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Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 28

Textus Latinus
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ARTICULUS UNICUS. De obiectis ex caritate diligendis.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendae sint creaturae irrationales. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Sapientiae undecimo1: Diligis omnia, Domine, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti; sed caritas facit nos diligere conformiter Deo: ergo si Deus, qui est caritas, diligit creaturas irrationales; videtur, quod et homines caritatem habentes eas ex caritate debeant diligere.

2. Item, creaturae rationales ex caritate diligendae sunt, propter hoc quod habent aliquam Dei similitudinem; sed in creaturis irrationalibus relucet Dei similitudo, licet minus perfecte quam in creaturis rationalibus; relucet enim Deus in eis sicut in vestigio2: ergo si similitudo Dei est ratio diligendi ex caritate, videtur, quod ceterae creaturae irrationales ex caritate diligendae sint.

3. Item, sicut ad fidem pertinet credere, Deum esse creatorem creaturarum rationalium, ita ad ipsam spectat credere, ipsum esse creatorem irrationalium; et sicut intellectus noster cognoscit Deum in creaturis per creaturas rationales, ita et per irrationales, licet minus plene3: si ergo fides et cognitio et contemplatio ipsius Dei indifferenter respicit ipsas creaturas rationales et irrationales, pari ratione videtur, quod et ipsa gratuita dilectio: ergo videtur, quod et irrationales creaturae ex caritate diligi possunt, cum caritas ita amet Deum, sicut fides credit.

4. Item, virtus et vitium habent esse circa idem: ergo circa quod habet esse amor vitiosus libidinis et cupiditatis, circa idem habet esse amor gratuitus et caritatis4; sed homo potest libidinose et cupide amare creaturas irrationales: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod vir iustus ex caritate habeat eas diligere.

5. Item, aliquis diligit bona temporalia, ut per illa serviat Deo, sicut vir iustus diligit possessiones, ut faciat eleemosynas; sed constat, quod talis amor est amor meritorius; sed amor meritorius procedit ex caritate5: ergo videtur, quod talia irrationalia sint ex caritate diligenda.

Sed contra:

1. Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctrina christiana, et habetur in littera praecedentis distinctionis6: «Ea sola ex caritate sunt diligenda, quae nobiscum societate quadam referuntur in Deum, sicut est homo et Angelus vel corpus nostrum»; sed talia non sunt irrationalia: ergo etc.

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2. Item, principale obiectum caritatis est Bonum increatum, cum caritas sit virtus theologica: ergo cum caritas faciat illi bono adhaerere et ipso frui, nihil in mundo diligit, nisi quod illo bono natum est frui et in illo beatificari7; sed creaturae irrationales non possunt in Deo beatificari: ergo non possunt ex caritate diligi.

3. Item, caritas est vinculum connexionis, ergo illa sola sunt nata ex caritate diligi, quae per caritatem possunt necti; talia autem non sunt nisi illa quae sunt nata esse de unitate corporis Christi; sed talia non sunt nisi rationalia8: ergo etc.

4. Item, nobilior est amor caritatis, quam sit amor socialis; sed amor socialis non potest esse nec debet nisi respectu rationalium creaturarum9: ergo nec amor caritatis.

5. Item, illa solum sunt ex caritate diligenda, quorum dilectio clauditur et exprimitur in duobus mandatis caritatis10; sed dilectio irrationalium nec includitur nec exprimitur in illis duobus mandatis: ergo videtur, quod amor caritatis ad creaturas irrationales non habeat extendi.

Conclusio. Creaturae irrationales diligendae sunt ex caritate imperante, non ex eliciente, vel, ut alia via probatur, non diliguntur ex caritate nisi improprie, ita ut caritas non ponat circa illas affectum.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum aliquis actus dicitur esse ex aliqua virtute, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo sicut a movente et imperante, alio modo sicut ab eliciente et informante. Primo modo potest dici, quod omnia opera meritoria sunt ex caritate, quia caritas imperat omne opus bonum; sicut ex caritate possum ire ad sanctum Iacobum et ex caritate levare festucam de terra. Secundo modo ille actus dicitur esse ex caritate, quem habitus caritatis respicit11 formaliter et directe, sicut diligere Deum et proximum, quem non habet anima elicere mediante alio habitu quam habitu caritatis.

Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod aliquid diligi ex caritate potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo ex caritate imperante; et sic concedi potest, quod irrationales creaturae sunt diligendae ex caritate. Sicut enim caritas imperat et movet ad faciendum et dicendum et cognoscendum12 omnia quae spectant ad salutem nostram et laudem divinam; sic etiam imperat ad amandum. Unde quia multae irrationales creaturae datae sunt nobis in adiutorium ad exercendum opera meritoria, ordinatae sunt etiam ad laudandum Deum13; hinc est, quod caritas, quae est amatrix Dei et proximi, imperat, tales creaturas diligi.

Alio modo dicitur aliquid diligi ex caritate eliciente et informante; et sic diligitur ex caritate illud, in quod est formalis et proprius actus ipsius caritatis; tale autem non est nisi illud quod est summum Bonum, vel cui summum Bonum natum est aliquo modo uniri per cognitionem et amorem. Ideo cum creaturae irrationales non sint hoc modo Dei capaces, quia non sunt ad Dei imaginem, per caritatem non potest eis exoptari summum Bonum; et ideo caritas non descendit ad illa diligenda secundum suum actum proprium et formalem: ac per hoc talia non diliguntur ex caritate elicitive.

Et si tu quaeras: quae virtus elicit illum actum dilectionis, quo quis diligit creaturas, in quantum sunt a Deo et ad Deum? dicendum, quod hoc est cuiusdam pietatis et affectionis naturalis. Sicut enim homo diligit canem quadam pietate naturali, quia videt eum sibi obedientem; sic et ceteras alias bestias et irrationales creaturas naturaliter ex quadam pietate14 natus erat diligere et fovere, quantum erat ex prima conditione. Unde secundum quod homo plus reformatur et reducitur ad statum innocentiae, secundum hoc magis sibi mansuescunt huiusmodi creaturae, et ipse circa eas maiori pietate movetur; sicut de beato Francisco legitur15, quod erga huiusmodi creaturas mira pietatis teneritudine affluebat, quia iam quodam modo innocentiam recuperaverat. In cuius rei signum creaturae irrationales eidem obtemperabant.

Et secundum hanc distinctionem patet responsio ad quaestionem: quia uno modo creaturae irrationales sunt ex caritate diligendae, videlicet ex caritate imperante; alio vero modo non, videlicet ex caritate eliciente. — Secundum hoc etiam potest responderi ad obiecta ad utramque partem, quia procedunt secundum diversas vias, sicut intuenti apparet.

Est et alius hic modus dicendi praedicto modo non contrarius, sed potius consonus, quod aliquid

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diligi ex caritate potest esse tripliciter: vel ita, quod caritas faciat circa ipsum dilectum ponere affectionem et finem; et sic solus Deus diligitur ex caritate. Alio modo ita, quod caritas circa ipsum dilectum faciat ponere affectionem, non tamen finem; et sic diligitur proximus ex caritate, quia circa proximum affectu caritatis afficitur, optando ei summum Bonum, non propter ipsum, sed propter Deum. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid ex caritate diligi ita, quod caritas circa illud non ponit finem, nec etiam affectionem intuitu sui, sed solum ratione illius, propter quod diligit; et hoc modo creaturae irrationales, in quibus Deus relucet, diliguntur ex caritate, quia Deus diligitur in illis; per quem modum quis dicitur diligere canem amici sui, non quia afficiatur circa canem speciali affectione, sed quia afficitur circa amicum1. — Et huius signum est, quia affectus caritatis non alligat hominem creaturae irrationali, secundum quod alligat et connectit hominem ipsi proximo, vel etiam ipsi Deo. Unde sicut amor amicitiae, qui est in amicum, se extendit ad amici filium, ita quod filius amici amicus est et dilectus, non autem sic se extendit ad amici catulum, ut canis diligatur consimili affectu; sic intelligendum est, quod caritas, quae est amor Dei, se extendit ad illos qui sunt nati esse eius filii per gratiam adoptionis. Et quia creaturae irrationales non sunt huiusmodi, ideo proprie loquendo, non sunt natae ex caritate diligi, ita quod caritas circa illas ponat affectum, bene tamen2 potest caritas in illis diligere Deum; ita quodam modo potest concedi, ut illae creaturae diligantur ex caritate, licet improprie. — Ideo non sunt numerandae inter illa quae proprie ex caritate diliguntur, sicut rationes ad hanc partem inductae ostendunt.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus diligit creaturas irrationales; dicendum, quod Deum creaturas irrationales diligere est eas conservare in esse naturae3; sed aliquid diligere ex caritate, hoc est summum Bonum ei optare; et ideo plus connotatur, cum dicitur, aliquid esse ex caritate diligendum, et aliquid esse Deo dilectum. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi Deus eas diligit, quod ex caritate amandae sint. Et si tu obiicias4, quod caritas conformat voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum primo et per se respectu omnium operum et quorumcumque obiectorum, sed respectu illorum quae habent expressam similitudinem, et quibus vult Deus dare se ipsum. Nam caritas omnibus, quae ex caritate diligit, optat Deum. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, et habetur in distinctione praecedenti5: «Sic nos invicem diligamus, ut, quantum possumus, ad habendum in nobis Deum ex dilectione attrahamus».

