Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 30
Quaestio IV. Utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad affectum.
Quarto quaeritur, utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad affectum. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Levitici decimo nono2: Diliges amicum tuum sicut te ipsum; super quo dicit Augustinus, quod « nomine proximi et amici intelligitur omnis homo », secundum etiam quod ipse Dominus innuit Lucae decimo: ergo si illud praeceptum datum est omnibus; cum omnes teneantur affectu diligere se, videtur, quod omnes teneantur affectu diligere inimicos.
2. Item, Matthaei quinto3: Si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt, quam mercedem habebitis? Glossa: « Nullam in caelo »: ergo qui tantum habet dilectionem respectu diligentium se non habet caritatem, cum caritas non possit esse sine mercede: igitur ad hoc, quod aliquis habeat caritatem, necesse est, quod ipsius caritas ad eos qui ipsum odiunt, se extendat.
3. Item, super illud Lucae sexto4: Diligite inimicos vestros; Glossa interlinearis: « Non sufficit non odisse »; sed omnes tenentur ad illud quod sufficit ad salutem: ergo omnes tenentur non solum ad non odiendum inimicos, sed etiam ad amandum.
4. Item, nulli Deus dimittit peccatum, nisi ipse dimittat proximo, secundum quod dicitur Matthaei sexto et decimo octavo5; sed nemo dimittit proximo ex corde, nisi ipsum diligat affectu: ergo nemo potest apud Deum veniam mereri, nisi offendentes se diligat ex corde.
5. Item, plus diligendus est proximus quam corpus proprium, nec aliquid adversatur magis et inimicatur spiritui quam ipsa caro6: cum ergo quilibet teneatur naturam carnis suae diligere, videtur, quod teneatur inimicum suum affectu amare.
6. Item, sicut culpa est detestabilis, sic imago Dei est diligibilis; sed quantumcumque homo diligatur, semper tenetur homo detestari eius culpam7: ergo quantumcumque per culpam adversetur, semper tenetur diligere naturam.
Sed contra: 1. Matthaei quinto8: Audistis, quia dictum est antiquis: Diliges amicum tuum et odio habebis inimicum tuum; sed ad nihil morale obligamur nunc, ad quod non obligarentur antiqui in Lege: ergo si tunc non tenebantur ad diligendum inimicum, sed potius ad odiendum; videtur, quod non omnes tenentur nunc inimicos diligere. Minor probatur: quia super illud Matthaei decimo quarto9 de quinque panibus etc. Glossa: « Non alia, quam quae scripta erant, praedicavit; sed Legem et Prophetas mysteriis gravida esse demonstrat ». Et iterum, tertii Regum septimo10: Fecit Hiram mare fusile decem cubitorum; ibi Glossa: « Decem praeceptis in Lege omnia quae facere debemus, Dominus expressit ». Si ergo in nullo decem praeceptorum continetur dilectio inimici, nec ad aliud obligantur moderni, ad quod non obligarentur antiqui; videtur etc.
2. Item, Lucae sexto11: Diligite inimicos vestros; ibi Glossa: « Hoc perfectorum est »; et iterum alia Glossa, ibi: « Ecclesia hic non lacte nutritur, quod est simplicium et imperfectorum, sed validiori cibo caritatis roboratur »; sed ad ea quae perfectionis sunt, non omnes tenentur: igitur non omnes tenentur diligere inimicos.
3. Item, super illud Psalmi12a: Revela oculos meos, et considerabo mirabilia de Lege tua; Glossa: « Nihil mirabilius est in mandatis quam diligere inimicos »; sed non omnes tenentur ad faciendum mirabilia, « quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, virtutes et mirabilia facere non omnibus datum est »: ergo etc.
4. Item, Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in distinctione praecedenti13a, ubi actum est de ordine caritatis: « Sufficit, quod inimicos odio non habemus »: ergo videtur, quod non omnes tenentur diligere inimicos ex corde.
Conclusio.
