the textp503-4; for that same division seems to be superfluous, since on Genesis according to the letter, in the twelfth book, and in the Gloss on the twelfth chapter of Second Corinthians, only three kinds of vision are distinguished.

I respond: It must be said that, according to the word of Augustinep503-5, faith, existing essentially in the soul, is known through its essence; and this all commonly hold.

But concerning charity some say that it is seen essentially, and that a man who has charity knows that he has it; but he does not know whether he perseveres in itp503-6. For they say that this is generally true, that of all things which are essentially in the soul the soul has certain knowledge, because it knows them through their essence, whether it be a habit of grace, or of charity, or of any other virtue. — But this response is contrary to experiential cognition itself. For there are many things in us which lie hidden from us; and many souls are deformed which in no way know their own deformities; and there are many things in us which lie openp503-7. And therefore it must not be said that all things which are in the soul essentially are held by sure vision and cognition. And concerning charity and grace it is plain enough, because few or none are there who know with certitude that they are in grace; and this is better known if it is inquired of holy and good men.

Therefore others say otherwise, that something is known in two ways, namely by the knowledge of acquaintance and by the knowledge of discernment, according as it is handed down by Augustine in the book on the Trinityp503-8, that to know a thing is one thing, to think about it and dis-

p. 504

tinguish it another. They say, therefore, that all things which are essentially in the soul are most certainly known by the knowledge of acquaintance; by which knowledge Augustine saysp504-1 that the soul cannot be ignorant of itself; and thus both faith and charity and other things too are known. But if we speak of the knowledge of discernment, then it does not hold true, for the reason that those things which are essentially in the soul, even if they are known by the knowledge of acquaintance, are nevertheless not always discerned from other things, as Augustine saysp504-2 of the soul itself, that even if it cannot fail to know itself, it sometimes does not know how to discern itself from other things; as is clear concerning those who held that the soul is a body, or water, or fire. And in this manner one does not have acquaintance with the charity which is in oneself, nor with the grace that makes one pleasing, because he does not know how to discern it from the gift of grace freely given, on account of the clouding of the mind itself by the involvement of phantasmsp504-3. — But not even this yet suffices, because one who has faith knows the habit itself not only by the knowledge of acquaintance, but also by that of discernment and of cognition; for he discerns it from the other habits of the virtues.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that the cognition by which the soul knows that which it has in itself is the cognition of a certain experience; for through this someone knows that he has faith, while, entering inward to himself, he experiences whether he is ready to believe; thus concerning the other habits of the virtues and all other things that lie hidden within. Since, therefore, the soul cannot have experience except of that which is in its own power, and of that which regards the act of the soul, since experience denotes the use of some powerp504-4; hence it is that, when certain things are so in the soul that they render its power fit for some work, or stand about some interior work, such things can be known by the soul itself with certitude. Hence if someone is fit for some work, he most certainly knows that he has that habit, as the believer the habit of believing, and the lover the habit of loving, and so concerning the rest. But when certain things are so in the soul that they themselves principally do not regard the use of some power, like a character, or like the deformity of past fault, or which are above the power of the soul itself, like grace, insofar as it renders one acceptable to God, and charity likewise; because the soul cannot have experience of such things, it cannot have certain acquaintance. Therefore when it is said that those things which are essentially in the soul are known with certitude; this is understood of those things of which the soul can take certain experiment; but of those of which it cannot take experimentp504-5 except by conjecture, it does not know except by conjecturing. And since concerning faith, according as it renders one fit for believing, most certain experience can be had; but according as one's believing is acceptable to God, certain experience cannot be had, but only conjecture: hence it is that faith, with respect to the underlying habit, is most certainly seen by the soul; but insofar as it is formed, it is not known except by conjecture; and thus it is connected with the others. — And through this the response to that which is objected concerning charity and grace is clear.

To that which he objects concerning the sufficiency of those modes, it must be said that the modes of seeing can be distinguished in two ways: either on the part of the knowing power, or on the part of the medium. If on the part of the cognitive powerp504-6, since it is threefold, namely the exterior sensitive, the imaginative, and the intellective; thus vision is distinguished as threefold, namely corporeal, imaginative, and intellectual. — But if on the part of the medium, then there are six differences, whose sufficiency is shown thus. For everything that is seen by the soul is seen either through its essence, or is seen through its species, or is seen through another thing, simply differing from it. If it is seen through its essence, thus there is one mode, which is placed in the sixth placep504-7. If through its species, this can be in three ways: for that species is either wholly concreted to matter, or abstracted, or partly concreted, partly abstracted. It is concreted when it is apprehended by the exterior sense, although there is some abstraction therep504-8; simply abstracted, when it is apprehended by the intellect; in the middle manner, when it is apprehended by the imagination; and thus

p. 505

these are the first three modes. — But if a thing is to be known through a thing differing from it, this can be in two ways: either because it is compared to it under the account of the similar, or in the account of an effect. And thus there are two modes, namely the fourth and the fifth. And if you object that something can be compared to another in the account of the disparate, or in the account of the contrary; it must be said that neither the disparate nor the contrary makes a thing known, except insofar as it hints at some mode in the account of the similar. Hence one who knows that « white disperses [the sight] » consequently knows that « black gathers [it] », because « the opposite is related to the opposite in the same way as the proposed to the proposedp505-1 ».