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creaturae rationales diliguntur ex caritate propter assimilationem ad Deum; dicendum, quod non quaecumque assimilatio ad Deum facit aliquid ex caritate diligibile, sed illa quae facit Dei capacem; et haec est similitudo imaginis. Anima enim «ideo est imago Dei, quia eius capax et particeps esse potest6». Caritas enim optat, illud summum Bonum haberi ab eo quem diligit; ad illud enim inclinat tanquam ad suum principale obiectum. Et quoniam similitudo vestigii non facit, creaturam ipsius Dei esse capacem per cognitionem et amorem; hinc est, quod non sequitur, quodsi in creaturis irrationalibus reperiatur aliqua vestigii similitudo, quod propter hoc ad ipsas extendatur caritatis dilectio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides ita credit Deum creatorem irrationalium sicut rationalium: dicendum, quod non est simile de fide et caritate. Nam fides non tantum est circa ipsum Deum, in quantum est finis, sed etiam in quantum est principium rerum. Et quia Deus est principium immediatum tam respectu rationalium quam irrationalium; ideo utroque respectu7 in Deum credit et ipsum contemplatur. Caritas autem respicit Deum sub ratione finis, quia sub ratione boni. Et quia creaturae rationales et irrationales non eodem modo habent tendere in ipsum summum finem, quia rationales immediate, irrationales vero mediate8; hinc est, quod non sequitur, quod dilectio caritatis ad has et illas se habeat uniformiter.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus et vitium habent esse circa idem; dicendum, quod illud argumentum dupliciter peccat. Primo, quia, quamvis virtus et vitium habeant esse circa idem subiectum, non tamen oportet, quod generaliter habeant esse circa idem obiectum; plura enim exiguntur ad virtutem quam ad vitium9. Ideo si circa aliquid potest consistere vitium, non propter hoc sequitur, quod et virtus. — Alius etiam defectus est ibi, quia, cum

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caritas sit virtus et amor specialis10, non oportet, quod circa illud consistat caritas, circa quod consistit quodlibet speciale vitium. Unde quamvis cupiditas consistat circa bona temporalia, non oportet, quod circa illa sit virtus caritatis, sed sufficit, quod sit virtus largitatis. Et ideo non oportet, huiusmodi temporalia ex caritate amari, sed ex largitate retineri et dispensari, quae iuxta eorum valorem novit eadem appretiari.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui diligit temporalia, ut per illa Deo serviat; iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt: quia ille motus est meritorius, non quia sit a caritate eliciente, sed quia est a caritate imperante, sicut ire ad sanctum Iacobum, vel facere quodcumque aliud opus in Dei obsequium. Praeterea, cum quis diligit temporalia ad serviendum Deo, affectio sua versatur circa eum cui vult servire, sicut prius tactum est. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod talia diligantur ex caritate, nisi valde extenso nomine. Nam proprie nihil ex caritate diligitur, circa quod caritas non ponat affectum specialem16.

Scholion

I. Solutio auctoris primo loco posita, quam tenent etiam B. Albert. et Durandus, visa est S. Thomae, Petro a Tar. aliisque non esse sufficiens; cui opinioni etiam Richard. a Med. et Scotus magis favent. Hi quidem concedunt, quod creaturae irrationales non possint ita diligi ex caritate eliciente, ut caritas terminetur directe ad eas ut obiectum ipsius; tamen contendunt, eas nihilominus posse diligi ex caritate non tantum imperante, sed etiam eliciente, scilicet non dilectione amicitiae, sed concupiscentiae, quae includitur in actu caritatis, ita ut indirecte diligantur ut materia, circa quam versatur dilectio, sicut diliguntur bona amici. De hac distinctione cfr. S. Thom., hic a. I. — Ad rem dicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. unica): «Verumtamen verbis Augustini et Magistri plus consonat positio Bonaventurae, et pro concordia potest dici, quod irrationabilia non diliguntur elicitive ex caritate proprie et perfecte, sed aliquantulum et imperfecte, quia nec donum gratiae nec donum gloriae eis optatur, tamen ex caritate ad Dei honorificentiam ordinantur». Huic Dionysii interpretationi satis concordat S. Bonav., ut patet ex ipsius solutione secunda; immo infra q. 5. quoad dona gratuita ad eandem, sicut S. Thomas, distinctionem recurrit.

