Dist. 30, Dubia
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 30
## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Obscura est responsio, quia non est facile iudicium, an unus et idem motus sit erga amicum et erga inimicum. Hoc enim videtur esse simpliciter falsum, quia, cum actus diversificentur per obiecta1, et amicus et inimicus sint diversa obiecta et diversa diligibilia; impossibile est, quod amicum et inimicum quis diligat uno motu. — Item, virtus simplex et finita, ad quaecumque se convertit, totaliter se convertit2; sed homo diligendo amicum convertit se ad ipsum: ergo non videtur, quod uno et eodem motu simul et semel possit diligere amicum et inimicum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis illud quod dicit Magister hic, non sit usquequaque bene intelligibile: possumus tamen utrumque exponere et ipsum salvare dupliciter. Primo sic: contingit enim erga aliquem affici dupliciter: vel proprie et distincte et sub propria ratione, vel in quadam generalitate cum aliis; sicut verbi gratia dupliciter potest aliquis affici in amando Petrum: aut quia specialiter afficitur circa ipsum, aut quia generaliter cogitat, omnem hominem diligendum3, et generaliter circa omnem hominem afficitur, secundum quod exigit ordo caritatis. — Si primo modo accipiatur motus dilectionis in amicum, sic non potest unus et idem motus, qui est in amicum, esse in inimicum, sicut rationes inductae ostendunt. Si vero secundo modo, sic potest esse idem; et hoc modo accipit Magister4, cum dicit, quod potest esse unus respectu utriusque.
Aliter autem potest sustineri, ut distinguamus, quod dupliciter contingit, vim aliquam moveri in obiectum: aut motu simplici et absoluto, aut motu collativo et quodam modo composito. Si loquamur de motu simplici et absoluto; sic non potest unus
et idem esse in amicum et inimicum, immo diversi sunt, quorum unus est intensior et alter remissior. — Si vero de motu collativo, quo quis afficitur circa aliqua duo, unum alteri praeponendo; sic potest esse motus unus, secundum quod dicit Magister5, secundum aliquid sui intensior, secundum vero aliquid remissior. — Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad ea quae obiiciuntur. Nam illa duo procedunt de actu simplici et absoluto, qui est respectu unius obiecti tantum, actus vero collativus potest esse respectu duorum sub ratione unius.
Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus affectionis non potest simul converti; patet responsio. Ex hoc enim non concluditur, quod non possit esse unus motus collativus, quia in eo est reperire prius et posterius6.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de verbis Augustini, quae dicit in littera: Procul dubio verba sponsionis huius implentur, si homo, qui non ita profecit, ut diligat inimicum, tamen quando rogatur ab homine, qui peccavit, dimittit. Sed contra hoc est: quia, si non dimittit, antequam rogetur, servat iram proximo; et si servat iram, caritatem non habet: ergo in oratione sua non est dignus exauditione, nec videtur, quod oret recte. — Item, sicut in praecedentibus7 probatum est, omnes tenentur inimicos suos diligere, etiam inimicitias exercentes: ergo omnes tenentur eis, etiam non rogati, offensas dimittere.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est dimittere rancorem, et est dimittere signa rancoris. Dimittere rancorem necessitatis est; et ad hoc omnes obligantur, et ad hoc tenetur homo, sive inimicus impugnet, sive veniam petat. Dimittere autem non solum rancorem, sed etiam signa rancoris, hoc perfectionis est, nec ad hoc tenetur homo nisi in casu8, videlicet quando devote et humiliter venia postulatur. — Et de hac dimissione loquitur Augustinus; obiectiones vero currunt de alia. Et per hoc patent tam littera quam obiecta9.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quisquis roganti non dimittit, non existimet, a Domino sua peccata dimitti. Videtur ergo secundum hoc, quod omnis qui servat rancorem erga proximum, quod contra se ipsum oret, quia, cum nolit alii dimittere, iam petit ex consequenti, quod nec Deus dimittat sibi: et qui petit, quod Deus non dimittat10, peccat mortaliter: ergo omnis qui est in rancore et dicit orationem dominicam, videtur mortaliter peccare.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnis qui orationem dominicam ex corde dicit, intendit per eam impetrare collationem bonorum et remissionem malorum; et qui hoc intendit a Domino assequi11, constans est, quod aut poenitet, aut proponit aliquando poenitere. Licet igitur aliquis odium habeat, tamen in dicendo orationem dominicam non incurrit mortalem offensam, quia non intendit petere, quod fiat sibi secundum voluntatem12 malam, quam nunc habet, sed secundum voluntatem bonam, quam, etsi tunc non habeat, intendit tamen Dei auxilio aliquando obtinere. Si quis autem illam orationem diceret, nunquam proponens ab odio fratris recedere, quamvis non intenderet iram petere, culpam tamen suam absque dubio aggravaret. — Aliter tamen posset dici, quod istam orationem, quando aliquis dicit, non dicit in persona sua, sed in persona Ecclesiae, cuius vult esse membrum. Et quantum ad hoc nihil petit contra se ipsum, nec intentione principali nec ex consequenti13.
