Bonaventure

Quaestio V. Quibus potentiis insit actus sive operatio gloriae.

Quinto quaeritur, de actu gloriae sive operatione, cui insit, et ostenditur, quod actus eius sit omnium potentiarum.

1. Quia gloria est perfectio plena et ultima. Quia plena, ideo perficit totam animam: ergo omnem eius spiritualem potentiam. Quia ultima, ultra quam non est alia; cum ultimata perfectio sit coniuncta actui, quia actus perficit habitum¹: ergo omnes potentiae ponuntur in actu.

2. Item, gloria totum perficit, quod gratia disponebat; sed gratia disponit et perficit actus animae non tantum qui sunt in Deum, sed etiam qui sunt in bonum creatum, per virtutes cardinales²: ergo gloriosi actus non tantum erunt in Deum, sed etiam in creaturam.

3. Item, hoc ostenditur: quia virtutes cardinales manebunt in patria in statu perfecto³, ergo in actu; sed actus earum est in his quae sunt ad finem, et penes eas consistit actus gloriae, quia, sicut earum actus nunc sunt gratuiti, ita tunc erunt gloriosi: ergo etc.

Item, quaeritur, utrum sit ibi actus perficiens memoriam. Et quod sic, videtur:

4. Per rationem: quia, si gloria reformat imaginem, et imago attenditur quantum ad memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem⁴: ergo oportet, quod memoria sit in actu.

5. Item, hoc ipsum dicit Bernardus⁵: « Deus futurus est intellectui plenitudo lucis, voluntati multitudo pacis, memoriae continuatio aeternitatis ».

Item, ostenditur, quod sit ibi actus irascibilis:

6. Quia quod est perfectibile virtute est perfectibile gloria; sed irascibilis perficitur spe⁶: ergo etc.

7. Item, super illud primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio⁷: Nunc autem manent etc.; Ambrosius dicit, quod « spei succedet beatitudo »: et Augustinus similiter hoc dicit de Doctrina christiana; ergo etc.

Sed contra: Quod non sit actus gloriae secundum omnes potentias, videtur.

1. Super illud Psalmi⁸: Ostendam illi salutare meum; Glossa dicit, quod « visio est tota merces »: ergo tota ratio beatitudinis consistit in actu intelligentiae. — Si dicas quod hoc dictum est per quandam concomitantiam; eadem ratione debet dici, quod fides est totum meritum.

2. Item, quaeritur: quare non⁹ magis dicit de unione quam de visione?

3. Item, Augustinus de Moribus Ecclesiae¹⁰: « Beatus est qui amat optimum, et cum habet optimum, quod amat »:

ergo videtur, quod tantum sit in actu motivae.

4. Item, Augustinus, ultimo de Civitate Dei¹: « Videbimus, amabimus, laudabimus », isti sunt actus gloriae; quodsi sufficienter eos numerat Augustinus, et hic est nullus actus memoriae nec potentiae irascibilis; patet etc.

5. Item, dotes distinguuntur penes actus gloriae; sed duae assignantur penes actum rationalis et concupiscibilis, scilicet visio et dilectio: ergo si distinguuntur aliquae penes actus memoriae et irascibilis, tunc erunt quatuor dotes; quod est contra omnium² opinionem; non enim ponuntur nisi tres.

6. Similiter opponitur, quodsi ponantur actus gloriae secundum omnes virtutes, quod tunc erunt septem³.

Quaeritur ergo, quare actus gloriosi appellantur dotes; et quare tantum tres sint; et penes quid accipiantur et distinguantur; et cum laus sit actus maxime gloriosus, secundum quod dicitur super illud Psalmi⁴: Laudate Dominum, quoniam bonus est psalmus; propter quid non est dos?

Conclusio

Secundum tres actus gloriae, scilicet visionem potentiae rationalis, amorem concupiscibilis, comprehensionem sive tentionem irascibilis assignantur tres tantum dotes animae.

Respondeo: Ad intelligentiam obiectorum⁵ notandum, quod actus gloriosi non tantum sunt in Deum ut in obiectum, sed etiam in bona creata; gaudebit enim homo et diliget proximum. Sed quia substantiale praemium beatitudinis in Deo consistit, ideo actus gloriae principales sunt, secundum quos anima convertitur in Deum. Et secundum hos actus dotes assignantur, quia secundum hos anima unitur Deo tanquam sponsa sponso; et in his ditatur et repletur, non solum vigoratur. Et ideo dicuntur dotes quasi divitiae animae desponsatae.