De hac (I.) quaestione: Scot., III. Sent. d. 32. n. 6. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. II. II. q. 25. a. 3; Qq. disp. de caritate, a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 4. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

II. Circa sequentem (2.) quaestionem Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 6.) dicit simpliciter, quod daemones nullo modo sint ex caritate diligendi. S. Thom. eadem ac in praecedenti quaestione distinctione utitur et resolvit (S. loc. cit. a. 11; cfr. hic a. 5.): «Alio modo diligitur aliquid, sicut quod volumus permanere ut bonum alterius... et per hunc modum naturam daemonum etiam ex caritate diligere possumus, in quantum scilicet volumus, illos spiritus in suis naturalibus conservari ad gloriam Dei». De eadem quaestione praeter laudatos: B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. et 3.

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English Translation

ARTICULUS UNICUS. On the objects to be loved out of charity.

QUESTION I. Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems.

1. Wisdom, eleventh chapter1: Thou lovest all things, O Lord, and hatest nothing of those things which thou hast made; but charity makes us love conformably to God: therefore if God, who is charity, loves irrational creatures, it seems that men too who have charity ought to love them out of charity.

2. Likewise, rational creatures are to be loved out of charity, on account of the fact that they have some likeness of God; but in irrational creatures the likeness of God shines forth, though less perfectly than in rational creatures; for God shines forth in them as in a vestige2: therefore if the likeness of God is the ground for loving out of charity, it seems that the other irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, just as it pertains to faith to believe that God is the creator of rational creatures, so it belongs to it to believe that He is the creator of irrational ones; and just as our intellect knows God in creatures through rational creatures, so also through irrational ones, though less fully3: if then the faith and knowledge and contemplation of God Himself looks indifferently upon both rational and irrational creatures, by parity of reasoning it seems that gratuitous love does too: therefore it seems that irrational creatures too can be loved out of charity, since charity loves God just as faith believes Him.

4. Likewise, virtue and vice are concerned with the same thing: therefore that about which there is the vicious love of lust and cupidity, about the same there is the gratuitous love also of charity4; but a man can love irrational creatures lustfully and covetously: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that the just man should love them out of charity.

5. Likewise, someone loves temporal goods, so that through them he may serve God, just as the just man loves possessions, so that he may give alms; but it is plain that such love is meritorious love; but meritorious love proceeds from charity5: therefore it seems that such irrational things are to be loved out of charity.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine, and it is contained in the text of the preceding distinction6: «Those things alone are to be loved out of charity which are referred together with us into God by a certain fellowship, as is a man and an Angel or our body»; but irrational things are not such: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the principal object of charity is the Uncreated Good, since charity is a theological virtue: therefore since charity makes one cleave to that good and enjoy it, it loves nothing in the world except what is born to enjoy that good and to be beatified in it7; but irrational creatures cannot be beatified in God: therefore they cannot be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, charity is the bond of connection, therefore those things alone are born to be loved out of charity which can be joined through charity; but such are only those which are born to be of the unity of the body of Christ; but such are only the rational ones8: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the love of charity is nobler than is social love; but social love cannot and ought not be except in respect of rational creatures9: therefore neither can the love of charity.

5. Likewise, those things alone are to be loved out of charity whose love is enclosed and expressed in the two commandments of charity10; but the love of irrational things is neither included nor expressed in those two commandments: therefore it seems that the love of charity has no reason to be extended to irrational creatures.

Conclusion. Irrational creatures are to be loved out of commanding charity, not out of eliciting charity; or, as is proved by another way, they are not loved out of charity except improperly, so that charity places no affection about them.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that when some act is said to be from some virtue, this can be understood in two ways: in one way as from something moving and commanding, in another way as from something eliciting and informing. In the first way it can be said that all meritorious works are from charity, because charity commands every good work; just as out of charity I can go to Saint James and out of charity lift a straw from the ground. In the second way that act is said to be from charity which the habit of charity regards11 formally and directly, as to love God and neighbor, which the soul does not elicit by means of any other habit than the habit of charity.

