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Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 6

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 30

Textus Latinus
p. 668

Quaestio VI. Utrum sit maioris perfectionis et meriti diligere amicum, an diligere inimicum.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, quid sit maioris perfectionis et meriti, utrum diligere amicum, an diligere inimicum. Et quod diligere inimicum, videtur.

1. Matthaei quinto1: Si diligitis illos qui vos diligunt, quam mercedem habebitis? Glossa, ibi: « Nullam in caelo »; sed constat, quod de dilectione inimicorum magna merces habetur: ergo maioris perfectionis et meriti est diligere inimicos quam diligere amicos.

2. Item, diligere inimicos est de superadditis a Domino in Evangelio2; sed Dominus non superaddidit, nisi ea quae maioris perfectionis erant: videtur ergo, quod maioris perfectionis sit diligere inimicos quam diligere amicos.

3. Item, ubi est maior pugna, ibi gloriosior est victoria; et ubi maior difficultas, ibi maior est ratio virtutis et meriti, pro eo quod « ars et virtus est circa difficilia3 »; sed maior est pugna et difficultas in diligendo inimicos quam in diligendo amicos: ergo maior residet perfectio et meritum circa dilectionem inimicorum quam circa dilectionem amicorum.

4. Item, quanto homo magis supra se elevatur in aliquo motu virtutis, tanto motus ille et actio est perfectior et excellentior; sed in dilectione inimicorum plus elevatur homo supra se et supra ea quae sunt naturae, quam in dilectione amicorum: ergo motus dilectionis circa inimicos est magis meritorius et perfectus quam motus dilectionis erga amicos4.

5. Item, quanto motus dilectionis est perfectior, tanto est liberalior et purior — amor enim spiritualis purus est et liberalis — sed motus dilectionis erga inimicos purior est et liberalior quam erga amicos: purior quidem, quia minus habet admixtum de carnalitate; liberalior, quia minus habet de obligationis necessitate: ergo videtur, quod sit multo perfectior et Deo acceptior et ad merendum efficacior5.

Sed contra: 1. Dilectio inimicorum ponitur ab Ambrosio6 in ultimo gradu: ergo dilectio illa maxime recedit a primo gradu dilectionis, qui est maximus et nobilissimus; sed quanto aliquid recedit a primo et summo in illo genere, tanto minus habet de perfectione et complemento: si ergo dilectio inimicorum magis recedit, et dilectio amicorum magis accedit; ergo videtur, quod multo perfectior et excellentior sit motus dilectionis erga amicos quam erga inimicos.

2. Item, quanto dilectio est excellentior, tanto dilectioni Dei similior; sed Deus magis diligit diligentes se, iuxta illud quod dicitur Proverbiorum octavo7: Ego diligentes me diligo: igitur dilectio amicorum magis assimilatur dilectioni Dei quam dilectio inimicorum; ergo est multo perfectior.

3. Item, motus dilectionis tanto melior est et excellentior, quanto ferventior et frequentior; sed motus caritatis erga amicos ferventior et frequentior est quam erga inimicos8: ergo etc.

4. Item, quanto motus dilectionis rectior est et plus habet de rectitudine et aequitate, tanto melior et excellentior est in se; sed magis aequum et iustum est diligere amicos quam inimicos: ergo motus iste dilectionis est melior illo.

5. Item, in eo quod melius et perfectius est, magis debet homo se exercere: ergo si motus dilectionis erga inimicos esset melior et perfectior, frequentius deberet homo circa ipsos affici et pro ipsis orare. Quodsi hoc est inconveniens dicere, quod magis debeat homo orare pro inimicis quam pro amicis, quia hoc esset ordinem caritatis pervertere: ergo restat, quod non est maius bonum inimicos quam amicos diligere.

