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Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 28

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum ex caritate diligendi sint mali homines.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendi sint mali homines. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Matthaei quinto1: Diligite inimicos vestros etc.; sed qui odit iustos absque dubio est iniquus et malus: ergo si talis est ex caritate diligendus iuxta mandatum dominicum, mali homines ex caritate diligendi sunt.

2. Item, omnes praedestinati diligendi sunt ex caritate; sed multi, qui sunt mali, sunt praedestinati: ergo aliqui mali ex caritate diligendi sunt. Sed nescimus, qui sint praedestinati, qui praesciti, dum in via sunt: ergo omnes mali sunt ex caritate diligendi.

3. Item, omnes, pro quibus est orandum, sunt ex caritate diligendi; sed orandum est pro peccatoribus: ergo tales ex caritate sunt diligendi.

4. Item, perfectissima caritas fuit in Christo; sed Christus, cum essemus iniusti et peccatores, dilexit nos2: si ergo omnis amor rectus debet caritatem Christi imitari, tunc videtur, quod peccatores et impii ex caritate sint diligendi.

Sed contra: 1. In Psalmo3: Nonne qui oderunt te, Domine, oderam, et super inimicos tuos tabescebam? sed omnes viri iniusti Deum offendunt et ipsi Deo inimicantur: ergo omnes peccatores odiendi sunt: non ergo ex caritate diligendi.

2. Item, caritas facit voluntatem nostram conformem voluntati divinae; sed peccatores et iniusti sunt Deo odibiles, secundum illud Ecclesiastici duodecimo4: Altissimus odio habet peccatores; et illud: Similiter abominabilis est Deo impius et impietas eius: ergo videtur, quod secundum legem caritatis mali sunt odiendi: non ergo ex caritate diligendi.

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3. Item, « in contrariis sequitur consequentia in ipso5 », et sicut se habet bonitas ad dilectionem, sic malitia ad odium; sed haec est per se vera: boni sunt diligendi, ergo et haec: mali sunt odiendi; sed odiendum non est diligendum: ergo mali non sunt ex caritate diligendi.

4. Item, caritas est vinculum unitatis6: ergo illi soli sunt ex caritate diligendi, qui sunt ex unitate corporis mystici; sed mali non sunt de unitate corporis mystici: ergo non sunt diligendi ex caritate.

Conclusio. Mali homines ex caritate diligendi sunt, quatenus sunt homines ad imaginem Dei facti et beatitudinis capaces; quatenus autem sunt mali, potius detestandi sunt quam diligendi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de malis hominibus dupliciter contingit loqui et dupliciter etiam eos contingit considerare: vel in quantum sunt homines, vel in quantum sunt mali; sive in quantum habent in se rationem divinae imaginis, secundum quam sunt capaces beatitudinis, vel in quantum carent perfectione divinae similitudinis.

Si primo modo consideremus homines malos, in quantum videlicet sunt homines et ad Dei imaginem, secundum quam sunt capaces beatitudinis; sic ex caritate diligendi sunt, pro eo quod liberalitas caritatis et eius amplitudo omnes recolligit7, qui ad illam summam beatitudinem habent idoneitatem. — Si vero consideremus homines malos, secundum quod mali sunt et privati perfectione divinae similitudinis; sic potius sunt detestandi quam diligendi. Et sic iidem homines et odiendi sunt et diligendi: odiendi quidem ratione inordinationis culpae, diligendi vero ratione ordinationis naturae, quae possibilis est ad perfectionem gratiae. Et hoc est quod dicit Gregorius in quadam Homilia8, « quod etsi indignationem debemus vitiis, compassionem debemus naturae ». Et Isidorus in libro de Virtutibus9: « Totum Christum non diligit qui hominem odit; bonum est non odire naturam, sed culpam ». Licet ergo malorum culpam odiamus, ipsos tamen diligere debemus. — Et sic concedendum est, quod licet malorum hominum malitia sit detestanda, ipsi tamen mali homines, in quantum sunt ad beatitudinem ordinati, sunt ex caritate diligendi. Unde et rationes, quae ad hoc inducuntur, concedi possunt.

Ad oppositorum solutionem: 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod Propheta odio habebat odientes Deum; dicendum, quod Propheta non odiebat naturam, sed eorum culpam; propter quod subiungit: Perfecto odio oderam illos10; Glossa: « id est, iniquitates eorum odivi, non naturam; hoc est enim perfecto odio odisse, ut nec propter vitia homines oderis, nec propter homines vitia diligas ».