According to this it must be understood that for something to be loved out of charity can be understood in two ways: in one way out of commanding charity; and thus it can be granted that irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity. For just as charity commands and moves toward doing and saying and knowing12 all things that pertain to our salvation and the divine praise, so too it commands toward loving. Whence, because many irrational creatures have been given to us as a help for performing meritorious works, they are also ordered to the praising of God13; hence it is that charity, which is the lover of God and of neighbor, commands that such creatures be loved.

In another way something is said to be loved out of eliciting and informing charity; and thus that is loved out of charity in which the formal and proper act of charity itself is; but such is only that which is the supreme Good, or that to which the supreme Good is born to be united in some way through knowledge and love. Therefore since irrational creatures are not in this way capable of God, because they are not unto the image of God, the supreme Good cannot be desired for them through charity; and therefore charity does not descend to loving them according to its proper and formal act: and through this such things are not loved out of charity elicitively.

And if you ask: which virtue elicits that act of love by which one loves creatures, insofar as they are from God and unto God? it must be said that this is of a certain natural piety and affection. For just as a man loves a dog by a certain natural piety, because he sees it obedient to him; so also he was born to love and cherish naturally, by a certain piety14, the other beasts and irrational creatures, as far as it was from the first condition. Whence according as a man is more reformed and led back to the state of innocence, accordingly creatures of this kind grow more tame toward him, and he is moved with greater piety about them; as is read of blessed Francis15, that toward creatures of this kind he overflowed with a wondrous tenderness of piety, because he had now in some way recovered innocence. As a sign of this thing irrational creatures obeyed him.

And according to this distinction the response to the question is plain: that in one way irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity, namely out of commanding charity; but in another way not, namely out of eliciting charity. — According to this also it can be answered to the objections on either side, because they proceed according to diverse ways, as is apparent to one who looks closely.

There is also here another manner of speaking, not contrary to the aforesaid manner, but rather consonant, namely that something

to be loved out of charity can be threefold: either thus, that charity makes one place about the beloved itself an affection and an end; and thus God alone is loved out of charity. In another way thus, that charity makes one place about the beloved itself an affection, yet not an end; and thus the neighbor is loved out of charity, because about the neighbor one is affected with the affection of charity, desiring for him the supreme Good, not on account of himself, but on account of God. In a third way something is said to be loved out of charity thus, that charity places about it no end, nor even affection with a view to it, but only by reason of that on account of which it loves; and in this way irrational creatures, in which God shines forth, are loved out of charity, because God is loved in them; in which way one is said to love the dog of his friend, not because he is affected about the dog with a special affection, but because he is affected about the friend1. — And the sign of this is that the affection of charity does not bind a man to an irrational creature in the way that it binds and connects a man to the neighbor himself, or even to God Himself. Whence just as the love of friendship, which is toward a friend, extends itself to the friend's son, so that the friend's son is a friend and beloved, yet does not thus extend itself to the friend's pup, so that the dog be loved with a like affection; so it must be understood that charity, which is the love of God, extends itself to those who are born to be His sons through the grace of adoption. And because irrational creatures are not of this kind, therefore properly speaking they are not born to be loved out of charity in such a way that charity places affection about them, though indeed2 charity can love God in them; so that in a certain way it can be granted that those creatures are loved out of charity, although improperly. — Therefore they are not to be numbered among those things which are properly loved out of charity, as the reasons brought forward for this side show.

To the arguments to the contrary:

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that God loves irrational creatures; it must be said that for God to love irrational creatures is to conserve them in the being of nature3; but to love something out of charity is to desire the supreme Good for it; and therefore more is connoted when it is said that something is to be loved out of charity, and that something is loved by God. And therefore it does not follow that if God loves them, they are to be loved out of charity. And if you object4 that charity conforms our will to the divine will; it must be said that this is not true primarily and per se in respect of all works and of whatever objects, but in respect of those which have an express likeness, and to which God wills to give Himself. For charity desires God for all those things which it loves out of charity. And this is what Augustine says, and it is contained in the preceding distinction5: «Let us so love one another that, as far as we can, we may by love draw toward having God within us».