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Conclusio

Si actus utriusque dilectionis comparantur ad diversos habitus, excellentius est diligere inimicos quam amicos; si vero ad eundem, mutuo se excedunt secundum diversas conditiones.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur de comparatione istorum duorum motuum dilectionis, quorum unus est erga amicos, alter erga inimicos; dupliciter potest quaeri: aut prout comparantur ad diversos habitus et radices, aut prout comparantur ad eundem. — Si prout ad diversas radices et habitus comparantur, ita quod unus habitus habilitat tantum ad amicos, alter vero se extendit usque ad inimicos; sic absque dubio multo maius et excellentius est diligere inimicos quam amicos; et multo perfectiori habitu indigemus ad hoc, quod possimus exire in istum actum, quam ad hoc, ut exeamus in alterum. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio, et habetur in littera9: « Magnum est erga eum qui tibi nihil mali fecit, esse benevolum et beneficum; illud vero multo grandius et magnificentissimae bonitatis est, ut tuum quoque inimicum diligas ».

Si vero loquamur de istis actibus, prout ad eandem radicem comparantur et ab eadem caritate procedunt; sic quodam modo sunt aequales et quodam modo mutuo se excedunt. Quantum enim ad rationem merendi respectu praemii substantialis aequalitatem habent, quia quantitas illius praemii respondet quantitati radicis10; quantum vero ad rationem merendi respectu praemii accidentalis et quantum ad vigorem ipsius actus et motus mutuo se excedunt. Nam motus dilectionis erga amicos excedit quantum ad fervorem et frequentationem; motus vero dilectionis erga inimicos est purior et difficilior; et ita quodam modo unus istorum motuum est maior11 alio, et e converso, secundum varium modum accipiendi magnitudinem. Nam in dilectione amicorum virtus caritatis magis exercetur intensive, sed in dilectione inimicorum magis exercetur extensive; sicut virtus caloris ignis amplius calefacit propinquiora quam remotiora, et quodam modo plus apparet efficacia illius virtutis in his quae sunt propinqua, quodam modo in his quae sunt longinqua: ratione intensionis plus in calefactione propinquorum, et ratione extensionis plus in calefactione longinquorum12. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod dilectio amicorum et dilectio inimicorum, prout ab eadem radice procedunt, secundum diversas conditiones et respectus mutuo se excedunt. — Et secundum hoc dissolvi possunt rationes, quae ad diversas partes adducuntur; diversis enim viis procedunt, secundum quas utraeque verum sine repugnantia concludere possunt.

Sed si ulterius quaeratur, quis istorum duorum motuum, omnibus pensatis, excedat reliquum; hic sunt diversae opiniones. Nam quidam volunt dicere, quod motus ille, qui est in amicum, melior est, quia intensior est, et plus habet de ratione boni; et istum modum dicendi videtur Magister approbare in littera13. — Et si hunc modum, qui satis videtur probabilis, sustinere velimus, responderi potest ad rationes, quae primo inducuntur, quod ab insufficienti procedunt. Cum enim dicitur, quod motus, quanto difficilior et purior et magis supra vires naturae, tanto perfectior et excellentior; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, ceteris paribus. Sed cum assumit14 de motu dilectionis inimicorum, quod est huiusmodi; responderi potest, quod non sunt cetera paria, quia multo maior et ferventior est motus dilectionis erga amicos, quam ille sit.

Alius vero est hic modus dicendi, quod dilectio inimicorum est excellentior, simpliciter loquendo, et magis in ea exercitatur perfectio caritatis. Et si hunc modum dicendi sustinere velimus, quoniam videtur auctoritas Augustini15 ipsum satis probabilem facere, potest responderi ad ea quae in contrarium adducuntur.

1. Ad primum quod obiicitur de ordine diligendorum, dici potest, quod Ambrosius in gradibus illis non intendit ponere vel assignare gradus perfectionis in dilectione, sed gradus exhibitionis secundum maiorem et minorem obligationem16.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dilectio amicorum est dilectioni Dei similior; responderi potest per interemptionem; quia perfectio dilectionis divinae magis manifestata est in hoc, quod dilexit nos, cum essemus inimici, quam si essemus amici, iuxta illud Apostoli ad Romanos quinto17: Commendat autem Deus caritatem suam in nobis, quia, cum adhuc peccatores essemus, secundum tempus Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Unde etsi in dilectione amicorum caritas Dei ostendatur esse magna, in dilectione inimicorum ostenditur esse nimia;

