← Back to Distinction 32

Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 32

Textus Latinus
p. 699

Quaestio II. Utrum Deus omnes creaturas diligat generaliter.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus omnes diligat generaliter. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Sapientiae undecimo: Diligis omnia, Domine, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti.1 Nihil hoc expressius dici potest.

2. Item, Genesis primo2: Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona; sed summum Bonum non potest non diligere bona: ergo Deus diligit omnem creaturam.

3. Item, omne quod factum est, a Deo factum est, Deus autem nihil facit nisi volens; sed velle bonum, hoc est amare3: ergo nihil procedit a Deo, quod non ametur ab ipso: si ergo omnia a Deo exeunt, videtur, quod omnia a Deo diligantur.

p. 700

4. Item, amor est donum, in quo omnia alia donantur4; sed nullum creatum est, quod non suscipiat influentiam divinae liberalitatis: si igitur huiusmodi influentiae communicatio non est nisi mediante dilectione, videtur, quod dilectio Dei sit respectu omnis creaturae.

5. Item, omnia exoptant summum Bonum, secundum quod dicit Boethius, et Dionysius5; sed tunc Deus dicitur diligere creaturam aliquam, quando illam ad se convertit per dilectionem — magis enim dicitur diligere effectu quam affectu — ergo videtur, quod dilectio Dei se extendat ad omne creatum.

Sed contra: 1. Cum Deus sit summa caritas, omne quod diligit ex caritate diligit; sed ex caritate non sunt diligenda nisi tria diligibilium genera, videlicet Deus et spiritus rationalis et corpus humanum, secundum quod dicit Augustinus6: ergo non videtur, quod Deus diligat omnem creaturam.

2. Item, « amor, sicut dicit Hugo de sancto Victore7, transformat amantem in amatum »; et quanto perfectior est amor, tanto magis conformat unum alteri: cum igitur amor Dei sit perfectissimus, nihil diligit, nisi quod est ei conformabile per se; hoc autem non est nisi creatura rationalis, quae facta est ad imaginem suam: ergo videtur, quod Deus non diligat omnem creaturam, sed solum rationalem.

3. Item, videtur, quod non omnem rationalem diligat: quia quidam sunt reprobi et quidam electi, quidam boni et quidam mali; sed impios et reprobos non diligit, secundum quod scribitur Malachiae primo8: Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui; et Sapientiae decimo quarto: Similiter abominabilis est Deo impius et impietas eius: si ergo Deus non diligit impietatem, videtur, quod non diligat impios: non ergo diligit omnes et singulos.

4. Item, dilectio est ratio electionis9, ergo illos solum Deus diligit, quos ab aeterno elegit; sed non elegit omnes indifferenter: ergo non dilexit omnes generaliter.

5. Item, diligere est velle bonum10, ergo illos tantum diligit, quibus vult bonum; sed cuicumque vult bonum, facit bonum: ergo illos tantum diligit Deus, quibus bona facit. Sed damnatis facit multa mala: ergo videtur, quod potius eos odiat, quam diligat: non ergo diligit generaliter omnem creaturam.

Conclusio.

Dilectio Dei quoad effectum naturae est omnibus communis et generalis, sed quoad effectum gratiae est specialis.

Respondeo: Ad huius intelligentiam est notandum, quod Deus non dicitur creaturam diligere ratione affectionis animi, sed ratione communicationis alicuius boni, ita quod dilectio Dei potius dicitur esse dilectio effectus quam affectus11. Communicatio autem bonitatis divinae attenditur in duplici genere effectus, videlicet in effectibus naturae et effectibus gratiae; et effectus naturae omnibus est communis, effectus vero gratiae non. — Hinc est, quod dilectio Dei quantum ad effectum naturae est omnibus communis et generalis; et secundum hanc12 dicitur diligere omnem creaturam. Quantum autem ad effectum gratiae est specialis; et quantum ad istum quosdam diligit, quosdam odit, quia quidam habent in se effectum gratiae, quidam defectum culpae et poenae. — Rationes ergo omnes, quae inducuntur ad primam partem et probant, Deum omnem creaturam diligere, quia probant de dilectione communi, quae attenditur quantum ad communicationem boni generalis, utpote bonitatis naturalis, verum concludunt; et ideo concedendae sunt.

