← Back to Distinction 31

Dist. 31, Art. 3, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 31

Textus Latinus
p. 692

Quaestio III. Utrum ordo caritatis in patria habeat immutari.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ordo caritatis in patria habeat immutari, an is sit ordo patriae, qui est ordo viae, ut primo nos ipsos et deinde proximos diligamus. Et quod maneat, videtur posse ostendi sic.

Argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

1. Sicut gratia est perfectio naturae, sic et gloria: ergo sicut ordo conveniens ipsi naturae institutae salvatur, habitu gratiae adveniente; sic videtur, quod salvetur, habitu gloriae superveniente. Si ergo hic est ordo naturae conveniens, ut magis nos quam proximos diligamus; videtur, quod sicut hic manet, quamdiu sumus in gratia, similiter manebit in gloria.

2. Item, sicut ad virtutem fidei spectat videre per speculum et in aenigmate, sic etiam ad virtutem caritatis spectat diligere ordinate: ergo sicut, sublato medio cognoscendi sive videndi ab ipsa fide, virtus fidei evacuatur, sic, si a caritate auferatur ordo, quem habet in diligendo, necesse est, ipsam evacuari. Si ergo caritas non evacuatur in patria, videtur, quod non auferatur ei ordo diligendi, quem habebat in via.

3. Item, si tantum diligit se quis in patria, quantum diligit proximum, et e converso, ita quod non est ibi ordo; igitur tantum gaudet de bono proximi, quantum de suo bono: ergo ille qui non est martyr, tantum gaudet de gloria martyris, quantum si ipsemet haberet illam gloriam. Si ergo non tantum gaudet non-martyr, quantum martyr, frustra ergo laborat homo aggredi opera perfectionis, cum tantum gaudeat ille qui non fecit, quantum ille qui fecit.

4. Item, si tantundem diligit aliquis alium, quantum semetipsum in gloria, ergo tantundem diligit sibi propinquos quantum remotos; tantundem etiam diligit illos quos convertit ad fidem, quantum illos quos non convertit; sed de illis quos convertit, habet quis gaudium accidentale, quod est aureola: ergo similiter de his quos non convertit. Quodsi hoc est inconveniens dicere, inconveniens est ponere, ordinem caritatis in gloria commutari.

Sed contra:

Pro parte negativa:

1. Augustinus de Vera Religione: « Perfecta iustitia haec est, ut plus potiora bona et minus minora diligamus »: si ergo in patria voluntas nostra ad perfectam iustitiam erit deducta, videtur, quod ibi magis diliget maius bonum. Si ergo proximus noster in patria melior est nobis, videtur, quod magis diligemus proximos nostros quam nosmetipsos.

2. Item, voluntas nostra per omnia erit in patria conformis voluntati divinae; sed Deus magis diligit meliorem: ergo videtur, quod caritas in Beatis eos magis faciat diligi, qui sunt magis boni: igitur in patria non attenditur ordo secundum rationem proprii et alieni, propinqui et remoti.

3. Item, in patria Deus erit omnia in omnibus, et affectus Beatorum sic erit dilectione inebriatus, secundum quod dicit Bernardus in libro de Diligendo Deo, ut sui obliviscatur: si ergo Beati in patria in diligendo non attendunt quod suum est, sed quod Dei; videtur, quod ordo caritatis non maneat in patria secundum rationem proprii et alieni, nec dilectio sui praeponderabit dilectioni proximi.

4. Item, si homo amaret se plus quam proximum, ergo magis optaret sibi bonum quam proximo, et magis delectaretur in bono proprio quam alieno; sed ubi hoc est, aliquo modo manet proprietas, nec omni modo est perfecta gaudii communitas: si igitur in gloria erit summa communicatio gaudiorum, videtur, quod non maneat ibi ordo, qui nunc est respectu diligendorum.

p. 693

Conclusio.

Valde probabile videtur, quod in patria non manebit ordo caritatis, qui attenditur ratione naturae substratae, ita ut per se non amemus magis nos quam proximos.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hanc quaestionem est duplex dicendi modus.