Affectu a caritate elicito tenemur etiam inimicos diligere, optando eis bona aeterna; affectu vero imperato, quo quis optat alii prosperitatem temporalem, eos diligere est perfectionis, unde sufficit non odisse.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc duplex est respondendi modus. Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod dupliciter est loqui de inimicis: aut secundum statum, in quo exercent inimicitias; aut secundum statum, in quo poenitent et petunt veniam. Si secundum statum, in quo veniam petunt; sic omnes tenentur ad diligendum inimicos propter illam conditionem, quam Dominus ponit in oratione dominica14a: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos etc. Si enim homo homini servat iram, frustra a Deo quaerit medelam, secundum quod dicitur Ecclesiastici vigesimo octavo. — Si autem loquamur de inimicis, prout sunt in statu et in actu laedendi et inimicitias exercendi; sic dicere voluerunt, quod affectu diligere inimicos non est necessitatis, sed magis perfectionis; nec hoc Dominus praecipit, sed magis consulit. Et istam opinionem quorundam Magister ponit in littera15a.
Sed si interius consideretur haec positio, minus sufficienter dicit, pro eo quod, secundum quod auctoritates Sanctorum expresse dicunt, et ipsa ratio aperte convincit, non est caritas vera, nisi diligat omne diligibile; diligibile autem a caritate est omne illud, quod est possibile ad beatitudinem pervenire: ideo non habet aliquis caritatem, nisi diligat omnes illos, qui sunt in statu viae, sive sint amici sive inimici. Unde in Psalmo16a dicitur: Latum mandatum tuum nimis, quia mandatum caritatis ad omnes se extendit. Et sicut longitudo mandati se extendit ad omnem differentiam temporis, sic latitudo ad omnem personam hominis viatoris. Unde sicut aliquis non haberet caritatem, si proponeret etiam in uno solo die peccare et in aliis bene facere, quia deficit sibi longitudo mandati; sic, esto quod aliquis omnes homines diligat praeter unum solum, quem a dilectione excludit, caritatem non habet, quia deficit sibi latitudo illius mandati17a.
Et propterea est alius modus dicendi, quod diligere affectu est dupliciter, secundum quod duplex est affectus amoris: quidam a caritate elicitus, et quidam a caritate imperatus. Ille est affectus amoris a caritate elicitus, quo quis optat alii summum Bonum sive beatitudinem aeternam. Ille vero est affectus imperatus, quo quis optat alii bonum temporale et prosperitatem transitoriam. Amor enim caritatis facit, quod homo velit alii omne bonum, nedum summum Bonum, sed etiam temporale, nisi illud sit impediens ad salutem18a.
Si ergo loquamur de primo affectu a caritate elicito, dico, quod omnes tenentur inimicos, etiam actu inimicantes, diligere et eis vitam aeternam optare. — Si autem loquamur de affectu imperato, quo quis optat alii prosperitatem temporalem; sic non omnes tenentur diligere, sed sufficit non odisse. Et hoc est quod dicit Ambrosius19a: « Sufficit, quod inimicos diligimus et non odio habemus », in quo innuit, quod cum duplex sit caritatis affectus, uno tenemur diligere, altero vero sufficit non odisse. Unde ad non odiendum inimicos et non gaudendum de malis eorum omnes tenentur, sicut dicitur Proverbiorum vigesimo quarto20a: Cum ceciderit inimicus tuus, ne gaudeas; et Ecclesiastici octavo: Noli de inimico tuo mortuo gaudere. Diligere vero omnino quantum ad affectum elicitum et imperatum optando ei bona aeterna et temporalia, hoc perfectionis est et supererogationis. Diligere vero ad bona aeterna hoc necessitatis est et praeceptionis; et ad hoc omnes generaliter sunt obligati, tam perfecti quam imperfecti, sicut rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, ostendunt, et ideo concedendae sunt.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Matthaei quinto: Diliges amicum tuum et odio habebis inimicum tuum; responderi potest dupliciter.
Primo, quod haec Lex nunquam praecipit, odio haberi inimicum, sed ipsi Iudaei hoc arguebant a contrario sensu: quia tantum praecipiebatur eis diligere amicos1, arguebant ex hoc, quod debebant odire inimicos. — Aliter responderi potest, quod est odium affectus et odium effectus; et iterum, est inimicus Ecclesiae sive fidei et inimicus personalis. Cum ergo Lex innuebat, inimicum odio esse habendum; hoc intelligitur de odio effectus et de inimico Ecclesiae et cultus divini. Odio vero affectus neminem praecipiebat odire, nec inimicum personalem nec inimicum Ecclesiae. Inimicum autem personalem non praecipiebat odiri nec odio affectus nec odio effectus, immo potius obligabat ad diligendum ipsum, licet non esset tunc ita expressum: unde et Dominus explicuit in Matthaei quinto2. Et propterea non potest ex hoc argui, quod non omnes teneantur diligere inimicos.