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: The future resurrection is proved, because the Patriarchs and other saints believed thus, and on account of this he means to say that faith is called an argument. For this seems to tend rather to the opposite than to the point at issue. For if that which is believed is proved through the authority of the Fathers, then it seems that faith is not an argument, but rather a conclusion: therefore if faith is an argument, it seems that he does not say correctly that the resurrection is proved through the faith of the Fathers. — Likewise, if the argument from authority is most uncertainp505-2, and faith draws its foundation from the argument from authority: therefore it seems that faith is most uncertain.

I respond: It must be said that according to somep505-3 the word of the Master is here understood of the faith which is acquired from the inspection of the Scriptures, but not of that which is inspired and which is numbered among the spiritual charisms. — But that does not satisfy, because the Master says this in order to explain that definition which the Apostlep505-4 assigns; and it is established that the Apostle speaks of formed faith.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that according to what the Masterp505-5 says, that which is believed through faith « is proved through faith itself ». For that very thing which is believed is proved through authority; but authority is of no efficacy in proving except through faith: and thus the whole firmness of the argument returns to faith. Hence if someone asks whether the resurrection is to be, it is proved to himp505-6 through the authorities of sacred Scripture and through the words of the Prophets, who said thus. But if he asks further that I prove to him that they themselves said the truth; it will be answered him that we know that they said the truth, because they were illumined by the Holy Spiritp505-7, and so were made certain through the faith which they received from God; and we are made certain of their certification through the faith which we receive from God himself. — And thus it is clear that the exposition of the Master is good, because by this he does not mean to say that faith is proved, but rather that faith proves, so that it is truly and properly called by the Apostle « argumentp505-8 ».

Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that faith precedes charity. For this seems to be false, because, as Ambrose saysp505-9, « charity is the mother of the virtues » and the head; and the mother precedes that of which she is the mother. — Likewise, the Gloss on that verse of the Psalmp505-10: Do not emulate, says that « hope is the entrance to faith »: therefore it seems that faith is not first among the theological virtues, according as it is said in the text. — Likewise, all the virtues are infused at the same timep505-11: therefore it does not seem that any order is found in them.

I respond: It must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking of faith and the other virtues, namely with respect to the ha-

p. 506

bit and with respect to the act. If with respect to the habit, then there is simultaneity; if with respect to the act, then there is a natural order, for the reason that the act of faith is preambular to the act of hope and of charity. For no one hopes for or loves anything unless he knows it and in some way believes itp506-1.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that charity is the mother; it must be said that this is understood with respect to the account of meriting. Moreover, charity is called the mother of the virtues, not because she generates them, but because she fosters and nourishes them, so that they may come to the state of perfectionp506-2.