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iuxta illud ad Ephesios secundo: Propter nimiam caritatem suam, qua dilexit nos etc.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tanto motus dilectionis est melior, quanto ferventior; dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi est par difficultas et resistentia. Ubi autem non est par difficultas, sicut in proposito, non habet veritatem; quod patet, quia modicus ignis citius adurit foenum, quam magnus ignis adurat forte lignum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto motus dilectionis est rectior, tanto perfectior; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed cum assumit, quod motus dilectionis erga amicum magis est rectus et aequus; respondendum est per distinctionem, quod maior aequitas potest esse dupliciter: aut propter exigentiam meritorum et dignitatis a parte dilecti, et sic magis est aequum diligere amicum quam inimicum; aut propter abundantiorem rectitudinem a parte diligentis, et sic non est magis aequum diligere amicum quam inimicum, immo magis e converso, quia hoc est abundantioris18 iustitiae quam illud.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis debet homo se exercere in eo quod est maioris perfectionis; responderi potest, quod in exhibitione alicuius beneficii et exsecutione alicuius actus duplici intentione potest homo se exercere: aut propter profectum alterius, aut propter meritum suum; nec debet homo in operibus suis tantum meritum suum intueri, sed etiam profectum proximi. Licet ergo in exercitatione circa dilectionem inimici maior sit via proficiendi et lucrandi et ad perfectionem perveniendi; quia tamen magis obligatur homo amico quam inimico, frequentius debet in dilectione amici se exercere. Unde quod dicit, quod magis nos debemus exercere in his quae sunt maioris perfectionis; dicendum, quod illud non est usquequaque verum, immo magis debemus nos exercere in his quae sunt maioris obligationis. — Et sic patet, quomodo potest19 satis rationabiliter utralibet pars sustineri.

Scholion

I. Ad quaestionem principalem antiqui doctores fere idem respondent, cum diversis tamen distinctionibus. Quoad quaestionem in fine responsionis annexam Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 59. m. 5. a. 3.) resolvit, quod « absolute maioris virtutis est diligere inimicum quam amicum »; et ipsi consentiens, B. Albert. (hic a. 3.) asserit, quod « meo iudicio melius absolute et simpliciter est diligere inimicum quam diligere amicum »; cui opinioni favet etiam Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. I.) et Durand. (hic q. 2.). Sed S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 27. a. 7; cfr. hic a. 3.) contrarium censet, cum sub rubrica Sed contra dicat absolute: « Diligere amicum est magis meritorium quam diligere inimicum »; et etiam rationes ad oppos. solvat. Ipsi consentit Richard. a Med. (hic q. 3.), qui proprias distinctiones satis aptas applicat; tamen solvit argumenta pro utraque parte, sicut S. Bonav., qui, ut patet, utramque sententiam iudicat esse probabilem. Dionys. Carth. (hic q. I.) favet solutioni S. Thomae.

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English Translation

Question VI. Whether it is of greater perfection and merit to love a friend, or to love an enemy.

Sixth and last it is asked, which is of greater perfection and merit, whether to love a friend, or to love an enemy. And that to love an enemy [is so], it seems.

1. Matthew chapter five1: If you love those who love you, what reward shall you have? The Gloss, there: « None in heaven »; but it is established that for the love of enemies a great reward is had: therefore it is of greater perfection and merit to love enemies than to love friends.

2. Likewise, to love enemies is among the things superadded by the Lord in the Gospel2; but the Lord superadded only those things which were of greater perfection: it seems therefore that it is of greater perfection to love enemies than to love friends.

3. Likewise, where there is greater struggle, there the victory is more glorious; and where there is greater difficulty, there is the greater account of virtue and of merit, on the ground that « art and virtue are concerned with what is difficult3 »; but the struggle and difficulty in loving enemies is greater than in loving friends: therefore greater perfection and merit reside in the love of enemies than in the love of friends.

4. Likewise, the more a man is raised above himself in some movement of virtue, the more that movement and action is more perfect and more excellent; but in the love of enemies a man is raised more above himself and above the things that belong to nature than in the love of friends: therefore the movement of love toward enemies is more meritorious and perfect than the movement of love toward friends4.

