Bonaventure

Quaestio VI. De differenti participatione beatitudinis, utrum scilicet omnes habeant aequalem beatitudinem.

Sexto quaeritur, de differenti participatione beatitudinis; et quaeritur, utrum omnes habeant aequalem beatitudinem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Ex textu Matthaei vigesimo²; ibi dicitur, quod omnes acceperunt singulos denarios, et quod Dominus tantum dedit novissimo, quantum primo. Et Glossa dicit primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto super illud: Stella differt a stella: « Eundem denarium Paterfamilias dedit omnibus, qui operati sunt in vinea; quo utique aliquid significatur, quod omnes communiter habebunt »; sed illud non est nisi beatitudo: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus³: « In dispari claritate erit par gaudium »; sed beatitudo est gaudium per essentiam: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia beatitudo consistit in Deo, qui est bonum summum in fine⁴ et omnino invariabile, non recipiens magis et minus: ergo nec beatitudo recipit magis et minus. — Si dicas, quod consistit in Dei participatione, quae magis et minus recipit; contra: unusquisque tantum participabit Deum in gloria, quod non volet nec poterit plus participare: ergo unusquisque in summo; sed quod summum est est in termino, et quod est in termino non recipit magis et minus⁵: ergo etc.

4. Item, tantum diliget unusquisque homo proximum, sicut se ipsum: ergo tantum gaudebit Linus de gloria Petri et tantum volet eam Petro, quantum sibi; et si hoc, tantum gaudebit de gloria Petri, quantum si eam haberet; sed si haberet, tantum gauderet, quantum Petrus gaudet⁶: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Ioannis decimo quarto⁷: In domo Patris mei mansiones multae sunt; Augustinus: « Multae mansiones in una vita erunt, quia variae praemiorum dignitates ».

2. Item, Apostolus, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto⁸: Stella differt a stella in claritate: si ergo claritas cognitionis generat gaudium et delectationem et differens est, ergo differens erit gaudium.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia praemium respondet merito; sed constat, aliquos esse maioris meriti: ergo et praemii⁹.

4. Item, Augustinus¹⁰: « Si essent aequalia, non essent omnia »: ordo ergo facit ad perfectionem; sed superna civitas est perfectissima: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Sicut beatitudo, sic praemium, sumtum ut obiectum, omnino unum est, sumtum vero formaliter, est unum unitate conformitatis et connexionis, differens vero quantitate gaudii et remunerationis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod diversitas et distinctio est in praemiis secundum maius et minus, sicut fuit in meritis.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod sicut beatitudo, ut dictum est supra¹¹, dicitur dupliciter: vel satians effective sicut obiectum, vel satians informative sicut perfectio; sic et praemium sive donum. Nam si dicatur sicut obiectum, p. 1011 omnino una est merces, unus Deus, una beatitudo, unum praemium. Si autem formaliter dicitur, beatitudo una est unitate conformitatis et unitate connexionis, sed tamen differens est quantitate gaudii et remunerationis. Unus enim alio clarius videt Deum et magis de illo gaudet et strictius tenet.

1. 2. Et sic patet primum de denario. Patet etiam secundum, quomodo gaudium par dicitur, non, inquam, intensive, sed extensive, quia de eisdem et tot gaudet unus, de quibus et quot gaudet alter.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quilibet participat Deum in summo; dicendum, quod est summum simpliciter et summum huic. Nullus participat¹ in summo simpliciter, sed in summo sibi; quilibet enim tantum participat, non quin possit participari plus, sed non plus ab ipso, quia non potest ultra proficere et contentus est omnino eo statu, quem habet.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tantum gaudet de bono proximi, quantum de suo; dicendum, quod verum est; unde Petrus plus gaudet de bono Lini quam ipse Linus; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod tantum gaudeat, quantum si haberet illud², quia, si haberet illud bonum, haberet maiorem caritatem et potestatem intensius gaudendi. — His visis, satis patent ea quae possent dici circa litteram³.