Ad 2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod hoc perfectorum est3; respondent aliqui, quod illud intelligitur de dilectione affectus et effectus, non de dilectione affectus tantum. Sed utrum hoc sit verum, in sequenti problemate declarabitur. Nunc autem dicamus, quod si intelligatur de affectu elicito et imperato, perfectionis est; si vero de affectu elicito tantum, est generalis necessitatis. Glossa vero loquitur ibi de dilectione quantum ad utrumque modum.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diligere inimicos est mirabile; dicendum, quod mirabile dicitur illud quod est supra facultatem naturae; hoc autem potest esse dupliciter, secundum quod est operatio naturae simpliciter, et naturae rationalis. Facere autem mirabilia supra posse naturae simpliciter, hoc est per gratiam gratis datam, quam vocat Apostolus4 operationem virtutum; et hoc non omnibus est datum. Facere vero mirabilia supra posse naturae rationalis, hoc est per gratiam gratum facientem, utpote per fidem et caritatem. Per fidem enim credimus multa, quae non possemus credere sine ea, et quae videntur infidelibus nimis incredibilia5; et per caritatem amamus ea quae videntur caritatem non habentibus odibilia. Et haec mirabilia continentur in Lege divina, et datum est illa omnibus facere, qui volunt in se suscipere gratiam gratum facientem. Et pro tanto non potest argui, quod non teneamur ad dilectionem inimici; hoc enim6 est aliud genus mirabilis quam illud, de quo loquitur Augustinus.
Ad 4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Ambrosii, quod sufficit, si odio non habemus; dicendum, quod auctoritas illa truncate inducitur; dicit enim haec duo simul7: « Sufficit, si simpliciter diligimus et non odio habemus ». Quae duo valde rationabiliter dicit et duplicem affectum dilectionis innuit; et ad confirmationem facit praehabitae responsionis, per quam auctoritas illa satis clare potest intelligi.
I. Haec et seq. (5.) quaestio intime cohaerent et a pluribus Magistri commentatoribus una quaestione absolvuntur. De utraque quaestione antiquitus in scholis exortae sunt diversae illae, hic relatae opiniones, quibus ansam praebuisse videntur quaedam verba tum S. Augustini (q. 5. arg. 3. ad oppos.), tum Origenis, sed Ambrosio a Magistro attributa (hic arg. 4. ad oppos.), tum Glossae (q. 4. et 5. arg. 2. ad oppos.; et cfr. lit. Magistri). — Ex principio supra d. 28. q. 3. stabilito facile eruitur, quod inimici, in quantum sunt inimici i. e. secundum vitium inimicitiae, non sunt diligendi, quia « hoc est perversum et caritati repugnans, quia hoc est diligere malum alterius » (S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 25. a. 8; cfr. etiam Bonav., d. 29. q. 6.).
De distinctione duplicis affectus, qua auctor noster in responsione utitur, haec habet Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.): « Affectus duplex est: quia unus est principalis, quem caritas primo et per se elicit, ut optare dilecto bona spiritualia, scilicet gratiam et gloriam; alter secundarius, quem secundum quosdam [etiam S. Bonav.] imperat, non elicit, secundum alios elicit etiam, sed non primo et per se et principaliter, sed per accidens (ideo nec semper, quia non semper expedit dilecto), ut optare ei bona temporalia » (cfr. supra d. 28. q. 1, et scholion). — A S. Thoma (S. loc. cit.) opportune alia additur distinctio, nempe quod sit dilectio in generali et in speciali, « ut scilicet aliquis in speciali moveatur motu dilectionis ad inimicum; et istud non est de necessitate caritatis absolute, quia nec etiam moveri motu dilectionis in speciali ad quoslibet homines singulariter est de necessitate caritatis, quia hoc esset impossibile. Est tamen de necessitate caritatis secundum praeparationem animi » etc. — Notatu digna est doctrina in solut. ad 1. et 3.