Unus est, quod in patria salvatur ordo caritatis, qui est in via, non tantum per comparationem nostri ad Deum, sed etiam per comparationem nostri ad proximum. Unde in omni statu, sive gloriae sive viae, plus homo diliget se ipsum quam proximum suum, et plus circa se ipsum afficietur, deinde plus circa illos qui ei coniuncti sunt, quam circa eos qui sunt minus coniuncti. — Ratio autem, quae movet hoc ponere, est, quia huiusmodi ordo consonare videtur dictamini naturae, perfectioni gloriae, rectitudini divinae iustitiae. Natura enim dictat, quod homo plus se quam alterum diligat. Gloria etiam essentialius11 respicit illum, in quo est, quam alium ei consimilem et propinquum. Divina etiam iustitia ordinat, quod plus de suis meritis gaudeat homo, quae fecit, quam de alienis. Et sic per omnem modum videtur conveniens12, ut ordo caritatis, qui est in via, salvetur in patria.

Alius autem modus dicendi est hic, quod cum duplex sit ordo caritatis: unus, qui respicit caritatem secundum se, qui quidem attenditur secundum gradum et differentias boni; alter, qui attenditur ratione naturae substratae, utpote ille qui est secundum differentias proprii et alieni, propinqui et remoti13: unus istorum ordinum, scilicet ille qui est caritatis secundum se, manet in patria. Ille enim est caritati essentialis; unde magis diliget homo in patria Deum quam spiritum creatum, et spiritum magis quam corpus. Alius vero ordo, qui attenditur ratione naturae substratae, non manebit, pro eo quod non competit illi statui. In statu namque beatitudinis perfecta erit obedientia naturae respectu gloriae, perfecta conformitas voluntatis nostrae respectu divinae, perfecta etiam redundantia communis laetitiae. Quia perfecta erit obedientia naturae respectu gloriae, conformabitur tunc omnino natura gloriae, ut, sicut corpus efficietur spirituale et per omnia spiritui obtemperabit, quamvis secundum statum viae oporteat, spiritum corpori condescendere14; sic natura per omnia conformabitur ordini gloriae et gratiae, qui attenditur secundum differentias boni, quamvis nunc gratia condescendat ipsi affectui naturali. — Rursus, quia perfecta erit conformitas voluntatis nostrae respectu divinae, non magis diligemus illud quod magis erit nobis propinquum, sed illud quod plus erit Deo placitum et acceptum. — Postremo, quia erit ibi perfecta affluentia communis laetitiae, multiplicabitur gaudium hominis multiplicatione perfecta, ut tantum gaudeat de bono uniuscuiusque proximi quantum de suo; quod non posset esse, nisi diligeret proximum quantum semetipsum. Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus in Prosologio, capitulo ultimo15: « In illa perfecta caritate innumerabilium Angelorum et hominum beatorum, ubi nullus minus alium quam se ipsum diligit, non aliter gaudebit quisque pro singulis aliis quam pro se ipso ».

Quis autem istorum duorum modorum sit rationabilior, difficile est definire, quamdiu sumus in statu praesentis miseriae. Si enim velimus iudicare secundum ea quae in nobis sentimus, vix videbitur alicui credibile nec rationabile, quod aliquis omnino16 diligat alterum quantum se ipsum. Unde iudicabit primum modum dicendi esse magis verum. — Si quis vero velit mentem suam altius elevare ad illud Bonum incomprehensibile, quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit17, et ad illam maximam civium unitatem; magis rationabilem iudicabit sequentem modum dicendi, secundum quod manifeste dicit auctoritas Anselmi et Augustini in libro de Vera Religione. Videtur id ipsum sentire et Bernardus in libro de Diligendo Deo. Unde si velimus loqui, ut plures, sustinebimus primum modum; si vero velimus loqui et sentire, ut sapientiores18, sustinebimus sequentem. Sustinentes igitur hunc secundum modum dicendi, possumus ad obiecta respondere per ordinem.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod gloria salvat ordinem naturae institutae; dicendum, quod verum est, quod naturam salvat; sed imperfectionem tollit et eliminat; ordo autem, qui attenditur respectu sui et proximi, deficit a perfecta communicatione et unitate et concordia affectionis; et ideo in ablatione talis ordinis nullum19 fit naturae praeiudicium, sed potius de imperfectione ducitur ad complementum.