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this section there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about this which he says: The answer is obscure, because the judgment is not easy, whether one and the same movement is toward a friend and toward an enemy. For this seems to be simply false, because, since acts are diversified by their objects1, and a friend and an enemy are diverse objects and diverse things-to-be-loved; it is impossible that one should love a friend and an enemy by one movement. — Likewise, a simple and finite power, to whatever it turns itself, turns itself wholly2; but a man, by loving a friend, turns himself to him: therefore it does not seem that by one and the same movement, simultaneously and at once, he can love a friend and an enemy.
I respond: It must be said that, although what the Master says here is not altogether well intelligible, we can nevertheless expound both [statements] and uphold him in two ways. First thus: for it happens that one is affected toward someone in two ways: either properly and distinctly and under a proper account, or in a certain generality together with others; as, for example, one can be affected in two ways in loving Peter: either because he is affected specially with respect to him, or because he thinks generally that every man is to be loved3, and is affected generally with respect to every man, according as the order of charity requires. — If the movement of love toward a friend is taken in the first way, then one and the same movement which is toward a friend cannot be toward an enemy, as the reasons adduced show. But if in the second way, then it can be the same; and in this way the Master takes it4, when he says that there can be one [movement] with respect to both.
But it can be upheld otherwise, by distinguishing that it happens in two ways that some power is moved toward an object: either by a simple and absolute movement, or by a comparative movement and one in a certain way composite. If we speak of a simple and absolute movement, then there cannot be one
and the same [movement] toward a friend and an enemy; rather they are diverse, of which one is more intense and the other more remiss. — But if [we speak] of a comparative movement, by which one is affected concerning two things, preferring one to the other; then there can be one movement, according as the Master says5, in some respect of itself more intense, but in some respect more remiss. — And according to this the response to the things objected is clear. For those two [objections] proceed from a simple and absolute act, which is with respect to one object only; but a comparative act can be with respect to two under the account of one.
To that which is objected, that the power of affection cannot be turned simultaneously, the response is clear. For from this it is not concluded that there cannot be one comparative movement, because in it there is to be found a before and an after6.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about the words of Augustine, which he says in the text: Without doubt the words of this promise are fulfilled, if a man, who has not so far advanced as to love his enemy, nevertheless forgives when he is asked by the man who has sinned. But against this is: because, if he does not forgive before he is asked, he keeps anger toward his neighbor; and if he keeps anger, he does not have charity: therefore in his prayer he is not worthy of being heard, nor does it seem that he prays rightly. — Likewise, as was proved in what precedes7, all are bound to love their enemies, even those who exercise enmities: therefore all are bound, even unasked, to forgive them offenses.