II. Quoad 5. quaestionem opinio primo loco recitata merito reprobatur, atque communiter docetur, quod inimicus in casu necessitatis (et per consequens semper secundum praeparationem animi) diligendus sit exhibitione operis. Praescindendo ab hoc casu necessitatis, B. Albert. (hic, a. 2.) docet: « Sine praeiudicio dico, quod mihi videtur grave, si omnes dicuntur teneri ad exhibendum signa dilectionis... sed tamen videtur mihi, si postulat veniam, non irridens, quod tunc non negandum est ei signum dilectionis ». — De ultima parte huius testimonii cfr. hic dub. 2; S. Thom., hic a. 2. ad 5. Quoad primam vero partem addenda videtur distinctio a S. Thoma, Petr. a Tar., Richardo a Med. adhibita et postea communiter recepta, videlicet inter signa et beneficia dilectionis communia, quae vulgo exhibentur proximis, et a quibus nec inimici debent excludi, et alia specialia, particulariter aliquibus personis conferenda, quae non nisi in casu necessitatis, vel particularium circumstantiarum etiam inimicis sub stricta obligatione sunt praestanda. Haec doctrina, licet hic in responsione explicite non ponatur, satis conformis est verbis auctoris, quae leguntur in fundam. et in refutatione 1. opinionis (cfr. eiusdem Comment. in Lucam, 17, 4.).
III. De utraque quaestione: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. III. q. 59. m. 5. a. 2. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 1. 2; S. II. II. q. 25. a. 8. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.
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Question IV. Whether all are bound to love their enemies as to affection.
Fourthly it is asked whether all are bound to love their enemies as to affection. And that they are, it seems.
1. Leviticus 192: You shall love your friend as yourself; on which Augustine says that « by the name of neighbor and friend every man is understood », according also to what the Lord himself indicates in Luke 10: therefore if that precept was given to all; since all are bound to love themselves as to affection, it seems that all are bound to love their enemies as to affection.
2. Likewise, Matthew 53: If you love those who love you, what reward shall you have? The Gloss: « None in heaven »: therefore he who has love only with respect to those who love him does not have charity, since charity cannot be without reward: therefore, in order that someone may have charity, it is necessary that his charity extend to those who hate him.
3. Likewise, on that of Luke 64: Love your enemies; the interlinear Gloss: « It does not suffice not to hate »; but all are bound to that which suffices for salvation: therefore all are bound not only to not hating their enemies, but also to loving them.
4. Likewise, God forgives sin to no one unless he himself forgives his neighbor, according to what is said in Matthew 6 and 185; but no one forgives his neighbor from the heart unless he loves him as to affection: therefore no one can merit pardon before God unless he loves from the heart those who offend him.
5. Likewise, the neighbor is to be loved more than one's own body, nor does anything oppose and act as an enemy to the spirit more than the flesh itself6: since therefore anyone is bound to love the nature of his own flesh, it seems that he is bound to love his enemy as to affection.
6. Likewise, just as the fault is detestable, so the image of God is lovable; but however much a man is loved, a man is always bound to detest his fault7: therefore however much he is opposed through his fault, one is always bound to love the nature.
On the contrary: 1. Matthew 58: You have heard that it was said to the ancients: You shall love your friend and hate your enemy; but we are now obligated to nothing moral to which the ancients in the Law would not have been obligated: therefore if then they were not bound to loving the enemy, but rather to hating; it seems that not all are now bound to love their enemies. The minor is proved: because on that of Matthew 149 concerning the five loaves etc. the Gloss: « He preached nothing other than what was written; but he shows the Law and the Prophets to be pregnant with mysteries ». And again, 3 Kings 710: Hiram made a molten sea of ten cubits; there the Gloss: « By the ten precepts in the Law the Lord expressed all the things which we ought to do ». If therefore the love of the enemy is contained in none of the ten precepts, neither are the moderns obligated to anything else to which the ancients would not have been obligated; it seems etc.
2. Likewise, Luke 611: Love your enemies; there the Gloss: « This belongs to the perfect »; and again another Gloss, there: « The Church here is not nourished with milk, which belongs to the simple and imperfect, but is strengthened with the stronger food of charity »; but not all are bound to those things which are of perfection: therefore not all are bound to love their enemies.
3. Likewise, on that of the Psalm12a: Reveal my eyes, and I shall consider the wonders of your Law; the Gloss: « Nothing is more wonderful among the commandments than to love one's enemies »; but not all are bound to do wonders, « because, as Augustine says, to do virtues and wonders is not given to all »: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, Ambrose says, and it is found in the preceding distinction13a, where the order of charity was treated: « It suffices that we do not hold our enemies in hatred »: therefore it seems that not all are bound to love their enemies from the heart.
