Bonaventure

Quaestio III. Utrum Deus diligat omnes creaturas aequaliter.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus diligat omnes aequaliter. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Sapientiae sexto¹: Pusillum et magnum ipse fecit, et aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus; sed eo modo diligit, quo modo est ei cura: ergo videtur, quod omnes aequaliter diligat.

2. Item, secundum quod dicit Philosophus², « primum uno modo se habet ad omnia »; sed Deum diligere creaturam hoc est Deum aliquo modo ad creaturam se habere: ergo si uniformiter se habet ad omnia, uniformiter et aequaliter se habet ad ea: non ergo diligit unam magis quam aliam.

3. Item, eadem dilectione, qua Pater diligit Filium, diligit creaturam³; sed dilectio, qua diligit Filium, est dilectio permaxima: ergo omnem creaturam diligit dilectione summa. Si ergo in summo non est ponere magis et minus, sed solum aequale; videtur, quod omnem creaturam diligat aequaliter.

4. Item, sicut Deus cognoscit creaturas, ita diligit⁴; sed omnes creaturas cognoscit aequaliter, non magis unam quam alteram: ergo omnes aequaliter diligit.

5. Item, sicut limpiditas cognitionis facit ad eius nobilitatem, sic magnitudo dilectionis facit ad eius commendationem⁵; sed quia cognitio Dei est nobilissima, omnem creaturam limpidissime cognoscit: ergo similiter, cum dilectio Dei sit excellentissima, omnem creaturam maxime diligit: ergo si in maximo non est ponere magis et minus, videtur, quod aequaliter amet cuncta quae diligit.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera⁶: « Quis digne exprimat, quantum Deus diligat membra unigeniti Filii sui, et quanto amplius ipsum Unigenitum »? si igitur amplius diligit ipsum Unigenitum quam ipsius membra, videtur, quod non omnia aequaliter diligat.

2. Item, Deus diligit bonum, quia bonum, ergo magis bonum magis diligit⁷; sed non omnia sunt aequaliter bona: ergo non omnia sunt a Deo aequaliter dilecta.

3. Item, caritas nostra est ordinata⁸: si ergo ordo est de eius complemento, videtur multo fortius, quod caritatis summae et increatae sit res diligere ordinate, cum illa sit exemplar caritatis crea-

tae: si ergo Deus diligit res ordinate, videtur, quod non aequaliter.

4. Item, secundum quod Deus diligit, secundum hoc dona sua distribuit; sed non omnibus aequaliter dona sua distribuit: ergo non omnes aequaliter diligit⁹.

5. Item, si aequaliter omnes diligeret, aequaliter omnibus propitius esset; sed non aequaliter omnibus propitiatur, immo cui vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat¹⁰: ergo non aequaliter diligit omnes creaturas.

Conclusio.

Deus diligit omnes aequali dilectione, si ea sumitur secundum essentiam, sive actum volendi; non vero, si sumitur secundum efficaciam, sive bonum volitum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de dilectione Dei est loqui dupliciter, videlicet secundum essentiam et secundum efficaciam¹¹; sive secundum actum essentialem et secundum effectum consequentem. Si loquamur de dilectione quantum ad essentiam sive quantum ad actum essentialem; sic non tantum aequali dilectione diligit omnia; immo tantum uno et eodem actu simplici et indivisibili, nullo variato, nullo multiplicato, qui quidem est divina usia¹², diligit se et omnia alia. — Si vero loquamur de dilectione quantum ad efficaciam sive quantum ad effectum consequentem; sic, cum effectus ab ipsa dilectione Dei procedentes sint ordinati et sese excedentes, dicere est, quod Deus non omnes creaturas diligit aequaliter.

Aliter potest dici et quasi in idem redit, quod cum diligere idem sit quod velle bonum¹³, aequalitas dilectionis potest attendi dupliciter: aut ex parte actus volendi, aut ex parte boni voliti. Si ex parte actus volendi, sic omnia diligit aequaliter, quia non magis intense vult Deus bonum alicui rei quam alteri, immo ipso¹⁴ summo amore suo vult bonum cuicumque vult. — Si autem ex parte boni voliti, sic, cum maius bonum velit uni quam alteri, non est dicere, quod omnia diligat aequaliter, sed quaedam maxime, quaedam vero minime, secundum quod vult communicare alicui bonum parvum, vel magnum, vel maximum. — Et quia secundum istam viam procedunt rationes ostendentes, quod Deus non diligit omnia aequaliter, sicut aspicienti patet; ideo sunt concedendae. — Verumtamen illa ratio, quae sumta est ex ordine caritatis nostrae, non valet, quia dilectio nostra diversis motibus movetur circa diversa diligibilia, qui possunt esse intensi et remissi; non sic autem est ex parte Dei.