p. 694

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ordo ille ita competit caritati, sicut aenigma fidei; dicendum, quod falsum est. Aenigma enim competit ipsi habitui fidei secundum se et in quantum est habitus virtutis dirigens ad voluntarie credendum ea quae non videntur; sed ordo ille qui est respectu proximi, attribuitur ipsi caritati ratione naturae substratae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc tantum gaudet20 homo de alio quantum de se ipso; dicendum, quod illud verum est ceteris paribus. Sed ad quantitatem gaudii, attendendum est, quod duo concurrunt, videlicet virtus dilectionis, quae facit gaudere, et materia, de qua gaudet. Quantum est ex parte materiae, aequaliter gaudebit quis in patria de bono proximi et de bono suo, si est aequale, et magis, si est maius, et minus, si est minus; sed quantum est ex parte virtutis, per quam gaudet, magis gaudebit qui maiorem caritatem habebit. Unde magis gaudebit Petrus de bono Lini, quam Linus de bono proprio. Unde non sequitur, quod non-martyr tantum gaudeat21 de bono martyris, quantum ipse martyr, quia merito martyrii aucta est ei virtus gaudendi. Et sic patet, quod licet ex hoc ponatur communitas gaudii, non tamen tollitur, quod unus plus gaudeat de alio quam alter.

4. Et per hoc patet ultimum, quod obiicit de praemio aureolae: quia, quod aliquis habeat gaudium speciale de alio, hoc non erit22 ratione ordinis in diligendo, quod magis diligat illum quam alterum, sed hoc erit ratione cuiusdam decoris et gloriae, quam adeptus est merito operis excellentis.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:

Si autem aliam positionem sustinere velimus, ad omnia obiecta responderi potest breviter, quod omnia intelliguntur ceteris paribus.

1. Unde quod dicitur, quod magis debemus diligere maiora bona; hoc verum est, quantum est de ratione boni, sed ratio23 maioris propinquitatis aliud exigit.

2. Similiter quod dicit, quod perfecte conformanda est voluntas nostra voluntati divinae; dicendum, quod verum est; sed Deus non diligit maiori affectu, sed diligit ad maius24. Unde ex hoc non sequitur, quod debeamus magis diligere proximos nostros meliores nobis quam nos ipsos, sed quod debeamus eos ad maius diligere.

3. Similiter quod dicitur, quod affectus Beatorum erit inebriatus; hoc non est, quia non diligunt semetipsos, sed quia affectus eorum non erit retardatus in dilectione Dei.

4. Postremo, quod dicitur de communicatione perfectae laetitiae, non cogit, quia perfecta laetitia non excludit, quin homo principaliter bonum suum diligat; sed hoc facit, quod diligendo bonum proprium sic circa se afficiatur, ut circa alios non torpescat25.

---

English Translation
p. 692

Question III. Whether the order of charity is to be changed in the fatherland.

Thirdly it is asked whether the order of charity is to be changed in the fatherland, or whether the order of the fatherland is that order which is the order of the way, namely that we love first ourselves and then our neighbors. And that it remains can be shown thus.

Arguments for the affirmative part:

1. As grace is the perfection of nature, so also is glory: therefore, as the order suited to nature as instituted is preserved when the habit of grace arrives, so it seems that it is preserved when the habit of glory supervenes. If therefore there is here an order suited to nature, namely that we love ourselves more than our neighbors, it seems that, as it remains here so long as we are in grace, it will likewise remain in glory.

2. Likewise, as it belongs to the virtue of faith to see through a mirror and in an enigma, so also it belongs to the virtue of charity to love in an ordered way: therefore, as, when the medium of knowing or seeing is removed from faith itself, the virtue of faith is voided, so, if from charity be taken away the order which it has in loving, it is necessary that it itself be voided. If therefore charity is not voided in the fatherland, it seems that there is not taken away from it the order of loving which it had on the way.

3. Likewise, if anyone loves himself in the fatherland as much as he loves his neighbor, and conversely, such that there is no order there; then he rejoices over his neighbor's good as much as over his own good: therefore he who is not a martyr rejoices over the glory of the martyr as much as if he himself had that glory. If therefore the non-martyr does not rejoice as much as the martyr, then man labors in vain to undertake works of perfection, since he who has not done [them] rejoices as much as he who has done them.

4. Likewise, if anyone loves another as much as himself in glory, then he loves those near to him as much as those remote; he also loves equally those whom he has converted to the faith as much as those whom he has not converted; but over those whom he has converted one has an accidental joy, which is the aureole: therefore likewise over those whom he has not converted. But if this is unfitting to say, it is unfitting to posit that the order of charity is changed in glory.

On the contrary:

For the negative part:

1. Augustine, On True Religion: "Perfect justice is this, that we love the more weighty goods more and the lesser goods less": if therefore in the fatherland our will shall be brought to perfect justice, it seems that there it will love the greater good more. If therefore our neighbor in the fatherland is better than we, it seems that we shall love our neighbors more than ourselves.