To that which is objected concerning the Gloss, it must be said that faith is not taken there for faith-the-virtue, or its act, but for that which succeeds faith, namely for the most blessed visionp506-3 itself.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 29.
    Verse 29.
  2. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.), propositis locis, ex quibus videre est, num quis « definiverit et dixerit, quid est esse » [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι], i. e. definiverit quidditatem sive essentiam (cfr. supra pag. 341, nota 7.), ait: Manifestum igitur, quod qui non per huiusmodi [scil. per priora et notiora] definivit, non definivit; si enim definivit, plures erunt eiusdem definitiones. Nam manifestum, quod et qui per priora ac notiora, iterum melius definivit; quare utraeque erunt definitiones eiusdem. Tale autem non videtur; nam unicuique eorum quae sunt, unum est esse id ipsum quod est; quare si plures erunt eiusdem definitiones, idem erit definito esse, quod quidem secundum utramque definitionem significatur; haec [esse sive essentiae] autem non eadem sunt, eo quod definitiones diversae etc. Cfr. II. Poster. c. 10. (c. 9.), et V. Metaph. text. 15. (IV. c. 8.), ac VII. text. 11. seqq. (VI. c. 4.), ubi illa definitionis notio allata invenitur, quae I. Topic. c. 4. etiam ad terminum (ὅρος) definitioni (ὁρισμός) respondentem applicatur, illa scilicet: « Oratio [λόγος] quid erat esse significans ». — Plurimi codd. habent ratio, indicans quid est esse, pro quo edd. fide paucorum tantum codd. substituerunt oratio indicans, quid est esse rei.
    Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 4), the texts having been set forth from which it can be seen whether someone « has defined and stated what the being is » [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι], i.e. has defined the quiddity or essence (cf. above p. 341, note 7), says: It is manifest, therefore, that one who has not defined through things of this kind [namely through what is prior and more known] has not defined; for if he had defined, there would be several definitions of the same thing. For it is manifest that one who has defined through what is prior and more known has defined better a second time; wherefore both will be definitions of the same thing. But this does not seem so; for for each of the things that are, there is one being which is that which it is; wherefore if there will be several definitions of the same thing, the defined being will be the same, which indeed is signified according to each definition; but these [the being or the essence] are not the same, since the definitions are diverse, etc. Cf. Posterior Analytics II, c. 10 (c. 9), and Metaphysics V, text 15 (IV, c. 8), and VII, text 11 ff. (VI, c. 4), where that notion of definition cited is found, which in Topics I, c. 4 is also applied to the term (ὅρος) corresponding to the definition (ὁρισμός), namely this: « An account [λόγος] signifying what the being was ». — Most codices have ratio, indicans quid est esse [the account indicating what the being is], in place of which the editions, on the trust of only a few codices, have substituted oratio indicans, quid est esse rei [a discourse indicating what the being of the thing is].
  3. Libr. II. Quaest. evang. q. 39. n. 1; in Ioan. Evang. tr. 79. n. 1. Cfr. ibid. tr. 40. n. 9. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
    Book II of the Questions on the Gospels, q. 39, n. 1; on the Gospel of John, tract 79, n. 1. Cf. ibid., tract 40, n. 9. See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
  4. Hebr. 11, 1. Explanationem Damasc. (IV. de Fide orthod. c. 10.) videsis supra a. 1. q. 3. ad 1.
    Hebrews 11:1. The Damascene's explanation (On the Orthodox Faith IV, c. 10) you may see above, a. 1, q. 3, to 1.
  5. In Epist. 120. (olim in edd. in duas divisa et sub num. 222. et 85. exhibita), ubi tamen non ad verbum habetur definitio allata, sed eruitur ex iis quae S. Doctor ibi c. 1-4. n. 4-18. profert ostendens, nos per fidem, Deo intus adiuvante et illuminante, pervenire « non solum ad tantam intelligentiam rerum incorporearum et incommutabilium, quanta in hac vita capi non ab omnibus potest, verum etiam ad summitatem contemplationis, quam dicit Apostolus facie ad faciem » (I. Cor. 13, 12.). Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 3. a. 1. ait: Quaedam [cognitio] vero est ex lumine gratiae infuso, elevante ipsum intellectum supra se ad assentiendum Veritati primae propter se et super omnia, secundum quem modum dicit Augustinus: « Fides est illuminatio mentis ad summam Veritatem ». Et secundum hunc modum definitur a Ioanne Damasc. (IV. de Fide orthod. c. 10.): « Indistabilis et iniudicabilis spes [ἀδιάστατος καὶ ἀδιάκριτος ἐλπίς] eorum quae a Deo nobis annuntiata sunt ». Cfr. infra d. 24. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro ad Consentium edd. ad Constantium.