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus odit peccatores; iam patet responsio: quia Deus non odit eos ratione naturae, sed ratione vitii. Licet enim ratione vitii puniantur a divina iustitia, ratione tamen naturae ad bonum ordinatae foventur et attrahuntur a divina misericordia, secundum illud quod dicitur ad Romanos quinto11: Commendat autem caritatem suam Deus in nobis, quia, cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est; sic enim Deus dilexit mundum, ut dicitur Ioannis tertio, ut Filium suum unigenitum etc.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod « si propositum de proposito, et oppositum de opposito12 »; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, intelligendo per se; et ideo in ratione illa est duplex defectus. Primum, quia boni homines sunt diligendi, non solum quia boni, sed etiam quia ad bonum ordinati, sive non solum quia boni in actu, sed etiam quia boni in aptitudine et habilitate; et ideo non sequitur, quod mali sint odiendi, quia mali, etsi non sint boni in actu, sunt tamen boni in aptitudine13. Praeterea, esto quod hoc sit verum, quod boni, in quantum boni, sunt diligendi; ex hoc non sequitur, nisi quod mali, in quantum mali, sunt odiendi. Et hoc quidem verum est; sed ex hoc ulterius non est inferendum, quod mali homines non sunt diligendi, quia, quamvis sit in eis malitia culpae, quae est ratio odiendi, est tamen in eis bonitas naturae, quae est ratio diligendi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est vinculum unitatis; dicendum, quod vinculum dilectionis, licet respiciat duo extrema, unum tamen illorum respicit sicut subiectum, alterum autem sicut

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terminum; nec oportet, quod utrumque respiciat sicut subiectum, nisi ubi reperitur perfecta ratio unionis. Quoniam ergo habens caritatem est de unitate corporis14, alius vero actu malus potest esse de unitate corporis illius, quamvis actu non sit; hinc est, quod caritas potest esse in uno respectu alterius, pro eo quod vinculum amicitiae ad sui esse non necessario exigit extremorum mutuam coniunctionem; multi enim diligunt, qui non diliguntur. Unde ad hoc, quod caritas sit vinculum unionis, non oportet, quod ponat utrumque extremorum in actu uniendi; sed sufficit, quod ponat unum in actu, scilicet subiectum, in quo est, reliquum vero in habitu, scilicet obiectum, sicut scientia ponit scientem in actu, scibile vero ponit in habitu15.

Scholion

I. Antiqui doctores in solvenda hac quaestione iisdem principiis et distinctionibus utuntur et etiam in conclusione consentiunt. De dilectione inimicorum speciali quaestione diffuse agitur infra d. 30. q. 4. — De hac (3.) quaestione distincte tractant: S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. II. II. q. 25. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3.

II. Etiam in sequenti (4.) quaestione et obiectionibus solvendis theologi idem omnes sentiunt. — Observatione digna est doctrina (in corp.), quod triplici modo aliquid possit esse beatum. — De eadem quaestione specialiter agunt: S. Thom., hic a. 7; S. loc. cit. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether evil men are to be loved out of charity.

Thirdly it is asked whether evil men are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems.

1. Matthew the fifth1: Love your enemies etc.; but he who hates the just is without doubt iniquitous and evil: therefore if such a one is to be loved out of charity according to the dominical command, evil men are to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, all the predestined are to be loved out of charity; but many who are evil are predestined: therefore some evil men are to be loved out of charity. But we do not know who are the predestined and who the foreknown, while they are on the way: therefore all evil men are to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, all those for whom one ought to pray are to be loved out of charity; but one ought to pray for sinners: therefore such persons are to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, the most perfect charity was in Christ; but Christ, while we were unjust and sinners, loved us2: if therefore every right love ought to imitate the charity of Christ, then it seems that sinners and the impious are to be loved out of charity.

On the contrary: 1. In the Psalm3: Did not I hate them, O Lord, that hated thee, and pined away because of thy enemies? but all unjust men offend God and are themselves enemies to God: therefore all sinners are to be hated: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, charity makes our will conformed to the divine will; but sinners and the unjust are hateful to God, according to that of Ecclesiasticus the twelfth4: The Most High hates sinners; and that: In like manner the impious man and his impiety are abominable to God: therefore it seems that according to the law of charity the evil are to be hated: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, « in contraries the consequence follows in the same way5 », and as goodness stands to love, so malice stands to hatred; but this is true of itself: the good are to be loved, therefore also this: the evil are to be hated; but what is to be hated is not to be loved: therefore the evil are not to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, charity is the bond of unity6: therefore those alone are to be loved out of charity who are of the unity of the mystical body; but the evil are not of the unity of the mystical body: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

Conclusion. Evil men are to be loved out of charity, inasmuch as they are men made to the image of God and capable of beatitude; but inasmuch as they are evil, they are rather to be detested than loved.