2. Likewise, our will in the fatherland will be in all things conformed to the divine will; but God loves the better one more: therefore it seems that charity in the Blessed makes those be loved more who are more good: therefore in the fatherland the order is not regarded according to the account of one's own and another's, near and remote.

3. Likewise, in the fatherland God will be all in all, and the affection of the Blessed will be so inebriated with love, according to what Bernard says in the book On Loving God, that one forgets himself: if therefore the Blessed in the fatherland in loving do not regard what is their own, but what is God's; it seems that the order of charity does not remain in the fatherland according to the account of one's own and another's, nor will love of self outweigh love of neighbor.

4. Likewise, if a man were to love himself more than his neighbor, then he would wish good for himself more than for his neighbor, and would be delighted more in his own good than in another's; but where this is, in some manner property remains, nor is there in every way a perfect community of joy: if therefore in glory there will be the highest communication of joys, it seems that there does not remain there the order which now exists with respect to the things to be loved.

p. 693

Conclusion.

It seems very probable that in the fatherland the order of charity will not remain which is regarded by reason of the underlying nature, such that of itself we love ourselves more than our neighbors.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this question there is a twofold manner of speaking.

One is that in the fatherland the order of charity which is on the way is preserved, not only by comparison of ourselves to God, but also by comparison of ourselves to neighbor. Hence in every state, whether of glory or of the way, a man will love himself more than his neighbor, and will be more affected toward himself, then more toward those who are joined to him, than toward those who are less joined. — And the reason which moves [one] to posit this is that an order of this kind seems to be consonant with the dictate of nature, the perfection of glory, the rectitude of divine justice. For nature dictates that a man love himself more than another. Glory too more essentially11 regards him in whom it is than another like and near to him. Divine justice too ordains that a man rejoice more over his own merits, which he has done, than over another's. And so in every way it seems fitting12 that the order of charity which is on the way be preserved in the fatherland.

But the other manner of speaking is this: that since the order of charity is twofold — one which regards charity in itself, which indeed is regarded according to the degree and differences of the good; the other which is regarded by reason of the underlying nature, namely that which is according to the differences of one's own and another's, near and remote13 — one of these orders, namely that which is of charity in itself, remains in the fatherland. For it is essential to charity; hence a man will love God more in the fatherland than a created spirit, and a spirit more than a body. But the other order, which is regarded by reason of the underlying nature, will not remain, because it does not befit that state. For in the state of beatitude there will be a perfect obedience of nature with respect to glory, a perfect conformity of will of ours with respect to the divine, and a perfect overflow of common joy. Because there will be a perfect obedience of nature with respect to glory, nature will then be wholly conformed to glory, so that, as the body will be made spiritual and will obey the spirit in all things, although according to the state of the way the spirit must condescend to the body14; so nature will be in all things conformed to the order of glory and grace, which is regarded according to the differences of the good, although now grace condescends to the natural affection itself. — Again, because there will be a perfect conformity of will of ours with respect to the divine, we shall not love more that which will be more near to us, but that which will be more pleasing and acceptable to God. — Lastly, because there will be there a perfect abundance of common joy, the joy of man will be multiplied with a perfect multiplication, so that one rejoices over the good of each neighbor as much as over his own; which could not be unless he loved his neighbor as much as himself. And this is what Anselm says in the Proslogion, in the last chapter15: "In that perfect charity of innumerable Angels and of blessed men, where no one loves another less than himself, each one will rejoice no otherwise for each of the others than for himself."

But which of these two manners is the more reasonable, it is difficult to define so long as we are in the state of the present misery. For if we wish to judge according to those things which we feel in ourselves, it will scarcely seem to anyone credible or reasonable that anyone should at all16 love another as much as himself. Hence he will judge the first manner of speaking to be more true. — But if anyone wishes to raise his mind higher to that incomprehensible Good, which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man17, and to that greatest unity of the citizens; he will judge the following manner of speaking to be more reasonable, according to what the authority of Anselm and of Augustine in the book On True Religion manifestly says. Bernard too in the book On Loving God seems to hold the same. Hence if we wish to speak as the many [do], we shall maintain the first manner; but if we wish to speak and to feel as the wiser18 [do], we shall maintain the following. Maintaining therefore this second manner of speaking, we can answer the objections in order.