Conclusion.
By an affection elicited from charity we are bound to love even our enemies, by wishing them eternal goods; but by a commanded affection, by which one wishes another temporal prosperity, to love them belongs to perfection, whence it suffices not to hate.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold manner of responding. For some wished to say that there is a twofold way of speaking of enemies: either according to the state in which they exercise their enmities; or according to the state in which they repent and seek pardon. If according to the state in which they seek pardon; thus all are bound to loving their enemies on account of that condition which the Lord places in the Lord's Prayer14a: Forgive us our debts, as we also etc. For if a man keeps anger toward a man, in vain does he seek healing from God, according to what is said in Ecclesiasticus 28. — But if we speak of enemies as they are in the state and act of harming and exercising enmities; thus they wished to say that to love enemies as to affection is not of necessity, but rather of perfection; nor does the Lord command this, but rather counsels it. And the Master sets down this opinion of certain men in the text15a.
But if this position be considered inwardly, it speaks less sufficiently, for the reason that, according to what the authorities of the Saints expressly say, and reason itself openly convinces, there is no true charity unless it love every lovable thing; but lovable by charity is everything which is able to attain to beatitude: therefore no one has charity unless he love all those who are in the state of the way, whether they be friends or enemies. Whence in the Psalm16a it is said: Your commandment is exceedingly broad, because the commandment of charity extends itself to all. And just as the length of the commandment extends to every difference of time, so its breadth to every person of a man who is a wayfarer. Whence just as someone would not have charity if he proposed to sin even on one single day and to do well on the others, because the length of the commandment is lacking to him; so, granted that someone love all men except one only, whom he excludes from love, he does not have charity, because the breadth of that commandment is lacking to him17a.
And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that to love as to affection is in a twofold way, according as the affection of love is twofold: one elicited from charity, and one commanded by charity. That affection of love is elicited from charity, by which one wishes for another the highest Good or eternal beatitude. But that is the commanded affection, by which one wishes for another a temporal good and transitory prosperity. For the love of charity brings it about that a man wills for another every good, not only the highest Good, but also the temporal, unless it be an impediment to salvation18a.
If therefore we speak of the first affection, elicited from charity, I say that all are bound to love their enemies, even those actually showing enmity, and to wish them eternal life. — But if we speak of the commanded affection, by which one wishes another temporal prosperity; thus not all are bound to love, but it suffices not to hate. And this is what Ambrose says19a: « It suffices that we love our enemies and do not hold them in hatred », in which he indicates that, since the affection of charity is twofold, by one we are bound to love, but for the other it suffices not to hate. Whence all are bound to not hating their enemies and to not rejoicing over their evils, as is said in Proverbs 2420a: When your enemy has fallen, do not rejoice; and Ecclesiasticus 8: Do not rejoice over your dead enemy. But to love wholly as to elicited and commanded affection, by wishing him eternal and temporal goods, this belongs to perfection and supererogation. But to love unto eternal goods, this is of necessity and of precept; and to this all are generally obligated, both the perfect and the imperfect, as the reasons which are brought forward for the first part show, and therefore they are to be conceded.
To the arguments:
To 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary from Matthew 5: You shall love your friend and hate your enemy; it can be answered in two ways.
First, that this Law never commands that the enemy be held in hatred, but the Jews themselves argued this from the contrary sense: because it was only commanded them to love friends1, they argued from this that they ought to hate enemies. — Otherwise it can be answered that there is a hatred of affection and a hatred of effect; and again, there is the enemy of the Church or of the faith and the personal enemy. When therefore the Law indicated that the enemy was to be held in hatred; this is understood of the hatred of effect and of the enemy of the Church and of divine worship. But by hatred of affection it commanded no one to hate, neither the personal enemy nor the enemy of the Church. The personal enemy, however, it did not command to be hated either by hatred of affection or by hatred of effect, but rather it obligated to loving him, although it was not then so expressed: whence the Lord also made it explicit in Matthew 52. And therefore it cannot be argued from this that not all are bound to love their enemies.
To 2. To that which is objected, that this belongs to the perfect3; some respond that it is understood of the love of affection and of effect, not of the love of affection alone. But whether this is true will be declared in the following problem. But now let us say that if it be understood of the elicited and commanded affection, it belongs to perfection; but if of the elicited affection alone, it is of general necessity. But the Gloss speaks there of love as to both ways.