5. Likewise, the more the movement of love is perfect, the more it is liberal and pure — for spiritual love is pure and liberal — but the movement of love toward enemies is purer and more liberal than toward friends: purer indeed, because it has less admixture of carnality; more liberal, because it has less of the necessity of obligation: therefore it seems that it is much more perfect and more acceptable to God and more efficacious for meriting5.

On the contrary: 1. The love of enemies is placed by Ambrose6 in the last degree: therefore that love recedes most from the first degree of love, which is the greatest and most noble; but the more anything recedes from the first and highest in that genus, the less it has of perfection and completion: if then the love of enemies recedes more, and the love of friends approaches more; therefore it seems that the movement of love toward friends is much more perfect and more excellent than toward enemies.

2. Likewise, the more excellent love is, the more like to the love of God; but God loves more those who love him, according to that which is said in Proverbs chapter eight7: I love those who love me: therefore the love of friends is more assimilated to the love of God than the love of enemies; therefore it is much more perfect.

3. Likewise, the movement of love is so much better and more excellent, the more fervent and more frequent it is; but the movement of charity toward friends is more fervent and more frequent than toward enemies8: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the more the movement of love is right and has of rectitude and equity, the better and more excellent it is in itself; but it is more equitable and just to love friends than enemies: therefore this movement of love is better than that.

5. Likewise, in that which is better and more perfect a man ought more to exercise himself: therefore if the movement of love toward enemies were better and more perfect, more frequently ought a man to be affected toward them and to pray for them. But if this is unfitting to say, that a man ought more to pray for enemies than for friends, because this would be to pervert the order of charity: therefore it remains that it is not a greater good to love enemies than friends.

Conclusion

If the acts of either love are compared to diverse habits, it is more excellent to love enemies than friends; but if [compared] to the same [habit], they mutually exceed one another according to diverse conditions.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, since it is asked concerning the comparison of these two movements of love, of which one is toward friends, the other toward enemies; it can be asked in two ways: either insofar as they are compared to diverse habits and roots, or insofar as they are compared to the same. — If they are compared as to diverse roots and habits, such that one habit qualifies only for friends, while the other extends even to enemies; then without doubt it is much greater and more excellent to love enemies than friends; and we have need of a much more perfect habit for this, that we may go forth into this act, than for this, that we may go forth into the other. And this is what Augustine says in the Enchiridion, and is found in the [Master's] text9: « It is a great thing to be benevolent and beneficent toward one who has done you no evil; but that other is far greater and of most magnificent goodness, that you love even your enemy ».

But if we speak of these acts insofar as they are compared to the same root and proceed from the same charity; then in a certain way they are equal and in a certain way mutually exceed one another. For as to the account of meriting with respect to the substantial reward they have equality, because the quantity of that reward corresponds to the quantity of the root10; but as to the account of meriting with respect to the accidental reward and as to the vigor of the act and movement itself, they mutually exceed one another. For the movement of love toward friends exceeds as to fervor and frequency; but the movement of love toward enemies is purer and more difficult; and so in a certain way one of these movements is greater11 than the other, and conversely, according to the varying mode of taking greatness. For in the love of friends the virtue of charity is exercised more intensively, but in the love of enemies it is exercised more extensively; just as the virtue of the heat of fire warms nearer things more amply than more remote ones, and in a certain way the efficacy of that virtue appears more in those things which are near, in a certain way in those which are far off: by reason of intensity more in the warming of near things, and by reason of extension more in the warming of distant things12. So also in the matter proposed it is to be understood that the love of friends and the love of enemies, insofar as they proceed from the same root, mutually exceed one another according to diverse conditions and respects. — And according to this the arguments which are adduced to the diverse sides can be resolved; for they proceed by diverse ways, according to which both can conclude the truth without contradiction.

But if it be further asked, which of these two movements, all things weighed, exceeds the other; here there are diverse opinions. For some wish to say that that movement which is toward a friend is better, because it is more intense, and has more of the account of the good; and this manner of speaking the Master seems to approve in the text13. — And if we should wish to maintain this manner, which seems probable enough, it can be replied to the arguments which are first adduced, that they proceed from an insufficient [ground]. For when it is said that a movement, the more difficult and purer and more above the powers of nature it is, the more perfect and excellent; it must be said that this is true, other things being equal. But when one assumes14 concerning the movement of love of enemies that it is of this kind; it can be replied that other things are not equal, because the movement of love toward friends is much greater and more fervent than that one is.