Ad obiecta:

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod haec praepositio ex1 dicat habitudinem principii motivi et productivi respectu effectus creati; et sic omnia quae diligit, ex caritate diligit — caritas enim Dei principium est omnium effectuum, quos producit — aut ita, quod non solum dicat habitudinem principii producentis, verum etiam exemplaris repraesentantis;

p. 701

et sic solum illos ex caritate diligit, quibus communicat caritatem creatam, cuius illa suprema caritas est exemplar. Nam caritas increata est exemplar caritatis creatae sub ratione caritatis; aliorum vero non est exemplar sub hac ratione. Cum ergo dicitur, quod solum tria sunt diligenda ex caritate; hoc non dicitur, secundum quod ex dicit solum habitudinem principii moventis et imperantis, sed prout dicit habitudinem formalis et elicientis; et sic non potest concludi, quod Deus non diligat omnem creaturam se ipso, qui est caritas summa, ex qua procedunt omnia bona creata.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor transformat amantem in amatum; dicendum, quod illud verum est de amore affectionis, qui facit in alterum tendere; sed amor divinus non est amor affectionis inclinans ad alterum, sed potius alia inclinans et trahens ad se ipsum. Unde amor divinus potius transformat et conformat amata ipsi amanti quam e converso. Secundum autem quod duplex est conformatio ipsarum rerum ad Deum, videlicet secundum similitudinem vestigii et secundum similitudinem expressam, quae est ratio imaginis1; sic dilectio Dei potest dupliciter accipi, ut praedictum fuit, videlicet generaliter, et sic non connotat ibi nisi quandam generalem assimilationem; et specialiter, et sic connotat quandam expressam unitionem. Et ideo prima dilectio est respectu omnis creaturae; secunda vero non est nisi eius creaturae, cui Deus communicat caritatem, ita quod per caritatem illam adhaeret Deo unione permaxima, ut sic per caritatem in Deo maneat, et Deus in eo2.

3. 4. 5. Ad tria vero sequentia, quae opponuntur, quibus ostenditur, quod Deus non diligit malos; unica est responsio: quia procedunt de dilectione speciali, non de generali. Et quantum ad illam dilectionem specialem verum est, quod Deus non diligit malos et reprobos, immo potius odit, quia non habent in se gratiam, sed culpam; quantum vero ad naturam non odit, sed diligit, quia solem suum super bonos et malos oriri facit.3 Et per hoc potest ad tria ultima responderi.

English Translation

Question II. Whether God loves all creatures generally.

Secondly it is asked whether God loves all things generally. And that he does so, it seems.

1. Wisdom eleven: Thou lovest all things, O Lord, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made.1 Nothing can be said more expressly than this.

2. Likewise, Genesis one2: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good; but the highest Good cannot fail to love good things: therefore God loves every creature.

3. Likewise, everything that has been made has been made by God, and God makes nothing except willingly; but to will the good, this is to love3: therefore nothing proceeds from God that is not loved by him: if therefore all things issue from God, it seems that all things are loved by God.

4. Likewise, love is the gift in which all other things are given4; but there is no created thing that does not receive an inflowing of the divine generosity: if therefore the communication of an inflowing of this kind is only through love, it seems that the love of God is in respect of every creature.

5. Likewise, all things long for the highest Good, according to what Boethius and Dionysius say5; but God is then said to love some creature when he turns it to himself through love — for he is rather said to love by effect than by affect — therefore it seems that the love of God extends to everything created.

On the contrary: 1. Since God is the highest charity, everything that he loves he loves out of charity; but out of charity only three kinds of lovable things are to be loved, namely God and the rational spirit and the human body, according to what Augustine says6: therefore it does not seem that God loves every creature.

2. Likewise, « love, as Hugh of Saint Victor says7, transforms the lover into the beloved »; and the more perfect the love is, the more it conforms the one to the other: since therefore the love of God is most perfect, he loves nothing except what is in itself conformable to him; but this is only the rational creature, which is made to his image: therefore it seems that God does not love every creature, but only the rational one.

3. Likewise, it seems that he does not love every rational one: for some are reprobate and some elect, some good and some evil; but the impious and the reprobate he does not love, according to what is written in Malachi one8: Jacob I loved, but Esau I held in hatred; and Wisdom fourteen: Alike are the impious man and his impiety abominable to God: if therefore God does not love impiety, it seems that he does not love the impious: therefore he does not love all and each.

4. Likewise, love is the ground of election9, therefore God loves only those whom he chose from eternity; but he did not choose all indifferently: therefore he did not love all generally.

5. Likewise, to love is to will the good10, therefore he loves only those for whom he wills the good; but for whomever he wills the good, he does good: therefore God loves only those for whom he does good things. But to the damned he does many evil things: therefore it seems that he rather hates them than loves them: therefore he does not love every creature generally.