Ad obiecta:

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de Sapientiae sexto, quod aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus; dicendum, quod aequalitas illa non excludit ordinatam boni communicationem, sed excludit personarum acceptionem, quae quidem est inaequalitas non solum deficiens ab unitate aequalitatis, verum etiam a pulcritudine ordinis; et ideo reprehensibilis est nec habet in Deo reperiri¹⁵.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prima causa uno modo se habet ad omnia; dicendum, quod illud verum est quantum ad id quod est ex parte Dei; sed tamen creaturae, sicut ipse¹⁶ dicit, non uniformiter se habent ad ipsum; et quoniam diligere Dei non tantum dicit, quod est ex parte ipsius, sed etiam effectum creatum: hinc est, quod ratione illius potest attendi inaequalitas.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem dilectione diligit Deus Filium suum et creaturam; dicendum, quod quamvis dilectio sit eadem quantum ad rationem principalis significati, tamen connotatum¹⁷ est aliud et aliud. Nam cum dicit, quod diligit Filium, non connotatur ibi aliquod bonum creatum, immo notatur communicatio Boni summi et infiniti: cum vero dicitur, quod diligit creaturam, connotatur communicatio boni creati et finiti; et ex hac parte dictum est, quod inaequalitas potest attendi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut cognoscit, sic diligit; dicendum, quod si diligere accipiatur pro ipso diligendi actu; sic veritatem habet, quia idem est Deo¹⁸ diligere et cognoscere. Si vero pro connotato effectu, sic non habet veritatem, quia cognoscere non connotat effectum, sicut diligere. Et ideo non potest attendi gradus et ordo in cognitione Dei ratione connotati, secundum quod in dilectione¹⁹.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de perfectione et nobilitate dilectionis est magnitudo sive immensi-

tas, sicut de perfectione cognitionis est ipsa limpiditas; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est ex parte ipsius actus diligendi; unde unumquodque²⁰ diligit Deus dilectione permaxima, nec magis delectatur Deus in dilectione unius quam in dilectione alterius. Deus enim in diligendo se ipsum et se ipso fruendo diligit cetera, ita quod omnia diligendo se ipso fruitur et summe in se ipso delectatur; hac tamen dilectione maxima et summa quibusdam communicat maiora bona, quibusdam minora. Unde sicut dilectio Dei in se est fruitio, ipsa tamen relata ad creaturam potest dici usus ratione connotati²¹; sic, quamvis in se sit summa, ratione tamen effectus connotati contingit dici, aliquid plus, aliquid minus ab eo diligi²².

Question III. Whether God loves all creatures equally.

Thirdly it is asked whether God loves all things equally. And that he does so, it seems.

1. Wisdom six¹: He made the little and the great, and he has care of all alike; but he loves in the same way as he has care: therefore it seems that he loves all equally.

2. Likewise, according to what the Philosopher says², « the first stands in one way to all things »; but for God to love a creature is for God to stand in some way toward the creature: therefore if he stands uniformly toward all things, he also stands uniformly and equally toward them: therefore he does not love one more than another.

3. Likewise, by the same love by which the Father loves the Son he loves the creature³; but the love by which he loves the Son is the very greatest love: therefore he loves every creature with the highest love. If therefore in what is highest there is no place for more and less, but only the equal; it seems that he loves every creature equally.

4. Likewise, as God knows creatures, so he loves [them]⁴; but he knows all creatures equally, not one more than another: therefore he loves all equally.

5. Likewise, as the clarity of knowledge contributes to its nobility, so the magnitude of love contributes to its commendation⁵; but since the knowledge of God is most noble, he knows every creature most clearly: therefore likewise, since the love of God is most excellent, he loves every creature most greatly: therefore if in what is greatest there is no place for more and less, it seems that he loves equally all the things that he loves.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine says, and it is found in the [Master's] text⁶: « Who can worthily express how much God loves the members of his only-begotten Son, and how much more the Only-begotten himself »? if therefore he loves the Only-begotten himself more than his members, it seems that he does not love all things equally.