2. To that which is objected, that rational creatures are loved out of charity on account of their assimilation to God; it must be said that not every assimilation to God makes something loveable out of charity, but that which makes it capable of God; and this is the likeness of image. For the soul «is therefore the image of God because it can be capable and partaker of Him6». For charity desires that that supreme Good be possessed by him whom it loves; for to that it inclines as to its principal object. And since the likeness of vestige does not make a creature capable of God Himself through knowledge and love; hence it is that it does not follow that if in irrational creatures some likeness of vestige be found, on this account the love of charity is extended to them.

3. To that which is objected, that faith believes God to be the creator of irrational things just as of rational ones: it must be said that the case of faith and charity is not similar. For faith is not only about God Himself, insofar as He is end, but also insofar as He is the principle of things. And because God is the immediate principle both in respect of rational and of irrational things; therefore in both respects7 it believes in God and contemplates Him. But charity regards God under the aspect of end, because under the aspect of good. And because rational and irrational creatures do not in the same way have to tend into that supreme end, since rational ones immediately, but irrational ones mediately8; hence it is that it does not follow that the love of charity bears itself uniformly toward these and those.

4. To that which is objected, that virtue and vice are concerned with the same thing; it must be said that that argument is doubly faulty. First, because, although virtue and vice have being about the same subject, it is nevertheless not necessary that they generally have being about the same object; for more is required for virtue than for vice9. Therefore if vice can subsist about something, it does not on this account follow that virtue does too. — There is also another defect there, because, since

charity is a virtue and a special love10, it is not necessary that charity subsist about that about which any special vice subsists. Whence although cupidity subsists about temporal goods, it is not necessary that the virtue of charity be about them, but it suffices that the virtue of largesse be. And therefore it is not necessary that temporal things of this kind be loved out of charity, but be retained and dispensed out of largesse, which knows how to appraise them according to their worth.

5. To that which is objected concerning him who loves temporal things in order that through them he may serve God; the response is already plain through what has been said: because that motion is meritorious, not because it is from eliciting charity, but because it is from commanding charity, just as to go to Saint James, or to do any other work in God's service. Moreover, when someone loves temporal things to serve God, his affection is occupied about Him whom he wishes to serve, as was touched on before. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that such things are loved out of charity, except by a very extended use of the name. For properly nothing is loved out of charity about which charity does not place a special affection16.

Scholion

I. The solution of the author placed in the first position, which Bl. Albert and Durandus also hold, seemed to St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and others not to be sufficient; to which opinion Richard of Mediavilla and Scotus rather favor. These indeed grant that irrational creatures cannot be loved out of eliciting charity in such a way that charity terminates directly at them as its object; yet they contend that they can nonetheless be loved out of charity not only commanding but also eliciting, namely not by the love of friendship, but of concupiscence, which is included in the act of charity, so that they are loved indirectly as the matter about which love is occupied, just as the goods of a friend are loved. On this distinction cf. St. Thom., here a. 1. — To the point Dionysius Carthusianus says (here q. unica): «Nevertheless the position of Bonaventure is more consonant with the words of Augustine and the Master, and for concord it can be said that irrational things are not loved elicitively out of charity properly and perfectly, but somewhat and imperfectly, because neither the gift of grace nor the gift of glory is desired for them, yet they are ordered out of charity to the honoring of God». With this interpretation of Dionysius St. Bonaventure sufficiently agrees, as is plain from his own second solution; indeed below in q. 5, as regards gratuitous gifts, he has recourse to the same distinction, as does St. Thomas.

On this (first) question: Scot., III. Sent. d. 32. n. 6. — S. Thom., here a. 2; S. II. II. q. 25. a. 3; Qq. disp. de caritate, a. 7. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Petr. of Tarentaise, here a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 4. — Durandus, on this and the following q. here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following qq. here q. unica.