Conclusion.

The love of God as to the effect of nature is common and general to all, but as to the effect of grace it is special.

I respond: For the understanding of this it must be noted that God is not said to love a creature by reason of an affection of the mind, but by reason of the communication of some good, so that the love of God is rather said to be a love of effect than of affect11. But the communication of the divine goodness is regarded in a twofold kind of effect, namely in the effects of nature and the effects of grace; and the effect of nature is common to all, but the effect of grace is not. — Hence it is that the love of God as to the effect of nature is common and general to all; and according to this12 he is said to love every creature. But as to the effect of grace it is special; and as to this he loves some and hates some, because some have in themselves the effect of grace, some the defect of fault and of punishment. — Therefore all the reasons that are brought forward for the first part and prove that God loves every creature, since they prove concerning the common love, which is regarded as to the communication of the general good, namely of natural goodness, conclude truly; and therefore they are to be conceded.

Reply to the objections:

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: either thus, that this preposition out of1 expresses the relation of a moving and producing principle in respect of the created effect; and thus everything that he loves, he loves out of charity — for the charity of God is the principle of all the effects that he produces — or thus, that it expresses not only the relation of a producing principle, but also of a representing exemplar;

and thus he loves out of charity only those to whom he communicates created charity, of which that highest charity is the exemplar. For uncreated charity is the exemplar of created charity under the formal character of charity; but of other things it is not the exemplar under this formal character. When therefore it is said that only three things are to be loved out of charity; this is not said insofar as out of expresses only the relation of a moving and commanding principle, but inasmuch as it expresses the relation of a formal and eliciting [principle]; and thus it cannot be concluded that God does not love every creature by himself, who is the highest charity, from whom proceed all created goods.

2. To that which is objected, that love transforms the lover into the beloved; it must be said that this is true of the love of affection, which makes one tend toward another; but the divine love is not a love of affection inclining toward another, but rather inclining and drawing other things to itself. Hence the divine love rather transforms and conforms the beloved things to the lover himself than the reverse. But inasmuch as there is a twofold conformation of things themselves to God, namely according to the likeness of vestige and according to the expressed likeness, which is the formal character of image1; so the love of God can be taken in two ways, as was said before, namely generally, and thus it connotes there only a certain general assimilation; and specially, and thus it connotes a certain expressed union. And therefore the first love is in respect of every creature; but the second is only of that creature to which God communicates charity, so that through that charity it adheres to God by a most great union, so that thus through charity it remains in God, and God in it2.

