Bonaventure

Quaestio V. Utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad effectum.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad effectum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate veteris Testamenti, Exodi vigesimo tertio¹: Si videris asinum odientis te iacere sub onere, non pertransibis, sed sublevabis cum eo; et hoc ipsum dicitur Proverbiorum vigesimo quinto: Si esurierit inimicus tuus, ciba illum; si sitierit, potum da illi: si ergo mandata ista omnibus proponebantur, videtur, quod omnes tenebantur diligere inimicos quantum ad effectum.

2. Item, hoc videtur ex auctoritate novi Testamenti, Matthaei quinto²: Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite his qui oderunt vos, et orate pro persequentibus vos etc.; ibi dicit quaedam Glossa: « Tribus modis peccatur contra Ecclesiam: odio, verbis, cruciatu corporis. Econtra Ecclesia facit tria: diligit, benefacit et orat »: ergo non est membrum Ecclesiae, qui non diligit inimicos et affectu et effectu: ergo omnes tenentur isto modo diligere.

3. Item, hoc videtur per rationem, quia dilectio affectus sine dilectione effectus non est dilectio vera; « probatio enim dilectionis exhibitio est operis³ »: si ergo veraci dilectione omnes tenentur inimicos diligere, videtur, quod omnes teneantur non solum affectu, sed etiam effectu inimicos amare.

4. Item, perniciosior inimicus est caro nostra quam aliquis proximus noster; sed carnem nostram repugnantem tenemur nutrire et fovere quantum ad eius naturam: ergo si magis tenemur proximos diligere⁴, videtur multo fortius, quod debeamus eos non solum affectu amare, sed etiam effectu eos nutrire et fovere et beneficia eis communicare.

5. Item, non solum sumit homo vindictam de alio, infligendo malum, sed etiam subtrahendo bonum; sed omnes tenentur non quaerere ultionem, secundum quod dicitur Levitici decimo nono⁵, et ad Romanos duodecimo: Non vos vindicantes: ergo omnes tenentur non subtrahere aliquod bonum propter acceptam iniuriam. Si ergo omnes tenentur diligere eos qui non sunt inimici, affectu pariter et effectu; videtur, quod similiter omnes utroque modo teneantur inimicos diligere.

Sed contra: 1. Frequenter praecipitur in Lege, quod ipsi interficiant inimicos suos, sicut praecipitur Exodi vigesimo tertio⁶: Non inibis cum eis foedus etc.: ergo videtur, quod in veteri Lege non tenebantur inimicos diligere quantum ad effectum: ergo pari ratione nec imperfecti tenentur in nova.

2. Item, super illud Matthaei quinto⁷: Diligite inimicos vestros; dicit quaedam Glossa: « Cumulus perfectionis est diligere inimicos et orare pro ipsis »: si ergo non omnes tenentur ad cumulum perfectionis, non omnes tenentur inimicos diligere effectu.

3. Item, Augustinus in Enchiridio — et habetur in littera⁸ — dicit, quod diligere inimicos et benefacere eis non est tantorum, quanti exaudiuntur in oratione dominica: si ergo in oratione dominica non exaudiuntur nisi boni, videtur, quod non omnes boni teneantur inimicos diligere affectu pariter et effectu.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per regulam Philosophi⁹: « Si oppositum in opposito, et propositum in proposito »: cum ergo amicis sit benefaciendum, per se loquendo, videtur, quod inimicis sit malefaciendum.

5. Item, videmus in omni natura, tam animata quam inanimata, quod inimicitia est causa pugnae, sicut amicitia est causa concordiae¹⁰: si ergo nemo debet facere contra naturalem rectitudinem, videtur, quod magis sit rectum secundum rationis ordinem inimicos expugnare quam eos adiuvare: ergo non videtur, quod omnes teneantur ipsos effectu diligere.

Conclusio.

Diligere inimicos effectu est generalis et necessariae obligationis, quando incumbit necessitas; sed est perfectionis, quando se offert tantum temporis opportunitas.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est duplex modus dicendi.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt¹¹, quod etsi diligere inimicos affectu sit necessitatis, ita quod ad illud obligantur tam perfecti quam imperfecti; diligere tamen affectu simul et effectu supererogationis et perfectionis est; nec ad illud obligantur imperfecti, sed tantum perfecti. — Sed iste modus dicendi in se ipso includit repugnantiam: primum quidem, quia eodem mandato praecipitur diligere inimicos et eis benefacere¹². Si ergo mandatum illud generale est, videtur, quod generaliter omnes obligentur ad utrumque. — Et iterum, perfecti quantum ad obligationem, quae est per mandatum, ad nihil obligantur, ad quod non obligantur imperfecti, quia mandata Dei omnibus generaliter proponuntur. Si ergo per illud mandatum obligantur perfecti ad diligendum inimicum tam affectu quam effectu, videtur similiter, de imperfectis idem esse dicendum. — Amplius, si dilectio vera non tantum consistit in corde, sed etiam manifestatur in opere¹³; dicere, quod ceteri tantum obligantur ad diligendum corde, non ad diligendum opere, cum se offert temporis et loci opportunitas, idem videtur dicere, ac si teneamur inimicos diligere ficte. — Praeter haec, dilectio inimicorum clauditur in mandato de dilectione proximi; et constat, quod mandatum illud intelligitur quantum ad affectum et effectum¹⁴, et ad illud mandatum omnes obligantur. Et propterea praedicta responsio non potest habere locum.