I respond: It must be said that one may speak of evil men in two ways, and one may also consider them in two ways: either inasmuch as they are men, or inasmuch as they are evil; that is, inasmuch as they have in themselves the character of the divine image, according to which they are capable of beatitude, or inasmuch as they lack the perfection of the divine likeness.

If we consider evil men in the first way, namely inasmuch as they are men and to the image of God, according to which they are capable of beatitude; then they are to be loved out of charity, because the liberality of charity and its amplitude gathers up all7 who have the aptitude for that highest beatitude. — But if we consider evil men according as they are evil and deprived of the perfection of the divine likeness; then they are rather to be detested than loved. And thus the same men are both to be hated and to be loved: to be hated indeed by reason of the disorder of fault, but to be loved by reason of the ordering of nature, which is capable of the perfection of grace. And this is what Gregory says in a certain Homily8, « that although we owe indignation to vices, we owe compassion to nature ». And Isidore in the book On the Virtues9: « He does not love the whole Christ who hates the man; it is good not to hate nature, but fault ». Therefore although we hate the fault of the evil, we ought nevertheless to love them. — And thus it must be conceded that, although the malice of evil men is to be detested, yet the evil men themselves, inasmuch as they are ordered to beatitude, are to be loved out of charity. Hence also the reasons which are brought forward for this can be conceded.

To the solution of the opposing arguments: 1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the Prophet held in hatred those who hate God; it must be said that the Prophet did not hate nature, but their fault; on account of which he adds: With a perfect hatred I hated them10; the Gloss: « that is, I hated their iniquities, not their nature; for this is to hate with a perfect hatred, that you neither hate men on account of their vices, nor love vices on account of men ».

2. To that which is objected, that God hates sinners; the response is already clear: because God does not hate them by reason of nature, but by reason of vice. For although by reason of vice they are punished by the divine justice, yet by reason of nature, ordered to the good, they are cherished and drawn by the divine mercy, according to that which is said to the Romans the fifth11: But God commends his charity towards us, because, when as yet we were sinners, Christ died for us; for so God loved the world, as is said in John the third, that he gave his only-begotten Son etc.

3. To that which is objected, that « if the proposed of the proposed, then the opposite of the opposite12 »; it must be said that this holds true when understood of itself; and therefore in that reasoning there is a twofold defect. First, because good men are to be loved not only because they are good, but also because they are ordered to the good, that is, not only because they are good in act, but also because they are good in aptitude and capacity; and therefore it does not follow that the evil are to be hated, because the evil, even if they are not good in act, are nevertheless good in aptitude13. Moreover, granted that this be true, that the good, inasmuch as they are good, are to be loved; from this it follows only that the evil, inasmuch as they are evil, are to be hated. And this indeed is true; but from this it is not further to be inferred that evil men are not to be loved, because, although there is in them the malice of fault, which is the ground of hatred, there is nevertheless in them the goodness of nature, which is the ground of love.

4. To that which is objected, that charity is the bond of unity; it must be said that the bond of love, although it regards two extremes, yet regards one of them as subject, but the other as

terminus; nor is it necessary that it regard both as subject, except where a perfect character of union is found. Since therefore one having charity is of the unity of the body14, but another, actually evil, can be of the unity of that body, although he is not so in act; hence it is that charity can be in one with respect to another, because the bond of friendship does not necessarily require for its being the mutual conjunction of the extremes; for many love who are not loved. Hence, for charity to be the bond of union, it is not necessary that it place both of the extremes in the act of uniting; but it suffices that it place one in act, namely the subject in which it is, and the other in habit, namely the object, just as knowledge places the knower in act, but places the knowable in habit15.

Scholion

I. The ancient doctors in solving this question use the same principles and distinctions and also agree in the conclusion. On the love of enemies a special question is treated at length below, d. 30, q. 4. — On this (3rd) question treat distinctly: St. Thomas, here a. 4; S. II–II, q. 25, a. 6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3.