To the arguments for the affirmative part:

1. To that therefore which is objected first, that glory preserves the order of nature as instituted; it must be said that it is true that it preserves nature; but it removes and eliminates imperfection; now the order which is regarded with respect to self and neighbor falls short of a perfect communication and unity and concord of affection; and therefore in the removal of such an order no19 prejudice is done to nature, but rather it is led from imperfection to completion.

p. 694

2. To that which is objected, that that order befits charity as the enigma befits faith; it must be said that it is false. For the enigma befits the habit of faith itself in itself and inasmuch as it is a habit of virtue directing toward voluntarily believing those things which are not seen; but that order which is with respect to neighbor is attributed to charity itself by reason of the underlying nature.

3. To that which is objected, that then one rejoices20 over another as much as over himself; it must be said that that is true other things being equal. But as to the quantity of joy, it must be noted that two things concur, namely the virtue of love, which makes [one] rejoice, and the matter over which one rejoices. As far as concerns the matter, one will rejoice equally in the fatherland over the good of his neighbor and over his own good, if it is equal, and more, if it is greater, and less, if it is less; but as far as concerns the virtue by which one rejoices, he will rejoice more who will have the greater charity. Hence Peter will rejoice more over the good of Linus than Linus over his own good. Hence it does not follow that the non-martyr rejoices21 over the good of the martyr as much as the martyr himself, because by the merit of martyrdom the power of rejoicing has been increased for him. And thus it is clear that, although from this a community of joy is posited, yet it is not removed that one rejoices more over another than the other.

4. And through this the last [argument] is clear, which objects concerning the reward of the aureole: because that anyone has a special joy over another, this will not be22 by reason of an order in loving, namely that he loves him more than another, but this will be by reason of a certain comeliness and glory which he has attained by the merit of an excellent work.

To the arguments for the negative part:

But if we wish to maintain the other position, all the objections can be answered briefly, since they are all understood other things being equal.

1. Hence as to what is said, that we ought to love greater goods more; this is true so far as concerns the account of the good, but the account23 of greater nearness requires something else.

2. Likewise, as to what it says, that our will is to be perfectly conformed to the divine will; it must be said that it is true; but God does not love with a greater affection, but loves toward a greater [good]24. Hence from this it does not follow that we ought to love our neighbors better than us more than ourselves, but that we ought to love them toward a greater [good].

3. Likewise, as to what is said, that the affection of the Blessed will be inebriated; this is not because they do not love themselves, but because their affection will not be retarded in the love of God.