Et ideo est alius modus dicendi, quod diligere in effectu exteriori hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut quandocumque se offert temporis opportunitas, aut quando incumbit necessitas. Si loquamur de exhibitione operis exterioris generaliter, quando se offert temporis opportunitas; sic diligere inimicos effectu « cumulus est perfectionis¹⁵ ». Si autem loquamur de exhibitione operis, quando incumbit necessitas; sic diligere inimicos effectu est generalis et necessariae obligationis; quia, si quis videt proximum suum, sive amicum sive inimicum, necessitatem habere, et claudit viscera sua ab eo, iuxta sententiam beati Ioannis¹⁶, iam amplius non est caritas Dei in eo. — Sic igitur patet, quod sicut diligere affectu uno modo necessitatis est, alio modo perfectionis¹⁷; sic diligere effectu, uno modo necessitatis est, alio modo perfectionis et supererogationis. Et secundum hunc modum possunt solvi diversae auctoritates Sanctorum, quae sibi videntur obviare de dilectione inimicorum.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam pro magna parte responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes, quae ostendunt, quod omnes tenentur inimicos suos diligere effectu, intelliguntur in casu necessitatis. Auctoritates vero, quae in oppositum adducuntur, intelliguntur de exhibitione operis magis generali¹⁸, videlicet cum se offert opportunitas congruitatis.

Ad argumenta in oppositum: Ad 4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod si benefaciendum est amicis, quod malefaciendum est inimicis; dicendum, quod non sequitur, propter hoc quod amicis non solum benefaciendum est propter illud, in quo repugnant inimicis, verum etiam propter illud, in quo conveniunt, videlicet quia sunt ad imaginem Dei. Unde sicut illud argumentum non valet: album est visibile, ergo nigrum est invisibile; quia album est visibile per illud, in quo communicat cum nigro: sic nec ratio praemissa¹⁹.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum ordinem naturae inimicitia inducit pugnam; dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi inimicitia ordinata est secundum ordinem naturae, sicut calidum inimicatur frigido, et humidum sicco²⁰; sed ubi est inimicitia praeter naturae ordinem, ibi non est pugna secundum naturam, sed magis contra naturam. Taliter autem est in hominibus; quia, cum « homo p. 668 sit animal mansuetum natura²¹ », secundum naturalem ordinem cum omnibus debet habere pacem et concordiam. Unde in inimico suo non debet homo odire naturam, sed solum culpam; quia non persequitur ipsum natura, quam fecit Deus, sed malitia, quam fecit homo, ut dicit Augustinus²². Cetera autem, quae opponuntur, satis manifestantur per ea quae dicta sunt²³.

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Question V. Whether all are bound to love enemies as to effect.

Fifthly it is asked whether all are bound to love enemies as to effect. And that they are, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of the Old Testament, Exodus twenty-three¹: If you see the ass of one who hates you lying under a burden, you shall not pass by, but you shall lift it up with him; and this same thing is said in Proverbs twenty-five: If your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he thirsts, give him drink: if therefore these commands were set forth to all, it seems that all were bound to love enemies as to effect.

2. Likewise, this seems from the authority of the New Testament, Matthew five²: Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute you, etc.; there a certain Gloss says: « In three ways one sins against the Church: by hatred, by words, by torment of the body. On the contrary the Church does three things: it loves, it does good, and it prays »: therefore he is not a member of the Church who does not love enemies both in affection and in effect: therefore all are bound to love in this way.

3. Likewise, this seems by reason, because the love of affection without the love of effect is not true love; « for the proof of love is the showing forth of work³ »: if therefore all are bound to love enemies with a true love, it seems that all are bound to love enemies not only in affection, but also in effect.

4. Likewise, our own flesh is a more pernicious enemy than any neighbor of ours; but we are bound to nourish and cherish our rebellious flesh as to its nature: therefore if we are bound the more to love our neighbors⁴, it seems all the more forcibly that we ought not only to love them in affection, but also in effect to nourish and cherish them and to share benefits with them.

5. Likewise, a man takes vengeance on another not only by inflicting evil, but also by withholding good; but all are bound not to seek vengeance, according to what is said in Leviticus nineteen⁵, and to the Romans twelve: Not avenging yourselves: therefore all are bound not to withhold any good on account of an injury received. If therefore all are bound to love those who are not enemies, in affection equally and in effect; it seems that likewise all are bound to love enemies in both ways.

