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Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 28

Textus Latinus
p. 624

QUAESTIO II. Utrum ex caritate diligendi sint daemones.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendi sint daemones. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Levitici decimo nono2: Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum; Glossa: «Proximus non propinquitate sanguinis intelligendus est, sed societate rationis»; sed daemones sunt rationales: ergo daemones sunt proximi nostri. Si ergo proximi sunt ex caritate diligendi, videtur, quod et daemones.

2. Item, ratio diligendi proximum est, quia est ad Dei imaginem3; sed haec est in daemonibus reperire: ergo cum in eis reperiatur ratio diligendi, videtur, quod eos debeamus ex caritate diligere.

3. Item, Angeli, antequam peccarent, ex caritate diligendi erant, propter ea quae habebant in se; sed Dionysius4 dicit, quod «daemones habent sibi data integra et splendidissima»: ergo si tunc ex caritate diligendi erant propter ea quae tunc habebant, pari ratione videtur, quod nunc debeamus ex caritate eos diligere.

4. Item, ex caritate debemus diligere quaecumque faciunt ad cumulum nostri meriti; sed daemones nos tentantes et vexantes faciunt ad nostri meriti cumulum: ergo videtur, quod ex caritate diligendi sunt.

Item, ex caritate diligendum est omne quod facit ad Dei honorem et decorem divinae iustitiae; sed daemones de caelo deiecti et poenis subiecti faciunt ad manifestationem decoris divinae iustitiae: ergo videtur, quod sint ex caritate diligendi. Prima sic probatur: quia caritas diligit beatitudinem et appetit beatificari5; ideo diligit omne illud, quod est ad beatitudinem ordinatum: ergo pari ratione, cum

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caritas diligat Dei honorem et laudem, diligit omne illud quod facit ad amplificationem laudis divinae. Minor est manifesta per se.

Sed contra: 1. In mandato dilectionis proximi praecipitur, ut homo diligat proximum sicut se ipsum; quod exponens Augustinus6 dicit: «Sicut te ipsum, id est ad quod te ipsum»; nos ipsos autem debemus diligere ad summi Boni participationem: si ergo daemones ad hanc non possunt pervenire, videtur, quod non sint diligendi ex caritate.

2. Item, super illud Lucae decimo7: Quis tibi videtur proximus esse? Glossa: «Proximus est cui impenditur, vel qui impendit misericordiam»; sed daemones non sunt tales: ergo non sunt diligendi ex caritate.

3. Item, Augustinus, octavo de Trinitate8: «Qui diligit homines, vel quia iusti sunt, vel ut iusti sint, amare debet»; sed daemones non sunt iusti nec possunt esse iusti: ergo non sunt ex caritate amandi.

4. Item, curia caelestis daemones non diligit, quin potius odit et detestatur: ergo si in eis est caritas maxime perfecta, et tanto perfectior est in via, quanto conformior est illis qui sunt in patria; videtur, quod nulla caritas se ad daemonum dilectionem extendere debeat.

5. Item, nihil est caritatis vinculo amplectendum, quod est perpetualiter separatum ab his quae9 caritate ligantur; sed daemones a membris Christi sunt sempiternaliter separati: ergo nullo modo sunt ex caritate diligendi.

Conclusio. Daemones et damnati non sunt diligendi ex caritate elicitive et proprie; sumendo caritatem large, sive ex caritate imperante, ratione naturae sunt diligendi, ratione culpae odiendi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut irrationalia ex caritate non sunt diligenda elicitive, quia non sunt ordinata ad illius summi Boni assecutionem, quod suis dilectis caritas optat; sic daemones, quia sunt obstinati in malitia et impossibiles effecti ad perveniendum in beatitudinem aeternam, diligendi non sunt ex caritate elicitive. — Caritas enim nullos facit diligere elicitive, nisi eos quos optat ad summam beatitudinem pervenire. Nullos autem optat pervenire ad illam supernam beatitudinem, cum moveatur rationabiliter et discrete, nisi eos qui sunt habiles ad perveniendum et secundum ordinem naturae et secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae. Quoniam ergo daemones, etsi sint apti nati per naturam felicitari et in Deo beatificari, quia tamen divina iustitia repugnat, per quam sunt damnati ad sempiternam miseriam; hinc est, quod caritas summum Bonum eisdem non optat. Et ideo concedendum est, quod daemones non sunt ex caritate diligendi.