To 3. To that which is objected, that to love enemies is wonderful; it must be said that that is called wonderful which is above the faculty of nature; but this can be in a twofold way, according as it is an operation of nature simply, and of rational nature. But to do wonders above the power of nature simply, this is through grace freely given, which the Apostle4 calls the operation of powers; and this is not given to all. But to do wonders above the power of rational nature, this is through sanctifying grace, namely through faith and charity. For through faith we believe many things which we could not believe without it, and which seem to unbelievers too incredible5; and through charity we love those things which seem hateful to those not having charity. And these wonders are contained in the divine Law, and it is given to all to do them, who wish to receive in themselves sanctifying grace. And for that reason it cannot be argued that we are not bound to the love of the enemy; for this6 is another kind of wonder than that of which Augustine speaks.
To 4. To that which is objected from the authority of Ambrose, that it suffices if we do not hold them in hatred; it must be said that that authority is brought forward in truncated form; for it says these two things together7: « It suffices if we simply love and do not hold in hatred ». Which two things it says very reasonably, and indicates a twofold affection of love; and it makes for the confirmation of the response already given, by which that authority can be understood clearly enough.
I. This and the following (5th) question are intimately connected and are dispatched by many commentators on the Master in a single question. Concerning both questions there arose of old in the schools those diverse opinions related here, to which certain words seem to have given occasion: both of St. Augustine (q. 5, arg. 3 to the contrary), and of Origen, but attributed by the Master to Ambrose (here, arg. 4 to the contrary), and of the Gloss (q. 4 and 5, arg. 2 to the contrary; and cf. the text of the Master). — From the principle established above at d. 28, q. 3, it is easily drawn that enemies, insofar as they are enemies, that is, according to the vice of enmity, are not to be loved, because « this is perverse and repugnant to charity, since this is to love the evil of another » (St. Thomas, Summa II-II, q. 25, a. 8; cf. also Bonaventure, d. 29, q. 6).
Concerning the distinction of the twofold affection, which our author uses in the response, Peter of Tarentaise (here, q. 1, a. 1) has this: « Affection is twofold: because one is principal, which charity elicits first and through itself, as to wish for the beloved spiritual goods, namely grace and glory; the other secondary, which according to some [including St. Bonaventure] it commands, does not elicit, according to others it also elicits, but not first and through itself and principally, but by accident (and therefore not always, because it is not always expedient for the beloved), as to wish him temporal goods » (cf. above d. 28, q. 1, and scholion). — By St. Thomas (loc. cit.) another distinction is opportunely added, namely that there is love in general and in particular, « so that someone be moved in particular by a motion of love toward the enemy; and this is not of the necessity of charity absolutely, since not even to be moved by a motion of love in particular toward any men singly is of the necessity of charity, because this would be impossible. It is, however, of the necessity of charity according to the preparation of the mind » etc. — Worthy of note is the doctrine in the solution to the 1st and 3rd.
II. As to the 5th question, the opinion recited in the first place is rightly rejected, and it is commonly taught that the enemy in a case of necessity (and consequently always according to the preparation of the mind) is to be loved by the showing of a work. Prescinding from this case of necessity, B. Albert (here, a. 2) teaches: « Without prejudice I say that it seems grave to me if all are said to be bound to showing signs of love... but nevertheless it seems to me that, if he asks pardon, not mockingly, then a sign of love is not to be denied him ». — Concerning the last part of this testimony cf. here dub. 2; St. Thomas, here a. 2 ad 5. As to the first part, however, the distinction seems to be added which was employed by St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and afterwards commonly received, namely between the common signs and benefits of love, which are usually shown to neighbors, and from which not even enemies ought to be excluded, and other special ones, to be conferred particularly on certain persons, which are to be rendered, even to enemies, under strict obligation, only in a case of necessity or of particular circumstances. This doctrine, although it is not here explicitly set down in the response, is sufficiently conformable to the words of the author which are read in the fundamenta and in the refutation of the 1st opinion (cf. the same author's Commentary on Luke, 17, 4).
III. Concerning both questions: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 59, m. 5, a. 2, 3. — Scotus, in both Writings here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here a. 1, 2; Summa II-II, q. 25, a. 8, 9. — B. Albert, here a. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.