On the contrary: 1. It is frequently commanded in the Law that they should kill their enemies, as is commanded in Exodus twenty-three⁶: You shall not enter into a covenant with them, etc.: therefore it seems that in the old Law they were not bound to love enemies as to effect: therefore by parity of reasoning neither are the imperfect bound in the new.

2. Likewise, on that text of Matthew five⁷: Love your enemies; a certain Gloss says: « The summit of perfection is to love enemies and to pray for them »: if therefore not all are bound to the summit of perfection, not all are bound to love enemies in effect.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the Enchiridion — and it is contained in the text⁸ — says that to love enemies and to do good to them does not belong to as many as are heard in the Lord's Prayer: if therefore in the Lord's Prayer none but the good are heard, it seems that not all the good are bound to love enemies in affection equally and in effect.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems by the rule of the Philosopher⁹: « If the opposite [is] in the opposite, then the proposed [is] in the proposed »: since therefore good is to be done to friends, properly speaking, it seems that evil is to be done to enemies.

5. Likewise, we see in every nature, both animate and inanimate, that enmity is the cause of strife, just as friendship is the cause of concord¹⁰: if therefore no one ought to act against natural rectitude, it seems that it is more right according to the order of reason to fight enemies than to help them: therefore it does not seem that all are bound to love them in effect.

Conclusion.

To love enemies in effect is of general and necessary obligation when necessity presses; but it is of perfection when only the opportunity of time presents itself.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking.

For some have wished to say¹¹ that although to love enemies in affection is of necessity, so that both the perfect and the imperfect are bound to it; yet to love in affection together with in effect is of supererogation and perfection; nor are the imperfect bound to it, but only the perfect. — But this manner of speaking includes in itself a contradiction: first indeed, because by the same command it is commanded to love enemies and to do good to them¹². If therefore that command is general, it seems that generally all are bound to both. — And again, the perfect, as to the obligation which is through a command, are bound to nothing to which the imperfect are not bound, because the commands of God are set forth to all generally. If therefore by that command the perfect are bound to love an enemy both in affection and in effect, it seems likewise that the same is to be said of the imperfect. — Further, if true love consists not only in the heart, but is also manifested in work¹³; to say that the rest are bound only to love in heart, not to love in work, when the opportunity of time and place presents itself, seems to say the same as if we were bound to love enemies feignedly. — Besides these, the love of enemies is included in the command concerning love of neighbor; and it is established that that command is understood as to affection and effect¹⁴, and to that command all are bound. And therefore the aforesaid response cannot stand.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that to love in exterior effect can be twofold: either whenever the opportunity of time presents itself, or when necessity presses. If we speak of the showing forth of exterior work generally, when the opportunity of time presents itself; thus to love enemies in effect is « the summit of perfection¹⁵ ». But if we speak of the showing forth of work when necessity presses; thus to love enemies in effect is of general and necessary obligation; because, if anyone sees his neighbor, whether friend or enemy, to be in need, and shuts his heart against him, according to the saying of blessed John¹⁶, the charity of God is no longer in him. — Thus therefore it is clear that, just as to love in affection is in one way of necessity, in another way of perfection¹⁷; so to love in effect is in one way of necessity, in another way of perfection and supererogation. And according to this manner the diverse authorities of the Saints, which seem to conflict with one another concerning the love of enemies, can be resolved.

From these things the response to the question proposed is clear, and the response to the objections is also for the greater part clear. For the reasons which show that all are bound to love their enemies in effect are to be understood in the case of necessity. But the authorities which are adduced to the contrary are to be understood of the showing forth of work more generally¹⁸, namely when the opportunity of fittingness presents itself.

To the arguments to the contrary: To 4. As to that which is objected, that if good is to be done to friends, then evil is to be done to enemies; it must be said that it does not follow, on account of the fact that good is to be done to friends not only on account of that in which they differ from enemies, but also on account of that in which they agree, namely because they are to the image of God. Hence just as that argument is not valid: white is visible, therefore black is invisible; because white is visible through that in which it shares with black: so neither is the foregoing reasoning¹⁹.

To 5. As to that which is objected, that according to the order of nature enmity induces strife; it must be said that this is true where the enmity is ordered according to the order of nature, as hot is at enmity with cold, and moist with dry²⁰; but where there is an enmity beyond the order of nature, there is no strife according to nature, but rather against nature. And such is the case in men; because, since « man p. 668 is by nature a gentle animal²¹ », according to the natural order he ought to have peace and concord with all. Hence in his enemy a man ought not to hate the nature, but only the fault; because it is not the nature, which God made, that pursues him, but the malice, which man made, as Augustine says²². But the other things which are objected are sufficiently made clear by the things which have been said²³.