2. Likewise, God loves the good because [it is] good, therefore the more good he loves the more⁷; but not all things are equally good: therefore not all things are equally loved by God.

3. Likewise, our charity is ordered⁸: if therefore order belongs to its completeness, it seems much more strongly that it belongs to the highest and uncreated charity to love things in an ordered way, since that is the exemplar of created charity: if therefore God loves things in an ordered way, it seems that [he does] not [love them] equally.

4. Likewise, according as God loves, accordingly he distributes his gifts; but he does not distribute his gifts to all equally: therefore he does not love all equally⁹.

5. Likewise, if he loved all equally, he would be equally favorable to all; but he is not equally favorable to all, indeed he has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens¹⁰: therefore he does not love all creatures equally.

Conclusion.

God loves all with an equal love, if it is taken according to essence, or the act of willing; but not so, if it is taken according to efficacy, or the good willed.

I respond: It must be said that one can speak of the love of God in two ways, namely according to essence and according to efficacy¹¹; or according to the essential act and according to the consequent effect. If we speak of love as to essence or as to the essential act; thus he does not love all things with merely an equal love; indeed by only one and the same act, simple and indivisible, nothing varied, nothing multiplied, which is the divine usia¹², he loves himself and all other things. — But if we speak of love as to efficacy or as to the consequent effect; thus, since the effects proceeding from the love of God itself are ordered and surpassing one another, one must say that God does not love all creatures equally.

It can be said otherwise, and it comes back to almost the same thing, that since to love is the same as to will the good¹³, the equality of love can be regarded in two ways: either on the part of the act of willing, or on the part of the good willed. If on the part of the act of willing, thus he loves all things equally, because God does not will the good for one thing more intensely than for another, indeed by his very¹⁴ highest love he wills the good for whomever he wills. — But if on the part of the good willed, thus, since he wills a greater good to one than to another, one cannot say that he loves all things equally, but some most greatly, some least, according as he wills to communicate to someone a good small, or great, or greatest. — And because the reasons showing that God does not love all things equally proceed along this way, as is clear to one who looks; therefore they are to be conceded. — Nevertheless that reason which is taken from the order of our charity does not hold, because our love is moved by diverse motions about diverse lovable things, which can be intense and remiss; but it is not so on the part of God.

Reply to the objections:

1. To that which is objected from Wisdom six, that he has care of all alike; it must be said that that equality does not exclude an ordered communication of the good, but excludes acceptance of persons, which indeed is an inequality not only deficient from the unity of equality, but also from the beauty of order; and therefore it is reprehensible and cannot be found in God¹⁵.

2. To that which is objected, that the first cause stands in one way to all things; it must be said that this is true as to that which is on the part of God; but nevertheless creatures, as he himself¹⁶ says, do not stand uniformly toward him; and since to love in God's case expresses not only what is on the part of himself, but also the created effect: hence it is that by reason of that an inequality can be regarded.

3. To that which is objected, that by the same love God loves his Son and the creature; it must be said that although the love is the same as to the formal character of the principal thing signified, yet the connoted thing¹⁷ is different and different. For when he says that he loves the Son, no created good is connoted there, but rather is denoted the communication of the highest and infinite Good: but when it is said that he loves the creature, there is connoted the communication of a created and finite good; and on this side it has been said that inequality can be regarded.

4. To that which is objected, that as he knows, so he loves; it must be said that if to love is taken for the very act of loving; thus it has truth, because in God¹⁸ to love and to know are the same. But if [it is taken] for the connoted effect, thus it does not have truth, because to know does not connote an effect, as to love [does]. And therefore a grade and order cannot be regarded in the knowledge of God by reason of the connoted [effect], as [they can] in love¹⁹.

5. To that which is objected, that the magnitude or immensity belongs to the perfection and nobility of love, as the very clarity belongs to the perfection of knowledge; it must be said that this is true as to what is on the part of the very act of loving; whence God loves each thing²⁰ with the very greatest love, nor is God more delighted in the love of one than in the love of another. For God in loving himself and in enjoying himself loves the rest, so that loving all things he enjoys himself and is supremely delighted in himself; yet with this greatest and highest love he communicates greater goods to some, lesser to others. Whence as the love of God in itself is fruition, yet related to the creature it can be called use by reason of the connoted²¹; thus, although in itself it is highest, yet by reason of the connoted effect it happens to be said that something is loved more, something less, by him²².