II. Concerning the following (second) question Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 6) says simply that demons are in no way to be loved out of charity. St. Thomas uses and resolves it by the same distinction as in the preceding question (S. loc. cit. a. 11; cf. here a. 5): «In another way something is loved, as that which we wish to remain as the good of another... and through this manner we can love even the nature of demons out of charity, namely insofar as we wish those spirits to be conserved in their natural endowments unto the glory of God». On the same question besides those cited: Bl. Albert, on this and the following q. here a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 1. and 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 25: Diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil etc. — In conclus. respicitur illud I. Ioan. 4, 8: Qui non diligit non novit Deum, quoniam Deus caritas est. (P. 621, n. 1.)
    Verse 25: For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing etc. — In the conclusion there is regard to that of 1 John 4:8: He that loveth not knoweth not God, for God is charity. (P. 621, n. 1.)
  2. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. in fine. — De maiori cfr. August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 22. n. 20. seq. — Inferius cod. A bene omittit ceteras. (P. 621, n. 2.)
    Cf. I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, at the end. — On the major cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, c. 22, n. 20 f. — Below, cod. A rightly omits ceteras. (P. 621, n. 2.)
  3. Vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4, et Itinerar. mentis in Deum, c. I. seqq. (P. 621, n. 3.)
    See I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, ad 4, and Itinerarium mentis in Deum, c. 1 ff. (P. 621, n. 3.)
  4. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 9, 16: In laqueo isto, quem absconderunt, comprehensus est pes eorum, ait: Pes animae recte intelligitur amor, qui, cum pravus est, vocatur cupiditas aut libido; cum autem rectus, dilectio vel caritas. Amore enim movetur tanquam ad locum, quo tendit. Locus autem animae... in delectatione, «se pervenisse per amorem laetatur». — Maior innititur in illo axiomate: «opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem»; de quo vide supra pag. 611, nota 3. (P. 621, n. 4.)
    Augustine, Enarrat. in Ps. 9, 16: In that snare which they have hidden their foot is taken, he says: The foot of the soul is rightly understood as love, which, when it is depraved, is called cupidity or lust; but when it is right, charity or affection. For by love it is moved as toward a place, whither it tends. But the place of the soul... is in delight, «it rejoices to have arrived through love». — The major rests on that axiom: «opposites are born to occur about the same thing»; on which see above, p. 611, note 3. (P. 621, n. 4.)
  5. Cfr. supra pag. 387, nota 3. (P. 621, n. 5.)
    Cf. above, p. 387, note 3. (P. 621, n. 5.)
  6. Cap. 8, ubi dictum August. plenius habetur. (P. 621, n. 6.)
    Chapter 8, where the said passage of Augustine is contained more fully. (P. 621, n. 6.)
  7. August., III. de Doctr. christ. c. 10. n. 16: Caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum, et se atque proximo propter Deum. (P. 622, n. 1.)
    Augustine, On Christian Doctrine III, c. 10, n. 16: I call charity the motion of the soul toward enjoying God on account of Himself, and oneself and neighbor on account of God. (P. 622, n. 1.)
  8. Epist. I. Cor. 12, 27: Vos autem estis corpus Christi et membra de membro. Cfr. Rom. 12, 5. (P. 622, n. 2.)
    Epistle, 1 Cor. 12:27: Now you are the body of Christ and members of member. Cf. Rom. 12:5. (P. 622, n. 2.)
  9. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 2: De inanimatorum amore amicitia minime dicitur, quippe cum neque redamatio neque voluntas boni illorum ulla sit. Ibid. c. 11: Erga inanimata neque amicitia ulla est neque ius, neque erga equum aut bovem etc. — Post debet cod. Z adiungit dici. (P. 622, n. 3.)
    Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 2: Of the love of inanimate things friendship is by no means spoken, since there is neither return of love nor any willing of their good. Ibid. c. 11: Toward inanimate things there is no friendship nor right, nor toward a horse or ox etc. — After debet cod. Z adds dici. (P. 622, n. 3.)
  10. Matth. 22, 37. seqq. — Pro mandatis cod. Z praeceptis. (P. 622, n. 4.)
    Matt. 22:37 ff. — For mandatis cod. Z reads praeceptis. (P. 622, n. 4.)
