Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 30
Articulus unicus. De caritate quantum ad perfectionem meriti.
Quaestio III. Utrum habens caritatem perfectam teneatur ea quae sunt perfectionis, implere.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum perfectam caritatem habentes teneantur ea quae sunt perfectionis, implere. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Matthaei quinto4: Estote perfecti, sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est; hoc dicitur Apostolis et apostolicis viris: ergo videtur, quod omnes viri perfecti teneantur ad ea quae sunt perfectionis.
2. Item, Gregorius in quadam homilia5: « Cum augentur dona, rationes crescunt donorum »; unde et auctoritas dicit, quod « cui plus committitur, plus ab eo exigitur »: ergo cui committitur perfecta caritas; cum Deus exigat actum convenientem habitui, videtur, quod ille teneatur ad opera perfectionis.
3. Item, sicut se habet caritas imperfecta ad opera simplicis iustitiae, sic se habet caritas perfecta ad opera iustitiae consummatae; sed habens caritatem imperfectam tenetur ad ea quae sunt simplicis iustitiae: ergo videtur, quod habens caritatem perfectam obligetur ad opera perfectionis.
4. Item, caritas aut proficit, aut deficit; sed habens caritatem tenetur non deficere: ergo tenetur proficere, cum non sit medium inter haec6. Qui autem habet perfectam caritatem non potest proficere nisi in operibus perfectis: ergo videtur, quod omnis, in quo est perfectio caritatis, obligetur ad opera perfectionis.
Sed contra: 1. Matthaei decimo nono7: Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata: igitur ex sola observantia mandatorum videtur quod homo possit pervenire ad salutem: ergo non videtur, quod ad ea obligetur, quae sunt caritatis perfectae.
2. Item, Iacobi tertio8: Qui non offendit in verbo, hic perfectus est vir; sed nullus tenetur ad hoc, quod non offendat in verbo, quantumcumque sit perfectus: ergo propter perfectionem caritatis non obligatur quis ad ea quae sunt perfectionis.
3. Item, quanto aliquis est in maiori caritate constitutus, tanto plus habet de libertate spiritus9; et quanto plus habet de libertate spiritus, tanto paucioribus vinculis obligatur: ergo perfecti non tenentur ad plura, quam teneantur imperfecti, quantum est de ipsa perfectione caritatis. Si ergo imperfecti non astringuntur ad opera perfectionis, videtur a maiori10, quod nec illi debeant astringi, qui sunt in caritate perfecta constituti.
5. Item, status caritatis perfectae non excedit caritatem imperfectam in infinitum: cum ergo mortale excedat veniale in infinitum11, quod est veniale imperfecto non est mortale perfecto, quantum est de ipso genere status: ergo non videtur, quod perfectio caritatis obliget hominem ad opera perfectionis. Si enim obligaret, iam videretur, quod perfectus vir esset peioris conditionis.
### Conclusio. Status caritatis perfectae, quantum est de se, non obligat nisi ad eam perfectionem, quae consistit in impletione mandatorum.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod multiplex est genus perfectionis, et multiplex est etiam ratio obligandi. — p. 662Quinque enim perfectionis genera consueverunt distingui. Una est perfectio sufficientiae, quae consistit in adimpletione mandatorum; et de hac Matthaei quinto1a: Estote perfecti, sicut Pater vester caelestis perfectus est. — Secunda est perfectio religionis, quae consistit in observantia consiliorum; et de hac dicitur Matthaei decimo nono2a: Si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende omnia quae habes etc. — Tertia est perfectio praelationis, quae consistit in regimine subditorum; et de hac dicitur Lucae sexto3a: Perfectus omnis erit, si sit sicut magister eius. — Quarta est perfectio comparationis, quae consistit in ostensione exemplorum; et de hac dicitur Genesis sexto4a: Noe vir iustus atque perfectus in generationibus suis. — Quinta est perfectio tranquillitatis, quae consistit in consummatione difficillimorum et optimorum; primae Ioannis quarto5a: Perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem; et Philosophus dicit, quod « perfecta virtus optimorum est operativa ».