II. Also in the following (4th) question and in solving the objections all the theologians think the same. — Worthy of note is the teaching (in the body) that in a threefold manner something may be blessed. — On the same question they treat specially: St. Thomas, here a. 7; St. [Thomas] loc. cit. a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 44. — Mox pro iniquus codd. A K iniustus. (P. 626, n. 6.)
    Verse 44. — Soon for iniquus ("iniquitous") codices A K read iniustus ("unjust"). (P. 626, n. 6.)
  2. Respicitur Rom. 5, 8. seqq.; Ioan. 4, 10. et 19. (P. 626, n. 7.)
    Reference is to Rom. 5:8 ff.; John 4:10 and 19. (P. 626, n. 7.)
  3. Psalm. 138, 21. — Post pauca pro inimicantur edd. iniuriantur. (P. 626, n. 8.)
    Psalm 138:21. — A little after, for inimicantur ("are enemies") the editions read iniuriantur ("do injury"). (P. 626, n. 8.)
  4. Vers. 3. — Seq. Script. locus est Sap. 14, 9: Similiter autem odio sunt Deo impius etc. (P. 626, n. 9.)
    Verse 3. — The following Scripture passage is Wisdom 14:9: In like manner the impious and his impiety are hateful to God etc. (P. 626, n. 9.)
  5. Vide supra pag. 570, nota 2. — Verba in ipso, et desiderantur in edd. (P. 627, n. 1.)
    See above p. 570, note 2. — The words in ipso ("in the same way") and [the following] are wanting in the editions. (P. 627, n. 1.)
  6. Cod. Z unionis. Deinde pro ex unitate edd. de unitate. (P. 627, n. 2.)
    Codex Z reads unionis ("of union"). Then for ex unitate the editions read de unitate ("of the unity"). (P. 627, n. 2.)
  7. De amplitudine caritatis, omnes in sinu amoris recipientis, cfr. Gregor., II. in Ezech. hom. 2. n. 15. (P. 627, n. 3.)
    On the amplitude of charity, receiving all into the bosom of love, cf. Gregory, II On Ezekiel, homily 2, n. 15. (P. 627, n. 3.)
  8. Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 33. n. 3: Quia distrionem [districtionem] debemus vitiis, compassionem naturae. — Aliquanto superius pro ordinationis naturae, quam lectionem ex codd. A K restituimus, edd. ordinabilitatis naturae, codd. B D Z et ordine naturae; alii codd., voce ordinationis omissa, ratione naturae. (P. 627, n. 4.)
    Book II of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 33, n. 3: Because we owe severity to vices, compassion to nature. — Somewhat above, for ordinationis naturae ("the ordering of nature"), which reading we have restored from codices A K, the editions read ordinabilitatis naturae, codices B D Z et ordine naturae; other codices, the word ordinationis omitted, ratione naturae. (P. 627, n. 4.)
  9. Sive II. Sent. c. 3. n. 7. seq.: Totum ergo Christum non diligit qui hominem odit. Bonorum discretionis est non odire [culpam]. (P. 627, n. 5.)
    Or Sentences II, c. 3, n. 7 f.: Therefore he does not love the whole Christ who hates the man. It belongs to the discernment of good men not to hate [the fault]. (P. 627, n. 5.)
  10. Psalm. 138, 22. — Glossa formata est ex verbis August., Enarrat. in hunc loc. n. 28: Quid est perfecto odio? Oderam in eis iniquitates eorum, diligebam conditionem tuam. Hoc est perfecto odio etc. (P. 627, n. 6.)
    Psalm 138:22. — The Gloss is formed from the words of Augustine, Enarration on this passage, n. 28: What is "with a perfect hatred"? I hated in them their iniquities, I loved your creation. This is "with a perfect hatred" etc. (P. 627, n. 6.)
  11. Vers. 8. — Seq. testimonium est Ioan. 3, 16. (P. 627, n. 7.)
    Verse 8. — The following testimony is John 3:16. (P. 627, n. 7.)
  12. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4. Cfr. supra pag. 505, nota 1, ubi pro de proposito et pro de opposito textus origin. et etiam edd. in proposito et in opposito. Inferius pro Primum codd. O Z au Primus. (P. 627, n. 8.)
    Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 4. Cf. above p. 505, note 1, where for de proposito and for de opposito the original text and also the editions read in proposito et in opposito. Below, for Primum codices O Z read Primus. (P. 627, n. 8.)
  13. Edd. addunt et habilitate; et mox pro ex hoc non sequitur exhibent ex hoc tamen non sequitur. (P. 627, n. 9.)
    The editions add et habilitate ("and capacity"); and soon, for ex hoc non sequitur ("from this it does not follow") they exhibit ex hoc tamen non sequitur ("from this, however, it does not follow"). (P. 627, n. 9.)
  14. Cod. W supplet mystici. Subinde pro actu malus edd. cum paucis codd. actu non habens caritatem. (P. 628, n. 1.)
    Codex W supplies mystici ("mystical"). Thereupon for actu malus ("actually evil") the editions, with a few codices, read actu non habens caritatem ("not actually having charity"). (P. 628, n. 1.)
  15. Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de his quae ad aliquid, ubi mediante eodem exemplo monstratur, quod non in omnibus, quae sunt ad aliquid, verum videatur, ipsa esse simul natura. (P. 628, n. 2.)
    Cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On those things which are toward something [relatives], where by means of the same example it is shown that it does not seem true in all things which are toward something that they are by nature simultaneous. (P. 628, n. 2.)
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