Hos autem actus quidam dicunt esse tres, quia tria requiruntur ad hoc, quod anima perfecte gaudeat de Deo, scilicet perfecta visio, perfecta dilectio et perfecta ipsius fruitio. Et fruitionem dicunt non esse secundum aliam potentiam quam rationalem et concupiscibilem. Nam irascibilis non habet ibi actum in Deum, habet tamen aliquem actum, scilicet gloriari per virtutes, quae manent in ipsa⁶; manet enim amor et fortitudo. — Sed ista positio dupliciter videtur incompetens: primum quidem, quia tunc tertia dos non differt a prima et secunda nisi secundum rationem; et hoc stultum est dicere. Alia via videtur inconveniens, scilicet quod irascibilis non habeat in gloria actum tendentem in Deum, cum in via habeat spem, per cuius actum tendit in Deum.

Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod omnes vires, quae habent per gratiam actum in Deum, habebunt per gloriam actus perfectos, evacuatis imperfectis. Unde rationalis, cuius est modo credere per fidem, tunc videbit aperte; concupiscibilis, cuius est amare, diliget tunc perfecte; irascibilis, cuius est erigi et inniti per spem, tunc tenebit continue et certe. Unde secundum hos tres actus distinguuntur tres dotes, scilicet visio, dilectio, comprehensio sive tentio sive fruitio per appropriationem; nam fruitio ista tria complectitur⁷.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod actus gloriae sunt plures, quia secundum omnes virtutes; patet responsio: quia, etsi secundum omnes virtutes sint, non tamen secundum omnes dotes⁸ accipiuntur, sed secundum eas quae tendunt immediate in Deum.

Ad 1. 2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod visio est tota merces, et huiusmodi; dicendum, quod isti tres actus sunt omnino coniuncti et connexi; unde qui perfecte videt perfecte amat et habet; et ideo in Sanctorum verbis per connexionem, quod est omnium, attribuitur uni; magis autem visioni attribuitur propter hoc, quod in visione distinguitur status patriae a statu viae; non sic in dilectione, quia utrobique dilectio, sed in patria est visio, non in via, sed credulitas de non viso⁹.

Ad 4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quare non est unus actus penes memoriam? dicendum, quod memoria non reformatur primo, sed ex consequenti per reformationem irascibilis; ipsa enim minime subiacet libero arbitrio, et ideo actus eius reformatur per reformationem irascibilis in reformatione gratiae¹⁰; sic et in perfectione gloriae. Et ratio huius est, quia

quodam modo conveniunt in actu; utriusque enim est continue tenere.

Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de laude, dicendum, quod aut intelligitur de laude vocali, et sic non est actus principalis nec debet esse dos; aut de laude mentali, et ita comprehendit actus trium potentiarum interiorum; et ideo non est distinguenda ab aliis, immo dicitur tota merces¹.

Quaracchi restarts its footnote numbering on every printed page. The labels below are therefore page-qualified: notes 1–10 of page 1008, notes 1–10 of page 1009, and note 1 of page 1010.

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Question V. In which powers the act or operation of glory resides.

Fifthly it is asked, concerning the act or operation of glory, in what it resides; and it is shown that its act belongs to all the powers.

1. Because glory is a full and ultimate perfection. Because it is full, it therefore perfects the whole soul: therefore every spiritual power of it. Because it is ultimate, beyond which there is no other; since an ultimate perfection is conjoined to act, because act perfects a habit¹: therefore all the powers are placed in act.

2. Likewise, glory perfects the whole of what grace was disposing; but grace disposes and perfects the acts of the soul, not only those which are toward God, but also those which are toward a created good, through the cardinal virtues²: therefore glorious acts will be not only toward God, but also toward the creature.

3. Likewise, this is shown: because the cardinal virtues will remain in the fatherland in a perfect state³, therefore in act; but their act is in those things which are toward the end, and in them the act of glory consists, because, just as their acts are now gratuitous, so then they will be glorious: therefore etc.

Likewise, it is asked whether there is there an act perfecting the memory. And that there is, seems so:

4. By reason: because, if glory reforms the image, and the image is regarded with respect to memory, intelligence, and will⁴: therefore it must be that memory is in act.

5. Likewise, Bernard says this very thing⁵: « God will be to the intellect a fullness of light, to the will a multitude of peace, to the memory a continuation of eternity ».

Likewise, it is shown that there is there an act of the irascible:

6. Because that which is perfectible by virtue is perfectible by glory; but the irascible is perfected by hope⁶: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, upon that text of First Corinthians thirteen⁷: But now there remain etc.; Ambrose says that « beatitude will succeed to hope »: and Augustine likewise says this in On Christian Doctrine; therefore etc.