The numbered footnotes below are Quaracchi's, and Quaracchi restarts its numbering on every printed page. The labels here are therefore page-qualified: notes 2–11 of page 1010 and notes 1–3 of page 1011. Note 1 of page 1010 anchors in the preceding question (q.5), and note 4 of page 1011 anchors in the Pars II divisio that follows; neither is rendered here.

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Question VI. On the differing participation in beatitude, namely whether all have equal beatitude.

Sixth, the question is asked concerning the differing participation in beatitude; and it is asked whether all have equal beatitude. And that they do, it seems:

1. From the text of Matthew, chapter twenty²; for there it is said that all received their several denarii, and that the Lord gave as much to the last as to the first. And the Gloss says, on First Corinthians fifteen, upon that text: Star differs from star: « The same denarius the Householder gave to all who worked in the vineyard; by which surely something is signified that all will have in common »; but that is nothing other than beatitude: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine³: « In unequal brightness there will be equal joy »; but beatitude is joy by essence: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because beatitude consists in God, who is the highest good in the end⁴ and altogether invariable, not admitting of more and less: therefore neither does beatitude admit of more and less. — If you say that it consists in participation of God, which does admit of more and less; on the contrary: each one will participate God in glory to just such a degree that he will neither will nor be able to participate more: therefore each one is at the highest; but what is highest is at the term, and what is at the term does not admit of more and less⁵: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, each man will love his neighbour as much as himself: therefore Linus will rejoice as much over Peter's glory, and will will it for Peter as much, as for himself; and if this is so, he will rejoice as much over Peter's glory as if he had it himself; but if he had it, he would rejoice as much as Peter rejoices⁶: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. John, chapter fourteen⁷: In my Father's house there are many mansions; Augustine: « There will be many mansions in one life, because the dignities of the rewards are various ».

2. Likewise, the Apostle, First Corinthians fifteen⁸: Star differs from star in brightness: if therefore the brightness of knowledge generates joy and delight, and is differing, then the joy will be differing.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because the reward answers to the merit; but it is established that some are of greater merit: therefore also of greater reward⁹.

4. Likewise, Augustine¹⁰: « If they were equal, they would not be all things »: order therefore makes for perfection; but the heavenly city is most perfect: therefore etc.

Conclusion

As beatitude, so the reward: taken as object, it is altogether one; but taken formally, it is one by the unity of conformity and of connexion, yet differing in the quantity of joy and of remuneration.

I respond: It must be said that there is diversity and distinction in the rewards according to more and less, just as there was in the merits.

But for the understanding of the objections it must be noted that, just as beatitude, as was said above¹¹, is spoken of in two ways — either as satisfying effectively, like an object, or as satisfying informatively, like a perfection — so also is the reward or gift. For if it be spoken of as object, p. 1011 the wage is altogether one, one God, one beatitude, one reward. But if it is spoken of formally, beatitude is one by the unity of conformity and by the unity of connexion, yet is nevertheless differing in the quantity of joy and of remuneration. For one sees God more clearly than another, and rejoices more over him, and holds him more closely.

To 1 and 2. And thus the first, about the denarius, is clear. The second is also clear, namely in what way the joy is called equal: not, I say, intensively, but extensively, because one rejoices over the same things and over as many things as the other rejoices over.

To 3. To that which is objected, that each one participates God at the highest; it must be said that there is a highest simply and a highest for this one. No one participates¹ at the highest simply, but at the highest for himself; for each participates only so much — not that it could not be participated more, but not more by him, because he cannot advance further and is altogether content with the state he has.

To 4. To that which is objected, that he rejoices as much over his neighbour's good as over his own; it must be said that this is true; whence Peter rejoices more over Linus's good than Linus himself does; but from this it does not follow that he rejoices as much as if he had it², because, if he had that good, he would have a greater charity and a greater power of rejoicing more intensely. — These things being seen, what could be said concerning the letter is sufficiently clear³.

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