4. Lastly, as to what is said about the communication of perfect joy, it does not compel, because perfect joy does not exclude that a man principally loves his own good; but it brings it about that, in loving his own good, he is so affected toward himself that he does not grow sluggish toward others25.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vide supra d. 28. q. 6.
    See above, d. 28, q. 6.
  2. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
  3. Cfr. supra d. 29. q. 3.
    Cf. above, d. 29, q. 3.
  4. Epist. 1. Cor. 13, 12. — Quod ad caritatem spectet diligere ordinate, ostensum est supra d. 29. q. 1. — Inferius post evacuatur edd. sic prosequuntur: sic, sublato a caritate ordine diligendi, necessario habet caritas evacuari. Si ergo etc.
    Epistle 1 Cor. 13:12. — That it pertains to charity to love in an ordered way was shown above, d. 29, q. 1. — Below, after evacuatur the editions continue thus: sic, sublato a caritate ordine diligendi, necessario habet caritas evacuari. Si ergo etc.
  5. In Vat. et nonnullis codd. desideratur non.
    In the Vatican [edition] and in several codices non is wanting.
  6. Cfr. II. Sent. d. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 6, d. 40. a. 2. q. 1; IV. Sent. d. II. p. II. dub. I. et d. 33. a. 2. q. 3. — Superius post quantum remotos Vat. interiicit et e converso (quod connectit cum seqq.). In fine arg. pro in gloria commutari cod. Z in patria immutari.
    Cf. II Sent. d. II, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6; d. 40, a. 2, q. 1; IV Sent. d. II, p. II, dub. I, and d. 33, a. 2, q. 3. — Above, after quantum remotos the Vatican [edition] inserts et e converso (which it connects with what follows). At the end of the argument, for in gloria commutari cod. Z [reads] in patria immutari.
  7. Cap. 48. n. 93. Cfr. supra pag. 650, nota 8. — Inferius pro maius bonum codd. K V magis bonum.
    Chapter 48, n. 93. Cf. above, p. 650, note 8. — Below, for maius bonum codd. K V [read] magis bonum.
  8. Vide infra d. 32. q. 3.
    See below, d. 32, q. 3.
  9. Cap. 10. n. 28. et c. 15. n. 39. Respicitur I. Cor. 15, 28. et inferius ibid. 13, 5.
    Chapter 10, n. 28, and c. 15, n. 39. Reference is made to 1 Cor. 15:28, and below to the same, 13:5.
  10. Cfr. verba Anselm., Proslog. c. 25, infra in corp. quaest. allata. Cfr. etiam August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 67. n. 2. — Pro omni modo cod. O habet omnimoda, edd. cum paucis codd. omnino, et deinde perfecta pro summa. Pro nunc, quod Vat. omittit quodque fide codd. A B H M O P U bb restituimus, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 nec non Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 75. a. 3. falso non.
    Cf. the words of Anselm, Proslogion c. 25, adduced below in the body of the question. Cf. also Augustine, On the Gospel of John, tr. 67, n. 2. — For omni modo cod. O has omnimoda, the editions with a few codices omnino, and then perfecta for summa. For nunc, which the Vatican [edition] omits and which on the faith of codd. A B H M O P U bb we have restored, the other codices and edd. 1, 2 and also the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 75, a. 3, falsely [read] non.
  11. Ita cod. A; alii codd. essentialis, quorum non pauci deinde verbo respicit praefigunt magis. In Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal., ubi etiam habetur essentialis, verbo respicit praefixum est plus.
    So cod. A; other codices [read] essentialis, not a few of which then prefix magis to the word respicit. In the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, where essentialis is likewise found, plus is prefixed to the word respicit.
  12. Cod. X convenientius. Subinde pro Alius autem codd. A U Z Alius etiam.
    Cod. X [reads] convenientius. Thereupon, for Alius autem codd. A U Z [read] Alius etiam.
  13. Cfr. supra d. 29. q. 5. et dub. 3.
    Cf. above, d. 29, q. 5, and dub. 3.
  14. Vide I. Cor. 15, 12. seqq. — Paulo inferius, contextu exigente, posuimus gratiae, qui, licet codd. et edd. legant gratiae, quae.
    See 1 Cor. 15:12 ff. — A little below, as the context requires, we have put gratiae, qui, although the codices and editions read gratiae, quae.
  15. Nunc cap. penultimo (c. 25.). August. pag. 692, nota 10. cit. ait: Ut quod habent singuli commune sit omnibus. Sic enim quisque etiam ipse habet, cum amat in altero quod ipse non habet. — Paulo superius post nisi diligeret cod. U subdit tantum.
    Now the penultimate chapter (c. 25.). Augustine, cited at p. 692, note 10, says: That what individuals have may be common to all. For thus each one even has it himself, when he loves in another what he himself does not have. — A little above, after nisi diligeret cod. U adds tantum.
  16. Codd. U Z tantum, cod. aa homo.
    Codd. U Z [read] tantum, cod. aa homo.
  17. Epist. I. Cor. 2, 9. — Mox pro unitatem edd. exhibent unionem et deinde pro Bernardus in libro de Diligendo Deo perperam Dionysius in libris de Divinis Nominibus (cfr. hic arg. 3. pro parte negat.).
    Epistle 1 Cor. 2:9. — Presently, for unitatem the editions exhibit unionem, and then for Bernard in the book On Loving God wrongly Dionysius in the books On the Divine Names (cf. here arg. 3 for the negative part).
  18. Codd. A U sapientes. Mox codd. G H I L aa omittunt secundum, pro quo cod. K sequentem.
    Codd. A U [read] sapientes. Presently codd. G H I L aa omit secundum, for which cod. K [reads] sequentem.
  19. Cod. U nulli, Vat. non.
    Cod. U [reads] nulli, the Vatican [edition] non.
  20. Cod. Z gaudebit.
    Cod. Z [reads] gaudebit.
  21. Cod. V gauderet.
    Cod. V [reads] gauderet.
  22. Pro erit codd. A N hic et paulo inferius est.
    For erit codd. A N [read], here and a little below, est.
  23. In non paucis codd. desideratur ratio; in cod. Z legitur sed maior propinquitas aliud exigit.
    In not a few codices ratio is wanting; in cod. Z is read sed maior propinquitas aliud exigit.
  24. Cfr. infra d. 32. q. 2. seq.
    Cf. below, d. 32, q. 2 f.
  25. Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.
    See the scholion to the 1st question of this article.
← Dist. 31, Art. 3, Q. 2Dist. 31, Dubia→