Eodem etiam modo dicendum est de damnatis, secundum quod ex caritate diligere accipitur proprie. Si vero ex caritate diligere accipiatur large, prout actus diligendi est ex caritate imperante10; sic daemones quodam modo sunt diligendi et quodam modo odiendi: odiendi ratione culpae, qua sunt Deo dissimiles, diligendi ratione naturae. Imago enim summi Regis, secundum naturam suam considerata, quantum est de se, pulcra est et formosa et naturali affectu amabilis a consimili natura11. — Verumtamen, quia habens caritatem multum detestatur eorum culpam; et culpa eorum totaliter et inseparabiliter possidet eorum naturam: hinc est, quod caritas magis movet affectum naturalem ad diligendum creaturas irrationales quam ad diligendum daemones. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod daemones non sunt diligendi ex caritate.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod proximus est qui communicat in ratione; dicendum, quod communicare in ratione est dupliciter: vel secundum ipsius rationis naturam puram, vel secundum ordinem et habilitatem ipsius ad gratiam. Dico ergo, quod proximitas secundum rationis naturam non est sufficiens ad hoc, quod aliquis dicatur esse proximus respectu actus diligendi; dilectio enim gratuita respicit ordinem12 ad gratiam. Et quoniam daemones hac proximitate carent, quia redditi sunt ad gratiam impossibiles; ideo sub nomine proximorum non continentur. Et ideo ex illa ratione non sequitur, quod diligendi sint ex caritate.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago est ratio diligendi in creatura13; dicendum, quod imago non est sufficiens ratio diligendi, nisi in quantum

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est ordinata ad gratiam et gloriam, ad quam ordinat caritas. Et quia hoc modo non est in daemonibus, immo omnino deordinata; ideo non cogit illa ratio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod angeli, antequam peccarent, ex caritate erant diligendi; dicendum, quod hoc erat, quia tunc habilitatem et idoneitatem habebant ad assequendum gloriam; sed hanc non habuerunt post lapsum: et ideo non sunt nunc, sicut tunc, ex caritate diligendi. Et si tu obiicias, quod «habent sibi data integra et splendidissima»; dicendum, quod illud dicitur quantum ad potentias respectu naturalium operationum, non autem quantum ad habilitates earundem respectu gratuitarum. Inhabiles enim facti sunt ad bene faciendum: tales enim habilitates corrumpuntur per peccatum, secundum quod vult Augustinus, et in secundo libro1 fuit ostensum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid facit ad cumulum nostri meriti, est ex caritate diligendum; dicendum, quod hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum principalem intentionem, vel per occasionem. Quamvis ergo praedicta propositio veritatem possit habere de eo quod facit ad cumulum nostri meriti secundum principalem intentionem et primariam ordinationem; de eo tamen, quod facit ad cumulum meriti per occasionem, non oportet habere veritatem, quia ex multis malis et peccatis Deus viris iustis elicit bona; et hoc modo daemones faciunt ad nostri meriti promotionem, quia, dum intendunt nos pervertere ad peccatum, virtute divina eorum exercitium convertitur viris iustis et sanctis ad meriti additamentum2.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod omne quod facit ad Dei honorem et decorem iustitiae, est diligendum ex caritate; dicendum, quod sicut ex praecedentibus3 patet, si proprie accipiatur diligere ex caritate, propositio non habet veritatem. Et si tu obiicias, quod ordinatum ad beatitudinem est diligendum ex caritate, ergo similiter ordinatum ad laudem; dicendum, quod dupliciter est aliquid ordinatum ad beatitudinem: aut quia ipsum de se ordinatum est, ut perveniat ad beatitudinem; aut quia per ipsum aliud ordinatum est pervenire. Et quod primo modo ordinatum est ad beatitudinem, diligendum est ex caritate; quod secundo modo ordinatum est, non debet diligi ex caritate, accipiendo proprie4. — Similiter aliquid ordinatum ad laudem Dei potest esse dupliciter: aut quia ipsum laudat et magnificat Deum et gloriatur in laude Dei, aut quia est materia laudis divinae. Et quod primo modo ordinatum est ad Dei laudem ex caritate diligendum est; quod vero secundo modo ordinatum est, non oportet, quod diligatur ex caritate, nisi dicatur diligi ex caritate imperante. Caritas enim imperat homini, ut velit, omne illud esse in universo, quod excitat virum iustum ad laudandum et magnificandum Deum suum5.

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English Translation

QUESTION II. Whether demons are to be loved out of charity.

Secondly it is asked whether demons are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems.