But there is another manner of speaking, that the love of enemies is more excellent, speaking absolutely, and in it the perfection of charity is more exercised. And if we should wish to maintain this manner, since the authority of Augustine15 seems to make it probable enough, it can be replied to the things which are adduced to the contrary.

1. To the first which is objected concerning the order of those to be loved, it can be said that Ambrose in those degrees does not intend to lay down or assign degrees of perfection in love, but degrees of exhibition according to greater and lesser obligation16.

2. To that which is objected, that the love of friends is more like to the love of God; it can be replied by interception; because the perfection of the divine love is more manifested in this, that he loved us when we were enemies, than if we were friends, according to that of the Apostle to the Romans chapter five17: But God commends his charity in us, in that, while we were yet sinners, in due time Christ died for us. Hence although in the love of friends the charity of God be shown to be great, in the love of enemies it is shown to be exceeding;

according to that to the Ephesians chapter two: On account of his exceeding charity, with which he loved us etc.

3. To that which is objected, that the movement of love is so much better, the more fervent; it must be said that this is true, where there is equal difficulty and resistance. But where there is not equal difficulty, as in the matter proposed, it does not hold true; which is plain, because a small fire burns up hay sooner than a great fire perhaps burns up wood.

4. To that which is objected, that the more the movement of love is right, the more perfect; it must be said that it is true. But when one assumes that the movement of love toward a friend is more right and equitable; it must be answered by a distinction, that greater equity can be in two ways: either on account of the exigency of merits and of dignity on the part of the one loved, and thus it is more equitable to love a friend than an enemy; or on account of more abundant rectitude on the part of the one loving, and thus it is not more equitable to love a friend than an enemy, but rather the converse, because this is of a more abundant18 justice than that.

5. To that which is objected, that a man ought more to exercise himself in that which is of greater perfection; it can be replied that in the exhibition of some benefit and the execution of some act a man can exercise himself with a double intention: either for the advancement of another, or for his own merit; nor ought a man in his works to regard only his own merit, but also the advancement of his neighbor. Although therefore in the exercise concerning the love of an enemy there is a greater way of advancing and gaining and arriving at perfection; yet because a man is more obligated to a friend than to an enemy, he ought more frequently to exercise himself in the love of a friend. Hence as to what he says, that we ought more to exercise ourselves in those things which are of greater perfection; it must be said that this is not everywhere true, but rather we ought to exercise ourselves more in those things which are of greater obligation. — And thus it is plain how19 either side can quite reasonably be maintained.