    In Letter 120 (formerly in the editions divided into two and exhibited under nn. 222 and 85), where nevertheless the cited definition is not had word for word, but is drawn out from the things which the holy Doctor there in cc. 1-4, nn. 4-18, brings forward, showing that through faith, with God inwardly helping and illumining, we come « not only to so great an understanding of incorporeal and unchangeable things as cannot in this life be grasped by all, but even to the summit of contemplation, which the Apostle calls face to face » (1 Cor. 13:12). Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 68, m. 3, a. 1, says: But a certain [cognition] is from the light of grace infused, elevating the intellect itself above itself to assent to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things, according to which mode Augustine says: « Faith is the illumination of the mind toward the highest Truth ». And according to this mode it is defined by John Damascene (On the Orthodox Faith IV, c. 10): « The unwavering and unjudging hope [ἀδιάστατος καὶ ἀδιάκριτος ἐλπίς] of those things which have been announced to us by God ». Cf. below, d. 24, a. 1, q. 1. — In place of ad Consentium the editions read ad Constantium.
  6. Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 11: Πίστις δέ ἐστιν ἀπολυπραγμόνητος [i. e. carens omni inquisitione] συγκατάθεσις. Similiter dicit Basil., in Ps. 115. n. 1: Fides prae cunctis rationalibus methodis animam trahens ad consensum; fides, quae non necessariis geometricis probationibus, sed Spiritus sancti operatione gignitur. — Non ita multo post complures codd. omittunt tamen, et deinde pro quantum consensus non inquisitus edd. substituunt quantum assensus non quaesitus.
    Book IV of On the Orthodox Faith, c. 11: Πίστις δέ ἐστιν ἀπολυπραγμόνητος [i.e. lacking all inquiry] συγκατάθεσις. Similarly Basil says, on Psalm 115, n. 1: Faith, beyond all rational methods, drawing the soul to consent; faith which is generated not by necessary geometrical proofs, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit. — Not long after, very many codices omit tamen, and then in place of quantum consensus non inquisitus the editions substitute quantum assensus non quaesitus.
  7. Paragraph. 4, secundum versionem Scoti Erig. — Pro Veritati Vat. in Veritate.
    Paragraph 4, according to the version of Scotus Eriugena. — In place of Veritati the Vatican edition reads in Veritate.
  8. Libr. I. p. X. c. 2.
    Book I, part X, c. 2.
  9. Dist. 24. a. 2. q. 1. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 5. a. 1; in Supplemento, coll. 31. a. 1; item B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 8; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.
    Distinction 24, a. 2, q. 1. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 68, m. 5, a. 1; in the Supplement, col. 31, a. 1; likewise Blessed Albert, here a. 3; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1, to 8; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1, sub-question 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 1.
  10. Vers. 23.
    Verse 23.
  11. Vers. 12. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Ier. 7, 28; tertius deinde Rom. 14, 23.
    Verse 12. — The following scriptural passage is Jeremiah 7:28; then the third, Romans 14:23.
  12. Epist. 98. (alias 23.) n. 9: Sicut ergo secundum quendam modum Sacramentum corporis Christi corpus Christi est... ita Sacramentum fidei fides est. Nihil est autem aliud credere quam fidem habere. Ac per hoc, cum respondetur parvulus credere, qui fidei nondum habet affectum, respondetur, fidem habere propter fidei Sacramentum etc.
    Letter 98 (otherwise 23), n. 9: As, therefore, in a certain manner the Sacrament of the body of Christ is the body of Christ... so the Sacrament of faith is faith. But to believe is nothing other than to have faith. And through this, when it is answered that the little one, who does not yet have the affection of faith, believes, it is answered that he has faith on account of the Sacrament of faith, etc.
  13. Libr. I. Comment. in Topic. Cicer., et I. de Differ. topic., quo posteriore loco verbis hic allatis addit: Non vero idem est argumentum et argumentatio; nam vis sententiae ratioque ea, quae clauditur oratione, cum aliquid probatur ambiguum, argumentum vocatur; ipsa vero argumenti elocutio argumentatio dicitur. — Pro acceptatione edd. assensione.
    Book I of the Commentary on Cicero's Topics, and I On Topical Differences, in which latter place he adds to the words here cited: But argument and argumentation are not the same; for the force of the proposition and the reasoning which is enclosed in the discourse, when something ambiguous is proved, is called the argument; but the very utterance of the argument is called argumentation. — In place of acceptatione the editions read assensione.
  14. Vers. 17. Penes Petrum Lombard. Glossa in hunc loc. sic sonat: « Vel transeundum fore intelligat de fide verborum et spei in fidem rerum et speciei ». Ipsa delibata est ex August., II. Quaest. evang. q. 39. n. 1. seq. Cfr. Enarrat. in Ps. 109. n. 8. et n. 12. seqq. — Edd. perperam in fidem spei.
    Verse 17. In Peter Lombard the Gloss on this passage runs thus: « Or let one understand that there is a passing over from the faith of words and of hope to the faith of realities and of vision ». It itself is excerpted from Augustine, II Questions on the Gospels, q. 39, n. 1 f. Cf. Expositions on the Psalms, on Psalm 109, n. 8 and n. 12 ff. — The editions wrongly read in fidem spei [unto the faith of hope].
  15. Vers. 26. — Seq. locus Scripturae est Rom. 1, 17.
    Verse 26. — The following scriptural passage is Romans 1:17.
  16. In Ioan. Evang. tr. 40. n. 9, et Serm. 43. (alias 27. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 1. n. 1. — Mox pro ipso obiecto fidei edd. obiecto ipsius fidei.
    On the Gospel of John, tract 40, n. 9, and Sermon 43 (otherwise 27, On the Words of the Apostle), c. 1, n. 1. — Soon, in place of ipso obiecto fidei the editions read obiecto ipsius fidei.