3. 4. 5. To the three following [objections] that are opposed, by which it is shown that God does not love the evil; there is one reply: because they proceed concerning the special love, not the general. And as to that special love it is true that God does not love the evil and the reprobate, indeed rather hates them, because they do not have in themselves grace, but fault; but as to nature he does not hate, but loves, because he makes his sun to rise upon the good and the evil.3 And by this it is possible to reply to the three last.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic c. 1. — In initio solut. pro copula amantis et amati codd. D copula amantis cum amato.
    Here c. 1. — At the beginning of the solution, for the bond of the lover and the loved codices D [read] the bond of the lover with the loved.
  2. Pro potest esse codd. a N dicitur. Mox pro res est in habitu non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 res est habitu.
    For can be codices a N [read] is said. Soon, for the thing is in a habit not a few codices and editions 1, 2 [read] the thing is by habit.
  3. Vide I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2.
    See I Sent., d. 45, a. 2, q. 2.
  4. August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 32. n. 33: Sed [Deus] neque sic utitur ut nos; nam nos res, quibus utimur, ad id referimus, ut Dei bonitate perfruamur; Deus vero ad suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert. Quia enim bonus est, sumus; et in quantum sumus, boni sumus... Ille igitur usus, qui dicitur Dei, quo nobis utitur, non ad eius, sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, ad eius autem tantummodo bonitatem.
    Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, c. 32, n. 33: But [God] does not use [things] as we do; for we refer the things we use to this, that we may enjoy the goodness of God; but God refers our use to his own goodness. For because he is good, we are; and insofar as we are, we are good... That use, therefore, which is called God's, by which he uses us, is referred not to his utility but to ours, but to his goodness alone.
  5. Vers. 25: Diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil etc.
    Verse 25: For thou lovest all things that are, and [hatest] nothing etc.
  6. Vers. 31. — In minori pro bona cod. Z ea quae sunt valde bona.
    Verse 31. — In the minor [premise], for good codex Z [reads] the things that are very good.
  7. Vide verba Aristot., supra pag. 574, nota 5. allata.
    See the words of Aristotle, adduced above, page 574, note 5.
  8. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. — Quoad minorem cfr. liber de Causis, propos. 1. 18. et 20. — Post omnia alia codd. AN PS bb subiiciunt dona.
    Cf. I Sent., d. 18, q. 1. — As to the minor [premise], cf. the Book of Causes, propositions 1, 18, and 20. — After all other things codices AN PS bb add gifts.
  9. Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11; Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 10, ubi etiam haec leguntur, quibus illustratur minor: Possumus autem fiducialiter et veraciter dicere, quod Deus, qui est omnium causa, propter suae bonitatis excessum amat omnia et perficit omnia et continet et ad se convertit; et est divinus amor bonus boni propter bonum etc. (Versio abbatis Vercellens.).
    Boethius, On Consolation III, prose 11; Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4, § 10, where also these things are read, by which the minor is illustrated: We can also confidently and truly say that God, who is the cause of all things, on account of the excess of his goodness loves all things and perfects all things and contains [them] and turns [them] to himself; and the divine love is good, [the love] of the good for the sake of the good, etc. (Version of the abbot of Vercelli.).
  10. Colligitur ex 1. de Doctr. christ. c. 23. n. 22, de quo videsis supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVIII. c. 1, et ibid. Comment. q. 1. et 6.
    It is gathered from On Christian Doctrine I, c. 23, n. 22, concerning which see above, the Master's text, d. XXVIII, c. 1, and there the Commentary, q. 1 and 6.
  11. De Arrha animae. Vide tom. II. pag. 4, nota 8.
    On the Pledge of the Soul. See vol. II, page 4, note 8.
  12. Vide verba Aristot., supra pag. 574, nota 5. allata.
    See the words of Aristotle, adduced above, page 574, note 5.
  13. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. — Quoad minorem cfr. liber de Causis, propos. 1. 18. et 20. — Post omnia alia codd. AN PS bb subiiciunt dona.
    Cf. I Sent., d. 18, q. 1. — As to the minor [premise], cf. the Book of Causes, propositions 1, 18, and 20. — After all other things codices AN PS bb add gifts.
  14. Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11; Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 10, ubi etiam haec leguntur, quibus illustratur minor: Possumus autem fiducialiter et veraciter dicere, quod Deus, qui est omnium causa, propter suae bonitatis excessum amat omnia et perficit omnia et continet et ad se convertit; et est divinus amor bonus boni propter bonum etc. (Versio abbatis Vercellens.).
    Boethius, On Consolation III, prose 11; Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4, § 10, where also these things are read, by which the minor is illustrated: We can confidently and truly say that God, who is the cause of all things, on account of the excess of his goodness loves all things and perfects all and contains [them] and turns [them] to himself; and the divine love is good, [the love] of the good for the sake of the good, etc. (Version of the abbot of Vercelli.).
  15. Vers. 2. seq. — Locus libri Sapientiae est 14, 9: Similiter autem odio sunt Deo impius etc. — Circa finem arg. pro diligit multi codd. diligit.
    Verse 2 and following. — The passage of the book of Wisdom is 14:9: Alike, moreover, are the impious and [his impiety] in hatred to God, etc. — Toward the end of the argument, for loves many codices [read] loves.
  16. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 3. q. 1. fundam. 4.
    Cf. I Sent., d. 40, a. 3, q. 1, fundamentum 4.
  17. Vide verba Aristot., supra pag. 574, nota 5. allata. — Subinde post diligit cod. Z supplet Deum.
    See the words of Aristotle, adduced above, page 574, note 5. — Thereafter, after loves codex Z supplies God.
  18. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo superius edd. omittunt animi.
    See here the Master's text, c. 3. — A little above, the editions omit of the mind.
  19. Cod. Z secundum hunc modum. Paulo inferius idem cod. etiam et quantum ad istum modum.
    Codex Z [reads] according to this way. A little below, the same codex also [reads] and as to this way.
  20. Cod. Z subiungit Dei.
    Codex Z appends of God.
  21. Priscian., XIV. Grammat. c. 3, de praepositione ex dicit, quod « pro causali coniunctione potest accipi, ut ex insidiis illius hoc patior, i. e. insidiarum illius causa ». — Aliquanto inferius pro suprema cod. Z summa.
    Priscian, Grammar XIV, c. 3, says concerning the preposition ex that « it can be taken for a causal conjunction, as out of his snares I suffer this, i.e. by reason of his snares ». — Somewhat below, for highest codex Z [reads] supreme.
← Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 3→