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- Vers. 18. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Luc. 10, 36. seq. — Dictum August. invenitur Enarrat. in Ps. 25. enarrat. 2. n. 2; de Disciplina christ. c. 3. n. 3, et Serm. 62. (in appendice) n. 1. (alias 59. de Tempore). — In fine arg. pro videtur, quod... teneantur codd. AFGHNTZ videtur, quod... tenentur.Verse 18. — The following Scripture passage is Luke 10:36 ff. — The saying of Augustine is found in Enarrationes in Ps. 25, enarrat. 2, n. 2; de Disciplina christiana c. 3, n. 3, and Serm. 62 (in the appendix) n. 1 (alias 59, de Tempore). — At the end of the argument, for videtur, quod... teneantur codices AFGHNTZ read videtur, quod... tenentur.
- Vers. 46. — Glossa est interlinearis et habetur apud Lyranum.Verse 46. — The Gloss is the interlinear one and is found in Lyra.
- Vers. 27. — Verba Glossae, quae apud Strabum et Lyranum habetur ut ordinaria, respiciunt Hieronymi exposit. in Matth. 5, 44: Multi, praecepta Dei imbecillitate sua, non Sanctorum viribus aestimantes, putant, esse impossibilia quae praecepta sunt, et dicunt sufficere virtutibus non odisse inimicos etc.Verse 27. — The words of the Gloss, which is found in Strabo and Lyra as the Ordinary one, refer to Jerome's exposition on Matt. 5:44: Many, esteeming the precepts of God by their own weakness, not by the strength of the Saints, think that the things which are commanded are impossible, and say that it suffices for the virtues not to hate one's enemies etc.
- Cap. 6, 15. et 18, 35.Chap. 6:15 and 18:35.
- Respicit Rom. 7, 23, et Gal. 5, 17. — Quoad maiorem cfr. verba August. supra in lit. Magistri, d. XXIX. c. 1. allata. — Quod corpus proprium diligendum sit, ostensum est supra d. 28. a. 4.Refers to Rom. 7:23 and Gal. 5:17. — As to the major, cf. the words of Augustine adduced above in the text of the Master, d. XXIX, c. 1. — That one's own body is to be loved was shown above at d. 28, a. 4.
- Vide supra d. 28. q. 3. — Subinde post ergo quantumcumque cod. K interiicit homo, quod vocabulum in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 72. a. 1. invenitur post semper tenetur. Tum pro diligere naturam edd. et nonnulli codd. diligere eius naturam.See above d. 28, q. 3. — Thereupon, after ergo quantumcumque, codex K inserts homo, which word in the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collat. 72, a. 1, is found after semper tenetur. Then for diligere naturam the editions and some codices read diligere eius naturam.
- Vers. 43. — In minori non pauci codd. omittunt antiqui.Verse 43. — In the minor, not a few codices omit antiqui.
- Vers. 19. — Glossa sumta est ex Comment. Rabani super hunc locum: Turbis, inquit Rabanus, esurientibus Salvator non nova creat cibaria, sed acceptis eis quae habuerunt discipuli, benedicit, quia veniens in carnem non alia, quam praedicta sunt, praedicabat, sed Legis et Prophetarum scripta quam sint mysteriis gratiae gravida, demonstrat. — Pro praedicavit edd. cum bene multis codd. prophetat.Verse 19. — The Gloss is taken from Rabanus's Commentary on this passage: To the crowds, says Rabanus, who hunger, the Savior does not create new foods, but, taking those which the disciples had, he blesses them, because, coming in the flesh, he preached nothing other than what was foretold, but he shows how pregnant with the mysteries of grace are the writings of the Law and the Prophets. — For praedicavit the editions with very many codices read prophetat.
- Vers. 23. — Glossa (Ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum) delibata est ex Beda, de Templo Salomonis, c. 19.Verse 23. — The Gloss (Ordinary, in Strabo and Lyra) is drawn from Bede, On the Temple of Solomon, c. 19.
- Vers. 27. — Prima Glossa, quae penes Lyranum habetur ut interlinearis, est secundum Augustinum, Enchirid. c. 73. n. 19. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri. Secunda Glossa est ordinaria et sumta ex Ambros., In Luc. n. 72; in ea pro nutritur Strabus cum textu originali substituit imbuitur, et omittit verba quod est simplicium et imperfectorum.Verse 27. — The first Gloss, which is found in Lyra as the interlinear one, is according to Augustine, Enchiridion c. 73, n. 19. Cf. here the text of the Master. The second Gloss is the Ordinary one and is taken from Ambrose, In Luc. n. 72; in it, for nutritur, Strabo, following the original text, substitutes imbuitur, and omits the words quod est simplicium et imperfectorum.