Similiter intelligendum est, quod quinque modis obligatur aliquis ad aliquid. Primum genus obligationis est propter mandatum divinum. Secundum est propter votum emissum. Tertium est propter officium susceptum. Quartum est propter vitandum scandalum. Quintum est propter conscientiae iudicium.
Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum homo in perfecta caritate existens teneatur ad opera perfectionis; dicendum, quod si perfectio accipiatur primo modo, videlicet pro perfectione iustitiae, quae consistit in impletione mandatorum; sic obligatur ad illam perfectionem, sicut et alii; et eo magis de bono et aequo, quo magis percepit donum, per quod possit implere divinum mandatum. — Si autem loquamur de aliis generibus perfectionis, dicendum, quod non obligatur homo existens in perfecta caritate ad illa, quantum est ex obligatione divini mandati; nec aliter obligatur, nisi interveniat aliquod vinculum sequentium, videlicet votum, per quod obligetur ad perfectionem religionis; vel officium susceptum, per quod obligetur ad perfectionem praelationis; vel scandalum, ratione cuius obligetur ad perfectionem comparationis; vel conscientiae dictamen, per quod obligetur ad perfectionem tranquillitatis. His enim6a intervenientibus, superinducitur nova obligatio ad huiusmodi genera perfectionum praedictarum. Sed status caritatis, quantum est de se, necessariam obligationem non adducit, sicut rationes, quae ad hanc partem sunt inductae, ostendunt. Et ideo concedi possunt.
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Domini in Matthaeo, iam patet responsio: quia illud intelligitur de perfectione iustitiae et sufficientiae, ad quam obligantur omnes, tam perfecti quam imperfecti.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Gregorii, quod sicut crescunt dona, sic crescunt rationes donorum; dicendum, quod hoc verum est7a quantum ad ea quae sunt necessitatis. Praeterea, quod dicitur, quod rationes donorum crescunt; hoc non est, quia Deus semper exigat necessario ab homine totum, quod potest; sed quia exigit de bono et aequo, ita quod illa exigentia non inducit tentionem necessitatis, sed congruitatis; et eius omissio non inducit culpam mortalem, sed venialem. Dominus autem non solum exigit rationem de mortalibus, sed etiam de venialibus, secundum illud quod dicitur Matthaei duodecimo8a, quod homines reddent rationem de omni verbo otioso.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet caritas imperfecta ad opera simplicis iustitiae etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia caritas imperfecta ordinatur ad opera simplicis iustitiae non propter ipsius caritatis statum, sed propter divinum mandatum; sed non sic est de operibus perfectionis, quia non cadunt sic sub praecepto, sed magis sub admonitione et consilio.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habens caritatem semper tenetur proficere; dicendum, quod caritas dicitur dupliciter proficere: uno modo propter multiplicationem bonorum operum; alio modo propter ipsius caritatis augmentum et progressum ad ultimum statum. Cum ergo dicitur, quod homo tenetur proficere in caritate, et quod caritas aut proficit, aut deficit; si intelligatur de profectu, qui consistit in ipsius caritatis augmento et incremento, sic non habet veritatem, quia caritas non augetur in homine continue9a. Si vero intelligatur de profectu, qui consistit in bonorum operum multiplicap. 663tione et iustitiae exercitatione, sic veritatem habet; sed iste profectus caritatis non tantum attenditur in impletione consiliorum et operum perfectorum, sed etiam in observantia mandatorum. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod homo in perfecta caritate existens ad opera perfectionis necesse habeat obligari18.
Article unique. On charity with respect to the perfection of merit.
Question III. Whether one having perfect charity is bound to fulfill the things which are of perfection.
Thirdly it is asked whether those having perfect charity are bound to fulfill the things which are of perfection. And that they are, seems [to follow].