Scholion

I. To the principal question the ancient doctors respond almost the same, yet with diverse distinctions. As to the question annexed at the end of the response, Alexander of Hales (Summa pt. III, q. 59, m. 5, a. 3) resolves that « absolutely it is of greater virtue to love an enemy than a friend »; and in agreement with him, Bl. Albert (here, a. 3) asserts that « in my judgment it is better, absolutely and simply, to love an enemy than to love a friend »; to which opinion Peter of Tarentaise (here, q. 2, a. 1) and Durandus (here, q. 2) also favor. But St. Thomas (Summa II–II, q. 27, a. 7; cf. here, a. 3) judges the contrary, since under the rubric Sed contra he says absolutely: « To love a friend is more meritorious than to love an enemy »; and he also solves the arguments to the opposite. Richard of Mediavilla (here, q. 3) agrees with him, who applies his own distinctions fittingly enough; yet he solves the arguments for either side, as does St. Bonaventure, who, as is plain, judges either opinion to be probable. Denis the Carthusian (here, q. 1) favors the solution of St. Thomas.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 46. — Glossa, quae interlinearis est, habetur apud Lyranum. — Paulo inferius pro magna edd. maior.
    Verse 46. — The Gloss, which is the interlinear gloss, is found in Lyra. — A little below, for magna the editions read maior.
  2. Matth. 5, 43. seq.: Audistis, quia dictum est: Diliges proximum tuum et odio habebis inimicum tuum, ego autem dico vobis: Diligite inimicos vestros etc.
    Matthew 5:43 ff.: You have heard that it was said: You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy, but I say to you: Love your enemies etc.
  3. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 488, nota 1. — Paulo inferius pro ergo non pauci codd. et.
    Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 3. Cf. above, p. 488, note 1. — A little below, for ergo not a few codices [read] et.
  4. Cfr. hic in lit. Magistri verba August. ex eius Enchirid. c. 73. n. 19. transcripta.
    Cf. here in the Master's text the words of Augustine transcribed from his Enchiridion c. 73, n. 19.
  5. August., I. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 21. n. 69: Perfectio autem misericordiae... ultra dilectionem inimici porrigi non potest, et ideo sic clauditur (Matth. 5, 48.): Estote ergo vos perfecti, sicut et Pater vester etc. — Superius pro primo quia minus edd. quia nihil.
    Augustine, On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount I, c. 21, n. 69: But the perfection of mercy... cannot be extended beyond the love of an enemy, and therefore it is thus closed (Matt. 5:48): Be you therefore perfect, as also your Father etc. — Above, for primo quia minus the editions [read] quia nihil.
  6. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIX. c. 2. De minori conferri post axioma Aristotelis relatum tom. II. pag. 94, nota 4. — Aliquanto inferius pro complemento cod. U habet completione.
    See above, the Master's text, d. XXIX, c. 2. On the minor [degree], to be compared after the axiom of Aristotle reported in tom. II, p. 94, note 4. — Somewhat below, for complemento codex U has completione.
  7. Vers. 17.
    Verse 17.
  8. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, in principio, et Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 5. — Pro excellentior edd. perfectior. Deinde pro caritatis cod. K dilectionis.
    Cf. here the Master's text, at the beginning, and Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 5. — For excellentior the editions [read] perfectior. Then for caritatis codex K [reads] dilectionis.
  9. Huius distinctionis. Pro Magnum est Vat. cum textu origin. Minus magnum est.
    Of this distinction. For Magnum est the Vatican edition, with the original text, [reads] Minus magnum est.
  10. Cfr. supra pag. 387, nota 3.
    Cf. above, p. 387, note 3.
  11. Edd. melior.
    The editions [read] melior.
  12. Cfr. supra pag. 647, nota 4. — Superius pro quae sunt propinqua codd. BCDIL (N a secunda manu) quae sunt propinquam. Deinde post quodam modo interserunt quam, quem vocabulum nonnulli codd. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 72. a. 6. substituunt pro quodam modo.
    Cf. above, p. 647, note 4. — Above, for quae sunt propinqua codices BCDIL (N by a second hand) [read] quae sunt propinquam. Then after quodam modo they insert quam, which word some codices and the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collat. 72, a. 6, substitute for quodam modo.
  13. Huius distinctionis. — Superius post motus ille cod. Z supplet dilectionis.
    Of this distinction. — Above, after motus ille codex Z supplies dilectionis.
  14. Nimirum in minori argumentorum. — Mox pro quod est edd. qui est. Paulo inferius pro quam ille sit cod. K quam erga inimicos, cod. Y (a secunda manu) quam ille qui sit erga inimicos.
    Namely in the minor of the arguments. — Soon, for quod est the editions [read] qui est. A little below, for quam ille sit codex K [reads] quam erga inimicos, codex Y (by a second hand) quam ille qui sit erga inimicos.
  15. Ille in lit. Magistri. — Mox post potest cod. Z inserit sic.
    That one [is] in the Master's text. — Soon, after potest codex Z inserts sic.
  16. Cfr. supra d. 29. q. 6. et dub. 3. — Codd. A F bis gradus.
    Cf. above, d. 29, q. 6, and dub. 3. — Codices A, F twice [read] gradus.
  17. Vers. 8. — Pro caritatem suam non pauci codd. misericordiam suam. — Seq. Scripturae locus est Eph. 2, 4.
    Verse 8. — For caritatem suam not a few codices [read] misericordiam suam. — The following Scripture passage is Eph. 2:4.
  18. Edd. maioris et abundantioris.
    The editions [read] maioris et abundantioris.
  19. Cod. K possit.
    Codex K [reads] possit.
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