On the contrary: That there is not an act of glory according to all the powers, seems so.

1. Upon that text of the Psalm⁸: I will show him my salvation; the Gloss says that « vision is the whole reward »: therefore the whole account of beatitude consists in the act of the intelligence. — If you say that this is said by a certain concomitance; by the same reasoning it would have to be said that faith is the whole merit.

2. Likewise, it is asked: why does he not⁹ rather speak of union than of vision?

3. Likewise, Augustine On the Morals of the Church¹⁰: « He is blessed who loves the best, and when he has the best, which he loves »:

therefore it seems that it lies only in the act of the motive power.

4. Likewise, Augustine, in the last book On the City of God¹: « We shall see, we shall love, we shall praise » — these are the acts of glory; and if Augustine enumerates them sufficiently, then here there is no act of memory nor of the irascible power; it is clear etc.

5. Likewise, the dowries are distinguished according to the acts of glory; but two are assigned according to the act of the rational and of the concupiscible, namely vision and love: therefore if any are distinguished according to the acts of memory and of the irascible, then there will be four dowries; which is against everyone's² opinion; for only three are posited.

6. Similarly it is objected, that if acts of glory are posited according to all the virtues, then there will be seven³.

It is asked therefore why the glorious acts are called dowries; and why they are only three; and according to what they are taken and distinguished; and since praise is the most glorious act, according to what is said upon that text of the Psalm⁴: Praise ye the Lord, for a psalm is good; on what account is it not a dowry?

Conclusio

According to the three acts of glory — namely the vision of the rational power, the love of the concupiscible, the comprehension or holding of the irascible — only three dowries of the soul are assigned.

I respond: For the understanding of the objections⁵ it must be noted that glorious acts are not only toward God as toward an object, but also toward created goods; for man will rejoice and will love his neighbour. But because the substantial reward of beatitude consists in God, therefore the principal acts of glory are those according to which the soul is turned toward God. And according to these acts the dowries are assigned, because according to these the soul is united to God as a bride to a bridegroom; and in these she is enriched and filled, not merely invigorated. And therefore they are called dowries, as it were the riches of a betrothed soul.

But some say that these acts are three, because three things are required for the soul to rejoice perfectly in God, namely perfect vision, perfect love, and perfect fruition of him. And they say that fruition is not according to any other power than the rational and the concupiscible. For the irascible does not have there an act toward God, yet it has some act, namely to glory through the virtues which remain in it⁶; for love and fortitude remain. — But this position seems incompetent in two ways: first indeed, because then the third dowry does not differ from the first and the second except in account; and it is foolish to say this. The other way seems unfitting, namely that the irascible should not have in glory an act tending toward God, since on the way it has hope, by whose act it tends toward God.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that all the powers which have through grace an act toward God will have through glory perfect acts, the imperfect ones being done away. Hence the rational, whose office it is now to believe through faith, will then see openly; the concupiscible, whose office it is to love, will then love perfectly; the irascible, whose office it is to be raised up and to lean by hope, will then hold continuously and certainly. Hence according to these three acts three dowries are distinguished, namely vision, love, comprehension or holding or fruition by appropriation; for fruition embraces these three⁷.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that the acts of glory are many, because according to all the virtues; the response is clear: because, even if they are according to all the virtues, they are nevertheless not taken according to all the dowries⁸, but according to those which tend immediately toward God.

To 1, 2, 3. To that which is objected, that vision is the whole reward, and the like; it must be said that these three acts are altogether conjoined and connected; hence he who sees perfectly loves perfectly and possesses; and therefore in the words of the Saints, by that connection, what belongs to all is attributed to one; but it is rather attributed to vision on account of this, that in vision the state of the fatherland is distinguished from the state of the way; not so in love, because in both there is love, but in the fatherland there is vision, not on the way, but rather belief concerning what is not seen⁹.

To 4, 5. To that which is objected: why is there not one act according to memory? it must be said that memory is not reformed first, but as a consequence, through the reformation of the irascible; for it is least of all subject to free choice, and therefore its act is reformed through the reformation of the irascible in the reformation of grace¹⁰; and so too in the perfection of glory. And the reason for this is, that

in a certain way they agree in act; for it belongs to both to hold continuously.

To that which is objected last concerning praise, it must be said that either it is understood of vocal praise, and thus it is not a principal act nor ought it to be a dowry; or of mental praise, and thus it comprehends the acts of the three interior powers; and therefore it is not to be distinguished from the others, but rather is called the whole reward¹.

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