1. Matthew 54: Be perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect; this is said to the Apostles and to apostolic men: therefore it seems that all perfect men are bound to the things which are of perfection.
2. Likewise, Gregory in a certain homily5: « When gifts are increased, the reckonings of the gifts grow »; whence also an authority says that « to whom more is committed, more is required of him »: therefore to him to whom perfect charity is committed — since God requires an act befitting the habit — it seems that he is bound to the works of perfection.
3. Likewise, as imperfect charity stands to the works of simple righteousness, so perfect charity stands to the works of consummate righteousness; but one having imperfect charity is bound to the things which are of simple righteousness: therefore it seems that one having perfect charity is obliged to the works of perfection.
4. Likewise, charity either advances or falls away; but one having charity is bound not to fall away: therefore he is bound to advance, since there is no middle between these6. But he who has perfect charity cannot advance except in perfect works: therefore it seems that everyone in whom there is perfection of charity is obliged to the works of perfection.
On the contrary: 1. Matthew 197: If you will enter into life, keep the commandments: therefore from the observance of the commandments alone it seems that a man can attain to salvation: therefore it does not seem that he is obliged to those things which are of perfect charity.
2. Likewise, James 38: He who offends not in word, he is a perfect man; but no one is bound to this, that he offend not in word, however perfect he may be: therefore on account of the perfection of charity one is not obliged to the things which are of perfection.
3. Likewise, the more anyone is constituted in greater charity, so much the more he has of freedom of spirit9; and the more he has of freedom of spirit, the fewer the bonds by which he is obliged: therefore the perfect are not bound to more than the imperfect are bound, as regards the perfection of charity itself. If therefore the imperfect are not constrained to the works of perfection, it seems from the greater10 that neither ought those to be constrained who are constituted in perfect charity.
5. Likewise, the state of perfect charity does not exceed imperfect charity infinitely: since therefore the mortal exceeds the venial infinitely11, what is venial to the imperfect is not mortal to the perfect, as regards the very kind of state: therefore it does not seem that the perfection of charity obliges a man to the works of perfection. For if it did oblige, it would now seem that the perfect man were of worse condition.
### Conclusion. The state of perfect charity, as regards itself, obliges only to that perfection which consists in the fulfillment of the commandments.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that the kind of perfection is manifold, and the ground of obliging is also manifold. — p. 662For five kinds of perfection are customarily distinguished. One is the perfection of sufficiency, which consists in the fulfillment of the commandments; and of this [Matthew 5]1a: Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect. — The second is the perfection of religion, which consists in the observance of the counsels; and of this it is said in Matthew 192a: If you will be perfect, go and sell all that you have etc. — The third is the perfection of prelacy, which consists in the governance of subjects; and of this it is said in Luke 63a: Everyone shall be perfect, if he be as his master. — The fourth is the perfection of comparison, which consists in the showing of examples; and of this it is said in Genesis 64a: Noah, a man just and perfect in his generations. — The fifth is the perfection of tranquillity, which consists in the consummation of the most difficult and best things; 1 John 45a: Perfect charity casts out fear; and the Philosopher says that « perfect virtue is operative of the best things ».
Likewise it must be understood that one is obliged to something in five ways. The first kind of obligation is on account of a divine commandment. The second is on account of a vow undertaken. The third is on account of an office received. The fourth is on account of the avoidance of scandal. The fifth is on account of the judgment of conscience.
When therefore it is asked whether a man existing in perfect charity is bound to the works of perfection; it must be said that if perfection be taken in the first way, namely for the perfection of righteousness, which consists in the fulfillment of the commandments; thus he is obliged to that perfection, just as also others; and so much the more, of what is good and equitable, the more he has received the gift by which he can fulfill the divine commandment. — But if we speak of the other kinds of perfection, it must be said that a man existing in perfect charity is not obliged to those, as regards the obligation of the divine commandment; nor is he otherwise obliged, unless some bond of the following [things] intervene, namely a vow, by which he is obliged to the perfection of religion; or an office received, by which he is obliged to the perfection of prelacy; or scandal, by reason of which he is obliged to the perfection of comparison; or the dictate of conscience, by which he is obliged to the perfection of tranquillity. For when these6a intervene, a new obligation is superinduced to the aforesaid kinds of perfection. But the state of charity, as regards itself, brings no necessary obligation, as the arguments which are adduced to this part show. And therefore they can be conceded.