  11. Edd. inspicit. Superius post Secundo codd. A K bb addunt vero. Mox pro quem non habet cod. W quia non habet. (P. 622, n. 5.)
    The editions read inspicit. Above, after Secundo codd. A K bb add vero. Soon, for quem non habet cod. W reads quia non habet. (P. 622, n. 5.)
  12. Codd. H M O Z bb cogitandum, plures codd. sunt dubiae lectionis; in cod. A desideratur et cognoscendum, in edd. 1, 2 et dicendum. (P. 622, n. 6.)
    Codd. H M O Z bb read cogitandum, several codd. are of doubtful reading; in cod. A et cognoscendum is wanting, in edd. 1, 2 et dicendum. (P. 622, n. 6.)
  13. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 1. (P. 622, n. 7.)
    Cf. II Sent., d. 13, a. 2, q. 1. (P. 622, n. 7.)
  14. Vat. addit innata diligit et fovet, sicut; edd. 1, 2 addunt innata diligit et fovet, sed deinde omittunt natus erat diligere et fovere. (P. 622, n. 8.)
    The Vatican edition adds innata diligit et fovet, sicut; edd. 1, 2 add innata diligit et fovet, but then omit natus erat diligere et fovere. (P. 622, n. 8.)
  15. Cfr. prima et secunda vita S. Francisci, auctore B. Thoma de Celano (in prima vita c. 21, in secunda c. 5. et 101. seqq.), nec non Legenda maior composita a S. Bonav. (c. 5. et 8.). — Mox pro mira pietatis teneritudine cod. A affectu pietatis et reverentiae. Pro teneritudine codd. G H I K L T U V aa remuneratione. (P. 622, n. 9.)
    Cf. the first and second Life of St. Francis, by Bl. Thomas of Celano (in the first life c. 21, in the second c. 5 and 101 ff.), as well as the Legenda maior composed by St. Bonaventure (c. 5 and 8). — Soon, for mira pietatis teneritudine cod. A reads affectu pietatis et reverentiae. For teneritudine codd. G H I K L T U V aa read remuneratione. (P. 622, n. 9.)
  16. Bernard., Serm. 1. in festo S. Michaelis, n. 3: Dicitur certe vulgari quodam proverbio: Qui me amat amat et canem meum. (P. 623, n. 1.)
    Bernard, Sermon 1 on the feast of St. Michael, n. 3: It is said indeed by a certain common proverb: Who loves me loves my dog also. (P. 623, n. 1.)
  17. Pro bene tamen codd. H L W aa et edd. 1, 2 unde, Vat. unde quia. Paulo inferius pro ut illae creaturae diligantur Vat. quod creaturae irrationales diligantur, et dein in fine corp. eadem Vat. cum edd. 1, 2 et cod. W post ostendunt addit et (cod. W vel) concedunt. (P. 623, n. 2.)
    For bene tamen codd. H L W aa and edd. 1, 2 read unde, the Vatican edition unde quia. A little below, for ut illae creaturae diligantur the Vatican edition reads quod creaturae irrationales diligantur, and then at the end of the body the same Vatican edition with edd. 1, 2 and cod. W after ostendunt adds et (cod. W vel) concedunt. (P. 623, n. 2.)
  18. Cfr. infra d. 32. q. 2. (P. 623, n. 3.)
    Cf. below, d. 32, q. 2. (P. 623, n. 3.)
  19. In minori huius obiectionis. (P. 623, n. 4.)
    In the minor of this objection. (P. 623, n. 4.)
  20. Cap. 7. in fine. — Paulo superius pro et quibus vult cod. K et in quibus vult, cod. A in quibus vult. (P. 623, n. 5.)
    Chapter 7, at the end. — A little above, for et quibus vult cod. K reads et in quibus vult, cod. A in quibus vult. (P. 623, n. 5.)
  21. August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. — Paulo superius pro diligibile codd. H Z aa diligere. Paulo inferius pro ab eo cod. A a Deo. Circa finem solut. pro reperiatur codd. A K bb reperitur. (P. 623, n. 6.)
    Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, c. 8, n. 11. — A little above, for diligibile codd. H Z aa read diligere. A little below, for ab eo cod. A reads a Deo. Near the end of the solution, for reperiatur codd. A K bb read reperitur. (P. 623, n. 6.)
  22. Post respectu Vat. supplet fides. Mox pro quia sub ratione boni edd. et sub ratione boni. (P. 623, n. 7.)
    After respectu the Vatican edition supplies fides. Soon, for quia sub ratione boni the editions read et sub ratione boni. (P. 623, n. 7.)
  23. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. n. 1. q. 1. in corp. (P. 623, n. 8.)
    Cf. II Sent., d. 16, n. 1, q. 1, in the body. (P. 623, n. 8.)
  24. Vide supra pag. 499, nota 2. (P. 623, n. 9.)
    See above, p. 499, note 2. (P. 623, n. 9.)
  25. Edd. quia licet caritas sit motus et amor specialis, non tamen oportet etc. In fine solut. pro quae iuxta edd. 1, 2 qui iuxta, Vat. ab eo qui iuxta. (P. 623, n. 10.)
    The editions read because, although charity is a motion and a special love, it is nevertheless not necessary etc. At the end of the solution, for quae iuxta edd. 1, 2 read qui iuxta, the Vatican edition ab eo qui iuxta. (P. 623, n. 10.)
  26. Codd. A K S affectum suum. (P. 624, n. 1.)
    Codd. A K S read affectum suum. (P. 624, n. 1.)
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