  17. Edd. ratio et assensus credulitatis. Paulo inferius pro quia illi sunt codd. A G li qui illi sunt, edd. et illi sunt.
    The editions read ratio et assensus credulitatis [an account and assent of credulity]. A little below, in place of quia illi sunt codices A G li read qui illi sunt, the editions et illi sunt.
  18. Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 64. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.
    Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 64, m. 1; Blessed Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1, sub-question 2.
  19. Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 8. — Subinde pro unius fidei cod. Z eiusdem fidei.
    Cf. above p. 470, note 8. — Thereupon, in place of unius fidei codex Z reads eiusdem fidei.
  20. Vide supra pag. 226, nota 1. — Mox pro habeat cod. Z debeat.
    See above p. 226, note 1. — Soon, in place of habeat codex Z reads debeat.
  21. Codd. Z bb credendo ei adhaerere. Proxime post cod. Z verbo incorporari adiicit eius membris. In textu Magistri (hic c. 4.) legitur: « credendo amare, credendo in eum ire, credendo ei adhaerere et eius membris incorporari », qui quatuor actus etiam circa finem solut. enumerantur.
    Codices Z bb read credendo ei adhaerere [by believing to cleave to him]. Next, after the word incorporari, codex Z adds eius membris [into his members]. In the text of the Master (here c. 4) is read: « by believing to love, by believing to go into him, by believing to cleave to him and to be incorporated into his members », which four acts are also enumerated near the end of the solution.
  22. Edd. supplent ultimum. Post pauca pro genus actus cod. Z genus actuum.
    The editions supply ultimum [ultimate]. After a few words, in place of genus actus codex Z reads genus actuum.
  23. Pro sustinendum edd. exhibent falso fugiendum, et paulo inferius ad effectum pro ad affectum. Subinde pro credendo ire cod. Z (a secunda manu) credendo in eum ire.
    In place of sustinendum [to bear] the editions falsely present fugiendum [to flee], and a little below ad effectum in place of ad affectum. Thereupon, in place of credendo ire codex Z (by a second hand) reads credendo in eum ire.
  24. De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 64. m. 5. a. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.
    On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 64, m. 5, a. 1; Blessed Albert, here a. 7; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2, sub-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2, sub-question 2.
  25. Part. I. q. 3. — De connexione virtutum vide infra d. 36. q. 1. seqq.
    Part I, q. 3. — On the connection of the virtues see below, d. 36, q. 1 ff.
  26. Hic c. 7, ubi sex modi visionis distinguuntur. Libr. XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 6. n. 15. seqq. tria tantum genera visionum distinguuntur, scil. visio corporalis sive sensitiva, spiritualis sive imaginativa, et intellectualis. Glossa ut ordinaria habetur apud Lyranum et etiam apud Petr. Lombard. in II. Cor. 12, 2, ubi Apostolus ad tertium caelum se raptum esse refert, cui relationi Glossa annectit expositionem de triplici caelo, et huic respondentem commemorat triplicem ab Augustino assignatam visionem. — Paulo ante pro non cognoscatur [supple: hoc] codd. K T bb non cognoscitur, cod. A non sequitur cognosci.
    Here c. 7, where six modes of vision are distinguished. In Book XII of On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 6, n. 15 ff., only three kinds of vision are distinguished, namely corporeal or sensitive vision, spiritual or imaginative, and intellectual. The Gloss as the ordinary one is had in Lyra and also in Peter Lombard on 2 Cor. 12:2, where the Apostle reports that he was caught up to the third heaven, to which report the Gloss attaches an exposition on the threefold heaven, and corresponding to this it mentions the threefold vision assigned by Augustine. — A little before, in place of non cognoscatur [supply: this] codices K T bb read non cognoscitur, codex A non sequitur cognosci.
  27. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 7.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 7.
  28. Praepositivus, S. p. III. quaestionem solvens, sciatne aliquis se habere caritatem, ait: Quidam dicunt, quod nemo scit, se habere caritatem; in praedictis auctoritatibus (Rom. 8, 38: Certus sum enim, quia neque mors etc.; II. Cor. 13, 3: An experimentum quaeritis eius, qui in me loquitur Christus etc.; 1. Cor. 7, 40; 11, 28; et August. VIII. de Trin. c. 8. n. 12: Magis enim novit dilectionem, qua diligit, quam fratrem, quem diligit etc.) accipitur scio pro credo. Nobis autem videtur, quod aliquis scit, se habere caritatem, ut Martinus, qui dixit: « Quid hic astas, cruenta bestia? Nihil in me funesti reperies »; et Apostolus, qui dicit: « Scio, quod Spiritum Dei habeam ». Aliqui credunt, se habere, et non habent, ut pharisaeus, qui dicebat: Gratias tibi ago, Domine, quia non sum sicut ceteri homines (Luc. 18, 11.). Aliqui credunt, se non habere, et habent, ut qui conteritur, tamen non credit, illam contritionem esse sufficientem. Et alii credunt, se habere, et habent, ut humiles, qui credunt, se satisfecisse. Quod ergo dicit Iob (1, 21.: « Sive nobiles fuerint filii eius, sive ignobiles, non intelliget »; et 9, 21: « Etiam si simplex fuero, hoc ipsum ignorabit anima mea »); dicimus, quod non loquitur in persona sua, sed in persona hominis generaliter; ita et de Paulo: Nihil mihi conscius etc. (I. Cor. 4, 4.). In auctoritate Augustini (Nemo scit, utrum dilectione dignus sit, an odio) intelligitur: finaliter nemo scit. — Dicit Praepositivus etiam (quae verba hic notentur ad enuntiatum seq.): Item, dilectio est motus animi ad fruendum Deum propter se et proximum propter Deum; ergo potest scire, se habere caritatem. — Paulo superius post qui [Vat. quam] habet codd. M O supplent eam; paulo inferius pro habet anima codd. A U habet suam.