1. Leviticus, nineteenth chapter2: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself; the Gloss: «The neighbor is to be understood not by closeness of blood, but by the fellowship of reason»; but demons are rational: therefore demons are our neighbors. If then neighbors are to be loved out of charity, it seems that demons are too.

2. Likewise, the ground for loving the neighbor is that he is unto the image of God3; but this is to be found in demons: therefore since the ground for loving is found in them, it seems that we ought to love them out of charity.

3. Likewise, the Angels, before they sinned, were to be loved out of charity, on account of those things which they had in themselves; but Dionysius4 says that «demons have the things given to them whole and most splendid»: therefore if they were then to be loved out of charity on account of those things which they then had, by parity of reasoning it seems that we ought now to love them out of charity.

4. Likewise, we ought to love out of charity whatever things contribute to the increase of our merit; but demons, by tempting and vexing us, contribute to the increase of our merit: therefore it seems that they are to be loved out of charity.

Likewise, everything that contributes to the honor of God and the adornment of divine justice is to be loved out of charity; but demons, cast down from heaven and subjected to punishments, contribute to the manifestation of the adornment of divine justice: therefore it seems that they are to be loved out of charity. The first [premise] is proved thus: because charity loves beatitude and desires to be beatified5; therefore it loves everything which is ordered to beatitude: therefore by parity of reasoning, since

charity loves the honor and praise of God, it loves everything which contributes to the amplification of the divine praise. The minor is manifest of itself.

On the contrary: 1. In the commandment of love of neighbor it is commanded that a man love his neighbor as himself; expounding which Augustine6 says: «As thyself, that is, unto that unto which thyself»; but we ought to love ourselves unto participation in the supreme Good: if then demons cannot attain to this, it seems that they are not to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, upon that passage of Luke, tenth chapter7: Who seems to thee to be neighbor? the Gloss: «The neighbor is he to whom mercy is shown, or who shows mercy»; but demons are not such: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, Augustine, eighth book On the Trinity8: «He who loves men ought to love them either because they are just, or that they may be just»; but demons are not just nor can they be just: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, the heavenly court does not love demons, but rather hates and detests them: therefore if charity is most perfect in them, and is so much the more perfect on the way insofar as it is more conformed to those who are in the fatherland; it seems that no charity ought to extend itself to the love of demons.

5. Likewise, nothing is to be embraced by the bond of charity which is perpetually separated from those things which9 are bound by charity; but demons are everlastingly separated from the members of Christ: therefore in no way are they to be loved out of charity.

Conclusion. Demons and the damned are not to be loved out of charity elicitively and properly; taking charity broadly, that is, out of commanding charity, they are to be loved by reason of nature, hated by reason of fault.

I respond: It must be said that just as irrational things are not to be loved out of charity elicitively, because they are not ordered to the attainment of that supreme Good which charity desires for its beloved; so demons, because they are obstinate in malice and rendered incapable of attaining eternal beatitude, are not to be loved out of charity elicitively. — For charity makes none be loved elicitively except those whom it desires to attain to supreme beatitude. But it desires none to attain to that supernal beatitude, since it is moved rationally and discreetly, except those who are fit for attaining it both according to the order of nature and according to the order of divine justice. Therefore since demons, although they are by nature apt to be made happy and beatified in God, yet because divine justice resists, by which they are damned to everlasting misery; hence it is that charity does not desire the supreme Good for them. And therefore it must be granted that demons are not to be loved out of charity.

In the same way too it must be said of the damned, according as to love out of charity is taken properly. But if to love out of charity be taken broadly, inasmuch as the act of loving is from commanding charity10; thus demons are in a certain way to be loved and in a certain way to be hated: to be hated by reason of fault, by which they are unlike God, to be loved by reason of nature. For the image of the supreme King, considered according to its own nature, as far as it is of itself, is fair and beautiful and by natural affection lovable to a like nature11. — Nevertheless, because one having charity greatly detests their fault; and their fault totally and inseparably possesses their nature: hence it is that charity moves the natural affection more toward loving irrational creatures than toward loving demons. — Therefore the reasons showing that demons are not to be loved out of charity are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that the neighbor is he who shares in reason; it must be said that to share in reason is twofold: either according to the pure nature of reason itself, or according to its order and fitness toward grace. I say therefore that proximity according to the nature of reason is not sufficient for this, that someone be called a neighbor in respect of the act of loving; for gratuitous love regards the order12 toward grace. And since demons lack this proximity, because they have been rendered incapable of grace; therefore they are not contained under the name of neighbors. And therefore from that reasoning it does not follow that they are to be loved out of charity.