1. But to that which is objected to the contrary concerning the authority of the Lord in Matthew, the response is already plain: because that is understood of the perfection of righteousness and sufficiency, to which all are obliged, both perfect and imperfect.
2. To that which is objected concerning the authority of Gregory, that as the gifts grow, so the reckonings of the gifts grow; it must be said that this is true7a as regards the things which are of necessity. Moreover, as to what is said, that the reckonings of the gifts grow; this is not because God always necessarily requires of a man all that he can [do]; but because he requires of what is good and equitable, so that that requirement does not bring on a holding of necessity, but of fittingness; and its omission does not bring on mortal fault, but venial. But the Lord requires a reckoning not only of mortal [sins], but also of venial ones, according to that which is said in Matthew 128a, that men shall render a reckoning of every idle word.
3. To that which is objected, that as imperfect charity stands to the works of simple righteousness etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, because imperfect charity is ordered to the works of simple righteousness not on account of the state of charity itself, but on account of the divine commandment; but it is not so concerning the works of perfection, because they do not fall thus under precept, but rather under admonition and counsel.
4. To that which is objected, that one having charity is always bound to advance; it must be said that charity is said to advance in two ways: in one way on account of the multiplication of good works; in another way on account of the increase of charity itself and its progress toward the ultimate state. When therefore it is said that a man is bound to advance in charity, and that charity either advances or falls away; if it be understood of the advance which consists in the increase and growth of charity itself, thus it is not true, because charity is not increased in a man continuously9a. But if it be understood of the advance which consists in the multiplication of good worksp. 663and the exercise of righteousness, thus it is true; but this advance of charity is attended not only in the fulfillment of the counsels and of perfect works, but also in the observance of the commandments. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that a man existing in perfect charity must of necessity be obliged to the works of perfection18.
- Vers. 48.Verse 48.
- Libr. 1. Homil. in Evang. homil. 9. n. 1. — Ad verba quae sequuntur: auctoritas [Vat. auctoritas divina] dicit, supple: in Glossa ordinaria (apud Strabum et Lyranum) in Luc. 12, 48: Cui multum datum est, multum quaeretur ab eo.Book 1, Homilies on the Gospel, homily 9, n. 1. — To the words that follow, an authority [the Vatican edition: a divine authority] says, supply: in the Glossa ordinaria (in Strabo and Lyra) on Luke 12:48: To whom much is given, much shall be required of him.
- Bernard., Epist. 254. n. 5. ait, inter profectum et defectum in hoc statu mortalis vitae nihil medium inveniri. Cfr. Epist. 91. n. 3; Serm. 35. de Diversis, n. 2. et Serm. 124. n. 1.Bernard, Epistle 254, n. 5, says that between advance and falling-away in this state of mortal life no middle is found. Cf. Epistle 91, n. 3; Sermon 35 on Diverse Subjects, n. 2, and Sermon 124, n. 1.
- Vers. 17.Verse 17.
- Vers. 2. — Minor fulcitur illo Bedae dicto (in vers. laudat.): « Quotidiana est huiusmodi et inevitabilis offensio », nec non et illo (ibid. in n. n.): Nullus loquentium est qui non aliquando delinquit in lingua sua.Verse 2. — The minor [premise] is supported by that saying of Bede (on the verse cited): « Of this kind is the daily and unavoidable offense », and also by that one (ibid., on the same): There is no one of those who speak who does not sometimes fall short with his tongue.
- Ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas [II. Cor. 3, 17.]. De seq. dicto vide supra pag. 31, nota 8. verba Augustini, quod aliud est esse in lege, aliud sub lege.Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty [2 Cor. 3:17]. On the following saying see above, p. 31, note 8, the words of Augustine, that it is one thing to be in the law, another to be under the law.
- Cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5.Cf. vol. I, p. 835, note 5.
- Vide IV. Sent. d. 16. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. — In fine arg. codd. K R W Y addunt quam imperfectus.See IV Sent., d. 16, p. II, a. 3, q. 1. — At the end of the argument codices K R W Y add quam imperfectus ("than the imperfect [man]").
- Vers. 48. — Paulo superius pro Una est edd. Prima est.Verse 48. — A little above, for Una est the editions [read] Prima est.
- Vers. 21.Verse 21.
- Vers. 40.Verse 40.
- Vers. 9. — Pro perfectio comparationis edd. cum nonnullis codd. hic et inferius perfectio operationis, refragantibus multis aliis codd. nec non Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 72. a. 3. Nostram lectionem tuentur etiam Petr. Pictaviensis († 1205), III. Sent. c. 25, et Guliel. Antissiodor., Sum. p. III. tr. 6. c. 5. q. 2. Hic, versum allatum exponens ait: « Erat Noe vir iustus et perfectus in generatione sua, id est in generatione humana, quoniam in comparatione hominum iustus apparebat, licet non in comparatione Angelorum ». Ille similiter locum laudatum explicat. Insuper perfectionem religionis vocat perfectionem quietis, perfectionem praelationis autem perfectionem actionis, et perfectionem tranquillitatis perfectionem certitudinis (Guliel. Antissiod. perfectionem securitatis). Utrique addunt quoque his quinque perfectionibus sextam, perfectionem sacri ordinis (e. gr. sacerdotii).Verse 9. — For perfectio comparationis the editions with some codices, here and below, [read] perfectio operationis, against many other codices and also the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 72, a. 3. Our reading is upheld also by Peter of Poitiers († 1205), III Sent. c. 25, and by William of Auxerre, Summa p. III, tr. 6, c. 5, q. 2. The latter, expounding the verse cited, says: « Noah was a man just and perfect in his generation, that is, in the human generation, since in comparison with men he appeared just, though not in comparison with the Angels ». The former likewise explains the passage cited. Moreover he calls the perfection of religion the perfection of rest, the perfection of prelacy the perfection of action, and the perfection of tranquillity the perfection of certitude (William of Auxerre, the perfection of security). Both also add to these five perfections a sixth, the perfection of sacred order (e.g., of the priesthood).
- Vers. 18. — Philosophi sententia habetur II. Ethic. c. 3. Cfr. II. Moral. Eudem. c. 3. et 6. (c. 1. et 5.) nec non supra pag. 472, nota 2.Verse 18. — The Philosopher's statement is in Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 3. Cf. Eudemian Ethics II, c. 3 and 6 (c. 1 and 5), and also above, p. 472, note 2.
- Pro enim, quod cod. A omittit, cod. bb igitur.For enim, which codex A omits, codex bb [reads] igitur.
- Cod. A interserit quia Deus semper exigit ab homine. Mox pro necessitatis cod. F necessaria. Inferius pro tentionem necessitatis cod. V et edd. 1, 2 tunc rationem necessitatis.Codex A inserts quia Deus semper exigit ab homine ("because God always requires of a man"). Soon, for necessitatis codex F [reads] necessaria. Below, for tentionem necessitatis codex V and editions 1, 2 [read] tunc rationem necessitatis.
- Vers. 36.Verse 36.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 4, et II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2. — Post pauca pro multiplicatione edd. cum aliquot codd. multitudine et circa finem solut. consistens pro existens.Cf. I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 4, and II Sent., d. 27, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2. — After a little, for multiplicatione the editions with some codices [read] multitudine, and near the end of the solution consistens for existens.
- Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli.See the scholion to question 1 of this article.