    Praepositivus, Summa p. III, solving the question whether someone knows that he has charity, says: Some say that no one knows that he has charity; in the aforesaid authorities (Rom. 8:38: For I am certain that neither death, etc.; 2 Cor. 13:3: Do you seek a proof of him who speaks in me, Christ, etc.; 1 Cor. 7:40; 11:28; and Augustine VIII On the Trinity, c. 8, n. 12: For he knows the love by which he loves more than the brother whom he loves, etc.) I know is taken for I believe. But to us it seems that someone does know that he has charity, like Martin, who said: « Why do you stand here, bloody beast? You will find nothing deadly in me »; and the Apostle, who says: « I know that I have the Spirit of God ». Some believe that they have it, and do not have it, like the Pharisee, who said: I give you thanks, Lord, that I am not as the rest of men (Luke 18:11). Some believe that they do not have it, and do have it, like one who is contrite, yet does not believe that contrition to be sufficient. And others believe that they have it, and do have it, like the humble, who believe that they have made satisfaction. As for what Job says (1:21: « Whether his sons be noble or ignoble, he will not understand »; and 9:21: « Even if I be simple, my soul will be ignorant of this very thing »); we say that he does not speak in his own person, but in the person of man in general; so too concerning Paul: I am conscious to myself of nothing, etc. (1 Cor. 4:4). In the authority of Augustine (No one knows whether he is worthy of love or of hatred) it is understood: in the end no one knows. — Praepositivus says also (let these words here be noted with reference to the following statement): Likewise, love is a motion of the soul toward enjoying God for his own sake and the neighbor for God's sake; therefore one can know that he has charity. — A little above, after qui [Vat. quam] codices M O supply eam; a little below, in place of habet anima codices A U read habet suam.
  29. Edd. quae non patent. Paulo ante pro et multa cod. K et etiam multa.
    The editions read quae non patent [which do not lie open]. A little before, in place of et multa codex K reads et etiam multa.
  30. Libr. X. c. 5. n. 7. seqq., ubi quaestio proponitur: Ut quid ergo ei [animae sive menti, quae sibi ipsi praesens est et se totam cognoscit] praeceptum est, ut se ipsam cognoscat? Quam quaestionem tractans S. Doctor, praemisso hoc, quod « aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare; neque enim multarum doctrinarum peritum ignorare grammaticam dicimus, cum eam non cogitat, quia de medicinae arte tunc cogitat »; et ostenso, quod error animae de se non inde veniat, quod ipsa sit absens, sed quod rerum sensarum imagines non secernat anima a semelipsa — concludit dicens: Cognoscat ergo semetipsam, nec quasi absentem se quaerat, sed intentionem voluntatis, qua per alia vagabatur, statuat in semetipsam, et se cogitet... Non itaque velut absentem se quaerat cernere, sed praesentem se curet discernere. Nec se, quasi non norit, cognoscat; sed ab eo quod alterum novit, dignoscat etc. (c. 8. n. 11. seq.). Cfr. ibid. XV. c. 14. n. 23.
    Book X, c. 5, n. 7 ff., where the question is proposed: Why, then, is it commanded to it [the soul or mind, which is present to itself and knows itself wholly] that it know itself? Treating this question, the holy Doctor, having premised this, that « it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think about oneself; for we do not say that one skilled in many disciplines is ignorant of grammar, when he is not thinking about it, because he is then thinking about the art of medicine »; and having shown that the soul's error about itself does not come from this, that it is absent, but that the soul does not separate the images of sensed things from itself — concludes saying: Let it therefore know itself, nor let it seek itself as though absent, but let it fix on itself the intention of will by which it was wandering through other things, and let it think about itself... Let it therefore not seek to behold itself as though absent, but take care to discern itself as present. Nor let it know itself as though it did not know it; but from that by which it knows another, let it recognize itself, etc. (c. 8, n. 11 f.). Cf. ibid. XV, c. 14, n. 23.
  31. Libr. X. de Trin. c. 3. n. 5. seqq., et VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 21. n. 28. Ratio, cui S. Doctor innititur, est, quia anima sibi ipsi sit praesens. — Mox pro et sic cognoscuntur, quae verba in non paucis codd. desiderantur, in aliis autem, ut in bb, habentur, edd. et sic cognoscitur, cod. H (a secunda manu) de quorum numero sunt.
    Book X On the Trinity, c. 3, n. 5 ff., and VII On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 21, n. 28. The reason on which the holy Doctor relies is that the soul is present to itself. — Soon, in place of et sic cognoscuntur, which words are lacking in not a few codices, but in others, as in bb, are had, the editions read et sic cognoscitur, codex H (by a second hand) de quorum numero sunt.