- Psalm. 118, 18. — Glossa, quae hic allegatur, est ordinaria et transcripta ex August. Enarrat. in hunc Ps. serm. 7. n. 4. — Dictum August. habetur in eius Serm. 225. (alias 47. de Sanctis) n. 2. (in appendice Serm. August.).Psalm 118:18. — The Gloss which is cited here is the Ordinary one and is transcribed from Augustine, Enarratio on this Psalm, serm. 7, n. 4. — The saying of Augustine is found in his Serm. 225 (alias 47, de Sanctis) n. 2 (in the appendix of Augustine's Sermons).
- Lit. Magistri, c. 2; ceterum verba allata sunt Origenis, non Ambrosii. — Cod. Z post et habetur in subdit littera.Text of the Master, c. 2; for the rest, the words adduced are Origen's, not Ambrose's. — Codex Z, after et habetur in, adds littera.
- Matth. 6, 12. — Seq. locus est Eccli. 28, 3: Homo homini reservat iram, et a Deo quaerit medelam?Matt. 6:12. — The following passage is Ecclus. 28:3: Man keeps anger for man, and does he seek healing from God?
- Huius distinctionis.Of this distinction.
- Psalm. 118, 96. Cfr. supra pag. 627, nota 3, et August., Epist. 140. (alias 120.) c. 26. n. 63. et Serm. 165. (alias 7. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 4. n. 4, ubi exponitur illud Eph. 3, 18: Quae sit latitudo et longitudo etc.Psalm 118:96. Cf. above p. 627, note 3, and Augustine, Epist. 140 (alias 120) c. 26, n. 63, and Serm. 165 (alias 7, de Verbis Apostoli) c. 4, n. 4, where that of Eph. 3:18 is expounded: What is the breadth and length etc.
- Cod. K. adiicit caritatis.Codex K adds caritatis.
- Cfr. supra d. 29. q. 6. in corp. — Paulo inferius pro et eis complures codd. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. et etiam eis.Cf. above d. 29, q. 6, in the body. — A little below, for et eis, several codices and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales read et etiam eis.
- Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 2. Pro diligimus et habemus nonnulli codd. et edd. diligamus et habeamus.See above the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 2. For diligimus et habemus some codices and editions read diligamus et habeamus.
- Vers. 17. — Locus Eccli. est 8, 8.Verse 17. — The passage of Ecclus. is 8:8.
- Levit. 19, 18: Diliges amicum tuum sicut te ipsum. — Superius pro praecipi... odio haberi edd. habent Primo per hoc quod... odio haberi, et deinde multi codd. omittunt tantum ante praecipiebatur.Levit. 19:18: You shall love your friend as yourself. — Above, for praecipi... odio haberi the editions have Primo per hoc quod... odio haberi, and then many codices omit tantum before praecipiebatur.
- Vers. 44. seqq. — Pro explicuit cod. A explicavit. Superius mallemus odire pro odiri, quod habent codd. et edd.Verses 44 ff. — For explicuit codex A reads explicavit. Above we should prefer odire over odiri, which the codices and editions have.
- Bd.: minus diligere inimicos perfectorum est. Paulo inferius pro declarabitur codd. PIL determinabitur.Bd.: to love enemies less belongs to the perfect. A little below, for declarabitur codices PIL read determinabitur.
- Epist. 1. Cor. 12, 10. — De mirabili vide II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. — Mox pro et hoc non... datum edd. et aliqui codd. et haec non... data.1 Epist. Cor. 12:10. — Concerning the wonderful see II. Sent. d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, ad 5. — Soon, for et hoc non... datum the editions and some codices read et haec non... data.
- Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.See above d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4.
- Codd. EFGHILNTU aa igitur, Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. hic igitur. Subinde pro mirabilis (sic codd. 1, 2 et memorat. Supplement. cum plurimis codd.) Vat. mirabilius.Codices EFGHILNTU read aa igitur, the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales hic igitur. Thereupon, for mirabilis (so codices 1, 2 and the cited Supplement with very many codices) the Vatican edition reads mirabilius.
- Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIX. c. 2.See above the text of the Master, d. XXIX, c. 2.