2. To that which is objected, that the image is the ground for loving in a creature13; it must be said that the image is not a sufficient ground for loving, except insofar as

it is ordered to grace and glory, to which charity orders. And because in this way it is not in demons, but rather wholly disordered; therefore that reasoning does not compel.

3. To that which is objected, that the angels, before they sinned, were to be loved out of charity; it must be said that this was because they then had the fitness and suitability for attaining glory; but this they did not have after the fall: and therefore they are not now, as then, to be loved out of charity. And if you object that «they have the things given to them whole and most splendid»; it must be said that that is said as regards their powers in respect of natural operations, but not as regards the fitnesses of the same in respect of gratuitous ones. For they were rendered unfit for doing well: for such fitnesses are corrupted by sin, according as Augustine holds, and was shown in the second book1.

4. To that which is objected, that whatever contributes to the increase of our merit is to be loved out of charity; it must be said that this can be twofold: either according to principal intention, or by occasion. Although therefore the aforesaid proposition can have truth concerning that which contributes to the increase of our merit according to principal intention and primary ordination; nevertheless concerning that which contributes to the increase of merit by occasion, it need not have truth, because out of many evils and sins God draws forth goods for just men; and in this way demons contribute to the furtherance of our merit, because, while they intend to pervert us to sin, by divine power their exertion is turned to just and holy men unto the increase of merit2.