  32. Libr. X. de Trin. c. 9. n. 13. seqq. — Paulo inferius pro posuerunt codd. A K ponunt.
    Book X On the Trinity, c. 9, n. 13 ff. — A little below, in place of posuerunt codices A K read ponunt.
  33. Hanc opinionem profitetur B. Albert., hic a. 15. De discretione caritatis Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 6. c. 6. q. 5, dicit: Istae [dilectio naturalis et gratuita] habent tantam affinitatem et coniunctionem inter se, quod non potest aliquis discernere, utrum suum diligere sit motus naturalis dilectionis, vel caritatis. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 3. ratio 2.
    Blessed Albert professes this opinion, here a. 15. On the discernment of charity William of Auxerre, Summa p. III, tr. 6, c. 6, q. 5, says: These [natural and gratuitous love] have so great an affinity and conjunction between themselves that one cannot discern whether his loving is a motion of natural love, or of charity. Cf. I Sentences, d. 17, p. I, q. 3, reason 2.
  34. Cfr. dictum Aristot., supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. arg. 3. ad oppos. allatum. — Paulo superius pro et de eo edd. et ideo de eo. Paulo inferius pro quod reddunt codd. H aa bb quae reddunt, omissa proxime ante vocula sic.
    Cf. the saying of Aristotle cited above, d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, arg. 3, to the opposite. — A little above, in place of et de eo the editions read et ideo de eo. A little below, in place of quod reddunt codices H aa bb read quae reddunt, the little word sic immediately before having been omitted.
  35. Edd. voci experimentum male praefigunt certum.
    The editions wrongly prefix certum to the word experimentum.
  36. Codd. E M P Q cognoscentis. Loco verborum vel a parte medii. Si a parte virtutis cognitivae edd. substituerunt solam voculam et.
    Codices E M P Q read cognoscentis. In place of the words vel a parte medii. Si a parte virtutis cognitivae the editions have substituted only the little word et.
  37. Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 7. — De triplici modo videndi a parte animae cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 4. et II. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. circa finem corp. Vide etiam August., Epist. 147. (alias 112.) c. 16. n. 38. — Paulo ante pro differentem edd. differente.
    Here in the text of the Master, c. 7. — On the threefold mode of seeing on the part of the soul cf. I Sentences, d. 17, p. I, q. 4, and II, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, near the end of the body. See also Augustine, Letter 147 (otherwise 112), c. 16, n. 38. — A little before, in place of differentem the editions read differente.
  38. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 121. (c. 12.): Oportet autem universaliter de omni sensu accipere, quod sensus est id quod est susceptivum formarum sine materia, ut cera anuli sine ferro et auro recipit signum etc. — De imaginationis et intellectus specie vide ibid. text. 156. seqq. et III. text. 6. ac 37. seqq. (III. c. 3. 4. 8.). — Aliquanto inferius pro aut in ratione codd. A K aut sub ratione.
    Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 121 (c. 12): But it must be taken universally concerning every sense, that the sense is that which is receptive of forms without matter, as the wax of the ring receives the impression without the iron and the gold, etc. — On the species of the imagination and of the intellect see ibid. text 156 ff. and III, text 6 and 37 ff. (III, cc. 3, 4, 8). — Somewhat below, in place of aut in ratione codices A K read aut sub ratione.
  39. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4: Si oppositum in opposito, et propositum in proposito erit. — De exemplo albi et nigri cfr. tom. II. pag. 643, nota 9. — Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 25. (c. 6.): Similis ratio in aliis est, ut quomodo malum cognoscit [anima], aut nigrum; contrario enim quodammodo cognoscit. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 7. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 15; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 4: If the opposite [is] in the opposite, the proposed will also be in the proposed. — On the example of white and black cf. vol. II, p. 643, note 9. — Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 25 (c. 6): The account is similar in other cases, as for how [the soul] knows evil, or black; for it knows in a certain way by the contrary. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 7, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 15; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
  40. Locus ab auctoritate, qui inter locos recensetur extrinsecos (i. e. in quibus argumentum sumitur ab eis quae omnino separata sunt a substantia rei) et locus a iudicio (sapientis) vocatur, a Cicerone, Topic. c. 19, describitur sic: « Haec ergo argumentatio, quae dicitur artis expers, in testimonio posita est. Testimonium autem nunc dicimus omne quod ab aliqua re externa sumitur ad faciendam fidem ». Cfr. Boeth., VI. Comment. in Topic. Cicer. circa finem. Idem in II. de Different. topic. maximam huius arg. assignat dicens: « Quod omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus hominibus videtur, ei contradici non oportere ». In Petri Hispan. Summul. tr. de Locis topicis extrinsecis habetur haec maxima: Unicuique experto in sua scientia credendum est.