I respond: It must be said that there is forgiving rancor, and there is forgiving the signs of rancor. To forgive rancor is of necessity; and to this all are obliged, and to this a man is bound, whether the enemy attacks or asks pardon. But to forgive not only rancor, but also the signs of rancor, this is of perfection, nor is a man bound to this except in a [particular] case8, namely when pardon is sought devoutly and humbly. — And of this forgiveness Augustine speaks; but the objections run on another [kind]. And through this both the text and the objections are clear9.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about this which he says: Whoever does not forgive one who asks, let him not suppose that his sins are forgiven by the Lord. It seems therefore, according to this, that everyone who keeps rancor toward his neighbor prays against himself, because, since he is unwilling to forgive another, he already asks by consequence that neither should God forgive him: and one who asks that God should not forgive10 sins mortally: therefore everyone who is in rancor and says the Lord's Prayer seems to sin mortally.
I respond: It must be said that everyone who says the Lord's Prayer from the heart intends by it to obtain the bestowal of goods and the remission of evils; and one who intends to attain this from the Lord11, it is certain that either he repents, or he proposes to repent at some time. Although therefore someone may have hatred, nevertheless in saying the Lord's Prayer he does not incur a mortal offense, because he does not intend to ask that it be done to him according to the evil will12 which he now has, but according to the good will which, although he does not have it then, he nevertheless intends at some time to obtain by God's help. But if someone were to say that prayer, never proposing to withdraw from hatred of his brother, although he would not intend to ask for anger, he would nevertheless without doubt aggravate his own fault. — Yet it could be said otherwise, that when someone says this prayer, he does not say it in his own person, but in the person of the Church, of which he wishes to be a member. And as to this he asks nothing against himself, neither by a principal intention nor by consequence13.
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- Secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.).According to Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 33 (c. 4).
- Cfr. supra pag. 311, nota 1. — In fine arg. multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt amicum et.Cf. above, p. 311, note 1. — At the end of the argument many codices and editions 1, 2 omit amicum et.
- Edd. cum nonnullis codd. supplent esse. Subinde pro circa omnem hominem cod. F circa Deum et hominem.The editions, with several codices, supply esse. Thereupon, for circa omnem hominem (with respect to every man), codex F reads circa Deum et hominem (with respect to God and man).
- Hic in principio lit., sed sententialiter tantum. — Deinde pro unus cod. K unus et idem.Here at the beginning of the text, but only in sense. — Then, for unus (one), codex K reads unus et idem (one and the same).
- Hic in lit. — Paulo superius post Si vero cod. G repetit loquamur.Here in the text. — A little above, after Si vero (But if), codex G repeats loquamur (we speak).
- Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic circa lit. (dicit: Hoc est impossibile, nisi unus propter alterum diligatur et actuali consideratione referatur in illud); Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.Cf. on this doubt B. Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas, here on the text (he says: This is impossible, unless the one is loved on account of the other and is referred to it by an actual consideration); Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.
- Quaest. 4. seq. et d. 28. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro exauditione cod. G exaudiri. Paulo inferius pro non rogati cod. K non rogantibus.Question 4 following, and d. 28, q. 3. — A little above, for exauditione (being heard) codex G reads exaudiri (to be heard). A little below, for non rogati (unasked) codex K reads non rogantibus.
- Cfr. supra q. 4. et 5. — Paulo ante pro in casu cod. F in hoc casu.Cf. above, qq. 4 and 5. — A little before, for in casu (in a case) codex F reads in hoc casu (in this case).
- Cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3, et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.Cf. on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
- Codd. Z aa adiungunt sibi.Codices Z, aa add sibi (to himself).
- Edd. exsequi.The editions read exsequi (to carry out).
- Cod. Z admittit suam et paulo inferius pro tunc substituit nunc. Deinde pro nunquam cod. K exhibet nec.Codex Z admits suam (his own) and a little below substitutes nunc (now) for tunc (then). Then, for nunquam (never), codex K exhibits nec (nor).
- Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert., hic a. 6, et S. Thom., hic circa lit.This doubt is solved also by B. Albert, here a. 6, and St. Thomas, here on the text.