5. To that which is last objected, that everything which contributes to the honor of God and the adornment of justice is to be loved out of charity; it must be said that, as is plain from the foregoing3, if to love out of charity be taken properly, the proposition does not have truth. And if you object that what is ordered to beatitude is to be loved out of charity, therefore likewise what is ordered to praise; it must be said that a thing is ordered to beatitude in two ways: either because it of itself is ordered to attain beatitude; or because through it something else is ordered to attain it. And what is ordered to beatitude in the first way is to be loved out of charity; what is ordered in the second way is not to be loved out of charity, taking it properly4. — Likewise a thing ordered to the praise of God can be twofold: either because it itself praises and magnifies God and glories in the praise of God, or because it is the matter of the divine praise. And what is ordered to the praise of God in the first way is to be loved out of charity; but what is ordered in the second way, it is not necessary that it be loved out of charity, unless it be said to be loved out of commanding charity. For charity commands a man to will that everything be in the universe which arouses the just man to praise and magnify his God5.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 18, qui versus in Vulgata sic sonat: Dilige amicum tuum sicut te ipsum. S. Bonav. versum istum hic exhibet secundum translationem Septuaginta interpretum. Glossa delibata est ex August., Epist. 155. (alias 52.) ad Maced. c. 4. n. 14, ubi s. Doctor illud Matth. 22, 40: In his duobus praeceptis etc. exponens ait: Proximus sane hoc loco non sanguinis propinquitate, sed rationis societate pensandus est, in qua socii sunt omnes homines. — Pro propinquitate, quae lectio et in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 63. a. 2. habetur, edd. cum plurimis codd. proprietate. (P. 624, n. 2.)
    Verse 18, which verse in the Vulgate sounds thus: Love thy friend as thyself. St. Bonaventure here gives this verse according to the translation of the Septuagint interpreters. The Gloss is drawn from Augustine, Epist. 155 (otherwise 52) to Macedonius, c. 4, n. 14, where the holy Doctor, expounding that of Matt. 22:40: On these two commandments etc., says: The neighbor surely in this place is to be weighed not by closeness of blood, but by the fellowship of reason, in which all men are companions. — For propinquitate (closeness), which reading is also found in the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collat. 63, a. 2, the editions with most codices read proprietate (property). (P. 624, n. 2.)
  2. Vide August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 22. n. 20. seq. (P. 624, n. 3.)
    See Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, c. 22, n. 20 f. (P. 624, n. 3.)
  3. De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 122, nota 8. (P. 624, n. 4.)
    On the Divine Names c. 4, § 23. Cf. vol. II, p. 122, note 8. (P. 624, n. 4.)
  4. Multi codd. supplent in Deo et omittunt deinde ideo; edd. quoque supplent in Deo, sed omittunt paulo superius decoris ante divinae iustitiae. (P. 624, n. 5.)
    Many codices supply in Deo and then omit ideo; the editions too supply in Deo, but omit a little above decoris before divinae iustitiae. (P. 624, n. 5.)
  5. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 5. Verba a Magistro Augustino tributa re vera sunt Magistri, qui his verbis breviter complectitur quod August., l. de Doctr. christ. c. 21. n. 21. fusius exponit. — In initio arg. pro dilectionis cod. W dilectioni. (P. 625, n. 1.)
    See above, text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 5. The words attributed to Augustine by the Master are in reality the Master's own, who in these words briefly comprises what Augustine, in the book On Christian Doctrine c. 21, n. 21, expounds more fully. — At the beginning of the argument, for dilectionis cod. W reads dilectioni. (P. 625, n. 1.)
  6. Vers. 36. — Glossa habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum in Luc. 10, 29. et 37; est secundum August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 30. n. 31. (cfr. Enarrat. in Ps. 18. serm. I. n. 14.). — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. seqq. (P. 625, n. 2.)
    Verse 36. — The Gloss is found in Strabo and Lyra on Luke 10:29 and 37; it is according to Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, c. 30, n. 31 (cf. Enarrat. in Ps. 18, sermon 1, n. 14). — See here the text of the Master, c. 2 ff. (P. 625, n. 2.)
  7. Cap. 6. n. 9. in fine. (P. 625, n. 3.)
    Chapter 6, n. 9, at the end. (P. 625, n. 3.)
  8. Edd. cum nonnullis codd. qui. (P. 625, n. 4.)
    The editions with some codices read qui. (P. 625, n. 4.)
  9. Vide quaest. praeced. — De obstinatione daemonum cfr. II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. q. I. seq. Mox pro obstinati cod. A confirmati, cod. K obstinati vel confirmati. Post pauca pro Caritas enim edd. cum paucis codd. Caritas autem. Deinde pro supernam beatitudinem codd. M O R S W X summam beatitudinem, edd. sempiternam beatitudinem. (P. 625, n. 5.)
    See the preceding question. — On the obstinacy of demons cf. II Sent., d. 7, p. 1, q. 1 f. Soon, for obstinati cod. A reads confirmati, cod. K obstinati vel confirmati. After a little, for Caritas enim the editions with a few codices read Caritas autem. Then, for supernam beatitudinem codd. M O R S W X read summam beatitudinem, the editions sempiternam beatitudinem. (P. 625, n. 5.)
  10. Vide quaest. praeced. (P. 625, n. 6.)
    See the preceding question. (P. 625, n. 6.)
  11. Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 1. — Paulo superius pro culpae, qua edd. cum compluribus codd. culpae, in qua. Paulo inferius post hinc est, quod caritas edd. 1, 2 addunt nihil, Vat. naturalis. (P. 625, n. 7.)
    Cf. Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 1. — A little above, for culpae, qua the editions with several codices read culpae, in qua. A little below, after hinc est, quod caritas editions 1, 2 add nihil, the Vatican [edition] naturalis. (P. 625, n. 7.)
  12. Edd. cum aliquot codd. ordinationem. Superius post diligendi non pauci codd. omittunt esse. Mox pro sub nomine edd. sub ratione. (P. 625, n. 8.)
    The editions with some codices read ordinationem. Above, after diligendi not a few codices omit esse. Soon, for sub nomine the editions [read] sub ratione. (P. 625, n. 8.)
  13. Cod. A ad diligendi ex caritate. (P. 625, n. 9.) [Marker on gratiam in obj.-reply 2; OCR fragments the entry.]
    Cod. A reads ad diligendi ex caritate. (P. 625, n. 9.)
  14. Dist. 35. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. per totum, ubi etiam Augustini dicta occurrunt. (P. 626, n. 1.)
    D. 35, a. 1, q. 1 and a. 2 throughout, where also the sayings of Augustine occur. (P. 626, n. 1.)
  15. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. seq. — Cod. Z augmentum. (P. 626, n. 2.)
    Cf. II Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 2 f. — Cod. Z reads augmentum. (P. 626, n. 2.)
  16. Scil. ex hac et praeced. quaest. — Paulo ante pro decorem iustitiae cod. Z decorem divinae iustitiae. (P. 626, n. 3.)
    Namely, from this and the preceding question. — A little before, for decorem iustitiae cod. Z reads decorem divinae iustitiae. (P. 626, n. 3.)
  17. Simul audi: diligi ex caritate. Edd. perperam supplent ordinatum. — Vide etiam scholion ad praecedentem quaest. (P. 626, nn. 4–5.)
    Understand at the same time: to be loved out of charity. The editions wrongly supply ordinatum. — See also the scholion to the preceding question. (P. 626, nn. 4–5.)
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