    The argument from authority, which is reckoned among the extrinsic arguments (i.e. in which the argument is taken from those things which are entirely separated from the substance of the matter) and is called the argument from the judgment (of the wise man), is described by Cicero, Topics c. 19, thus: « This argumentation, therefore, which is called devoid of art, is placed in testimony. But by testimony we now mean everything which is taken from some external thing to produce belief ». Cf. Boethius, VI Commentary on Cicero's Topics, near the end. The same author in II On Topical Differences assigns the maxim of this argument, saying: « That which seems [true] to all or to most or to wise men ought not to be contradicted ». In Peter of Spain's Summulae, the treatise on extrinsic topical arguments, this maxim is had: Everyone expert in his own science is to be believed.
  41. Quibus assentitur B. Albert., hic a. 19. — De fide acquisita et inspirata vide supra a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — Pro intelligitur hic edd. substituunt intelligi potest, et subinde post de fide omittunt cum non paucis codd. quae est.
    With whom Blessed Albert agrees, here a. 19. — On acquired and inspired faith see above a. 2, q. 2, in the body. — In place of intelligitur hic the editions substitute intelligi potest, and thereupon after de fide they omit, with not a few codices, quae est.
  42. Hebr. 11, 1: Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 5. Mox pro formata Vat. inspirata.
    Hebrews 11:1: Now faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing. Cf. above a. 1, q. 5. Soon, in place of formata the Vatican edition reads inspirata.
  43. Hic c. 8.
    Here c. 8.
  44. Pro ei, quod in codd. A H K invenimus, codd. M O ita ei, alii codd. enim, edd. quod sic.
    In place of ei, quod we find in codices A H K, codices M O read ita ei, other codices enim, the editions quod sic.
  45. Epist. II. Petri 1, 21: Non enim voluntate humana allata est aliquando prophetia, sed Spiritu sancto inspirati, locuti sunt sancti Dei homines. — Paulo inferius pro certificatione non pauci codd. certitudine; subinde pro accipimus codd. A H K (N primitus) T U Z bb accepimus.
    2 Peter 1:21: For prophecy was not at any time brought by human will, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit. — A little below, in place of certificatione not a few codices read certitudine; thereupon, in place of accipimus codices A H K (N originally) T U Z bb read accepimus.
  46. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 5. ad 2. — Cfr. de hoc dub. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 1. a. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 19.
    Cf. above a. 1, q. 5, to 2. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 68, m. 1, a. 2; Blessed Albert, here a. 19.
  47. In Comment. in I. Cor. 8, 2. (inter opera Ambrosii) caritas dicitur « mater omnium bonorum »; in Comment. in Rom. 11, 1. « quasi mater animarum », in Precat. II. pro praeparat. ad Missam, n. 5. « fundamentum omnium virtutum et bonorum ». Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. et 8.
    In the Commentary on 1 Cor. 8:2 (among the works of Ambrose) charity is called « the mother of all good things »; in the Commentary on Rom. 11:1, « as it were the mother of souls », in the second Prayer in preparation for Mass, n. 5, « the foundation of all virtues and good things ». See here the text of the Master, cc. 3 and 8.
  48. Psalm. 36, 1. Glossa, quae hic allegatur, spectat ad v. 3: Spera in Domino etc. Habetur apud Lombard. et sumta est ex Cassiodoro, qui verba illa commentans ait: Hoc [scil. sperare] introitus fidei, hoc initium salutis est. — Sententia Magistri habetur hic in lit. c. 8. seq.
    Psalm 36:1. The Gloss which is cited here regards v. 3: Hope in the Lord, etc. It is had in Lombard and is taken from Cassiodorus, who, commenting on those words, says: This [namely to hope] is the entrance of faith, this is the beginning of salvation. — The opinion of the Master is had here in the text, c. 8 f.
  49. Ut ostendetur infra d. 36. q. 1.
    As will be shown below, d. 36, q. 1.
  50. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et infra d. 26. a. 2. q. 3.
    Cf. above a. 1, q. 1, in the body, and below d. 26, a. 2, q. 3.
  51. Vide infra d. 36. q. 6. — Paulo superius voci virtutum cod. A praemittit omnium.
    See below, d. 36, q. 6. — A little above, codex A prefixes omnium to the word virtutum.
  52. Plurimi codd. videlicet [cod. aa omittit videlicet] per ipsam beatissimam visionem. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 9. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 21; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 5; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 4. quaestiunc. 3. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3.
    Most codices read videlicet [codex aa omits videlicet] per ipsam beatissimam visionem. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 68, m. 9, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 21; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 5; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 4, sub-question 3, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 3.
← Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 5